Inre: Vigilant Video, Inc. , 535 F. App'x 928 ( 2013 )


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  • Case: 13-161    Document: 16     Page: 1   Filed: 08/16/2013
    NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    IN RE VIGILANT VIDEO, INC. AND THE CITY OF
    PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS,
    Petitioners.
    ______________________
    Miscellaneous Docket No. 161
    ______________________
    On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United
    States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in
    No. 10-CV-173, Judge Rodney Gilstrap.
    ______________________
    ON PETITION
    ______________________
    Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
    O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.
    ORDER
    The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
    trict of Texas has a standing order requiring parties
    seeking to file certain motions to first file a letter brief
    and request leave of court to file such motion. After the
    patent in this case was subjected to reexamination pro-
    ceedings, petitioners were permitted leave to file a motion
    for summary judgment of non-infringement, which was
    denied-in-part. Petitioners, however, were not permitted
    to file a subsequent motion for summary judgment con-
    cerning patent invalidity of newly added infringement
    Case: 13-161    Document: 16      Page: 2   Filed: 08/16/2013
    2                           IN RE VIGILANT VIDEO, INC.
    contentions. They now seek review of the denial of sum-
    mary judgment and denial of leave to file rulings pursu-
    ant to this court’s authority under the All Writs Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    .
    I.
    Vigilant Video, Inc. manufactures a device for scan-
    ning and comparing license plates that it sold to the police
    department in Port Arthur, Texas. Respondent John B.
    Adrain is also in the monitoring system market.
    In May 2010, Adrain filed suit against Vigilant and
    Port Arthur (the “petitioners”) in the Eastern District of
    Texas, alleging that the sale and use of the license plate
    recognition system infringed claims 1-3 and 6-10 of his
    patent (No. 5,831,669) disclosing a system for recording
    images and identifying correlation or lack of correlation
    with the images.
    In August 2012, the Patent and Trademark Office
    (PTO) issued a reexamination certificate. That certificate
    canceled Claim 1, amended Claim 2, and added several
    claims, including 30-32, 35-39, 41-42, and 51. Petitioners
    responded to the reexamination certificate by moving for
    summary judgment asserting, in relevant part, that they
    did not infringe Claim 6, which was not part of the reex-
    amination proceedings, but claimed a system in accord-
    ance with now amended Claim 2.
    According to petitioners, Claim 6 now had to be read
    with the limitation that the claimed system comprised “a
    movably mounted digital camera adapted for receiving
    images of a space to be monitored for directly outputting
    digital image data[.]” (emphasis added).         Petitioners
    claimed that because their device used an analog camera
    they did not infringe and, in any event, could only be
    liable for damages after the reexamination certificate
    issued under the doctrine of intervening rights.
    Case: 13-161    Document: 16       Page: 3   Filed: 08/16/2013
    IN RE VIGILANT VIDEO, INC.                                 3
    On May 13, 2013, the district court held, in relevant
    part, that “Claim 6 still exists as originally issued, includ-
    ing its dependence from the canceled claim 1 and original
    claim 2.” The court concluded that, because Claim 6 was
    not part of the reexamination proceedings, in accordance
    with MPEP § 2260.01, “claim 6 still exists as originally
    issued.”
    On June 28, 2013, petitioners requested permission to
    file another motion for summary judgment concerning
    newly added claims 30-32, 35-39, and 41-42, which the
    court had allowed respondent to include in his infringe-
    ment contentions. In their letter brief, petitioners stated
    that they intended to present the following three argu-
    ments: (1) that the newly added claims had not been
    plead, which was also the subject of a motion to dismiss;
    (2) that the claims were invalid; and (3) that they intend-
    ed to argue “[t]hose same issues raised by defendants in
    [their] first Motion for Summary Judgment,” which the
    court had found to be moot. Petitioners acknowledged
    that the court’s docketing control order had set forth a
    deadline of April 3, 2013 for filing dispositive motions, but
    argued that the deadline should be disregarded in light of
    the fact that Adrain had been allowed to amend his
    complaint and discovery regarding the newly added
    claims was ongoing.
    On July 8, 2013, the district court denied petitioners’
    request for leave to file its motion for summary judgment
    without explanation. On that same day, the district court
    issued a separate order that, among other things, amend-
    ed the docket control order to extend the deadline for
    filing dispositive motions to August 2, 2013.
    II.
    A.
