Vanderbilt Univ. v. Icos Corp. ( 2010 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2009-1258
    VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ICOS CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Robert S. Brennan, Miles & Stockbridge P.C., of Baltimore, Maryland, argued for
    plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Donald E. English, Jr.; Kurt C. Rommel and
    James T. Carmichael, of McLean, Virginia. Of counsel were Leona Marx and David
    Williams, II, Vanderbilt University, of Nashville, Tennessee.
    Kevin M. Flowers, Marshall, Gerstein & Borun LLP, of Chicago, Illinois, argued for
    defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Thomas I. Ross and Matthew C. Nielsen.
    Of counsel on the brief were Paul R. Cantrell, Donald L. Corneglio and Dan L. Wood, Eli
    Lilly and Company, of Indianapolis, Indiana.
    Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Delaware
    Judge Sue L. Robinson
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2009-1258
    VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ICOS CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
    in case no. 05-CV-506, Judge Sue L. Robinson.
    __________________________
    DECIDED: April 7, 2010
    __________________________
    Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, CLEVENGER and DYK, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CLEVENGER. Opinion concurring in part
    and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge DYK.
    CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge.
    This is an appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
    in a patent action that Vanderbilt University ("Vanderbilt") brought against ICOS
    Corporation ("ICOS") on July 20, 2005. Vanderbilt filed suit under 
    35 U.S.C. § 256
    alleging that Vanderbilt scientists Jackie D. Corbin ("Dr. Corbin"), Sharron H. Francis
    ("Dr. Francis"), and Sekhar R. Konjeti ("Dr. Konjeti") (collectively the "Vanderbilt
    Scientists") should be added as joint inventors on U.S. Patent Nos. 5,859,006 ("the '006
    patent") and 6,140,329 ("the '329 patent"). The district court rendered its findings of fact
    and conclusions of law in a January 27, 2009 opinion. Vanderbilt Univ. v. ICOS Corp.,
    
    594 F. Supp. 2d 482
     (D. Del. 2009).           The district court entered final judgment on
    January 29, 2009, concluding that Vanderbilt failed to prove that the Vanderbilt
    Scientists are joint inventors of the '006 and '329 patents. Vanderbilt appeals the district
    court's final judgment. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
    I
    This case involves compounds and methods for treating erectile dysfunction,
    including the compound known as tadalafil, a PDE5 inhibitor and the active ingredient in
    the drug Cialis®. PDE5 is a phosphodiesterase enzyme found in smooth muscle cells
    that binds to and hydrolyzes or breaks down cGMP, a cyclic nucleotide found in smooth
    muscle tissues. In normal function, cGMP binds with and activates a cGMP-dependent
    protein kinase which results in relaxation and dilation of the smooth muscle cell. PDE5
    inhibitors bind to PDE5 and prevent it from binding with and breaking down cGMP.
    Drs. Corbin and Francis are employed by Vanderbilt University and were among
    the first to discover PDE5 in the late 1970s. Since that time, Drs. Corbin and Francis
    have worked on both the development of cGMP analogs and PDE5 related research.
    In December 1988, Dr. Corbin submitted a research proposal to Glaxo Inc.
    ("Glaxo") 1 requesting it sponsor his research to develop cGMP analogs. The proposal
    1
    Glaxo Inc., later renamed Glaxo Wellcome Inc., was a North Carolina
    corporation that merged with SmithKline Beecham to form Glaxo SmithKline in 2001.
    Glaxo Group Limited ("Glaxo U.K.") was a U.K.-based subsidiary of Glaxo. At all times
    relevant to this litigation, Glaxo maintained a research facility in Les Ulis, France ("Glaxo
    France"). The patents in suit list a Glaxo France scientist as the sole inventor and are
    assigned to ICOS.
    2009-1258                                 2
    listed new cGMP analogs that Dr. Corbin hoped would activate cGMP-dependent
    protein kinase.
    In June 1989, Glaxo entered into an agreement with Dr. Corbin through Glaxo's
    "Cardiovascular Discovery Grant" program to underwrite the Vanderbilt Scientists'
    research of cGMP analogs. Under the agreement, the University retained ownership of
    intellectual property, but Glaxo was granted a license agreement to any discoveries.
    During the three years of the program, Drs. Corbin, Francis, and Konjeti submitted
    numerous presentations and progress reports to Glaxo.
    In November 1990, Dr. Corbin sent an abstract to Glaxo U.K. disclosing his
    discovery that the potency of cGMP analogs is enhanced by adding a phenyl ring at the
    8-position.     Meanwhile, the Vanderbilt Scientists continued to work on improving
    potency with new cGMP analogs. In May 1991, however, Glaxo indicated to Dr. Corbin
    its concern that cGMP analogs do not work well as orally-administered drugs and
    encouraged the Vanderbilt Scientists to shift their future focus to PDE5 inhibitors.
