Glaxosmithkline LLC v. Banner Pharmacaps, Inc. ( 2014 )


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  • United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC
    (formerly known as SmithKline Beecham
    Corporation),
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC. AND
    IMPAX LABORATORIES, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    AND
    ROXANE LABORATORIES, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    AND
    MYLAN INC. AND
    MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    AND
    WATSON LABORATORIES, INC. FLORIDA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ______________________
    2013-1593, -1594, -1595, -1598
    ______________________
    2         GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware in Nos. 11-CV-0046, 11-CV-0542 and
    11-CV-0789, Judge Richard G. Andrews.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 24, 2014
    ______________________
    WILLIAM F. LEE, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
    Dorr, LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts, argued for plaintiff-
    appellee. With him on the brief were LISA J. PIROZZOLO
    and SARAH R. FRAZIER, of Boston, Massachusetts;
    WILLIAM G. MCELWAIN, THOMAS G. SAUNDERS and
    MATTHEW GUARNIERI, of Washington, DC; and
    CHRISTOPHER R. NOYES, of New York, New York.
    DEANNE E. MAYNARD, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, of
    Washington, DC, argued for all defendants-appellants.
    With her on the brief for defendants-appellants Banner
    Pharmacaps, Inc., et al., were MARC A. HEARRON, of
    Washington, DC and PARISA JORJANI, of San Francisco,
    California.   Of counsel on the brief were C. KYLE
    MUSGROVE and MICHAEL M. SHEN, Haynes and Boone,
    LLP, of Washington, DC. On the brief for Roxane Labora-
    tories, Inc. were KENNETH G. SCHULER and MARC N.
    ZUBICK, Latham & Watkins LLP, of Chicago, Illinois; and
    DARRYLL H. STEENSMA, of San Diego, California. On the
    brief for Watson Laboratories, Inc. – Florida were GARY E.
    HOOD and MARK T. DEMING, Polsinelli, PC, of Chicago,
    Illinois. On the brief for Mylan Inc., et al. were JAMES H.
    WALLACE, JR., MARK A. PACELLA, and LUCY M. STARK,
    Wiley Rein, LLP, of Washington, DC.
    ______________________
    Before O’MALLEY, WALLACH, and TARANTO, Circuit
    Judges.
    GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.           3
    TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
    Plaintiff GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK”) sued Banner
    Pharmacaps, Inc., Impax Laboratories, Inc., Roxane
    Laboratories, Inc., Mylan Inc., Mylan Pharmaceuticals,
    Inc., and Watson Laboratories, Inc.–Florida (collectively,
    “Defendants”).     Invoking 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), GSK
    alleged that drug products containing the molecule dutas-
    teride that Defendants propose to market fall within
    claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,565,467, which covers dutas-
    teride and its pharmaceutically acceptable solvates. All
    Defendants stipulated to infringement, which is no longer
    an issue, but alleged that the asserted claims were invalid
    for anticipation, lack of utility, lack of enablement, and
    inadequacy of the written description. After a three-day
    bench trial, the district court issued an opinion concluding
    that Defendants did not prove the asserted claims invalid.
    GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Banner Pharmacaps, Inc., No.
    11-CV-046, 
    2013 WL 4082232
    (D. Del. Aug. 9, 2013).
    Defendants appeal the rejection of their written-
    description challenge. Their appeal presents only one
    contention—that “solvate” is not adequately described,
    whether construed as Defendants urge or as the district
    court construed it. We affirm, without resolving the
    claim-construction dispute.
    BACKGROUND
    This case involves claims to the chemical compound
    dutasteride and its pharmaceutically acceptable solvates.
    Claim 1 of the ’467 patent, the only independent claim,
    reads, “17β-N-(2,5-bis(Trifluoromethyl))phenylcarbamoyl-
    4-aza-5α-androst-1-en-3-one or a pharmaceutically ac-
    ceptable solvate thereof.” ’467 patent, col. 16, lines 4-6.
    The parties agree that dutasteride is the molecule identi-
    fied before “or a pharmaceutically acceptable solvate
    thereof.” The other asserted claims all recite “[a] phar-
    maceutical formulation comprising” the “compound of
    claim 1,” subject to further restrictions having no effect on
    4         GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.
    the issue presented here. See 
    id. at col.
