Presidio Components, Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics Corp. , 702 F.3d 1351 ( 2012 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Cross Appellant,
    v.
    AMERICAN TECHNICAL CERAMICS CORP.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    __________________________
    2010-1355, 2011-1089
    __________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of California in Case No. 08-CV-0335,
    Chief Judge Irma E. Gonzalez.
    ___________________________
    Decided: December 19, 2012
    ___________________________
    BRETT A. SCHATZ, Wood, Herron & Evans, L.L.P., of
    Cincinnati, Ohio, argued for the plaintiff-cross appellant.
    With him on the brief was GREGORY F. AHRENS.
    MARVIN S. GITTES, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
    Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., of New York, New York, argued
    for the defendant-appellant. With him on the brief was
    TIMUR E. SLONIM.
    __________________________
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                   2
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, PLAGER and WALLACH, Circuit
    Judges.
    RADER, Chief Judge.
    After a trial, the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of California denied American Techni-
    cal Ceramics Corporation’s (“ATC”) motions for judgment
    as a matter of law (“JMOL”) and in the alternative a new
    trial on validity and infringement of 
    U.S. Patent No. 6,816,356
     (“the ’356 patent”). Presidio Components, Inc.
    v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., 
    723 F. Supp. 2d 1284
    (S.D. Cal. 2010); Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Techni-
    cal Ceramics Corp., No. 3:08-CV-00335, 
    2010 WL 3070370
    (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2010) (“Post-JMOL Order”). ATC
    appeals these decisions. Presidio Components, Inc. (“Pre-
    sidio”) cross-appeals the district court’s denial of a per-
    manent injunction, JMOL on willfulness, and its ongoing
    royalty rate and false marking determinations. Presidio,
    
