Voit Technologies, LLC v. Del-Ton, Inc. ( 2019 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    VOIT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    DEL-TON, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2018-1536
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of North Carolina in No. 5:17-cv-00259-
    BO, Judge Terrence William Boyle.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 8, 2019
    ______________________
    PETER JOSEPH CORCORAN, III, Corcoran IP Law PLLC,
    Texarkana, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.
    JOSEPH A. SCHOUTEN, Ward and Smith, PA, Raleigh,
    NC, for defendant-appellee.
    ______________________
    Before WALLACH, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    WALLACH, Circuit Judge.
    2                    VOIT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. DEL-TON, INC.
    Appellant Voit Technologies, LLC (“Voit”) sued Appel-
    lee Del-Ton, Inc. (“Del-Ton”) in the U.S. District Court for
    the Eastern District of North Carolina (“District Court”),
    alleging infringement of claims 1, 3−6, 8−10, 12−13, and
    17−23 (“Asserted Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 6,226,412
    (“the ’412 patent”). Del-Ton filed a motion to dismiss Voit’s
    complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6), arguing that the Asserted Claims are patent-inel-
    igible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 1 The ’412 patent
    teaches a method that “provide[s] secure interactive com-
    munication of text and image information between a cen-
    tral server computer and one or more [remote] client
    computers . . . for the purpose of storing and retrieving
    files describing unique products, services[,] or individuals.”
    ’412 patent, Abstract. The District Court granted Del-
    Ton’s Motion, determining that the Asserted Claims are
    patent-ineligible. VOIT Techs., LLC v. Del-Ton, Inc., No.
    5:17-CV-259-BO, 
    2018 WL 385188
    , at *3–4 (E.D.N.C. Jan.
    11, 2018); see J.A. 1 (Judgment).
    Voit appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). We affirm.
    DISCUSSION
    Voit argues that the District Court erred in holding the
    Asserted Claims patent-ineligible under § 101. See Appel-
    lant’s Br. 15−36. After articulating the applicable stand-
    ards, we address Voit’s arguments.
    I. Standards of Review and Legal Standard
    “We apply regional circuit law to the review of motions
    to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),”
    In re TLI Commc’ns Patent Litig., 
    823 F.3d 607
    , 610 (Fed.
    1  Congress did not amend § 101 when it passed the
    Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. See generally Pub. L.
    No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
    VOIT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. DEL-TON, INC.                         3
    Cir. 2016) (citation omitted), here, the Fourth Circuit. The
    Fourth Circuit “review[s] de novo the grant of a motion to
    dismiss for failure to state a claim” and “accept[s] as true
    all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
    Gerner v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 
    674 F.3d 264
    , 266 (4th Cir.
    2012) (citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss for
    failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege “enough
    facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
    Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). While
    “well-pleaded factual allegations” are necessary to state a
    claim, mere “conclusions[] are not entitled to the assump-
    tion of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 679 (2009).
    “We review issues unique to patent law, including pa-
    tent eligibility under . . . § 101, consistent with our circuit’s
    precedent.” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chi. Transit
    Auth., 
    873 F.3d 1364
    , 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal quo-
    tation marks and citation omitted). Although a district
    court’s determination of patent eligibility under § 101 is an
    issue of law, which we review de novo, see Intellectual Ven-
    tures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 
    850 F.3d 1315
    , 1325 (Fed.
    Cir. 2017), “[t]he patent eligibility inquiry may contain un-
    derlying issues of fact,” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 
    881 F.3d 1360
    , 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Under § 101,
    a patent claim is ineligible if “(1) it is ‘directed to’ a patent-
    ineligible concept,” such as an “abstract idea,” and “(2), if
    so, the particular elements of the claim, considered ‘both
    individually and “as an ordered combination,”’ do not add
    enough to ‘“transform the nature of the claim” into a pa-
    tent-eligible application.’” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
    S.A., 
    830 F.3d 1350
    , 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Alice
    Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 
    573 U.S. 208
    , 217 (2014)).
    II. The Asserted Claims Are Patent-Ineligible
    The Asserted Claims are directed to the abstract idea
    of entering, transmitting, locating, compressing, storing,
    and displaying data (including text and image data) to fa-
    cilitate the buying and selling of items. See ’412 patent
    4                     VOIT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. DEL-TON, INC.
    col. 11 ll. 5−53 (reciting, in claim 1, 2 the process of, inter
    alia, (1) entering “text[] . . . and image information” into a
    remote data terminal, (2) “data-compressing the image
    data,” (3) “receiving” the text and image data, creating
    multiple “unique records” before “storing,” “locating” and
    “transmitting” the text and image data separately, (4) “de-
    compressing the images . . . at the . . . remote data termi-
    nal,” and (5) “displaying the de-compressed images along
    with textual information”). We have previously deter-
    mined that similar claims are directed to patent-ineligible
    subject matter. See, e.g., Elec. 
