Lledo v. Office of Pers. Mgmt. ( 2018 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    TITO C. LLEDO,
    Petitioner
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2017-1717
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. SF-0831-16-0799-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: March 28, 2018
    ______________________
    TITO C. LLEDO, San Narcisco, Zambales, Philippines,
    pro se.
    BORISLAV KUSHNIR, Commercial Litigation Branch,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
    CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., FRANKLIN
    E. WHITE, JR.
    ______________________
    Before NEWMAN, WALLACH, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
    NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
    2                            LLEDO   v. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT.
    Tito C. Lledo appeals the decision of the Merit Sys-
    tems Protection Board (“Board”) that affirmed the Office
    of Personnel Management’s (“OPM”) reconsideration
    decision, denying his application for deferred retirement
    and his request to make a deposit in the Civil Service
    Retirement and Disability Fund (“CSRDF”). Lledo v.
    Office of Pers. Mgmt., MSPB Docket No. SF-0831-16-0799-
    I-1, 
    2016 WL 7667554
    (Jan. 6, 2017) (“Board Op.”). The
    Board’s decision is in accordance with law, and is af-
    firmed.
    BACKGROUND
    From 1968 to 1991, Mr. Lledo was employed by the
    United States at the U.S. Navy Public Works Center in
    Subic Bay, Philippines. His initial position was as an
    “Apprentice (electrician)”—a position designated as
    “excepted service – indefinite appointment.” Mr. Lledo
    resigned with the designated severance pay on November
    13, 1991. During his 23 years as a Navy employee, Mr.
    Lledo worked in various positions, culminating in a final
    position as a Telephone Installation and Repair Fore-
    man I.
    On March 31, 2014, Mr. Lledo filed an application for
    deferred retirement benefits under the Civil Service
    Retirement System (“CSRS”), and requested to make a
    post-employment deposit into the CSRDF. The OPM
    denied the application and deposit request. Mr. Lledo
    appealed to the Board, arguing that he was entitled to
    CSRS benefits under 5 C.F.R. § 831.303(a) and “based
    upon [his] non-deduction service ending involuntarily [on]
    September 30, 1982.” Resp’t’s App. 20 (explanation at
    section 25 of OPM form); see also Board Op. at 4–5.
    The Board’s administrative judge affirmed OPM’s de-
    nial, stating that “all of [Mr. Lledo’s] appointments with
    the Navy, including his final position, were either not-to-
    exceed (“NTE”) appointments or indefinite appointments
    in the excepted service.” Board Op. at 2. The administra-
    LLEDO   v. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT.                           3
    tive judge affirmed the OPM decision, stating that
    “[w]hile [Mr. Lledo] has shown that he had sufficient
    creditable federal service, he has failed to show that any
    of that service was performed in a position covered under
    the [Civil Service Retirement Act].” Board Op. at 6. This
    initial decision became the Board’s final decision, and Mr.
    Lledo appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    We review a decision of the Board to determine
    whether it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
    tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained
    without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation
    having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial
    evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor,
    
    680 F.3d 1353
    , 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Substantial evi-
    dence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Simp-
    son v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    347 F.3d 1361
    , 1364 (Fed.
    Cir. 2003) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB,
    
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938)).
    Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8333(a)–(b), to qualify for a
    CSRS retirement annuity, an employee must have per-
    formed at least five years of creditable civilian service,
    and must have served at least one of his last two years of
    federal service in a covered position—i.e., service that is
    subject to the Civil Service Retirement Act. Quiocson v.
    Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    490 F.3d 1358
    , 1360 (Fed. Cir.
    2007); Casilang v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    248 F.3d 1381
    ,
    1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001). While nearly all federal service is
    creditable service, covered service is a narrower subset of
    federal service. Rosete v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    48 F.3d 514
    , 516 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Aquino v. Office of Pers.
    Mgmt., 451 F. App’x 941, 942 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Tempo-
    rary, intermittent, term, and excepted indefinite ap-
    pointments are not covered positions. 5 C.F.R.
    § 831.201(a); 
    Quiocson, 490 F.3d at 1360
    .
    4                             LLEDO   v. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT.
    The Board found that Mr. Lledo’s employment was
    creditable civilian service. Board Op. at 6. However, the
    Board also found that Mr. Lledo did not ever serve in a
    covered position, citing the requirement for covered
    service in one of his last two years of federal service, that
    is, during the period between November 13, 1989 and
    November 13, 1991. See 
    id. at 4.
    The Board specifically
    observed that “all of [Mr. Lledo’s] appointments with the
    Navy, including his final position, were either not-to-
    exceed (‘NTE’) appointments or indefinite appointments
    in the excepted service.” 