    Outside of the Glaxo program, the Vanderbilt Scientists continued to work on
    other research interests.     In November 1991, the Vanderbilt Scientists applied the
    results of their cGMP analog research to synthesize a new PDE5 inhibitor.              The
    Vanderbilt Scientists used a 3-isobutyl-1-methylxanthine ("IBMX") compound because it
    was a cheap and readily available PDE5 inhibitor that is easily substituted at the 8-
    position.     Building upon their earlier research, the Vanderbilt Scientists attached a
    phenyl ring to the 8-position of the compound and attached an electron-donating
    hydroxyl group at the 4 position of the phenyl ring. By applying the results of their
    cGMP research to IBMX, the Vanderbilt Scientists created a PDE5 inhibitor they thought
    2009-1258                                3
    was 160 times more potent in inhibiting PDE5 than the original IBMX molecule.
    Dr. Corbin drafted a letter to Vanderbilt's general counsel disclosing possible
    therapeutic uses for the new IBMX analogs, including the treatment of male impotence.
    In December 1991, during discussions regarding a new research agreement,
    Dr. Corbin mentioned Vanderbilt's work on PDE5 inhibitors to Dr. Barry Ross, a scientist
    at Glaxo U.K. On January 3, 1992, Dr. Corbin sent a research proposal to Glaxo U.K.
    detailing the test results of the cGMP analogs developed under the first research
    agreement. In the proposal, Dr. Corbin also described the Vanderbilt Scientists' IBMX
    analog that was 160-fold more potent as a PDE5 inhibitor than the original IBMX
    molecule.   Dr. Corbin explained the Vanderbilt Scientists' overall strategy that "the
    potencies of existing inhibitors . . . could be enhanced by appending groups that would
    allow the inhibitors to more closely resemble the entire cyclic GMP molecule."
    Dr. Corbin proposed that Glaxo fund the Vanderbilt Scientists' work on PDE5 inhibitors
    going forward. Dr. Corbin also noted in the January letter that "the cG kinase has
    important disease-related functions other than the induction of vascular smooth muscle
    relaxation." Male impotence was listed as an area of interest, though Glaxo was not
    researching male impotence at the time.
    On February 3, 1992, Drs. Corbin and Francis met with Dr. Ross regarding the
    January proposal. Later that month, on February 24, Dr. Corbin sent a more detailed
    research proposal to Dr. Ross which disclosed the exact design of the Vanderbilt IBMX
    analog. The detailed research proposal also identified a table of IBMX and zaprinast 2
    2
    Zaprinast was the most powerful known PDE5 inhibitor at the time of the
    research proposal.
    2009-1258                              4
    analogs that Vanderbilt proposed for further testing. Many of the listed compounds
    contain what Vanderbilt now refers to as the "Vanderbilt Structural Features" of
    Vanderbilt's IBMX analog.
    On March 11 and 12, 1992, Glaxo France tested 26 compounds for PDE5
    inhibition, including a compound it designated GR35273x.
    On April 8, 1992, Dr. Ross forwarded copies of Vanderbilt's February 24, 1992
    proposal to six Glaxo scientists, including Dr. Richard Labaudiniere, the head of
    chemistry and leader of the PDE5 project at Glaxo France.
    On April 23, 1992, Glaxo France tested 29 compounds for PDE5 inhibition,
    including a beta-carboline compound designated GR30040x. Vanderbilt claims all of
    the tested compounds make some use of the Vanderbilt Structural Features with 11 of
    the 29 compounds containing nearly all of the Vanderbilt Structural Features. Based on
    the PDE5 inhibition test results, Dr. Labaudiniere identified GR30040x as a lead
    compound for further research on PDE5 inhibition.       Dr. Labaudiniere assigned the
    further GR30040x research to Dr. Alain Claude-Marie Daugan, the named inventor on
    the patents at issue, as a separate study. In the course of testing various modifications
    to the GR30040x compound between June 1992 and January 1994, Dr. Daugan
    discovered tadalafil, the claimed compound at issue in this case.
    II
    In 1991, Glaxo assigned to ICOS the rights, title, and interest in the compounds
    covered by the patents at issue. Vanderbilt brought this suit under 
    35 U.S.C. § 256
    against ICOS to correct inventorship of the '006 and '329 patents. Vanderbilt asserts
    that the Vanderbilt Scientists should be added as joint inventors.         According to
    2009-1258                               5
    Vanderbilt,   the   GR30040x      compound     could    not   have    been    identified   by
    Dr. Labaudiniere as the lead compound without his use of the Vanderbilt Structural
    Features. Nor could tadalafil have been identified by Dr. Daugan without his reliance on
    Vanderbilt's work. The district court held a bench trial and found in favor of ICOS.
    In its analysis, the district court noted that 
    35 U.S.C. § 116
    , the applicable section
    for joint inventorship, sets "no explicit lower limit on the quantum or quality of inventive
    contribution required for a person to qualify as a joint inventor." Vanderbilt Univ. v.
    ICOS Corp., 
    594 F. Supp. 2d 482
    , 504 (D. Del. 2009) (quoting Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v.
    Ewen, 
    123 F.3d 1466
    , 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The district court further noted that "a
    person is a joint inventor 'only if he contributes to the conception of the claimed
    invention.'" 
    Id.
     (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 
    376 F.3d 1352
    , 1458-59 (Fed.
