Inre: Giannelli ( 2014 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    IN RE RAYMOND GIANNELLI
    ______________________
    2013-1167
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board, in Serial No.
    10/378,261.
    ______________________
    Decided: January 13, 2014
    ______________________
    MICHAEL LAWRENCE OLIVERIO, Novak, Druce, Connol-
    ly, Bove & Quigg, LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts, argued
    for appellant.
    JEREMIAH S. HELM, Associate Solicitor, United States
    Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia,
    argued for appellee. With him on the brief were NATHAN
    K. KELLEY, Deputy Solicitor, and AMY J. NELSON, Associ-
    ate Solicitor.
    ______________________
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and MOORE, Circuit
    Judges.
    LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
    Raymond Giannelli (“Giannelli”) appeals from the
    decision of the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office (“PTO”) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the
    2                                          IN RE: GIANNELLI
    Board”) affirming the rejection of claims 1–25 of U.S.
    Patent Application 10/378,261 (Mar. 3, 2003) (the “’261
    application”) under 
    35 U.S.C. § 103
    (a) 1 as obvious over
    U.S. Patent 5,997,447 (the “’447 patent”). Ex Parte Gian-
    nelli, No. 2010-007582, slip op. at 5 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 29,
    2012) (“Board Decision”). Because the Board erred in
    concluding that the claims of the ’261 application would
    have been obvious in view of the ’447 patent, we reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    Giannelli filed the ’261 application, entitled “Rowing
    Machine,” in March 2003. The ’261 application discloses
    an exercise machine on which a user can perform a row-
    ing motion against a selected resistance, thereby
    strengthening the back muscles. ’261 application, at 2–3.
    Claim 1, as amended, is representative of the claims
    on appeal and reads as follows:
    1. A row exercise machine comprising an input as-
    sembly including a first handle portion adapted to
    be moved from a first position to a second position
    by a pulling force exerted by a user on the first
    handle portion in a rowing motion, the input as-
    1  At the time, the statute provided that:
    (a) A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differ-
    ences between the subject matter sought to be pa-
    tented and the prior art are such that the subject
    matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
    time the invention was made to a person having
    ordinary skill . . . .
    
    35 U.S.C. § 103
    (a) (2006). This provision has since been
    amended. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”),
    Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(c), 
    125 Stat. 284
    , 287–88 (2011).
    However, because the ’261 application was filed before
    March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA § 103(a) applies. See AIA,
    125 Stat. at 293.
    IN RE: GIANNELLI                                          3
    sembly defining a substantially linear path for the
    first handle portion from the first position to the
    second position.
    Response to Office Action, No. 10/378,261, at 2 (Apr. 12,
    2006).
    The specification teaches that the rowing machine’s
    arms travel in a substantially linear path as the handles
    are pulled. ’261 application, at 3–4. An exemplary meth-
    od of operation described in the specification depicts the
    user as pulling the machine’s handles to overcome a
    selected resistance. Id. at 9. Figure 4 of the ’261 applica-
    tion, reproduced below, shows a left side view of an em-
    bodiment of the row exercise machine.
    ’261 application, fig. 4.
    4                                           IN RE: GIANNELLI
    The PTO examiner initially rejected all the original
    claims of the ’261 application, finding the claims antici-
    pated by the ’447 patent.
    The ’447 patent, entitled “Chest Press Apparatus for
    Exercising Regions of the Upper Body,” describes a chest
    press exercise machine where the user performs the
    exercise by pushing on the handles to overcome the se-
    lected resistance. ’447 patent col. 11 ll. 39–50. Figure 1 of
    the ’447 patent, reproduced below, depicts an angled view
    of the chest press apparatus.
    ’447 patent fig. 1.
    In response to the rejection, Giannelli amended the
    claims to add the limitation “by a pulling force exerted by
    a user on the first handle portion in a rowing motion,” but
    the examiner again rejected the ’261 application under 
    35 U.S.C. § 102
    (b) and 103(a) in view of the ’447 patent. The
    rejection was made final.
    IN RE: GIANNELLI                                          5
    Giannelli appealed the examiner’s rejection to the
    Board. The Board affirmed the obviousness rejection and
    did not address the anticipation rejection. Board Decision
    at 5. The Board characterized the dispositive issue as
    being whether the chest press machine of the ’447 patent
    was “capable of being used by exerting a pulling force on
    the handles in a rowing motion.” 
    Id. at 3
    . The Board
    deemed it reasonable that a user could face the handles of
    the prior art chest press machine and exert a pulling force
    on its handles in a rowing motion. 