    723 F. Supp. 2d 1284
    ; Post-JMOL Order, 
    2010 WL 3070370
    . This court affirms the vast majority of the
    district court’s determinations set forth in its comprehen-
    sive and attentive opinions with the exception of its
    finding of no irreparable injury, the related denial of a
    permanent injunction, and the ongoing royalty determi-
    nation. This court also vacates the district court’s false
    marking judgment due to an intervening change in law.
    For the reasons below, this court affirms-in-part, vacates-
    in-part, and remands.
    I.
    Presidio is a family-owned niche manufacturer of elec-
    trical components for high-tech applications. It is oper-
    ated by Dan Devoe and his two sons Alan and Lambert.
    The Devoes are the three listed inventors on the ’356
    patent, entitled “Integrated Broadband Ceramic Capaci-
    tor Array.” ATC, a subsidiary of AVX Corporation, manu-
    3                    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH
    factures electrical components. ATC’s 545L capacitors, a
    variety of monolithic broadband capacitors, compete with
    Presidio’s Buried Broadband capacitor (“BB capacitor”).
    At trial, Presidio asserted that ATC’s 545L capacitors
    infringe the ’356 patent.
    Capacitors are passive electronic components used in
    numerous electrical systems including consumer electron-
    ics, mobile phones, and audio amplifiers. These capaci-
    tors typically filter ripples or spikes in a power supply and
    store energy to provide a charge to other components on a
    printed circuit board.
    A traditional capacitor comprises two parallel metal
    plates separated by a dielectric material, such as a ce-
    ramic or air. Because the dielectric material is not con-
    ductive, a positive charge accumulates on one plate with a
    negative charge on the opposite plate. The capacitor may
    release this stored energy by connecting the two plates
    through a conductive path that closes the circuit. The
    amount of energy a capacitor can store is its “capaci-
    tance,” which depends on the orientation of the metal
    plates and the properties of the dielectric material.
    Frequently, multiple capacitors are combined to cre-
    ate a “multilayer capacitor.” A multilayer capacitor has
    several layers of conductive and non-conductive materials
    stacked together. Each layer has its own electrical prop-
    erties that affect the overall performance of the multilayer
    capacitor. Capacitor design is a compromise between
    capacitance, resistance, and inductance. These designs
    become more complicated as operational frequencies
    increase in broadband products. In addition to layering,
    capacitor design typically must also accommodate mount-
    ing on a circuit board. A capacitor designer must further
    consider manufacturing costs and size restrictions. For
    example, the capacitors in this dispute are tiny—about
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                  4
    the size of the tip of a sharpened pencil. They are rela-
    tively inexpensive and produced in quantities of several
    thousand per batch.
    The ’356 patent claims a capacitor design with a lower
    frequency portion and a higher frequency portion, for use
    in broadband applications. The patent teaches a multi-
    layer integrated network of capacitors electrically con-
    nected in series and in parallel.          This network of
    capacitors is disposed within a “substantially monolithic
    dielectric body,” as shown in Fig. 10A. The invention
    incorporates both electrical and mechanical aspects.
    Conductive plates 10 and 11 extend from conductive
    contacts 12 and 13 on opposite sides of a ceramic dielec-
    tric body. This structure creates a capacitance between
    the internal plate combinations 10 and 11 in the upper
    section 60. At the same time a fringe-effect capacitance
    arises between external contacts 72 and 74 in the lower
    section 62 of the device. ’356 patent col. 7 ll. 20-60.
    On the mechanical side, the invention uses a “one-
    piece” design—an improvement over previous “two-piece”
    designs. A two-piece design, such as shown in Fig. 8A,
    5                   PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH
    had to be joined both together and to a circuit board
    through soldering or an epoxy. This time-consuming
    process yielded a less reliable product that in turn was
    more difficult to use in mass production of end products.
    Presidio asserted claims 1-5, 16, 18, and 19 of the ’356
    patent against ATC. Independent claim 1 is representa-
    tive and recites as follows:
    1. A capacitor comprising:
    a substantially monolithic dielectric body;
    a conductive first plate disposed within the dielec-
    tric body;
    a conductive second plate disposed within the di-
    electric body and forming a capacitor with the
    first plate;
    a conductive first contact disposed externally on
    the dielectric body and electrically connected to
    the first plate; and
    a conductive second contact disposed externally on
    the dielectric body and electrically connected to
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS     v. AMERICAN TECH                    6
    the second plate, and the second contact being
    located sufficiently close to the first contact to
    form a first fringe-effect capacitance with the
    first contact.
    ’356 patent col. 12 l. 59–col. 13 l. 5.
    According to inventor Lambert Devoe, the ’356 patent
    covers and protects one of Presidio’s main products, the
    BB capacitor. The BB capacitor is a monolithic capacitor
    used in fiber optic network amplifiers and other broad-
    band frequency applications. Another inventor, Dan
    Devoe, also testified that the ’356 patent covered the BB
    capacitors. Based on this belief, Presidio marked the BB
    capacitors with a reference to the ’356 patent. During
    this litigation however, Presidio conceded that the ’356
    patent did not cover the BB capacitors. Nonetheless,
    Presidio maintains that the BB capacitors have a “sub-
    stantially monolithic dielectric body,” as shown in Fig.
    10A of the ’356 patent.
    Presidio filed the application leading to the ’356 pat-
    ent with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) in
    April 2003. This application was a continuation-in-part of
    an application filed in 2002. The ’356 patent issued in
    November 2004. In September 2003, ATC filed a provi-
    sional patent application for its work on the 545L broad-
    band capacitor.       After reviewing Presidio’s published
    patent application in March 2004, ATC proceeded to file
    its non-provisional application in September 2004.
    In February 2006, the PTO rejected ATC’s applica-
    tion, citing the ’356 patent as prior art. Nonetheless, ATC
    started selling 545L capacitors in June 2006. In August