    Cir. 2004)). After a summary of the law regarding conception of chemical compounds,
    the district court concluded that "conception of a chemical substance includes
    knowledge of both the specific chemical structure of the compound and an operative
    method of making it" and "does not occur unless one has a mental picture of the
    structure of the chemical." 
    Id.
     (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
    
    40 F.3d 1223
    , 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1994) and Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd.,
    
    927 F.2d 1200
    , 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The district court determined that the Vanderbilt
    Scientists could not be co-inventors because they never "conceived the specific
    chemical structure of the compound claimed or the compound with all of its
    components." Id. at 505 (citations omitted).
    To guide its analysis, the district court reviewed our decision in American
    BioScience and concluded the case contained similar facts and thus controlled its
    2009-1258                                 6
    decision. Id. at 504-05. The district court recognized that in American BioScience we
    declined to add inventors who provided the "starting materials" for a chemical
    compound.     See Bd. Of Educ. ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. State Univ. v. Am.
    BioScience Inc., 
    333 F.3d 1330
     (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("American BioScience"). The district
    court found that "[t]he 'Vanderbilt Structural Features' constitute no more than a 'specific
    portion[] of a claimed compound' in the language of American BioScience." Vanderbilt
    Univ., 
    594 F. Supp. 2d at 505
    .
    The district court concluded that "[b]ecause there is no evidence that [the
    Vanderbilt Scientists] ever conceived the 'specific chemical structure of the compound'
    claimed, Burroughs Wellcome, 
    40 F.3d at 1230
    , or 'the compound with all of its
    components,' American BioScience, 
    333 F.3d at 1340
    , or communicated that compound
    to Glaxo, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence, that
    Corbin, Francis and Konjeti are coinventors of the patents at issue." 
    Id.
     The district
    court noted that "even if the court were to find that plaintiff's disclosure of [the Vanderbilt
    Structural Features] led to the identification of GR30040x and the subsequent discovery
    of tadalafil, American BioScience precludes the result plaintiff seeks: namely, that the
    contribution of a molecular scaffold in the context of one molecule . . . renders the
    disclosing party or parties inventors of a different family of molecules containing the
    same scaffold." Id. at 506-07.
    Even after reaching the conclusion that its decision was bound by American
    BioScience, the district court provided a detailed analysis of the remaining facts of the
    case. First, the court noted that "[t]his is not to say that Corbin, Francis, and Konjeti did
    not make contributions to Daugan's inventive process; only that, under the applicable
    2009-1258                                  7
    law, these contributions fall more into the category of 'prosaic' contributions because
    they did not conceive the invention as claimed." Id. at 505. After again reviewing the
    conflicting stories of the parties, the district court alternatively noted that "the court views
    plaintiff's theory . . . and defendant's story . . . equally plausible with respect to the
    identification of GR30040x."      Id. at 506.     Also, in the absence of any evidence of
    collaboration between the Vanderbilt Scientists and Dr. Daugan, the district court
    rejected Vanderbilt's claim to have contributed to Dr. Daugan's identification of tadalafil.
    Id. at 505-06.
    III
    We begin by reviewing our case law on joint inventorship.                The statutory
    requirements for joint inventorship are found in 
    35 U.S.C. § 116
     which states, in
    pertinent part:
    When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall
    apply for patent jointly and each make the required oath, except as
    otherwise provided in this title. Inventors may apply for a patent jointly
    even though (1) they did not physically work together or at the same time,
    (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each
    did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the
    patent.
    
    35 U.S.C. § 116
     (1988).
    Section 116 was amended, in relevant part, in 1984 to clarify the law of joint
    inventorship by codifying the principles set forth in Monsanto                 Co. v. Kamp,
    
    269 F. Supp. 818
     (D.D.C. 1967). See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib.
    Co., Inc., 
    973 F.2d 911
    , 916 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The court in Monsanto stated:
    A joint invention is the product of collaboration of the inventive endeavors
    of two or more persons working toward the same end and producing an
    invention by their aggregate efforts. To constitute a joint invention, it is
    necessary that each of the inventors work on the same subject matter and
    2009-1258                                  8
    make some contribution to the inventive thought and to the final result.
    Each needs to perform but a part of the task if an invention emerges from
    all of the steps taken together. It is not necessary that the entire invention
    concept should occur to each of the joint inventors, or that the two should
    physically work on the project together. One may take a step at one time,
    the other an approach at different times.
    Monsanto, 
    269 F. Supp. at 824
    .
    In Kimberly-Clark, we applied section 116 to a situation where Proctor & Gamble
    wished to attribute inventor status to one of its employees who did not collaborate with
    the named inventor. 
    973 F.2d at 912-13
    . While both employees worked on the same
    subject matter, the court noted that the named inventor "worked alone and was
    completely unaware of earlier work done by other [] employees." 
    Id. at 913
    . The court
    reviewed the amendments and Monsanto and stated that:
    For persons to be joint inventors under Section 116, there must be some
    element of joint behavior, such as collaboration or working under common
    direction, one inventor seeing a relevant report and building upon it or
    hearing another's suggestions at a meeting. Here there was nothing of
    that nature. Individuals cannot be joint inventors if they are completely
    ignorant of what each other has done until years after their individual
    efforts. They cannot be totally independent of each other and be joint
    inventors.