    Id. at 2;
    see also 
    id. at 5
    (discuss-
    ing how Mr. Lledo’s appointment forms supported this
    conclusion). The Board further observed that the absence
    of any appointment forms “indicating that [Mr. Lledo] was
    in a covered position combined with the evidence that he
    was not required to contribute to the [CSRD] Fund while
    he was employed with the Federal government, and
    evidence that he was provided severance pay at his resig-
    nation” led the Board to conclude that Mr. Lledo was
    never in a “covered position.” Board Op. at 5. Mr. Lledo
    has not disputed these findings. See Resp’t’s App. 19
    (indicating in section 6 of the OPM form that Mr. Lledo’s
    appointment is “Excepted”). Because substantial evidence
    supports the Board’s conclusion that Mr. Lledo’s service
    was excluded from CSRDF coverage, the decision that Mr.
    Lledo is not entitled to CSRS benefits is in accordance
    with law. See 
    Quiocson, 490 F.3d at 1360
    (“Mr. Quioc-
    son’s appointment forms indicate that his positions were
    not covered by the CSRS and that no CSRS retirement
    contributions were withheld from his pay. Mr. Quiocson
    was covered by a different retirement system, the FEPI.
    His receipt of benefits under a non-CSRS plan indicates
    that his service was not covered under the CSRS.”);
    Hocson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 662 F. App’x 922, 923
    (Fed. Cir. 2016).
    In this appeal, Mr. Lledo focuses on his service on and
    before September 30, 1982, and the provisions of 5 C.F.R.
    LLEDO   v. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT.                           5
    § 831.303(a). This regulation permits an employee en-
    gaged in creditable civilian service before October 1, 1982,
    for which retirement deductions were not taken, to elect
    to make a deposit according to 5 U.S.C. § 8334(c) or
    otherwise have his annuity reduced. Mr. Lledo argues
    that § 831.303(a) and its mention of an annuity means
    that an employee engaged in creditable civilian service
    prior to October 1, 1982 was deemed engaged in covered
    service and eligible for CSRS benefits. It is not disputed
    that Mr. Lledo was engaged in creditable civilian service
    before October 1, 1982; he argues that § 831.303(a) con-
    verted his creditable service into covered service despite
    the exceptions to covered service stated in § 831.201(a).
    In Rosimo v. Office of Personnel Management, 448 F.
    App’x 60, 62 (Fed. Cir. 2011), this court discussed a simi-
    lar situation:
    Mr. Rosimo’s argument that 5 C.F.R. § 831.303(a)
    allows him to convert his “creditable service” into
    “covered service” is unavailing.             Section
    831.303(a), by its terms, only applies to “an em-
    ployee,” and allows periods of “creditable civilian
    service” to be “included in determining length of
    service to compute annuity.” Section 831.303(a)
    thus allows an employee who qualifies for an an-
    nuity to include certain periods of creditable ser-
    vice in the calculation. Mr. Rosimo, however,
    lacks “covered service,” not “creditable service,” so
    5 C.F.R. § 831.303(a) does not help him.
    Similarly, in Fontilla v. Office of Personnel Management,
    482 F. App’x 563, 565 (Fed. Cir. 2012), this court held:
    5 C.F.R. § 831.303(a) allows those already covered
    by the Act to include certain creditable service in
    calculating the annuity. There is nothing in the
    language of 5 C.F.R. § 831.303(a) to support the
    argument that it retroactively converted “credita-
    ble service” into “covered service” or changed who
    6                            LLEDO   v. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT.
    qualified for an annuity. Section 831.303(a) . . .
    cannot circumvent the covered service require-
    ment of 5 U.S.C. § 8333(b). Because 5 C.F.R.
    § 831.303(a) is inapplicable to Fontilla, he cannot
    rely on it either to deem his creditable service to
    be covered service or to waive any deposit re-
    quirement.
    Mr. Lledo’s argument is similarly foreclosed, for
    § 831.303(a) does not alter the definition of covered ser-
    vice, or convert creditable service into covered service.
    See Dullas v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 708 F. App’x 672, 674
    (Fed. Cir. 2017); Hocson, 662 F. App’x at 924–25; Garcia
    v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 660 F. App’x 930, 931–32 (Fed.
    Cir. 2016).
    Mr. Lledo’s creditable service between 1968 and Sep-
    tember 30, 1982 is also not the relevant time period for
    the calculation of covered service, for the relevant period
    under 5 U.S.C. § 8333(a)–(b) is the last two years of Mr.
    Lledo’s employment. Section 831.303(a) does not change
    the relevant time period during which Mr. Lledo needed
    to have served in a “covered position” or the fact that Mr.
    Lledo never served in a covered position during the criti-
    cal time period to receive a CSRS retirement annuity.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered all of Mr. Lledo’s arguments in
    light of the applicable law. Since Mr. Lledo did not serve
    in a “covered position” during the required time period,
    the judgment of the Board must be affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.