    2006, ATC responded to the PTO’s rejection by arguing
    that the ’356 patent did not teach “orientation insensitiv-
    ity,” a claimed limitation of its application. This argu-
    ment convinced the PTO examiner and ATC’s application
    7                    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS    v. AMERICAN TECH
    issued as 
    U.S. Patent No. 7,248,458
     (“the ’458 patent”) in
    July 2007.
    Presidio sued ATC in February 2008, alleging ATC’s
    545L capacitors infringe the ’356 patent. ATC subse-
    quently brought numerous counterclaims against Presi-
    dio, including false marking of the BB capacitors with the
    ’356 patent. In July 2009, ATC requested ex parte reex-
    amination of the ’356 patent. The PTO granted the
    request, identifying substantial new questions of pat-
    entability in light of nine prior art references identified by
    ATC. In September 2011, the PTO issued a reexamina-
    tion certificate confirming patentability of the asserted
    claims without amendment.
    The district court conducted a jury trial in December
    2009. The jury found the asserted claims willfully in-
    fringed, not invalid, and awarded Presidio $1,048,677 in
    lost profits. The jury also found that Presidio’s marking
    of the BB capacitors before its October 24, 2008 conces-
    sion was not done for the purpose of deceiving the public.
    After trial, the district court resolved a number of mo-
    tions. It denied Presidio’s motions for a permanent in-
    junction, enhanced damages, and attorney fees, but
    granted Presidio $235,172.68 in supplemental damages.
    In response to motions from ATC, the trial court vacated
    the willfulness verdict and set an ongoing royalty rate of
    12% of the 545L capacitor’s wholesale price. At the same
    time, the trial court denied ATC’s motions for JMOL or a
    new trial on noninfringement, anticipation, obviousness,
    lack of enablement, lack of written description, indefi-
    niteness, and inequitable conduct. The district court went
    on to deny ATC’s motion for JMOL on the jury’s lost profit
    damages award; and on false marking prior to October 24,
    2008. However, the trial court fined Presidio $228,086.25
    for false marking after that date. Presidio, 723 F. Supp.
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                     8
    2d at 1288, 1293–1342; Post-JMOL Order, 
    2010 WL 3070370
     at *1–7.
    Between ATC’s appeal and Presidio’s cross-appeal,
    the parties have challenged the majority of the district
    court’s determinations and numerous evidentiary issues.
    ATC asserts error on over a dozen issues. This court
    rejects ATC’s attempt to retry the case anew on appeal.
    Presidio responded with at least five issues of its own on
    appeal. The parties’ appeal strategy completely discounts
    and overlooks the thorough, well-reasoned, and detailed
    opinions of the district court. In nearly every respect, this
    court detects no reversible error. This court has jurisdic-
    tion over this appeal under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    II.
    This court reviews JMOL determinations after a jury
    verdict and new trial rulings as well under the same
    standard applied by the trial court. Lucent Techs., Inc. v.
    Gateway, Inc., 
    580 F.3d 1301
    , 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The
    United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
    reviews a motion for JMOL as a matter of law. Pavao v.
    Pagay, 
    307 F.3d 915
    , 918 (9th Cir. 2002). “JMOL is
    appropriate when ‘a party has been fully heard on an
    issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis
    for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.’”
    Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
    373 F.3d 998
    , 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)).
    A district court in the Ninth Circuit “may grant a new
    trial only if the verdict is against the clear weight of the
    evidence.” 
    Id.
     The resolution of a motion for a new trial
    is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
    Id.
    III.
    On the issue of infringement, the jury found that
    ATC’s 545L capacitors literally infringe the asserted
    9                   PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH
    claims of the ’356 patent. The district court had earlier
    determined on summary judgment that ATC did not
    infringe the patent indirectly or under the doctrine of
    equivalents. ATC challenges the jury’s finding that the
    545L capacitor meets the “substantially monolithic dielec-
    tric body” limitation of the asserted claims.
    To prove literal infringement, a plaintiff must show
    that the accused device contains each and every limitation
    of the asserted claims. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft
    Corp., 
    632 F.3d 1292
    , 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In infringe-
    ment cases, the court first interprets the claims to deter-
    mine their scope and meaning. Cybor Corp. v. FAS
    Techs., Inc., 
    138 F.3d 1448
    , 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
    banc). Next, the jury compares the properly construed
    claims to the allegedly infringing device. 
    Id.
     “If any
    claim limitation is absent from the accused device, there
    is no literal infringement as a matter of law.” Bayer AG v.
    Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 
    212 F.3d 1241
    , 1247 (Fed.
    Cir. 2000). This court reviews a finding of infringement
    for substantial evidence. Uniloc, 
    632 F.3d at 1301
    .
    The district court materially adopted ATC’s proposed
    construction of “a substantially monolithic dielectric body”
    as “a dielectric body largely but not wholly without seams
    from the inclusion of plates within the dielectric body.”
    Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics
    Corp., No. 3:08-CV-00335, slip op. at 6–8 (S.D. Cal. June
    11, 2008). On appeal, ATC asserts the 545L capacitors do
    not contain seams and therefore the jury could not find
    infringement. ATC’s contention focuses on the alleged
    admission of Presidio’s expert, Dr. Huebner, that “there
    are no seams” in the 545L capacitors. J.A. 990–91. To
    the contrary, Dr. Huebner’s testimony, taken as a whole,
    supports the jury’s infringement determination. Dr.
    Huebner told the jury on direct examination that after
    analyzing the 545L capacitor, he concluded that it was a
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                  10
    one-piece construction that exhibited a substantially
    monolithic dielectric body. J.A. 946–48. On cross-
    examination, when discussing “seams,” Dr. Huebner
    indicated that the word “seams” is not used by persons of
    ordinary skill in the art, thus he did not find “seams” in