    Id.
     The Board noted
    that the recitation of a new intended use for an old prod-
    uct did not make a claim to that old product patentable,
    and consequently determined that the ’261 application
    simply recited the new intended use of rowing for the ’447
    patent chest press apparatus. 
    Id.
     at 3–4. The Board
    further found that even though using the ’447 patent’s
    invention as a rowing machine “may not fully achieve the
    ‘purpose’ of [the ’447] apparatus,” Giannelli had not
    shown that the apparatus could not be used in such a
    manner. 
    Id. at 4
    . In the Board’s view, Giannelli thus
    failed to rebut the Board’s showing of capability of pulling
    the handles. 
    Id.
     The Board also found that the ’261
    application’s claimed “substantially linear path” encom-
    passed the “slightly curvilinear path” disclosed in the ’447
    patent Abstract. 
    Id. at 5
    .
    Giannelli appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(4)(A).
    DISCUSSION
    We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo, In re
    Elsner, 
    381 F.3d 1125
    , 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and the
    Board’s factual findings underlying those determinations
    for substantial evidence, In re Gartside, 
    203 F.3d 1305
    ,
    1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A finding is supported by substan-
    tial evidence if a reasonable mind might accept the evi-
    dence to support the finding. Consol. Edison Co. v.
    NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938). Obviousness is a ques-
    6                                           IN RE: GIANNELLI
    tion of law, based on underlying factual findings. Graham
    v. John Deere Co., 
    383 U.S. 1
    , 17–18 (1966); Elsner, 
    381 F.3d at 1127
    . A claim is invalid for obviousness if, to one
    of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, “the differences
    between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
    prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
    would have been obvious at the time the invention was
    made . . . .” 
    35 U.S.C. § 103
    (a) (2006); see also KSR Int’l
    Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
    550 U.S. 398
    , 406–07 (2007).
    Giannelli argues that the Board’s decision sustaining
    the examiner’s rejection is based on an incorrect assertion
    that the chest press machine disclosed in the ’447 patent
    could be used as a rowing machine rather than consider-
    ing how it would be used. Giannelli contends that the
    Board erred in concluding that the examiner had met the
    burden of establishing a case of prima facie obviousness
    over the cited ’447 reference because he failed to explain
    how or why a user could possibly use the prior art chest
    press machine to perform a rowing motion. The Director
    responds that claim 1 only requires an exercise machine
    with handles that can be pulled. The Director contends
    that the Board correctly found that the chest press ma-
    chine described in the ’447 patent either disclosed or
    rendered obvious all of the limitations of the ’261 applica-
    tion claims. The Director further contends that the Board
    correctly held that Giannelli did not rebut the finding of
    capability because he did not provide any persuasive
    argument or evidence to show that the chest press ma-
    chine described in the ’447 patent could not be used to
    perform the rowing exercise.
    The Board did not review and decide the anticipation
    issue, so neither will we. Thus, it is obviousness that is
    before us, and we conclude that the Board erred in con-
    cluding that the claims of the ’261 application would have
    been obvious in view of the ’447 patent. The Board prem-
    ised its conclusion on its theory that the machine de-
    IN RE: GIANNELLI                                              7
    scribed in the ’447 patent was “capable of” having its
    handles pulled.
    The PTO bears the initial burden of showing a prima
    facie case of obviousness. In re Sullivan, 
    498 F.3d 1345
    ,
    1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When a prima facie case of obvi-
    ousness is made, the burden then shifts to the applicant
    to come forward with evidence and/or argument support-
    ing patentability. In re Glaug, 
    283 F.3d 1335
    , 1338 (Fed.
    Cir. 2002). The PTO did not carry its burden in this case.
    The claims of the ’261 application specifically require
    a “first handle portion adapted to be moved from a first
    position to a second position by a pulling force . . . in a
    rowing motion.”          Response to Office Action, No.
    10/378,261, at 2 (Apr. 12, 2006). We have noted that, “the
    phrase ‘adapted to’ is frequently used to mean ‘made to,’
    ‘designed to,’ or ‘configured to,’ . . .” Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v.
    Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 
    672 F.3d 1335
    , 1349 (Fed. Cir.
    2012). Although the phrase can also mean “‘capable of’ or
    ‘suitable for,’” 
    id.,
     here the written description makes
    clear that “adapted to,” as used in the ’261 application,
    has a narrower meaning, viz., that the claimed machine is
    designed or constructed to be used as a rowing machine
    whereby a pulling force is exerted on the handles.