    Kimberly-Clark, 
    973 F.2d at 917
    .
    A primary focus of section 116 has thus always been on collaboration and joint
    behavior. A person must contribute to the conception of the claimed invention to qualify
    as a joint inventor. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 
    376 F.3d 1352
    , 1359 (Fed. Cir.
    2004). Yet, each contributor need not have their own contemporaneous picture of the
    final claimed invention in order to qualify as joint inventors. See Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v.
    Ewen, 
    123 F.3d 1466
    , 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("One need not alone conceive of the
    entire invention, for this would obviate the concept of joint invention."). Rather, "the
    2009-1258                                9
    qualitative contribution of each collaborator is the key – each inventor must contribute to
    the joint arrival at a definite and permanent idea of the invention as it will be used in
    practice." Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 
    40 F.3d 1223
    , 1229 (Fed. Cir.
    1994).    The interplay between conception and collaboration requires that each co-
    inventor engage with the other co-inventors to contribute to a joint conception.
    Inventorship is a question of law that we review without deference. Ethicon,
    Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 
    135 F.3d 1456
    , 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998).         We review the
    underlying findings of fact for clear error. See Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
    Inc., 
    106 F.3d 976
    , 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
    IV
    Vanderbilt raises two arguments on appeal.      First, Vanderbilt argues that its
    disclosure of the Vanderbilt Structural Features led to Glaxo France's identification of
    the GR30040x molecule incorporating the same molecular scaffold. In this regard, the
    gist of Vanderbilt's case is that Dr. Labaudiniere could only have identified GR30040x
    by using the Vanderbilt Structural Features. Second, Vanderbilt alleges that the key
    modification to GR30040x that yielded tadalafil was the addition of an electron-donating
    substituent on the phenyl ring based upon the work of the Vanderbilt Scientists.
    There is no dispute raised between the parties regarding the district court's
    finding that Dr. Labaudiniere at Glaxo France identified GR30040x as a lead compound
    for research regarding PDE5 inhibition.      Thus, as all relevant contact between the
    Vanderbilt Scientists and Glaxo occurred at Glaxo U.K., Vanderbilt attempts to piece
    together sufficient facts to demonstrate that the Vanderbilt Structural Features must
    have been used by Dr. Labaudiniere to identify GR30040x. As Vanderbilt's argument is
    2009-1258                               10
    based largely upon criticizing ICOS's evidence regarding how GR30040x was
    recognized, we first review Glaxo's version of the story.
    ICOS contends that Dr. Labaudiniere independently discovered the compounds
    to be tested for PDE5 inhibition through his knowledge of beta-carbolines and their
    vasorelaxation effect. This theory can be found in a paper received by the Journal of
    Medicinal Chemistry on February 5, 2003, entitled "The Discovery of Tadalafil: A Novel
    and Highly Selective PDE5 Inhibitor." According to Glaxo, Dr. Labaudiniere became
    aware of the vasorelaxation effect of beta-carbolines from his review of two references:
    a 1983 article in the European Journal of Pharmacology ("the Koe article") and a May
    1992 article in the Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics ("the
    Elgoyhen article").    Glaxo claims that Dr. Labaudiniere identified two beta-carboline
    compounds, β-CEE and GR35273x, in March 1992 as potential PDE-5 inhibitors.
    Dr. Labaudiniere then searched an internal database in April 1992 with the beta-
    carboline core structure of these two molecules and his search yielded GR30040x.
    Glaxo's internal "PDE V Inhibitors Project Annual Report for the Year Ending 30/4/93"
    confirms this story.
    Vanderbilt takes issue with Glaxo's story because Glaxo's internal testing records
    indicate that GR30040x was first tested by Glaxo on April 23, 1992. The Elgoyhen
    article was not published until May 8, 1992. As the district court found, GR30040x could
    not have been identified based upon the Elgoyhen reference.
    At trial, ICOS backed away from the Elgoyhen story and instead argued that
    Dr. Labaudiniere took GR35273x from another Glaxo program and tested it on
    March 11 and 12, 1992 for PDE5 inhibition.        According to ICOS, Dr. Labaudiniere
    2009-1258                               11
    undertook substructure searches using the tetrahydro beta-carboline scaffold of
    GR35273x, based upon the "impressive" PDE5 inhibition results and his knowledge
    from the Koe article, and identified GR30040x, among other compounds. ICOS points
    to the large number of tetrahydro beta-carbolines tested between March and July 1992
    to support its theory.
    ICOS also points to Glaxo documents to corroborate various details of its story.
    For example, the minutes of a Glaxo Cardiovascular Research Management Committee
    meeting in April 1992 describe GR35273x as a compound used in a different study. In
    the June 1992 minutes, the same committee noted that GR35273x displayed a high
    PDE5 inhibition activity and noted that Glaxo was starting a program testing GR35273x
    analogs. At the same meeting, GR30040x was identified as a new PDE5 inhibitor.