    16, lines 7-20
    (dependent claims 2 through 5).
    Dutasteride “is useful in the treatment of androgen
    responsive diseases.” ’467 patent, col. 10, lines 19-20.
    Androgens are a class of hormones—with testosterone
    “the major circulating androgen”—implicated in a number
    of diseases, including “benign prostatic hyperplasia,
    prostate cancer, acne, male pattern baldness and hir-
    sutism.” 
    Id. at col.
    1, lines 18-19, 55-60. In some target
    tissues, including prostate and skin tissue, testosterone
    produces certain effects by first being converted to dihy-
    drotestosterone. See 
    id. at col.
    1, lines 15-25. Dutasteride
    inhibits the enzymes that catalyze the conversion and
    thus mitigates some of testosterone’s physiological effects,
    which is sometimes medically desirable. See 
    id. The asserted
    claims cover not only dutasteride, but
    also any “pharmaceutically acceptable solvate thereof.” A
    “solvate,” by definition, is something that originates in a
    “solution,” which is a mixture of two substances: a “solute”
    dissolved in a “solvent.” Salt water is a solution, in which
    salt is the solute and water the solvent. A solvate is a
    molecule (a) consisting of a complex made up of solute
    molecules and solvent molecules (b) resulting from the
    solution. The parties agree on that much, and also on the
    proposition that, at least frequently, a solvate complex is
    “crystalline,” a purely structural description referring to
    the regular, periodic arrangement of the constituent
    molecules or atoms. The parties disagree about whether
    “solvate” (in the context of this patent) means only such
    crystalline complexes—a dispute we need not resolve.
    Dutasteride has been proven effective in treating be-
    nign prostatic hyperplasia, otherwise known as enlarge-
    ment of the prostate gland. GSK markets Avodart® and
    Jalyn™, which contain dutasteride and are approved by
    the Food and Drug Administration to treat symptoms of
    benign prostatic hyperplasia. Each Defendant filed at
    GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.            5
    least one Abbreviated New Drug Application under 21
    U.S.C. § 355(j), seeking FDA approval to market a generic
    version of Avodart® or Jalyn™. Each ANDA included a
    certification under § 355(j)(2)(A) that the ’467 patent is
    invalid, is unenforceable, or would not be infringed by
    marketing of the proposed generic product. As authorized
    by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), GSK responded by suing Defend-
    ants for infringement of its ’467 patent.
    The district court construed “pharmaceutically ac-
    ceptable” to mean “[s]uitable for use when administered
    to the recipient thereof as a pharmaceutical.” Claim
    Construction Opinion at 8, GlaxoSmithKline LLC, No. 11-
    CV-046 (D. Del. Nov. 15, 2012). The court also construed
    “solvate” (of dutasteride), which is the claim term at issue
    here. GSK and Defendants disagreed about whether the
    term refers only to crystalline complexes of solute and
    solvent molecules—that is, of dutasteride (the solute) and
    some solvent—or, instead, also includes non-crystalline
    complexes. GSK argued for the broader construction,
    Defendants for the narrower. The district court acknowl-
    edged Defendants’ “considerable extrinsic evidence” that,
    in the pharmaceutical field, “solvate” is limited to crystal-
    line complexes, no matter how created, but it concluded
    that the specification of this particular patent “direct[ly]
    contradict[s]” any such narrow usage. See 
    id. at 7-8
    (relying on ’467 patent, col. 3, line 58, through col. 4, line
    12). The court construed a “solvate” of dutasteride to
    mean
    [a] complex formed by dutasteride with a solvent
    in which dutasteride is reacted or from which it is
    precipitated or crystallized.
    
    Id. at 4.
    Despite potential confusion about the meaning of
    this language, including about what “it” refers to, the
    parties agree in interpreting the district court’s construc-
    tion to refer to three processes of forming dutasteride
    solvates—by a reaction of dutasteride with a solvent; by
    6         GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.
    precipitation of a complex from a solution of dutasteride
    and a solvent; by crystallization of a complex from a
    solution of dutasteride and a solvent—with the resulting
    complex not required to be crystalline.