    The written description of the ’261 application de-
    scribes how the position of the handles relative to the
    primary and secondary lever arms and the resistance
    mechanism renders them “adapted” to be moved by the
    user’s pulling force. For example, the application states
    that the exercise machine “enables a user to maintain
    biomechanical alignment of the user’s wrist and forearm
    during performance of the exercise, while maintaining a
    consistent resistance applied to the muscles, in the stabil-
    ity of an exercise machine.” ’261 application, at 3. The
    location of those handles relative to the other components
    is one of their structural attributes that enables perfor-
    mance of the rowing motion against the selected re-
    8                                             IN RE: GIANNELLI
    sistance. ’261 application, at 4 (“The declining, substan-
    tially linear path [of the pulled handles] enables the user
    to maintain proper biomechanical alignment of the force
    angle being applied to the grip. This allows for a fairly
    consistent torque application at the shoulder throughout
    the range of motion of the exercise.”). Consequently, the
    relevant question before the Board was whether the
    apparatus described in the ’447 patent was “‘made to,’
    ‘designed to,’ or ‘configured to,’” allow the user to perform
    a rowing exercise by pulling on the handles as claimed in
    the ’261 application.
    There is no question that the ’447 patent does not
    have handles that are adapted to be pulled in a rowing
    motion. The ’447 patent’s written description describes
    the exercise machine’s structure as allowing a movement
    that “simulates as natural a human musculoskeletal
    outward pushing motion as possible while maintaining
    proper biomechanical alignment of the user’s joints.” ’447
    patent col. 11 ll. 61–64; see also 
    id.
     col. 2 ll. 37–41 (stating
    that the position of the machine and handles allows the
    exercising user to “maintain the proper biomechanical
    alignment of the joints” and “the proper alignment of the
    wrists”). The Board stated that using the ’447 patent as a
    rowing machine was a new intended use of the prior art
    apparatus. Board Decision at 4. In the context of the
    claimed rowing machine, however, the mere capability of
    pulling the handles is not the inquiry that the Board
    should have made; it should have determined whether it
    would have been obvious to modify the prior art appa-
    ratus to arrive at the claimed rowing machine. Because
    the Board determined that the machine claimed in the
    ’261 application would have been obvious by merely
    showing that a rowing exercise could be performed on the
    machine disclosed in the ’447 patent, and not whether it
    was obvious to modify the chest press machine to contain
    handles “adapted to” perform the rowing motion by pull-
    ing on them, the Board erred in concluding that the
    IN RE: GIANNELLI                                          9
    examiner had met his initial burden of establishing a case
    of prima facie obviousness. In re Sullivan, 
    498 F.3d at 1351
    .
    Physical capability alone does not render obvious that
    which is contraindicated. And, on this record, it is not
    obvious to modify a machine with handles designed to be
    pushed to one with handles adapted to be pulled. A chest
    press machine is not a rowing machine, nor has evidence
    been shown that it is. In fact, anyone who has used
    exercise machines knows that a sure-fire way to cause
    injury is to use a machine in a manner not intended by
    the manufacturer.
    Because the Board’s analysis began with the premise
    that “adapted to” meant “capable of,” its affirmance of the
    examiner’s rejection also contained no explanation why or
    how a person having ordinary skill in the art would
    modify the prior art chest press machine to arrive at the
    apparatus of the ’261 application. And because the initial
    burden was not met, Giannelli was not obligated to sub-
    mit additional evidence to rebut the examiner’s findings
    of pulling capability. See In re Rijckaert, 
    9 F.3d 1531
    ,
    1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Only if that burden [of establish-
    ing a prima facie case] is met, does the burden of coming
    forward with evidence or argument shift to the appli-
    cant.”). The Board thus erred in affirming the conclusion
    of the examiner that the ’447 patent apparatus rendered
    obvious the claimed invention of the ’261 application.
    As indicated earlier, the Board did not review the ex-
    aminer’s anticipation rejection, so neither will we. How-
    ever, as we are reversing the Board’s obviousness
    conclusion, it is hard to see how these claims could have
    been anticipated by the cited ’447 patent.
    Finally, we do not need to address the distinction be-
    tween the “substantially linear” path claimed in the ’261
    application and the “slightly curvilinear” path disclosed in
    the ’447 patent. At oral argument, counsel for Giannelli
    10                                       IN RE: GIANNELLI
    conceded that the two phrases are not inconsistent. Oral
    Argument at 2:50, In re Giannelli, No. 2013-1167, availa-
    ble    at     http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
    recordings/13-1167/all.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board
    affirming the final rejection of the ’261 application’s
    claims 1–25 is reversed.
    REVERSED