    ICOS also points to testimony of Dr. Labaudiniere and Dr. Daugan to corroborate
    its theory on the identification of GR30040x. Dr. Labaudiniere testified that he did not
    have any knowledge about the Vanderbilt Scientists' research until June 1993, he did
    not consider IBMX as a starting point for his work on PDE5 inhibitors, and he was not
    aware of anyone at Glaxo France using data relating to IBMX analogs or trying to
    develop PDE5 inhibitors that would resemble cGMP.              Dr. Daugan confirmed his
    recollection matches that of Dr. Labaudiniere. In sum, ICOS argues that Vanderbilt's
    case fails for lack of evidence of any joint collaboration on the invention since neither of
    the Glaxo France scientists had any knowledge of the work of the Vanderbilt Scientists
    when they did their work relating to the discovery of tadalafil.
    Vanderbilt argues a different view of the same facts. First, Vanderbilt points out
    that GR30040x is never identified in any Glaxo documents as a GR35273x analog.
    2009-1258                                12
    Vanderbilt also argues that a GR35273x substructure search would not yield GR30040x
    because no documents demonstrate that Glaxo identified the beta-carboline structure in
    GR35273x as significant until October 1992. Finally, Vanderbilt argues that Glaxo lacks
    credibility as it had previously claimed GR30040x was identified from a β-CEE search
    until that was proven false.      In sum, Vanderbilt attacks Glaxo's story based upon
    missing documentary evidence.
    Vanderbilt instead proposes that Dr. Labaudiniere reviewed the February 1992
    research proposal and conducted a substructure search based upon the Vanderbilt
    IBMX analog. Vanderbilt points out that in April, just weeks after receiving the February
    proposal, Glaxo France tested 29 compounds for PDE5 inhibition. Vanderbilt points out
    a number of structural similarities between the tested compounds and its February
    research proposal.
    Vanderbilt's second argument is that after the GR30040x project was assigned to
    Dr. Daugan, he added to tadalafil an additional element of the Vanderbilt Structural
    Features by replacing the pyridine ring in GR30040x with a combination of a phenyl ring
    and an electron-donating methoxy substituent. Vanderbilt argues that this modification
    directly uses the results of the Vanderbilt Scientists' research. ICOS responds that the
    modifications were all part of a standard trial and error procedure that would be tried
    with any molecules of interest.
    The only evidence of record regarding Glaxo's modifications to GR30040x is the
    testimony of Dr. Daugan and Dr. Labaudieniere. Dr. Daugan testified that "[t]he first
    thing [he] did in this series was explore the replacement of the pyridinyl[] moiety with
    other heterocyclic or aromatic moieties." Dr. Labaudiniere testified that there are a
    2009-1258                               13
    standard group of substitutions or additions that would be tried with any molecules of
    interest.   Dr. Labaudiniere characterizes the modifications leading to tadalafil as
    "obvious" and conducted in a "trial-and-error" fashion.       There is no testimony or
    documentary evidence demonstrating a link between the Vanderbilt Scientists and
    Dr. Daugan prior to the identification of tadalafil. Indeed, Vanderbilt admitted in the
    district court that it had no direct evidence to support its view of the facts; instead
    Vanderbilt argued that it "need not prove specifically how that occurred, but simply how
    it logically could have occurred."
    V
    Vanderbilt's challenge to the stated inventorship of the '006 and '329 patents
    turns on competing claims to inventorship of GR30040x and to tadalafil.      As explained
    above, Vanderbilt admits that no direct evidence supports its claims to joint
    inventorship.   Nonetheless, Vanderbilt argues that Dr. Labaudiniere could not have
    identified GR30040x as a lead compound independently; nor could Dr. Daugan have
    identified tadalafil on his own.     ICOS counters Vanderbilt's arguments with direct
    evidence supporting Dr. Labaudiniere's claim to sole identification of GR30040x and
    with similar direct evidence pointing to Dr. Daugan's independent discovery of tadalafil.
    To succeed on its claim to joint inventorship, Vanderbilt must prevail by clear and
    convincing evidence. Our precedent has long required proof of misjoinder or nonjoinder
    of co-inventors by clear and convincing evidence. 3      See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm
    3
    Vanderbilt recognizes that the clear and convincing evidence test for
    correction of inventorship is settled law which binds the court. It suggests that the law
    should be changed to a lower standard of proof, namely preponderance of the
    evidence, and that under the lower test it should prevail in this case. We express no
    view on whether Vanderbilt would prevail under a preponderance of the evidence test.
    2009-1258                               14
    Corp.,
    376 F.3d 1352
    , 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 
    135 F.3d 1456
    , 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 
    106 F.3d 976
    , 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The district court correctly concluded that Vanderbilt failed to
    meet its burden.
    We find no clear error in the district court's factual findings underpinning its
    determination regarding Glaxo's identification of GR30040x. The district court noted
    that "there is a close proximity in time of the relevant events which renders plausible
    plaintiff's theory that Glaxo did take note of [the Vanderbilt IBMX compound] and
    incorporated the 'Vanderbilt Structural Features' into the beta-carboline research it was
    conducting." Vanderbilt Univ. v. ICOS Corp., 
    594 F. Supp. 2d 482
    , 506 (D. Del. 2009).
