Burroughs v. Department of the Army ( 2013 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    MILO D. BURROUGHS,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2012-3195
    ______________________
    Appeal of the Merit Systems Protection Board in No.
    SF3330120255-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 5, 2013
    ______________________
    MILO D. BURROUGHS, of Yelm, Washington, pro se.
    VINCENT D. PHILLIPS, Trial Attorney, Commercial Lit-
    igation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department
    of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him
    on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Direc-
    tor, and STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM, Assistant Director.
    ______________________
    2                                  MILO BURROUGHS   v. ARMY
    Before PROST, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Milo D. Burroughs, a military veteran, applied for a
    position as an aerospace engineer in January 2007. While
    designated as an alternate by the selecting official, Mr.
    Burroughs was not selected for the job. He appealed his
    non-selection to the Merit Systems Protection Board
    (“Board”) in a prior action seeking corrective action on the
    grounds that his non-selection resulted from discrimina-
    tion on the basis of his military service. Prior to the
    conclusion of that case, he filed a second Board appeal,
    also alleging discrimination based on alleged retaliation,
    which he believed occurred because he had filed numerous
    previous appeals from other, unrelated non-selections.
    The appeal currently pending before this court arises from
    Mr. Burroughs’s second Board appeal. We affirm the
    Board’s dismissal of Mr. Burroughs’s second appeal.
    BACKGROUND
    On January 18, 2007, the Army issued a vacancy an-
    nouncement for the position of Aerospace Engineer at
    Fort Lewis, Washington. Burroughs v. Dep’t of the Army,
    No. SF-3330-12-0255-I-1, 2012 MSPB LEXIS 1911, at *1
    (M.S.P.B. Apr. 4, 2012) (“Board Decision”). Mr. Bur-
    roughs timely applied and was designated as “Second
    Alternate”; because there was only one position to be
    filled, Mr. Burroughs was not chosen. 
    Id. at *2. Mr.
    Burroughs filed his first appeal with the Board
    based on his non-selection for the Fort Lewis job on Octo-
    ber 24, 2011. Burroughs v. Dep’t of the Army, No. SF-
    4324-12-0050-I-1, 2012 MSPB LEXIS 487 (M.S.P.B. Jan.
    26, 2012). In that case, Mr. Burroughs asserted violations
    of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemploy-
    ment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (“USERRA”), arguing
    that he had been discriminated against based upon his
    military service, 
    id. at *3; the
    administrative judge found
    MILO BURROUGHS   v. ARMY                                3
    that Mr. Burroughs presented no evidence of discrimina-
    tion whereas the selecting official provided a declaration
    stating that his decision was not motivated by the appli-
    cant’s military status, 
    id. at *6. The
    full Board then
    denied Mr. Burroughs’s petition for review, and Mr.
    Burroughs did not appeal. Burroughs v. Dep’t of the Army,
    118 M.S.P.R. 432 (M.S.P.B. 2012).
    Immediately after the initial decision from the first
    appeal was issued, Mr. Burroughs filed a second Board
    appeal on January 30, 2012, challenging the same non-
    selection. Board Decision at *2-3. In this appeal, Mr.
    Burroughs originally asserted a Veterans Employment
    Opportunities Act of 1998 (“VEOA”) claim, which was
    later withdrawn. 
    Id. at *3-4. Mr.
    Burroughs then re-
    quested “a declaratory ruling” regarding alleged Veterans’
    Preference Act of 1944 (“VPA”) claims and also sought
    relief for his non-selection under a separate USERRA
    provision than asserted in his previous Board appeal. 
    Id. at *7-10. On
    April 4, 2012, the Board issued its decision deny-
    ing Mr. Burroughs’s claim for corrective action under
    USERRA, finding that Mr. Burroughs had failed to sub-
    mit any evidence to support his claim of discriminatory
    animus and finding the sworn declaration of the selecting
    official demonstrated that it was more likely true than not
    that Mr. Burroughs’s veteran status was not a motivating
    factor in his non-selection. 
