Case: 23-111 Document: 18 Page: 1 Filed: 03/01/2023
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
In re: ZHEJIANG CRYSTAL-OPTECH CO. LTD.,
Petitioner
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2023-111
______________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:21-
cv-00378-JRG, Chief Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap.
______________________
ON PETITION
______________________
Before DYK, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
DYK, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co. Ltd. (“Crystal”) petitions
for a writ of mandamus directing the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas to vacate its order
denying Crystal’s motion to transfer and transfer the case
to the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California. Viavi Solutions Inc. (“Viavi”) opposes.
For the following reasons, we deny the petition.
Viavi sued Crystal in the Eastern District of Texas, al-
leging that Crystal was actively inducing others to infringe
three of its patents. Viavi’s complaint asserts that Crystal,
Case: 23-111 Document: 18 Page: 2 Filed: 03/01/2023
2 IN RE: ZHEJIANG CRYSTAL-OPTECH CO. LTD.
a foreign-based corporation, was subject to personal juris-
diction in the Eastern District of Texas because it know-
ingly sold the accused optical filter products with the
expectation that they would be incorporated into mobile de-
vices that would be sold in Texas. Appx031.
Crystal moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Crystal also moved to transfer the case under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Northern District of California,
though Crystal “dispute[d] that it is subject to personal ju-
risdiction by any United States District Court.” Appx183.
The district court denied both motions. It first found that
“Crystal, through its sales of Filters for application in Sam-
sung Galaxy phones, knew (or should have reasonably
known) the likely destination of the products, and their
conduct and connections with the forum state were such
that they should reasonably have anticipated being
brought into court here.” Appx010. On that basis, the
court denied Crystal’s motion to dismiss.
As to § 1404(a), the court found that Crystal had failed
to establish the threshold requirement that the action
“might have been brought” in the Northern District of Cal-
ifornia, noting Crystal’s own insistence that it was not sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction there and explaining that it
was “not necessarily true” that personal jurisdiction in
Northern California would follow from its reasoning as to
why jurisdiction existed in the Eastern District of Texas.
Appx012. In the alternative, the court analyzed the private
and public interest factors that govern transfer determina-
tions and concluded that Crystal had failed to establish
that the Northern District of California was clearly more
convenient. Crystal then filed this petition challenging
only the district court’s no-transfer determination.
We follow regional circuit standards governing motions
under § 1404(a). See In re TS Tech USA Corp.,
551 F.3d
1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under Fifth Circuit law, Crys-
tal, as the § 1404(a) movant, bore the burden of
Case: 23-111 Document: 18 Page: 3 Filed: 03/01/2023
IN RE: ZHEJIANG CRYSTAL-OPTECH CO. LTD. 3
demonstrating that transfer was appropriate. See In re
Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
545 F.3d 304, 314 (5th Cir. 2008)
(en banc). Our limited task here is to determine whether
the district court clearly abused its discretion in concluding
that Crystal failed to satisfy that burden. See In re Juniper
Networks, Inc.,
14 F.4th 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
We see no such clear abuse. Crystal insists that the
district court’s finding that it is subject to personal juris-
diction in the Eastern District of Texas also compels the
conclusion that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the
Northern District of California. Pet. at 7. But the core
premise of Crystal’s petition—that the court relied on Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) to conclude that per-
sonal jurisdiction exists, Pet. at 11; Reply at 3—is wrong.
The district court indicated that its conclusion was based
on an analysis of Crystal’s “connections with the forum
state,” i.e., Texas, Appx010, as opposed to its contacts with
the United States as a whole. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)
(establishing personal jurisdiction only where “the defend-
ant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction”). Because Crystal has not otherwise
clearly shown that this case “might have been brought” in
the transferee forum, we deny its mandamus petition.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The petition is denied.
FOR THE COURT
March 1, 2023 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
Date Peter R. Marksteiner
Clerk of Court