    However, after a thorough review of all of the evidence, the district court concluded "the
    court views plaintiff's theory (which is devoid of evidence regarding the alleged
    substructure searches based on [the Vanderbilt IBMX compound]) and defendant's
    story (which is devoid of the aforementioned foundation) equally plausible with respect
    to the identification of GR30040x." 
    Id.
     We agree that Vanderbilt fails to present clear
    and convincing evidence to support its argument that the work of the Vanderbilt
    Scientists was appropriated by Dr. Labaudiniere for his substructure search.
    As for Vanderbilt's argument that Dr. Daugan made use of the Vanderbilt
    Scientists' research for the modifications to GR30040x, the district court noted that
    "plaintiff admitted that Corbin, Francis and Konjeti never had any direct communication
    with Daugan regarding this subject matter." 
    Id.
     at 505 n.50. The district court also
    Vanderbilt is of course free to seek en banc reconsideration of our settled law on this
    issue.
    2009-1258                               15
    noted "a lack of evidence" supporting Vanderbilt's request for an inference that
    Dr. Labaudiniere communicated the Vanderbilt Structural Features to Dr. Daugan. 
    Id.
    There is nothing in the record to suggest that these factual findings are erroneous.
    Thus, Vanderbilt also fails to present clear and convincing evidence to support its
    argument that the modifications to GR30040x by Dr. Daugan made use of the
    Vanderbilt Scientists' research.
    VI
    Vanderbilt makes much of what it perceives to be an error of law committed by
    the district court. We agree that the district court opinion contains some erroneous
    statements regarding the law of joint inventorship and a misunderstanding of the
    relevance of American BioScience to the facts of this case. These errors, however, do
    not affect the outcome of this appeal and are therefore harmless in context. When
    tested by the correct law, the facts of the case still require affirmance.
    The district court understood our decision in American BioScience to require that
    each co-inventor have an independent conception of the final compound for a chemical
    invention.   The district court ruled that because the Vanderbilt Structural Features
    constitute no more than a portion of a claimed compound, the Vanderbilt Scientists
    cannot, as a matter of law, be joint inventors. Vanderbilt Univ., 
    594 F. Supp. 2d at 505
    .
    The district court hinged this portion of its opinion on the following language from
    American Bioscience:
    Having in mind specific portions of a claimed compound is not the same
    as conceiving the compound with all of its components. One must have a
    conception of the specific compounds being claimed, with all of their
    component substituents . . . .
    2009-1258                                 16
    
    333 F.3d at 1340
    . Yet, when this language from American BioScience is reviewed in
    context, the district court's error is clear.
    The portion of the opinion quoted by the district court phrased the question under
    review as "whether the district court erred in determining that the FSU scientists were
    true inventors of the claimed compounds."         
    Id.
     (emphasis added).     In American
    BioScience the court was faced with choosing between two competing groups of
    inventors.
    Prior to the invention of the compounds at issue in American BioScience,
    Dr. Tao, a scientist at Florida State University ("FSU"), left FSU to join a group of
    scientists at American BioScience that were working on similar subject matter. 
    Id. at 1333-35
    . Shortly after Dr. Tao joined American BioScience, the company filed a patent
    application that led to the patent in suit, which claimed three taxol analog compounds.
    The patent named Dr. Tao and three American BioScience scientists as joint inventors.
    In the district court, FSU claimed that the patent named the wrong inventors. FSU
    asserted that three of its scientists, along with Dr. Tao, were the correct team of joint
    inventors. The district court reviewed the evidence on behalf of both competing teams
    of joint inventors, and concluded that the FSU team was the true group of joint
    inventors. Accordingly, the district court ordered that the three American BioScience
    scientists be removed from the patent and the patent be corrected to add the three FSU
    scientists as inventors. Bd. of Educ. v. Am. BioScience, Inc., No. 4:99cv131/RV, 
    2001 WL 34104924
    , at *11 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
    American BioScience appealed to this court, arguing clear error in the fact
    findings made by the district court to support its correction of inventorship. Because the
    2009-1258                                   17
    record provided no evidence of conception by any of the FSU scientists, acting
    individually or together, this court found clear error in awarding inventorship to the FSU
    joint inventor team. Properly understood, American BioScience correctly states the law
    governing joint inventorship. Absent conception within an inventorship team, there can
    be no invention.
    This court began its inquiry with the statement that "[i]nvention requires
    conception, and 'conception does not occur unless one has a mental picture of the
    structure of the chemical . . . or whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it. It is
    not sufficient to define it solely by its principal biological property.'"         American
    BioScience, 
    333 F.3d at 1340
     (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 
    927 F.2d 1200
    , 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). This court held that the FSU group could not have been
    the true inventors unless the group had a complete mental picture of the structure of the
    chemical compounds at issue, and continued its analysis with the language relied upon
    by the district court. See 
    id. at 1340
     ("One must have a conception of the specific
    compounds being claimed, with all of their component substituents, and the record does
    not support a finding that [anyone in the FSU group] conceived the three claimed
    compounds . . . .").
