Browder v. Wilkie ( 2018 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    JOE A. BROWDER, JR.,
    Claimant-Appellant
    v.
    ROBERT WILKIE, ACTING SECRETARY OF
    VETERANS AFFAIRS,
    Respondent-Appellee
    ______________________
    2017-2626
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
    Veterans Claims in No. 15-4329, Judge Mary J. Schoelen,
    Judge Margaret C. Bartley, Senior Judge Kenneth B.
    Kramer.
    ______________________
    Decided: May 1, 2018
    ______________________
    JOE A. BROWDER, JR., Louisville, KY, pro se.
    ALISON VICKS, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
    Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
    ton, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
    CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., MARTIN F.
    HOCKEY, JR.; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, SAMUEL PEARSON-MOORE,
    2                                         BROWDER   v. WILKIE
    Office of General Counsel, United States Department of
    Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
    ______________________
    Before WALLACH, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Appellant Joe A. Browder, Jr., appeals a memoran-
    dum decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
    Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming the decision of the
    Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“the Board”), which denied
    Mr. Browder’s request to reopen a previously-denied claim
    for hypertension; entitlement to special monthly compen-
    sation; and entitlement to service-connected benefits for
    flat feet, psychiatric disorder (other than post-traumatic
    stress disorder), insomnia, and headaches. See Browder
    v. Shulkin, No. 15-4329, 
    2017 WL 2569870
    , at *1, *3–6
    (Vet. App. June 14, 2017). Because we lack jurisdiction
    over Mr. Browder’s appeal, we dismiss.
    JURISDICTION
    For appeals from the Veterans Court, we “have exclu-
    sive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge to the
    validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation
    thereof . . . , and to interpret constitutional and statutory
    provisions.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (2012); see Goodman v.
    Shulkin, 
    870 F.3d 1383
    , 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “Except to
    the extent that an appeal . . . presents a constitutional
    issue,” we “may not review . . . a challenge to a factual
    determination, or . . . a challenge to a law or regulation as
    applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C.
    § 7292(d)(2).
    We do not possess jurisdiction over Mr. Browder’s
    claims. First, Mr. Browder raises several factual chal-
    lenges, which we cannot review. See 
    id. For example,
    Mr.
    Browder argues the Veterans Court erred in affirming the
    Board’s decision to “disregard evidence” attached to a
    BROWDER   v. WILKIE                                       3
    certain regulatory waiver. See Appellant’s Br. 1; see also
    38 C.F.R. § 20.1304(c) (2016) (“Any pertinent evidence
    submitted by the appellant . . . must be referred to the
    agency of original jurisdiction for review, unless this
    procedural right is waived by the appellant . . . .” (empha-
    sis added)). However, he does not challenge the Veterans
    Court’s interpretation that a § 20.1304(c) waiver
    “appl[ies] to evidence, not claims,” Browder, 
    2017 WL 2569870
    , at *2, and instead attacks the application of the
    regulation to his factual circumstance, see Reply Br. 2
    (alleging the Veterans Court’s finding on waiver “was
    patently false”). “We do not have authority to review” Mr.
    Browder’s challenge to “the application of law to particu-
    lar facts.” Arnesen v. Principi, 
    300 F.3d 1353
    , 1357 (Fed.
    Cir. 2002).
    Similarly, Mr. Browder argues the Veterans Court
    erred in allowing the Department of Veterans Affairs
    (“VA”) to request an additional medical examination. See
    Appellant’s Br. 2. However, he does not challenge the
    validity or interpretation of the relevant statute or regu-
    lation. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(1) (acknowledging that
    the Secretary of the VA may help a claimant by “provid-
    ing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion
    when such an examination or opinion is necessary to
    make a decision”); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(c) (“The development
    of evidence in connection with claims for service connec-
    tion will be accomplished when deemed necessary . . . .”
    (emphasis added)). See generally Appellant’s Br. Instead,
    Mr. Browder challenges only the application of that
    statute and regulation to the facts here, which we may
    not review. See 
    Arnesen, 300 F.3d at 1357
    .
    Mr. Browder also argues that a VA reviewing officer
    and a VA medical examiner either “misstated” his diagno-
    ses by improperly weighing his medical evidence or by
    “failing to account for the etiology and progres-
    sion/remission” of his disorders. Appellant’s Br. 2; cf.
    Reply Br. 1 (contending “the [Veterans] Court never had
    4                                         BROWDER   v. WILKIE
    the facts” based on a regional officer’s and the Board’s
    “misapplication[] and deliberate misquot[ation] of” the
    facts (emphasis added)), 2–3 (stating that “[m]y argu-
    ment . . . is that the [Veterans] Court ignored [a certain]
    fact,” that the Veterans Court “wrongfully discount[ed]”
    other facts, and “[t]he Board failed to properly weigh the
    evidence” (emphases added)). These are factual issues
    that we “lack jurisdiction to review.” Bastien v. Shinseki,
    
    599 F.3d 1301
    , 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see 
    id. (“The evalua-
    tion and weighing of evidence and the drawing of appro-
    priate inferences from it are factual determinations
    committed to the discretion of the fact-finder.”); see also
    Prinkey v. Shinseki, 
    735 F.3d 1375
    , 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
    (“[T]he sufficiency of a medical opinion is a matter beyond
    our jurisdictional reach[] because the underlying question
    is one of fact.”).
    Second, Mr. Browder characterizes certain arguments
    as raising constitutional issues, without further explana-
    tion. See Appellant’s Br. 1 (referencing “Constitutional
    rights to due process of law and equal protection under
    the laws” in reference to the Veterans Court’s determina-
    tion not to grant further review), 2 (mentioning “Due
    Process” regarding the Board’s so-called “duty to assist in
    ordering [s]upplemental [s]tatement(s) of the [c]ase(s)”).
    We conclude these challenges are “constitutional in name
    only,” such that Mr. Browder’s “characterization . . . does
    not confer upon us jurisdiction that we otherwise lack.”
    Helfer v. West, 
    174 F.3d 1332
    , 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999). To
    the extent that Mr. Browder challenges the constitution-
    ality of the Veterans Court’s denial of his request for “full-
    court review” and “panel review,” Appellant’s Br. 1, we
    have previously held that “[Veterans Court] Rule 35
    establishes a procedure for requesting panel and then full
    court review of a single judge decision” and “[d]enial of
    BROWDER   v. WILKIE                                     5
    such requests does not of itself violate due process.”
    
    Arnesen, 300 F.3d at 1360
    . 1
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Mr. Browder’s remaining argu-
    ments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, Mr.
    Browder’s appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    Veterans Claims is
    DISMISSED
    COSTS
    Each party shall bear its own costs.
    1     Mr. Browder also argues that the VA “arbitrarily
    lower[ed his] disability rating without good cause [or] an
    intervening examination.” Appellant’s Br. 1; see Reply
    Br. 3 (similar). As the Veterans Court explained, the VA
    reduced Mr. Browder’s “disability rating for major depres-
    sive disorder with psychosis from 100% to 70% for non-
    service-connected pension purposes” but “[t]hat issue was
    not before the Board,” such that the Veterans Court “lacks
    jurisdiction over it.” Browder, 
    2017 WL 2569870
    , at *5.
    Mr. Browder does not challenge this finding.