    Defendants stipulated to infringement and have not
    raised any infringement issue on appeal (not even condi-
    tionally, should we reverse the district court’s claim
    construction in deciding the issue they do raise on ap-
    peal). The only issue before us is Defendants’ invalidity
    challenge asserting the inadequacy of the written descrip-
    tion, a challenge that the district court rejected—along
    with invalidity challenges asserting anticipation, lack of
    utility, and lack of an enabling disclosure—after a three-
    day bench trial held after the stipulation of infringement.
    Defendants did not dispute that dutasteride is adequately
    described: it is precisely identified by structure. Instead,
    they argued that “solvates” of dutasteride, a limitation in
    all asserted claims, lacked adequate support in the writ-
    ten description. Specifically, Defendants argued that the
    written description failed to describe the crystalline form
    of solvate or, more generally, a wide enough range of the
    solvates included in the district court’s construction,
    which need not be crystalline and could be produced
    through reaction, precipitation, or crystallization.
    Addressing the adequacy of the written description,
    the district court made various findings, some focused on
    solvate formation and some on determining which solv-
    ates were therapeutically effective. See GlaxoSmithKline
    LLC v. Banner Pharmacaps, Inc., No. 11-CV-046, 
    2013 WL 4082232
    , at *2-3 (D. Del. Aug. 9, 2013) (findings of
    fact). It found that dutasteride is “the key structural
    feature of the solvate” and what “distinguish[es] the ’467
    [p]atent from the prior art.” 
    Id. at *2,
    8. It found that
    solvate formation “has been known in the art for over 100
    years,” that dutasteride is a steroid, that “[s]teroids in
    particular have been known to be prone to solvate for-
    mation since 1983,” and that “the universe of solvents
    GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.           7
    thought to be pharmaceutically acceptable was well-
    known and relatively small.” 
    Id. at *2,
    6. The court noted
    that “it [was] difficult or even impossible to predict
    whether a particular solvate form will offer bioavailabil-
    ity, at least prior to the solvate’s actual formation,” but
    found that methods to determine the solubility of an
    already formed solvate “were well-known and routine in
    the art” and “could be done in less than a week.” 
    Id. at *6-7
    (emphasis added).
    The district court concluded that Defendants failed to
    prove the inadequacy of the written description. Accord-
    ing to the district court, “[t]here is no reason why a person
    skilled in the art would not credit a patentee with posses-
    sion of a solvate merely because the patentee did not
    disclose solvates formed by each solvation pro-
    cess,” i.e., reaction, precipitation, crystallization. 
    Id. at *5.
    The district court characterized Example 3D—which
    describes dissolving dutasteride in liquid propylene
    glycol, see ’467 patent, col. 15, lines 21-25—as identifying
    a “reacted” solvate. 
    Id. at *7-8.
    The court found the
    example, in addition to what was known in the art, “suffi-
    cient to meet the written description requirement.” 
    Id. The district
    court rejected not only Defendants’ writ-
    ten-description challenge but also their remaining inva-
    lidity arguments. In particular, based on extensive
    findings of fact, the court concluded that the patent
    enables a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and
    to use the full range of the claimed molecules. 
    Id. at *8-
    13. Defendants do not appeal that ruling.
    Defendants timely appealed, raising only a written-
    description issue here. We have jurisdiction under 28
    U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    This appeal presents a single issue: whether, under
    what is now 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), the written description of
    8         GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC    v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.
    the ’467 patent adequately supports the claims to “solv-
    ates” of dutasteride. Adequacy of the written description
    is a question of fact. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
    
    598 F.3d 1336
    , 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). After a
    bench trial, we review the district court’s findings of fact
    for clear error. Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 
    696 F.3d 1151
    , 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    Defendants have presented a limited issue. Although
    noting that the claimed solvates must be “pharmaceuti-
    cally acceptable,” Defendants’ brief does not argue that,
    even if the specification adequately describes “solvates,” it
    inadequately describes the pharmaceutically acceptable
    ones. There is no such contention, and there is no men-
    tion of the “pharmaceutically acceptable” language, in the
    statement of issues, in the (argument-summarizing)
    introduction and statement of the case, in the summary of
    the argument, or in any heading or subheading of the
    argument section of the brief. The only argument actual-
    ly developed in the brief is that there is no adequate
    description of “solvates,” whether that term is limited to
    crystalline structures (as Defendants argue) or covers
    crystalline and non-crystalline structures, produced
    through reaction with a solvent or precipitation or crystal-
    lization from a solution (as the parties understand the
    district court’s construction). We conclude that Defend-
    ants have not properly presented any other contention in
    this court, especially given the lack of elaboration on the
    distinct issues that would be raised by a written-
    description challenge to the phrase “pharmaceutically
    acceptable.”
