White v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 553 F. App'x 979 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    LEELAND O. WHITE,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2013-3146
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. DA3330120297-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: January 14, 2014
    ______________________
    LEELAND O. WHITE, of El Paso, Texas, pro se.
    CALVIN M. MORROW, Attorney, Office of the General
    Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington,
    DC, for respondent. With him on the brief was BRYAN G.
    POLISUK, General Counsel.
    ______________________
    Before PROST, WALLACH, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
    2                                            WHITE   v. MSPB
    PER CURIAM.
    Leeland O. White appeals from an order of the Merit
    Systems Protection Board (“Board”) denying his petition
    for review of a decision by the administrative judge dis-
    missing his claims for lack of jurisdiction, on the basis
    that the petition for review was untimely filed without
    good cause for delay. Because the Board did not abuse its
    discretion and acted in accordance with the law, we
    affirm. We also dismiss Mr. White’s motion to remand his
    case to the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), as
    we lack jurisdiction over his untimely filed request for
    judicial review.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. White was an applicant for employment as a Pub-
    lic Safety Officer with the International Boundary and
    Water Commission: United States and Mexico (“Agency”),
    a position advertised by the San Antonio Services Branch
    of OPM. The body of the vacancy announcement for the
    position included veterans’ preference language, as well
    as a list of key requirements that included passing a pre-
    employment physical as a condition of employment. Mr.
    White was found to be qualified and OPM referred him for
    positions in Texas. He was also informed of the pre-
    employment screening process scheduled on March 10,
    2012, which included a physical fitness assessment. Mr.
    White participated in the screening, but failed to complete
    a component of the fitness assessment. The Agency
    subsequently removed him from consideration for the
    position.
    Mr. White appealed the Agency’s decision, which noti-
    fied him of his right to appeal to the Board under the
    Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (“VEOA”) on
    March 21, 2012, after having initially filed a complaint
    with the Department of Labor. On March 30, 2012, the
    Board advised Mr. White that it might not have jurisdic-
    tion over his appeal and gave him an opportunity to
    WHITE   v. MSPB                                           3
    submit argument and evidence to establish the Board’s
    jurisdiction. Mr. White responded on April 11, 2012,
    arguing that the Board had jurisdiction over his claim as
    an individual right of action (“IRA”) pursuant to 5 U.S.C
    § 1221 and that VEOA did not apply to his case. On June
    27, 2012, the administrative judge issued an initial deci-
    sion dismissing Mr. White’s VEOA appeal on the grounds
    that Mr. White had failed to raise a nonfrivolous argu-
    ment that the Agency had violated a regulation or statute
    related to veterans’ preference and that Mr. White had
    failed to show that he had exhausted his IRA remedy
    before the Office of the Special Counsel.
    The administrative judge’s initial decision was sent to
    Mr. White, including a “Notice to Appellant” advising that
    the initial decision was to become final on August 1, 2012,
    unless a petition for review was filed by that date or the
    Board reopened the case on its own motion. The Notice
    further advised Mr. White that the date the final decision
    issues “is an important date because it is usually the last
    day on which you can file a petition for review with the
    Board,” and that the “date on which the initial decision
    becomes final also controls when you can file a petition for
    review with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”
    The following paragraphs provided instructions for filing
    a petition for review. Under the heading entitled “Board
    Review,” Mr. White was informed that he could request
    Board review by filing a petition for review by the later of
    the date on which the initial decision became final or
    thirty days after receipt of the initial decision if it was
    received more than five days after the date of issuance.
    The instructions also provided the address of the Clerk of
    the Board as well as instructions for filing the petition
    electronically. The section describing the process for
    Board review was followed immediately by a section
    entitled “Judicial Review,” which stated that if Mr. White
    was “dissatisfied with the Board’s final decision,” he could
    file a petition with this court pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703,
    4                                             WHITE   v. MSPB
    and provided this court’s address. This section of the
    instructions also indicated that to be timely, a petition
    “must be received by the court no later than 60 calendar
    days after this initial decision becomes final.”
    On August 21, 2012, Mr. White faxed the Board’s re-
    gional office a pleading entitled “Rule 59 Fed. Civ. P.
    Motion to Amend the Judgment” challenging the initial
    decision’s dismissal and seeking relief from the Board.