    Power, 830 F.3d at 1353
    (holding claims that, inter alia, “collect[],” “analyz[e],” and
    “display[]” information directed to abstract ideas); In re
    
    TLI, 823 F.3d at 609
    (holding claims that, inter alia, “trans-
    mit[]” digital images directed to the “abstract idea of clas-
    sifying and storing digital images” (emphasis added)).
    Moreover, although we have stated that claims “pur-
    porting to improve the functioning of the com-
    puter . . . might not succumb to the abstract idea
    exception,” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 
    822 F.3d 1327
    ,
    1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and brack-
    ets omitted), Voit’s broad assertion that the Asserted
    Claims “allow[ed] more rapid transmission of higher reso-
    lution digital images” via “advanced image data compres-
    sion” is unsupported, Appellant’s Br. 17, 18 (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Representative claim 1 appears
    to have specific limitations that are further described in the
    specification as being directed to using different compres-
    sion formats in the claimed network, see 
    id. col. 7
    ll. 23−49,
    col. 11 ll. 16−17, 33−34, 48−54, such that all communica-
    tion goes through the server and not directly between the
    personal computers (“PC”), see 
    id. col. 7
    ll. 41−45 (explain-
    ing that because “client PCs [lack] provisions for converting
    2   Independent claim 1 is representative.
    VOIT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. DEL-TON, INC.                      5
    T-format 3 images into usable form[,] . . . the image filer
    server . . . will perform this conversion step”). However,
    Voit fails to explain how employing different formats, as
    claimed, improves compression techniques or the function-
    ing of the computer. Instead, the specification demon-
    strates that the Asserted Claims are directed to use of
    generic computer components performing conventional
    compression techniques to carry out the claimed invention.
    See, e.g., ’412 patent col. 6 ll. 60−64 (acknowledging that
    “[i]n practice, the actual data compression methods em-
    ployed could include the industry standard JPEG for-
    mat . . . or other proprietary or commercially available
    techniques” (emphases added)); cf. In re 
    TLI, 823 F.3d at 612
    (finding claims “directed to the use of conventional or
    generic technology in a nascent but well-known environ-
    ment” do not survive Alice step one). Thus, the Asserted
    Claims are directed to an abstract idea at Alice step one.
    Nor do the Asserted Claims recite an inventive concept
    that transforms the abstract idea into a patentable inven-
    tion. When claims, such as the Asserted Claims, are “di-
    rected to an abstract idea” and “merely requir[e] generic
    computer implementation,” they “do[] not move into [§] 101
    eligibility territory.” buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 
    765 F.3d 1350
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted). Although Voit alleges the method of
    the ’412 patent “improves the efficiency of transmitting”
    high resolution data, Appellant’s Br. 10, we have recog-
    nized that claims directed to “improved speed or efficiency
    inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer”
    3     The ’412 patent’s specification describes modifying
    locally stored format files into “’T’ or ‘Transmitted’ format”
    files for transmission to the image file server “utilizing for-
    matting methods similar to those . . . for encrypting with-
    out hardware security keys.” ’412 patent col. 7 ll. 6−7,
    8−10.
    6                    VOIT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. DEL-TON, INC.
    are insufficient to demonstrate an inventive concept, Intel-
    lectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 
    792 F.3d 1363
    , 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
    Moreover, Voit has to do more than simply restate the
    claim limitations and assert that the claims are directed to
    a technological improvement without an explanation of the
    nature of that improvement. See e.g., ’412 patent col. 11 ll.
    16−17, 50–52 (providing claim 1’s compression steps). Gen-
    eral statements of “advanced image data compression” or
    faster communications will not suffice where it is unclear
    how the different compression format claim limitations ac-
    tually achieve the alleged improvements. In re 
    TLI, 823 F.3d at 615
    (finding claims did not survive Alice step two
    where “abstract functional descriptions [were] devoid of
    technical explanation as to how to implement the inven-
    tion”). Therefore, the Asserted Claims are patent-ineligi-
    ble at Alice step two.
    We are unpersuaded by Voit’s primary counterargu-
    ment that the District Court erred because the Asserted
    Claims’ “ordered combination recites the inventive concept
    of improving client-server communications” by use of
    “batch uploading” and “performing image capture on a non-
    interactive basis . . . to minimize server participation.” Ap-
    pellant’s Br. 33 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
    marks, underlining, and citation omitted). Even if cap-
    tured in the Asserted Claims, those steps are generic and
    conventional; considering them as part of an ordered com-
    bination “add[s] nothing . . . that is not already present
    when the steps are considered separately.” 
    Alice, 573 U.S. at 225
    (citation omitted). Accordingly, the District Court
    did not err in holding the Asserted Claims patent-ineligible
    under § 101.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Voit’s remaining arguments and
    find them unavailing. The Judgment of the U.S. District
    Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina is
    VOIT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. DEL-TON, INC.   7
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-1536

Filed Date: 2/8/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021