    While it is true that the court used the term "one" in reference to conception, it is
    apparent from context that the court was referring to "the inventor" or, in the case of
    joint inventors, "the group of inventors." Thus, in American BioScience, the court found
    that the FSU inventors were not part of any group or collaboration that together
    envisioned the final claimed compounds. This is because "[w]hile Holton may have
    invented many of the compounds synthesized in his laboratory . . . there is nonetheless
    2009-1258                                 18
    no evidence of conception by Holton or anyone else at FSU of analogs having the
    [required combination of molecules]." 
    Id. at 1341
    . The court's finding in American
    BioScience was premised on the fact that the FSU and American BioScience scientists
    were not working together, but rather competing for the patent rights in the compounds
    at issue. There was no evidence of conception within the FSU group, and this court
    found sufficient evidence of conception within the American BioScience group.
    Vanderbilt is correct that the district court erred in reading American BioScience
    to find that each co-inventor must have an independent mental picture of the complete
    compound claimed.       Such an interpretation is clearly wrong under our established
    precedent. Instead, a group of co-inventors must collaborate and work together to
    collectively have a definite and permanent idea of the complete invention. Similarly, the
    district court's statement that "the contribution of a molecular scaffold in the context of
    one molecule" could never rise to the level of joint inventorship for "a different family of
    molecules containing the same scaffold" is in error. Vanderbilt Univ., 
    594 F. Supp. 2d at 506-07
    . "The determination of whether a person is a joint inventor is fact specific, and
    no bright-line standard will suffice in every case."    Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen,
    
    123 F.3d 1466
    , 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Our case law was not intended to create such a
    bright line rule as was used by the district court.
    As previously stated, the district court, however, did not rest its opinion solely on
    this interpretation of our case law. The district court correctly noted that conception
    requires identification of the specific chemical structure of the compound. The parties
    agree that Dr. Daugan was the first to conceive of tadalafil. After a careful review of the
    evidence, the district court concluded that the parties' respective stories about whether
    2009-1258                                 19
    the Vanderbilt Scientists contributed to the identification of GR30040x were "equally
    plausible" and that Vanderbilt failed to produce any evidence of joint invention of
    tadalafil. For Vanderbilt to succeed in its inventorship claim, it must carry its burden of
    proof of demonstrating that the Vanderbilt Scientists contributed to the claimed invention
    with clear and convincing evidence. See Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
    
    106 F.3d 976
    , 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The district court's findings demonstrate that under
    the correct legal test, Vanderbilt did not carry its burden.        Thus, any erroneous
    interpretations of our case law were harmless error.
    COSTS
    No costs.
    AFFIRMED
    2009-1258                               20
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2009-1258
    VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ICOS CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
    in case no. 05-CV-506, Judge Sue L. Robinson.
    DYK, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    There is no question that the district court applied the wrong standard for joint
    inventorship. The majority agrees, and I agree. However, I respectfully dissent from
    the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s legal error was harmless, because in
    my view, the findings are either contradictory or infected by the court’s legal error. I
    would vacate the judgment and remand, requiring the district court to make findings of
    fact in light of the correct law.
    I
    Vanderbilt University (“Vanderbilt”) argues that its scientists—Drs. Jackie D.
    Corbin, Sharron H. Francis, and Sekhar R. Konjeti (“the Vanderbilt scientists”)—should
    be added as joint inventors to the patents in suit under two theories: (1) Dr. Richard
    Labaudiniere (“Labaudiniere”) at Glaxo, Inc. (“Glaxo”) used the Vanderbilt scientists’
    disclosure of 8-(4-hydroxy phenylthio)-IBMX to identify the compound GR30040x, which
    was in turn used by Dr. Alain Daugan (“Daugan”), the sole inventor listed on the patents
    in suit, and (2) Daugan used the Vanderbilt scientists’ disclosure of 8-(4-hydroxy
    phenylthio)-IBMX to modify GR30040x and create the patented compounds.                  ICOS
    Corporation (“ICOS”) 1 responds that the Vanderbilt scientists’ disclosure played no role
    in Glaxo’s identification of GR30040x or the patented compounds. I agree with the
    majority that the district court’s findings with respect to the second theory are not clearly
    erroneous. The court found that Daugan did not himself directly utilize the Vanderbilt
    scientists’ contributions; this finding was supported by Daugan’s testimony that he was
    not aware of the contributions and Labaudiniere’s testimony that he did not forward the
    Vanderbilt scientists’ work to Daugan.
    However, the findings with respect to the first theory were either tainted by the
    district court’s legal error or are contradictory on their face. The district court found that
    the Vanderbilt scientists did in fact make contributions to Glaxo’s work, a point the
    majority ignores. After incorrectly explaining that the Vanderbilt scientists could not be
    joint inventors because there was no evidence that they had ever conceived the
    complete patented compound, the district court went on to state:
    This is not to say that Corbin, Francis and Konjeti did not make
    contributions to Daugan’s inventive process; only that, under the
    applicable law, these contributions fall more into the category of “prosaic”
    contributions because they did not conceive the invention as claimed.