    On the sole issue properly presented, we reject De-
    fendants’ challenge. Under either the district court’s
    claim construction or Defendants’ claim construction, the
    claim term “solvate” refers to a molecular complex defined
    by structure and by the process of creating it, not by what
    the molecule does. Under the district court’s construction,
    the structure is any complex of dutasteride and solvent,
    GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.          9
    not necessarily a crystalline complex, resulting from any
    of three processes: reaction with a solvent or precipitation
    or crystallization from a solution. Under Defendants’
    construction, the structure is a complex of dutasteride and
    a solvent in which the arrangement is crystalline, result-
    ing from crystallization out of a solution. In either event,
    the written description, which presents materially the
    same interpretive choice, describes the same class by
    identifying a particular structure obtained by particular
    processes. No matter which construction is adopted, the
    term “solvate” involves no performance property (the
    claimed compound need not perform an identified func-
    tion or produce an identified result) and hence raises no
    issue of insufficient structural, creation-process, or other
    descriptions to support such a property. In this situation,
    we affirm the district court’s finding that “solvate” is
    adequately described, without needing to choose between
    the offered constructions of “solvate.”
    The Detailed Description provides a description by
    structure and process of creation that matches the
    claimed term, whichever construction is preferable. It
    declares:
    Those skilled in the art of organic chemistry will
    appreciate that many organic compounds can
    form complexes with solvents in which they are
    reacted or from which they are precipitated or
    crystallized. These complexes are known as “solv-
    ates”. For example, a complex with water is
    known as a “hydrate”. Solvates of [dutasteride]
    are within the scope of the invention.
    It will also be appreciated by those skilled in or-
    ganic chemistry that many organic compounds
    can exist in more than one crystalline form. For
    example, crystalline form may vary from solvate
    to solvate. Thus, all crystalline forms of [dutas-
    teride] or the pharmaceutically acceptable solv-
    10         GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.
    ates thereof are within the scope of the present
    invention.
    ’467 patent, col. 3, line 58, through col. 4, line 12. That
    language defines the claimed genus by two properties.
    First, a solvate is a complex of dutasteride molecules and
    solvent molecules, with dutasteride being, as the district
    court found, “the key structural component.”           Glax-
    oSmithKline LLC, 
    2013 WL 4082232
    , at *2. Second, the
    structure is one that is created by an identified process—
    specifically, by dissolving dutasteride (the solute) in a
    solvent. Just as they dispute the claim construction, the
    parties dispute the precise meaning of this passage,
    including whether the resulting complex must be crystal-
    line and whether it must be produced by just one process
    or any of three (crystallization only, or any of reaction,
    precipitation, or crystallization). But under each side’s
    construction and reading of the specification, the descrip-
    tion matches the claim, and regardless of which side is
    right, the description remains entirely based on structure
    of the compound and its process of creation.
    We have no precedent under which this two-condition
    description, matching the claim scope, would be insuffi-
    cient. To the contrary, this court has repeatedly “ex-
    plained that an adequate written description requires a
    precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical
    name, physical properties, or other properties, of species
    falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the
    genus from other materials.” 
    Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350
    (emphasis added). Describing a complex of dutasteride
    and solvent molecules is an identification of “structural
    features commonly possessed by members of the genus
    that distinguish them from others,” allowing one of skill
    in the art to “visualize or recognize the identity of the
    members of the genus.” Regents of the Univ. of California
    v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
    119 F.3d 1559
    , 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997); cf.
    Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 
    647 F.3d 1353
    , 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding written descrip-
    GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.          11
    tion inadequate “[g]iven the absence of information re-
    garding structural characteristics of” the claimed genus).
    The structural identification here is further narrowed by
    requiring that the structure result from (one or any of
    three) identified processes. On the (related, though
    distinct) question of establishing conception, i.e., a defi-
    nite and permanent idea of the complete and operative
    invention, we have indicated that it can be enough to
    identify a compound “by its method of preparation.”
    Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 
    927 F.2d 1200
    , 1206
    (Fed. Cir. 1991); see Fiers v. Revel, 
    984 F.2d 1164
    , 1169
    (Fed. Cir. 1993); 
    id. at 1171
    (written-description analysis
    referring to earlier conception analysis).
    In this case, the claim is no broader in scope than the
    written description: the above-quoted passage from the
    written description matches the claim scope (whether
    they are narrow or broad, as the parties dispute). It is
    therefore quite different from the claims in Eli Lilly & Co.
    v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 
    619 F.3d 1329
    , 1344-
    45 (Fed. Cir. 2010), where the claim covered particle sizes
    before and after formulation into tablets, but the specifi-
    cation addressed only pre-formulation size. Critically,
    moreover, the claim term at issue, “solvate,” is not func-
    tional: to be a “solvate,” a compound need not produce a
    desired result or otherwise perform a certain function.
    The claim term and its corresponding description, howev-
    er broad, identify certain structures produced by certain
    processes. We have not required more for an adequate
    written description that matches claim scope. And we see
    no basis for doing so in the present context, where “the
    concept of solvation . . . has been known in the art for over
    100 years” and “[s]teroids in particular [such as dutaster-
    ide] have been known to be prone to solvate formation
    since 1983,” GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 
    2013 WL 4082232
    , at
    *2, 6, and it is now undisputed that the written descrip-
    tion enables a person of skill in the art to make and use
    the full claimed range of “solvates” of dutasteride.
    12        GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.
    The claims in this case, not involving functional claim
    language, do not present the fundamental difficulty
    presented by the claims in virtually all of the precedents
    on which Defendants rely. The claims in those cases used
    functional language: they “cover[ed] any compound later
    actually invented and determined to fall within the
    claim’s functional boundaries”; such language may “mere-
    ly recite a description of the problem to be solved [how to
    produce a desired result] while claiming all solutions to
    it.” 
    Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353
    . In the field of genetic inven-
    tions, our precedents have addressed claims that seek to
    distinguish members of the claimed genus by the shared
    performance property of encoding a particular enzyme or
    other product. See, e.g., Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoff-
    mann-La Roche Inc., 
    541 F.3d 1115
    , 1123-24 (Fed. Cir.
    2008) (claiming “recombinant plasmids that contain a
    DNA coding sequence that is broadly defined, and only by
    its function, viz., encoding DNA polymerase I”); Eli 
    Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562-63
    (claiming genetic material capable of
    “encod[ing] insulin” or “coding for human proinsulin”);
    
    Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171
    (claiming all DNA “that achieve[s]
    a result without defining what means will do so”). In
    other cases, the claimed performance property has been a
    compound’s ability to inhibit the action of a particular
    protein, see 
    Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340-41
    ; Univ. of Rochester
    v. G.D. Searle & Co., 
    358 F.3d 916
    , 918 (Fed. Cir. 2004), a
    compound’s ability to inhibit a particular medical compli-
    cation, see Boston Scientific 
    Corp., 647 F.3d at 1364
    , or an
    antibody’s ability to bind to a particular antigen, see
    Noelle v. Lederman, 
    355 F.3d 1343
    , 1349-50 (Fed. Cir.
    2004); In re Alonso, 
    545 F.3d 1015
    , 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
    Here, in contrast, under any of the parties’ preferred
    claim constructions, “solvates” of dutasteride are not
    distinguished by a particular performance property. The
    claim term does not assert coverage of yet-unidentified
    ways of achieving a desired result; it does not “attempt to
    preempt the future before it has arrived.” Fiers, 984 F.2d
    GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC   v. BANNER PHARMACAPS, INC.          13
    at 1171. This case thus sharply differs from those De-
    fendants invoke. In the circumstances of this case, we
    have no basis for reversing the district court’s finding that
    the written description conveys to the relevant skilled
    artisan that “the inventor[s] actually invented the inven-
    tion claimed.” 
    Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351
    .
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
    court’s rejection of Defendants’ written-description chal-
    lenge to the validity of the asserted claims of the ’467
    patent.
    AFFIRMED