    Id. at *8-10. Additionally,
    the
    Board determined that it did not have jurisdiction to
    address Mr. Burroughs VEOA and VPA claims. 
    Id. at *4- 6.
        Mr. Burroughs petitioned the full Board for review of
    its decision, and the Board denied his petition, finding
    that he had failed to make a showing of retaliation based
    on protected USERRA activity. Burroughs v. Dep’t of the
    Army, No. SF-3330-12-0255-I-1, 2012 MSPB LEXIS 4797
    4                                  MILO BURROUGHS   v. ARMY
    (M.S.P.B., Aug. 21, 2012). Thus, the full Board adopted
    the Initial Decision without substantive modifications.
    Mr. Burroughs filed a timely appeal; we have jurisdic-
    tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
    DISCUSSION
    This court must uphold a decision of the Board unless
    it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
    otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained with-
    out procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having
    been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evi-
    dence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Additionally, whether the
    Board has jurisdiction over a claim is a question of law
    this court reviews without deference. Butler v. Soc. Sec.
    Admin., 
    331 F.3d 1368
    , 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    An employee making a USERRA discrimination claim
    bears the initial burden of showing, by a preponderance of
    the evidence, that his military service was a substantial
    motivating factor in his adverse employment action.
    Sheehan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
    240 F.3d 1009
    , 1013 (Fed.
    Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). “If this require-
    ment is met, the employer then has the opportunity to
    come forward with evidence to show, by a preponderance
    of the evidence, that the employer would have taken the
    adverse action anyway, for a valid reason.” 
    Id. In this case,
    Mr. Burroughs failed to meet his initial
    burden; as noted by the administrative judge, Mr. Bur-
    roughs submitted no evidence of discrimination nor does
    he submit any such evidence on appeal. Board Decision at
    *8-10; see generally Pet. Br. and Pet. Reply Br. 1 The
    1   Mr. Burroughs’s speculation regarding a form let-
    ter he received informing him of his non-selection does not
    constitute evidence of discrimination. See Pet. Reply Br.
    at Tab 2. Additionally, Mr. Burroughs’s argument on
    appeal that the dismissal was improper because the
    MILO BURROUGHS   v. ARMY                                 5
    Army, however, offered a sworn declaration by the select-
    ing authority who stated he “did not discriminate against
    [the appellant] based on his veterans status or his exer-
    cise of any rights he may have under veterans statutes.”
    Board Decision at *9. The selecting authority also stated
    that he not only did not consider military status as a
    negative factor but, rather, considered it a positive factor;
    Mr. Burroughs was not chosen because, ultimately, the
    selecting authority considered another service member to
    be more qualified. 
    Id. at *8-10. Additionally,
    the Board properly determined that it
    did not have jurisdiction over the VEOA claim as the
    claim was withdrawn. Board Decision at *4-6. Finally,
    the Board correctly determined that it did not have juris-
    diction over Mr. Burroughs’s claim trying to assert rights
    under the VPA. 
    Id. at *6. The
    VPA defines the various
    veterans’ preference rights and who is entitled to them.
    Patterson v. Dep’t of Int., 
    424 F.3d 1151
    , 1155 (Fed. Cir.
    2005). The VPA does not, however, provide the Board
    with authority to hear claims alleging violations of veter-
    ans’ preference. Noble v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 
    892 F.2d 1013
    , 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1999). It is the VEOA not the VPA
    that “establishes vindication rights for veterans who
    consider themselves the victims of violations of their
    preference rights.” Lapuh v. Merit Sys. Pro. Bd., 
    284 F.3d 1277
    , 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
    administrative judge afforded too much weight to the
    selecting official’s declaration is beside the mark. Pet. Br.
    at 3.
    6                                 MILO BURROUGHS   v. ARMY
    CONCLUSION
    Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s
    denial of Mr. Burroughs’s USERRA claim and because the
    Board correctly determined it had no jurisdiction over Mr.
    Burroughs’s VPA and VEOA claims, we AFFIRM.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2012-3195

Judges: Per Curiam, Prost, Reyna, Wallach

Filed Date: 4/5/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024