    The regional office forwarded the pleading to the Clerk of
    the Board, and it was docketed as a petition for review.
    On August 29, 2012, the Board notified Mr. White that
    the petition for review was untimely filed without an
    accompanying motion to accept the petition as timely or
    showing good cause for an untimely filing, including an
    affidavit or sworn statement of facts, pursuant to 5 C.F.R.
    § 1201.114(f). The Board gave Mr. White notice that he
    could submit such a motion and statement of facts by
    September 13, 2012. On October 1, 2012, Mr. White filed
    a reply to the Agency’s response to his petition on the
    merits, but only addressed the untimely filing by attach-
    ing an unsworn “certificate of service.”
    On June 6, 2013, the Board issued a final order find-
    ing that Mr. White’s petition for review of the initial
    decision was untimely filed without good cause shown for
    the delay. On July 8, 2013, Mr. White filed a timely
    request for judicial review of that order (related to the
    timeliness of his petition for review). While Mr. White’s
    appeal was pending, he filed a motion for limited remand
    of his case to the OPM on November 21, 2013.
    DISCUSSION
    Our review of the Board’s decisions is limited by stat-
    ute. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), we set aside any
    action, findings, or conclusions found to be: (1) arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
    accordance with the law; (2) obtained without procedures
    required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed;
    WHITE   v. MSPB                                             5
    or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence. Mendoza v.
    Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    966 F.2d 650
    , 653 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
    (en banc). “[W]hether the regulatory time limit for an
    appeal should be waived based upon a showing of good
    cause is a matter committed to the Board’s discretion and
    this court will not substitute its own judgment for that of
    the Board.” 
    Id. To seek
    the Board’s review of the administrative
    judge’s initial decision on his case, Mr. White would have
    needed to submit his petition for review by August 1,
    2012. The record shows that the Board’s regional office
    did not receive a petition for review until August 20, 2012.
    Because Mr. White’s petition was entitled a “motion to
    amend the judgment” and included a request for relief
    from the Board to compel the Agency to hire him, the
    Board did not abuse its discretion in interpreting Mr.
    White’s petition as an untimely filed petition for review. 1
    The only evidence that Mr. White submitted to estab-
    lish good cause for the untimely filing of his petition for
    review was the unsworn “certificate of service” that he
    attached to his October 1 reply to the Agency’s argu-
    ments. This document indicated that he had sent a
    petition to the regional office to the wrong address on July
    24, 2012, which would have been timely.
    1    While it has no effect on the outcome of this case,
    we do observe that the Board’s instructions attached to its
    initial decision could be clearer in setting out the signifi-
    cance of the different deadlines for the alternative ave-
    nues for review. The instructions simply include the text
    describing the process for Board review immediately
    followed by the text describing judicial review. It may not
    be clear to a pro se petitioner that even once a final deci-
    sion issues and the deadline for Board review passes there
    are still sixty days left to make a timely filing for judicial
    review.
    6                                             WHITE   v. MSPB
    As the Board discussed in its order, Mr. White’s error
    in addressing his filing may have sufficed as good cause
    for an untimely filing, especially given that he is a pro se
    petitioner. However, he did not provide any further
    information or explanation regarding his good faith effort
    to file his petition in a timely manner. It was Mr. White’s
    burden to respond to the order to show good cause for the
    delay “in a timely manner with a statement explaining
    precisely why he was unable to file his appeal on time.”
    Anderson v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    999 F.2d 532
    , 534 (Fed. Cir.
    1993) (emphasis added). The Board, therefore, did not
    abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. White did not
    show good cause for the untimely filing of his petition for
    review. Accordingly, we must affirm the Board’s dismis-
    sal of his appeal.
    Finally, given that Mr. White did not send this court
    any petition for review until July 8, 2013, we lack juris-
    diction either to review his appeal of the Board’s initial
    decision or to remand his case to the OPM, as we do not
    have the authority to waive a statutory deadline. See
    Pinat v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    931 F.2d 1544
    , 1546 (Fed.
    Cir. 1991).
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s dis-
    missal of Mr. White’s appeal of the Board’s final decision
    as untimely and we dismiss his motion for limited re-
    mand.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    Each party shall bear its own costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-1872

Citation Numbers: 553 F. App'x 979

Judges: Prost, Wallach, Chen

Filed Date: 1/14/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024