    the 545L capacitor. Dr. Huebner testified that if one were
    to examine any ceramic multilayer capacitor that is
    referred to as monolithic, one would find tiny voids pre-
    sent in the solid. These tiny voids are referred to as
    “porosity” in the art. He explained: “the term substan-
    tially monolithic, to me, implies that the vast majority of
    the component is solid, albeit there could be a percent or
    two [of porosity], and the same is true for the 545L. There
    is some tiny amount of porosity present.” J.A. 978–79.
    Simply put, he testified that no ceramic capacitor can
    be 100% monolithic, which is why the patent claims a
    “substantially monolithic” capacitor. Further, based on
    his testimony that the 545L capacitor had 70 plates,
    ATC’s counsel asked Dr. Huebner to assume that a seam
    is the boundary between a plate and the dielectric. Dr.
    Huebner testified that under this hypothetical, ATC’s
    545L capacitor would have 140 seams and would thus be
    largely, but not wholly, without seams. J.A. 991–95. As
    this brief revisiting of Dr. Huebner’s testimony shows, he
    did not admit without qualification that ATC’s capacitors
    had no seams. Rather he tried to explain his concept of a
    “substantially monolithic” capacitor. Even if Dr. Hueb-
    ner’s direct and cross-examination are not entirely consis-
    tent, the jury had the ultimate discretion to evaluate his
    credibility and weigh his presentation. See Kinetic Con-
    cepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 
    554 F.3d 1010
    ,
    1024 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting a jury can accept the testi-
    mony it finds most persuasive); see also Doan v. United
    States, 
    202 F.2d 674
    , 680 (9th Cir. 1953) (“It was for the
    jury who observed him and the manner and emphasis
    11                  PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH
    with which he gave his answers on direct and cross-
    examination to weigh and evaluate his testimony ….”).
    ATC’s expert, Dr. Dougherty, also testified that the
    545L capacitor has 70 plates and corresponding seams.
    J.A. 1246. Presidio’s expert, Dr. Ewell further explained
    to the jury that a substantially monolithic body some-
    times has one seam per plate and sometimes each plate
    would have two associated seams. J.A. 1654–55. Taken
    together, this testimony also provides sufficient basis for
    the jury’s conclusion that ATC’s 545L capacitor has a
    substantially monolithic body.
    This court affirms the district court’s finding that
    substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that
    ATC’s 545L capacitors infringe the asserted claims of the
    ’356 patent. This court has also considered ATC’s numer-
    ous other arguments regarding the jury’s infringement
    determination and finds no reversible error.
    IV.
    ATC challenges the district court’s denial of JMOL on
    lost profit damages. At trial, Presidio presented both lost
    profits and reasonable royalty damages theories. Presidio
    asserted that ATC’s infringing sales of 545L capacitors
    caused it to lose profits that it otherwise would have made
    from the BB capacitors. The jury awarded Presidio
    $1,048,677 in lost profits while finding a reasonable
    royalty not applicable. J.A. 292.
    Presidio advanced its lost profits theory under the
    four-factor Panduit test, which requires Presidio to show:
    (1) demand for the patented product; (2) absence of ac-
    ceptable noninfringing substitutes; (3) manufacturing and
    marketing capability to exploit the demand; and (4) the
    amount of profit that would have been made. Depuy
    Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                  12
    1314, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Panduit Corp. v.
    Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 
    575 F.2d 1152
    , 1156 (6th
    Cir. 1978)). ATC argues Presidio did not establish the
    first two Panduit factors. With respect to the first fac-
    tor—demand for the patented product—ATC contends
    Presidio’s BB capacitors are neither covered by the as-
    serted patent, nor in direct competition with the infring-
    ing 545L capacitors.
    As an initial matter, the demand in question in the
    first Panduit factor is not limited to demand for the
    patented products. Rather, demand may also arise from a
    product that “directly competes with the infringing de-
    vice.” Depuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1330 (citing Rite-Hite
    Corp. v. Kelley Co., 
    56 F.3d 1538
    , 1548–49 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
    (en banc)). Because Presidio conceded that the ‘356
    patent does not cover its BB capacitors, this record must
    show that the BB capacitors directly competed with ATC’s
    545L capacitors.
    ATC argues that the record does not link market de-
    mand with the claimed fringe-effect capacitance limita-
    tion. This argument fails because the first Panduit factor
    “does not require any allocation of consumer demand
    among the various limitations recited in a patent claim.”
    Depuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1330. Next, ATC argues that
    the record does not show that the BB capacitors and the
    545L capacitors are sufficiently similar. According to
    ATC, the two capacitors have different characteristics and
    served different markets. ATC contends that the 545L
    capacitors have a lower insertion loss, 0.3 dB at 40GHz,
    and were designed to compete in a higher performance
    market than the BB capacitors with their higher insertion
    loss of 0.9 dB at 40GHz. Thus, ATC asserts the jury could
    not have found that Presidio established the first Panduit
    factor.
    13                  PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH
    To the contrary, Presidio’s BB capacitor and ATC’s
    545L capacitor are both one-piece broadband capacitors
    with a substantially monolithic design. Presidio’s dam-
    ages expert, Mr. Newman, testified that the two products
    compete “head-to-head” in the one-piece capacitor market
    for the same customers and for the same applications.
    J.A. 1035–36, 1043. Mr. Newman supported his conclu-
    sion using third-party market studies and ATC’s internal
    documents. He stated these sources showed customer
    demand moving from a two-piece design to a one-piece
    design, resulting in substantial sales of one-piece capaci-
    tors. For example, one ATC document compares the 545L
    capacitor to the BB capacitor’s electrical performance
    while highlighting the 545L’s “[o]ne-piece construction,
    with its inherently higher reliability.” J.A. 1037–38,
    2720–21. Mr. Newman further testified that by 2008,
    ATC was selling several hundred thousand 545L capaci-
    tors per year while Presidio was selling over one million
    BB capacitors per year.