    Because the writ of mandamus is reserved for “ex-
    traordinary situations,” and is thus to be invoked only
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    4                           IN RE VIGILANT VIDEO, INC.
    sparingly, two requirements must be satisfied before
    issuance: first, petitioners must show a “clear and indis-
    putable” right to the writ and, second, petitioners must
    have “no other adequate means to attain the relief [de-
    sired].” Kerr v. U. S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. Of Cal., 
    426 U.S. 394
    , 403 (1976).
    In light of this exacting standard, courts have recog-
    nized that mandamus is generally unavailable to parties
    seeking review of the merits of an order denying a motion
    for summary judgment, even an erroneous one. See
    Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
    932 F.2d 199
    , 210 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Rigby v. Damant, 
    486 F.3d 692
    , 693 (1st Cir. 2007); Chappell & Co., Inc. v.
    Frankel, 
    367 F.2d 197
    , 199-200 (2d Cir. 1966); cf. In re
    Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 
    516 F.3d 1003
    , 1004 (Fed. Cir.
    2008).
    This case is quite different from a case like Missis-
    sippi Chemical Corp. v. Swift Agricultural Chemicals
    Corp., 
    717 F.2d 1374
     (Fed. Cir. 1983), upon which peti-
    tioners rely. In Mississippi Chemical, we recognized that
    mandamus may issue to direct a trial court to grant
    summary judgment in the extraordinary circumstance
    where it is clear a trial can be avoided, such as where the
    patent-in-suit previously had been invalidated. 
    Id. at 1380
    . While the PTO decision here altered the asserted
    claims, nothing in the PTO reexamination proceedings
    rendered Claim 6, or any of the other now asserted
    claims, invalid. Thus, unlike in Mississippi Chemical,
    this is not a case in which it is clear that trial can and
    should be avoided.
    In any event, petitioners have not shown the neces-
    sary lack of another adequate means to obtain the relief of
    invalidating some or all of the asserted claims—both the
    trial and appellate process remain in which those issues
    can be addressed. If the district court applies the wrong
    construction of a claim during trial, the jury reaches an
    Case: 13-161    Document: 16      Page: 5   Filed: 08/16/2013
    IN RE VIGILANT VIDEO, INC.                               5
    unsupported conclusion, or damages are not correctly
    addressed, such errors can be corrected on appeal from
    final judgment.
    B.
    A district court’s failure to consider the merits of a
    summary judgment motion when it had the duty to do so
    is subject to mandamus review. See In re Sch. Asbestos
    Litig., 
    977 F.2d 764
    , 793 (3d Cir. 1992). Petitioners
    contend that is exactly what happened here when their
    second request to file a motion for summary judgment
    was denied without explanation.
    A district court has broad discretion in deciding how
    to conduct summary judgment proceedings. See generally
    Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Traillour Oil Co., 
    987 F.2d 1138
    ,
    1155-56 (5th Cir. 1993). The use of stated deadlines and
    limits on the number of filings reasonably fall within the
    court’s discretion. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b).
    It has no discretion, however, to arbitrarily refuse an
    otherwise timely and allowable summary judgment
    motion. See Brown v. Crawford Cnty., Ga., 
    960 F.2d 1002
    ,
    1008-10 (11th Cir. 1992); Sch. Asbestos Litig., 
    977 F.2d at 794-95
    ; see also Johnson v. United States, 
    460 F.3d 616
    ,
    620-21 (5th Cir. 2006); cf. Eisemann v. Greene, 
    204 F.3d 393
    , 397 (2d Cir. 2000). Though respondent argues that
    petitioners’ motion was untimely, the court order extend-
    ing the dispositive motion deadline to August 2, 2013
    indicates otherwise.
    The ground upon which the district court denied leave
    to file a motion for summary judgment is unclear. While
    untimeliness or earlier excessive, yet frivolous motions
    practice may have been concerns, as respondent asserts,
    there is no way to know on the current record. Given this
    gap in the record, we think the better course is to allow
    petitioners to seek the missing explanation(s) from the
    Case: 13-161      Document: 16       Page: 6    Filed: 08/16/2013
    6                               IN RE VIGILANT VIDEO, INC.
    district court so the need for mandamus intervention may
    be avoided, if appropriate.
    Accordingly,
    IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    The petition is denied.
    FOR THE COURT
    /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole
    Daniel E. O’Toole
    Clerk
    s19