Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc. ( 2015 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    VERSATA SOFTWARE, INC., VERSATA
    DEVELOPMENT GROUP, INC., VERSATA, INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees
    v.
    CALLIDUS SOFTWARE, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant
    ______________________
    2014-1468
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware in No. 1:12-cv-00931-SLR, Judge Sue
    L. Robinson.
    ______________________
    ON MOTION
    ______________________
    Before CHEN, MAYER, AND LINN, Circuit Judges.
    CHEN, Circuit Judge.
    ORDER
    On November 20, 2014, this court issued an opinion in
    this interlocutory appeal. The opinion, reported at 
    771 F.3d 1368
    , reversed the order of the district court denying
    a stay of trial court proceedings pending the outcome of
    post-grant review of the asserted patents under the
    2        VERSATA SOFTWARE, INC.   v. CALLIDUS SOFTWARE, INC.
    Patent Office’s Transition Program for Covered Business
    Method (CBM) Patents. Late on November 19, 2014,
    however, the parties filed with this court a joint request to
    dismiss the appeal, noting that they had concurrently
    filed a joint and unconditional stipulation of dismissal of
    the underlying complaint with the district court pursuant
    to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 41(a). This
    joint request was not presented to the judges until after
    the release of the opinion.
    Due to the unique timing and sequence of events, we
    stayed issuance of the mandate and directed the parties
    to respond whether the circumstances require that we
    vacate our prior opinion. We have considered the parties’
    responses. Because the parties’ voluntary and uncondi-
    tional dismissal mooted the appeal before the release of
    our prior opinion, we vacate the opinion and dismiss the
    appeal.
    We have yet to address this precise scenario but find
    several orders from our sister circuits informative. For
    example, as explained by the Ninth Circuit, the timing of
    events in such situations is critical because:
    There is a significant difference between a
    request to dismiss a case or proceeding for
    mootness prior to the time an appellate court
    has rendered its decision on the merits and a
    request made after that time. Different con-
    siderations are applicable in the two circum-
    stances. When we refrain from deciding a
    case on grounds of mootness, we do so based
    upon the limitations of our power. We do not
    have the constitutional authority to decide
    moot cases.
    Armster v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 
    806 F.2d 1347
    , 1355 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, when an
    appeal is moot before issuance of the appellate court’s
    opinion, it is appropriate to vacate that opinion. See, e.g.,
    VERSATA SOFTWARE, INC.   v. CALLIDUS SOFTWARE, INC.     3
    Shokeh v. Thompson, 
    375 F.3d 351
     (5th Cir. 2004) (vacat-
    ing, in an immigration case, opinion issued after release
    of appellant from custody, which rendered appeal moot);
    Bouvagnet v. Bouvagnet, 45 F. App’x 535 (7th Cir. 2002)
    (vacating opinion and dismissing appeal where parties
    filed joint notice of settlement and motion to dismiss
    appeal four days prior to issuance of opinion); In re Pat-
    tullo, 
    271 F.3d 898
    , 902 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacating prior
    non-precedential opinion when case became moot shortly
    before issuance of the disposition, although the court of
    appeals was not timely made aware of the mooting event);
    Duran v. Reno, 
    197 F.3d 63
     (2d Cir. 1999) (vacating prior
    opinion as moot because appellant was deported prior to
    issuance); Walker v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, Atl., 
    593 F.2d 21
     (5th Cir. 1979) (vacating prior opinion as moot
    because it was released after death of petitioner-
    appellant). 1 A case or controversy must remain alive
    during all stages of a case, including appellate review.
    Steffel v. Thompson, 
    415 U.S. 452
    , 459 n.10 (1974).
    Because the question of when the district court action
    was dismissed is a procedural issue not unique to patent
    law, we apply regional circuit law. See, e.g., Wilson Sport-
    ing Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 
    442 F.3d 1322
    ,
    1  We note that, unlike the situation here, when par-
    ties reach a settlement soon after a valid decision has
    been rendered, courts have recognized that the proper
    course of action is not so straightforward. See, e.g., Unit-
    ed States v. Payton, 
    593 F.3d 881
    , 883 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (denying vacatur of opinion where mootness occurred
    after a decision issued but before the mandate and cata-
    loguing other circuit cases); Humphreys v. Drug Enforce-
    ment Admin., 
    105 F.3d 112
    , 115 (3d Cir. 1996) (drawing
    distinction for vacatur purposes between mooting event
    occurring before decision and mooting event after decision
    but before mandate).
    4        VERSATA SOFTWARE, INC.   v. CALLIDUS SOFTWARE, INC.
    1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Panduit Corp. v. All
    States Plastic Mfg. Co., 
    744 F.2d 1564
    , 1575 (Fed. Cir.
    1984)) (“The Federal Circuit reviews procedural matters
    that are not unique to patent issues under the law of the
    particular regional circuit court where appeals from the
    district court would normally lie.”). When the parties
    filed the joint and unconditional stipulation to dismiss the
    complaint in district court pursuant to FRCP
    41(a)(1)(A)(ii), the complaint was automatically dismissed
    with no further action of the district court required. In
    First Nat’l Bank v. Marine City, Inc., 
    411 F.2d 674
     (3d
    Cir. 1969), the Third Circuit explained the effect of such a
    stipulation. “The entry of such a stipulation of dismissal
    is effective automatically and does not require judicial
    approval.” 
    Id. at 677
    . See also In re Bath & Kitchen
    Fixtures Antitrust Litig., 
    535 F.3d 161
    , 165 (3d Cir. 2008)
    (“[A] filing under [FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i)] is a notice, not a
    motion. Its effect is automatic: the defendant does not file
    a response, and no order of the district court is needed to
    end the action.”).
    Because the parties’ joint stipulation was filed in the
    district court the day before the issuance of this court’s
    opinion on November 20, 2014, the appeal was moot when
    our opinion issued. 2 There was no longer a controversy
    whether district court proceedings should be stayed
    2 We note that the parties appeared to have reached a
    settlement nearly a week prior to filing the joint stipula-
    tion with this court. We stress the importance of parties
    informing this court promptly and without delay when a
    matter has been settled or otherwise may have become
    moot. Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 
    520 U.S. 43
    ,
    68 n.23 (1997) (citing Bd. of License Comm’rs of Tiverton
    v. Pastore, 
    469 U.S. 238
    , 240 (1985)) (“It is the duty of
    counsel to bring to the federal tribunal’s attention, ‘with-
    out delay,’ facts that may raise a question of mootness.”).
    VERSATA SOFTWARE, INC.   v. CALLIDUS SOFTWARE, INC.        5
    pending disposition of the post-grant review, because the
    matter was no longer extant.
    Accordingly,
    IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    (1) The court’s opinion issued on November 20, 2014
    is vacated.
    (2) This appeal is dismissed. The previous stay of the
    mandate is lifted. Each side shall bear its own costs.
    FOR THE COURT
    /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole
    Daniel E. O’Toole
    Clerk of Court
    ISSUED AS A MANDATE: February 27, 2015