    The record also contains Lambert Devoe’s explanation
    that the BB and 545L capacitors are the same type of
    broadband capacitor used in the same applications, which
    are different from ATC’s other products like its previous
    generation 540L capacitors. J.A. 682–684. Finally, one
    ATC witness testified that at least some of its 545L ca-
    pacitor customers also purchased BB capacitors. J.A.
    1136.
    In sum, substantial evidence supports the jury’s find-
    ing that demand existed for Presidio’s BB capacitors and
    that they directly competed with the infringing 545L
    capacitor. See Depuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1330. This court
    therefore affirms the district court’s finding that Presidio
    satisfied the first Panduit factor.
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                    14
    With respect to the second Panduit factor—absence of
    acceptable noninfringing substitutes—ATC argues the
    prior art ATC 540L capacitors and DLI’s Opticap capaci-
    tors were available substitutes for the BB capacitors
    during the relevant period. ATC states that customers
    would have chosen its 540L capacitors with their stan-
    dard 0402 size and lower insertion loss at 40GHz, com-
    pared to Presidio’s BB capacitors with their allegedly non-
    standard 0502 size and higher insertion loss at 40GHz.
    Once again, a review of the record overcomes these asser-
    tions.
    “A patentee need not negate every possibility that the
    purchaser might not have purchased a product other than
    its own, absent the infringement.” Rite-Hite, 
    56 F.3d at 1545
    ; accord King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 
    767 F.2d 853
    , 864 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[A patentee] need not
    meet the impossible burden of negating every possibility
    that a purchaser might not have bought another product
    or might not have bought any comparable product at
    all.”). Here, Presidio “need only show that there was a
    reasonable probability that the sales would have been
    made ‘but for’ the infringement.” Rite-Hite, 
    56 F.3d at 1545
    . Moreover, the “[m]ere existence of a competing
    device does not make that device an acceptable substi-
    tute.” TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 
    789 F.2d 895
    , 901
    (Fed. Cir. 1986). In some instances, as is true in this case,
    products lacking the advantages of the patented invention
    “can hardly be termed a substitute acceptable to the
    customer who wants those advantages.” 
    Id.
     at 901–02
    (quoting Panduit, 
    575 F.2d at 1162
    ).
    The record shows that the proposed non-infringing
    substitutes are not adequate substitutes in the same
    market at all. ATC’s 540L capacitors are broadband
    capacitors of a two-piece design. They were the previous
    generation capacitor replaced by ATC’s 545L. After the
    15                  PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH
    545L capacitor was released, ATC’s 540L capacitor sales
    decreased, while its 545L capacitor sales increased to
    significant levels. As noted above, two-piece capacitors
    had inferior reliability and performance results compared
    to one-piece capacitors. Two ATC employees testified that
    the 540L product suffered from drawbacks common with
    two-piece capacitors. The markets are also different
    because most assembly machines accept a single compo-
    nent, not a two-piece assembled component like the 540L.
    Indeed, delicate two-piece capacitors break if set in place
    with too much force. J.A. 6656–6657.
    The record also includes Lambert Devoe’s testimony
    that the BB capacitor did not have any competing devices
    until introduction of ATC’s 545L capacitors in 2006. In
    fact, the BB capacitors were the only one-piece solution on
    the market when introduced in 2003. It took Presidio, a
    small niche competitor, a few years to generate significant
    demand for the BB capacitors. Lambert Devoe further
    testified that the growth rate of the BB capacitor sales
    started to decline upon introduction of the 545L capacitor.
    The jury also heard Presidio’s expert, Mr. Newman,
    explain that products other than the BB capacitors could
    not have met the demand if 545L capacitors were re-
    moved from the marketplace. Mr. Newman testified that
    sales of ATC’s two-piece 540L capacitors were declining
    prior to ATC’s launch of the 545L capacitor. He further
    discussed how both Presidio and ATC recognized that the
    market was moving from two-piece to one-piece designs.
    ATC argues customers would have turned to the two-
    piece DLI Opti-Cap capacitor had they not purchased
    545Ls. Mr. Newman testified that ATC did not view the
    Opti-Cap as competition for itself or Presidio. ATC com-
    munications show that during development of the 545L,
    ATC had not found any customers who liked DLI’s prod-
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                     16
    uct because “[m]echanially, it is difficult to work with and
    electrically, it does not perform as well as competitive
    devices (specifically ours and Presidio’s). So for all practi-
    cal purposes, DLI is not a major concern.” J.A. 1047–48,
    2384.
    The record contains substantial evidence to support
    the market’s migration away from a two-piece design,
    thus supporting the jury’s finding of no acceptable nonin-
    fringing substitutes. See Rite-Hite, 
    56 F.3d at 1545
    . This
    court therefore affirms the district court’s finding that
    Presidio satisfied the second Panduit factor. In sum, the
    record supports the jury’s lost profits verdict with sub-
    stantial evidence. This court has considered the remain-
    der of ATC’s arguments and does not find reversible error.
    V.
    On cross-appeal, Presidio contends the district court
    erred in denying a permanent injunction in light of its
    finding that the ’356 patent is not invalid and infringed by
    ATC’s 545L capacitors. Presidio and ATC both challenge
    the district court’s ongoing royalty determination,
    awarded in light of the court’s denial of a permanent
    injunction. Based on the four-factor test for permanent
    injunctions, the district court denied Presidio’s request for
    a permanent injunction. Specifically the trial court
    detected no irreparable injury or inadequacy of monetary
    damages. The court also found that the balance of hard-
    ships favored injunction, while the public interest tipped
    in ATC’s favor. The trial court noted that “substantial
    evidence supported the jury’s finding that demand existed
    for the BB capacitors, which compete with the 545L
    capacitors.” With this direct competition in the same
    market, the district court still opined that ATC was not a
    direct competitor for purposes of finding irreparable
    injury. Presidio, 
    723 F. Supp. 2d at 1326
    , 1336–37. The
    17                   PRESIDIO COMPONENTS    v. AMERICAN TECH
    tension created by acknowledging competition for one
    purpose but not for another, combined with Presidio’s
    other evidence showing irreparable injury, shows that the
    district court clearly erred by dismissing the irreparable
    injury evident on this record.
    Of course the axiomatic remedy for trespass on prop-
    erty rights is removal of the trespasser. See 
    35 U.S.C. § 154
    (a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain … a grant to the
    patentee … of the right to exclude others from making,
    using, offering for sale, or selling the invention ….”).
    However, particularly with an eye to protecting the public
    interest, the decision to deny a permanent injunction
    remains within the equitable discretion of the district
    courts. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 
    547 U.S. 388
    ,
    391 (2006). A trial court, though, can misapply and abuse
    that discretion with “a clear error of judgment in weighing
    relevant factors or . . . an error of law or clearly erroneous
    factual findings.” lnnogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 
    512 F.3d 1363
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Joy Techs., Inc.
    v. Flakt, Inc., 
    6 F.3d 770
    , 772 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). “To the
    extent the court’s decision is based upon an issue of law,
    we review that issue de novo.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v.
    Apotex, lnc., 
    470 F.3d 1368
    , 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
    Equity sets forth the four-factor test for removal of a
    trespasser from property infringement. eBay, 
    547 U.S. at 391
    . This analysis proceeds with an eye to the “long
    tradition of equity practice” granting “injunctive relief
    upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of
    patent cases.” 
    Id. at 395
     (Roberts, C.J., concurring). This
    historical practice of protecting the right to exclude
    through injunctive relief is not surprising given the
    difficulties of protecting this right solely with monetary
    relief. Indeed, a calculating infringer may thus decide to
    risk a delayed payment to obtain use of valuable property
    without prior negotiation or the owner’s permission.
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                    18
    While a patentee is not entitled to an injunction in every
    case, “it does not follow that courts should entirely ignore
    the fundamental nature of patents as property rights
    granting the owner the right to exclude.” Robert Bosch
    LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 
    659 F.3d 1142
    , 1149 (Fed. Cir.
    2011). This court reviews the district court’s decision to
    impose an ongoing royalty, in light of its denial of a per-
    manent injunction, for abuse of discretion. Paice LLC v.
    Toyota Motor Corp., 
    504 F.3d 1293
    , 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
    As noted, the district court’s finding of no competition
    for the purpose of irreparable harm conflicts with the
    clear finding of competition for the purpose of awarding
    damages. Indeed the record shows direct and substantial
    competition between the parties. The trial court found
    that ATC and Presidio shared some of the same custom-
    ers, that the two products occupy the same markets, and
    that Presidio was at times seen as ATC’s only true com-
    petitor. Presidio, 
    723 F. Supp. 2d at
    1336–37. Indeed, in
    its damages award the jury also found this direct competi-
    tion. 
    Id. at 1327
    . As discussed above, the record contains
    substantial evidence to support these findings. To briefly
    recount, the record shows that Presidio and ATC were
    competing for the same customers in the same markets.
    In fact, ATC considered Presidio the most significant, if
    not the only, competitor for the 545L capacitors. See, e.g.,
    J.A. 1054, 1136, 2359, 2384. For example, during the
    545L capacitor’s development, the named inventor of
    ATC’s ’458 patent reported to ATC’s Vice President of RF
    Engineering that “[u]nfortunately, our original belief that
    Presidio was not a threat because of their small size and
    limited production capability was totally wrong.” J.A.
    2384.
    In addition to the jury’s implicit finding of direct com-
    petition, Presidio showed that it was unwilling to license
    the ’356 patent. The district court correctly found Presi-
    19                   PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH
    dio’s unwillingness to license favored finding irreparable
    injury. In light of the record evidence of direct competi-
    tion, the district court placed too much weight on Presi-
    dio’s failure to practice the ’356 patent. While Presidio
    conceded during this litigation that its BB capacitors do
    not practice the ’356 patent, this does not prevent Presidio
    from receiving injunctive relief, as the district court
    properly noted. Even without practicing the claimed
    invention, the patentee can suffer irreparable injury.
    Direct competition in the same market is certainly one
    factor suggesting strongly the potential for irreparable
    harm without enforcement of the right to exclude. See
    Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 
    543 F.3d 683
    , 703
    (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
    Here, Lambert Devoe testified that the BB capacitor
    is one of Presidio’s main products. Presidio also alleges
    that ATC dissected and analyzed its BB capacitors while
    developing the 545L capacitor. Independent of any al-
    leged reverse engineering, ATC analyzed the published
    ’356 patent application during development of the 545L
    capacitor before filing its non-provisional ’458 patent
    application. Further, the PTO used Presidio’s ’356 patent
    application as prior art against ATC’s application. This
    indicates, as the jury implicitly found, the BB and 545L
    capacitors embody similar technology and are close com-
    petitors. The jury also awarded lost profit damages, while
    expressly finding a reasonable royalty not applicable.
    J.A. 292. Thus, the jury necessarily found ATC’s 545L
    capacitor sales caused Presidio to lose BB capacitor sales.
    This squarely supports a finding of irreparable harm.
    The record shows that ATC did not present sufficient
    evidence to overcome Presidio’s showing of irreparable
    injury inflicted by ATC’s entry into the market. These
    findings, combined with Presidio’s unwillingness to li-
    cense the ’356 patent, reveal that the district court clearly
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                   20
    erred in finding no irreparable injury. See Robert Bosch,
    
    659 F.3d at 1151
     (holding district court erred in not
    finding irreparable harm when the parties were direct
    competitors, patentee showed lost market share and
    access to potential customers, and defendant lacked
    financial stability).
    Because the district court clearly erred in finding no
    irreparable injury, this court concludes that the district
    court abused its discretion when it denied Presidio a
    permanent injunction. See lnnogenetics, 
    512 F.3d at 1379
    . Accordingly, this court vacates the district court’s
    denial of Presidio’s motion for a permanent injunction and
    remands for a re-weighing of the four-factors consistent
    with this opinion. This court also vacates the district
    court’s ongoing royalty determination, which was predi-
    cated on the district court’s denial of a permanent injunc-
    tion.
    VI.
    Both ATC and Presidio challenge portions of the dis-
    trict court’s findings regarding ATC’s false marking
    counterclaim under 
    35 U.S.C. § 292
    . ATC contends that
    the district court erred in declining to grant JMOL over-
    turning the jury’s finding of no false marking before
    October, 24, 2008. Presidio asserts that the district court
    erred in granting summary judgment of liability for false
    marking after Presidio’s October 24, 2008 admission that
    the BB capacitors are not covered by the ’356 patent.
    ATC and Presidio both argue that the district court
    abused its discretion in determining the fine for Presidio’s
    false marking after October 24, 2008. This court reviews
    false marking fines for abuse of discretion. Forest Group,
    Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 
    590 F.3d 1295
    , 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
    This court reviews the grant of summary judgment with-
    21                    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS    v. AMERICAN TECH
    out deference. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 
    424 F.3d 1374
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
    As an initial matter, this court must determine
    whether recent changes to the false marking statute
    apply to this appeal. While ATC’s appeal was pending
    before this court, the President signed into law the Leahy-
    Smith America Invents Act, Pub.L. No. 112–29, § 16, 
    125 Stat. 284
    , 329 (2011) (“AIA”). The AIA made several
    changes to the false marking statute, 
    35 U.S.C. § 292
    ,
    including eliminating the qui tam provision supporting
    ATC’s false marking claim. 
    Id.
     Under the amended
    statute, a person must show they have “suffered a com-
    petitive injury” to recover false marking damages. 
    Id.
    § 16(b)(2); see also 
    35 U.S.C. § 292
    (b). ATC contends that
    these AIA amendments do not apply to its false marking
    counterclaim because the claim was not pending on
    September 16, 2011, when these AIA amendments were
    enacted.
    Because the amendments to the false marking statute
    apply retroactively, they cover this appeal. An Act must
    clearly indicate its retroactive application. See Landgraf
    v. USI Film Prods., 
    511 U.S. 244
    , 272-73 (1994). Section
    16 of the AIA states in relevant part:
    (b) FALSE MARKING—
    (1) CIVIL PENALTY.—Section 292(a) of title 35,
    United States, Code, is amended by adding at the
    end the following: “Only the United States may
    sue for the penalty authorized by this subsection.”
    (2) CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES.—Subsection
    (b) of section 292 of title 35, United States Code, is
    amended to read as follows: “(b) A person who has
    suffered a competitive injury as a result of a viola-
    tion of this section may file a civil action in a dis-
    PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH                     22
    trict court of the United States for recovery of
    damages adequate to compensate for the injury.”
    …
    (4) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made
    by this subsection shall apply to all cases, without
    exception, that are pending on, or commenced on
    or after, the date of the enactment of this Act.
    The statute’s “shall apply to all cases, without exception”
    language shows a clear intent to preclude all private false
    marking cases, including cases pending in this appellate
    court. The AIA’s legislative history confirms that mean-
    ing. 157 Cong. Rec. S1360–02 at S1372 (Sen. Kyl) (“It is
    anticipated that courts will find the same clarity in the
    language of section 2(k)(2) [of this law], and will apply the
    revised section 292(b) to cases pending at any level of
    appeal or review.”); see also generally Boumediene v.
    Bush, 
    553 U.S. 723
    , 738–39 (2008) (employing legislative
    history in determining whether legislation was intended
    to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain cer-
    tain habeas corpus actions pending at time of enactment).
    In sum, this court applies the AIA’s false marking
    amendments to this case. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
    Inc., 
    514 U.S. 211
    , 226 (1995) (“When a law makes clear
    that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that
    law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were
    rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the
    outcome accordingly.”). Thus, ATC does not have a claim
    under amended 
    35 U.S.C. § 292
    (a) because this statute
    only allows the United States to bring a false marking
    claim. This court does not reach the question whether
    ATC has a claim under the amended § 292(b) because the
    district court has not had an opportunity to address it in
    the first instance. This court has reviewed ATC and
    23                   PRESIDIO COMPONENTS   v. AMERICAN TECH
    Presidio’s other arguments directed toward the district
    court’s false marking findings and it finds no reversible
    error.
    Under the amendments to 
    35 U.S.C. § 292
    , ATC’s ap-
    peal of its qui tam false marking counterclaim is moot.
    This court vacates the district court’s judgment in favor of
    ATC and against Presidio on ATC’s claim of false mark-
    ing. This court does not disturb the district court’s under-
    lying determinations supporting its false marking
    judgment.
    VII.
    For the foregoing reasons, this case is remanded to
    the district court for further proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND
    REMANDED
    COSTS
    Costs to Presidio.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-1789

Citation Numbers: 702 F.3d 1351, 105 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1417, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25938, 2012 WL 6602786

Judges: Rader, Plager, Wallach

Filed Date: 12/19/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (22)

Harolyn Pavao, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of ... , 307 F.3d 915 ( 2002 )

Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc. , 554 F.3d 1010 ( 2009 )

Presidio Components Inc. v. American Technical Ceramics ... , 723 F. Supp. 2d 1284 ( 2010 )

King Instrument Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-... , 767 F.2d 853 ( 1985 )

rite-hite-corporation-acme-dock-specialists-inc-allied-equipment-corp , 56 F.3d 1538 ( 1995 )

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. , 115 S. Ct. 1447 ( 1995 )

Joy Technologies, Inc., and A/s Niro Atomizer, Involuntary ... , 6 F.3d 770 ( 1993 )

Innogenetics, N v. v. Abbott Laboratories , 512 F.3d 1363 ( 2008 )

Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. , 504 F.3d 1293 ( 2007 )

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. , 543 F.3d 683 ( 2008 )

Bayer Ag and Bayer Corporation v. Elan Pharmaceutical ... , 212 F.3d 1241 ( 2000 )

Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc. , 575 F.2d 1152 ( 1978 )

Doan v. United States , 202 F.2d 674 ( 1953 )

Twm Manufacturing Co., Inc., Appellee/cross-Appellants v. ... , 789 F.2d 895 ( 1986 )

Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc. , 470 F.3d 1368 ( 2006 )

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. , 632 F.3d 1292 ( 2011 )

Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. , 580 F.3d 1301 ( 2009 )

Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, l.p. , 424 F.3d 1374 ( 2005 )

Joan Hangarter v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance ... , 373 F.3d 998 ( 2004 )

Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co. , 590 F.3d 1295 ( 2009 )

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