    Vanderbilt Univ. v. ICOS Corp., 
    594 F. Supp. 2d 482
    , 505 (D. Del. 2009) (quoting Eli
    Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 
    376 F.3d 1352
    , 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (emphases
    added). The district court also found that ICOS’s position that Glaxo made no use of
    1
    In 1991, Glaxo and ICOS entered into a collaboration agreement wherein
    all rights, title, and interest in the compounds ultimately covered by the patents in suit
    were assigned to ICOS.
    2009-1258                                     2
    the Vanderbilt scientists’ disclosures was “untenable.” 
    Id.
     at 505–06. It further stated
    that ICOS “loses credibility in the court’s view for failing to acknowledge that Glaxo
    made any use of plaintiff’s disclosure.” Id. at 506. The court even cited a number of
    factors supporting its finding that Glaxo relied on the Vanderbilt scientists’ work in
    Glaxo’s research: the disclosed potency of 8-(4-hydroxy phenylthio)-IBMX, the common
    structure of the compounds, and the short time between the Vanderbilt disclosure and
    Glaxo’s identification of GR30040x. Id. at 505–06.
    At the same time, the district court found that ICOS’s theory as to how
    Labaudiniere identified GR30040x was unsupported. Prior to trial, ICOS asserted that
    Labaudiniere identified GR30040x by following up on research reported in two journal
    articles. Id. at 496. But after it was shown that one of those articles was not published
    until after GR30040x had been tested, ICOS offered a different story at trial. ICOS
    claimed that Labaudiniere arrived at GR30040x by performing substructure searches
    based on the tetrahydro beta-carboline fragment of GR35273, a compound discovered
    in a separate Glaxo program. See id. at 497–98. However, the district court noted that
    “nowhere in its papers did [ICOS] articulate why Labaudiniere selected tetrahydro beta-
    carbolines (more specifically, the tetrahydro beta-carboline fragment of GR35273) for
    his substructure searches.” Id. at 506.
    Thus the district court found that the Vanderbilt scientists did make a contribution
    to the identification of GR30040x.        The district court then went on to find that
    “[Vanderbilt]’s theory (which is devoid of evidence regarding the alleged substructure
    searches based on 8-(4-OH-PT)-IMBX [sic]) and [ICOS]’s story (which is devoid of the
    aforementioned foundation) [are] equally plausible with respect to the identification of
    2009-1258                                    3
    GR30040x.” Id. at 506 (emphasis added). As a footnote to this finding, the district court
    added: “Notably, even if GR30040x were the invention, the balance would not so tip in
    favor of plaintiff such as to constitute clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 506 n.53.
    II
    There are two possible ways to interpret the district court’s findings, either of
    which requires a remand.        The first is that the district court’s findings are directly
    contradictory. The court could not have properly found that the Vanderbilt scientists
    made a contribution to the identification of GR30040x if it were “equally plausible” that
    they did not make a contribution. In this situation, we must send the case back to the
    district court so that it can reconsider its findings. Both this circuit and other circuits
    have uniformly found that judgments based on contradictory findings cannot stand.
    See, e.g., Essex Electro Eng’rs, Inc. v. Danzig, 
    224 F.3d 1283
    , 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
    Mattson v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
    86 F.3d 211
    , 215 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Lyles v. United States,
    
    759 F.2d 941
    , 944 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Grano v. Dep’t of Dev. of City of Columbus, 
    637 F.2d 1073
    , 1081–82 (6th Cir. 1980); Legate v. Maloney, 
    334 F.2d 704
    , 708 (1st Cir.
    1964).
    The alternative is that the district court found that Vanderbilt did not establish by
    clear and convincing evidence that the Vanderbilt scientists’ contributions were
    sufficient to make them joint inventors.       The problem with this interpretation of the
    finding is that it is obviously tainted by the district court’s view that in order to be joint
    inventors, the Vanderbilt scientists must have “conceived the ‘specific chemical
    structure of the compound’ claimed or ‘the compound with all of its components,’ or
    communicated that compound to Glaxo.” Vanderbilt, 
    594 F. Supp. 2d at 505
     (citations
    2009-1258                                      4
    omitted).   In particular, the district court misinterpreted our decision in American
    Bioscience when it stated that the Vanderbilt scientists could not be joint inventors
    “even if the court were to find that [their] disclosure of 8-(4-OH-PT)-IMBX [sic] led to the
    identification of GR30040x and the subsequent discovery of [the patented compounds]”
    because “the contribution of a molecular scaffold in the context of one molecule . . .
    [could not] render[] the disclosing party or parties [joint] inventors of a different family of
    molecules containing the same scaffold.” 
    Id.
     at 506–07; see Bd. of Educ. ex rel. Bd. of
    Trustees of Fla. State Univ. v. Am. BioScience, Inc., 
    333 F.3d 1330
     (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    The majority correctly rejected this legal error. See Majority Op. at 19.
    An alleged joint inventor does not have to conceive of the entire claimed
    invention, as the district court mistakenly required. He merely must contribute to the
    conception of the claimed invention. Eli Lilly, 
    376 F.3d at 1359
    . There is “no explicit
    lower limit on the quantum or quality of inventive contribution required for a person to
    qualify as a joint inventor.” Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 
    123 F.3d 1466
    , 1473 (Fed.
    Cir. 1997). The law does not require that the joint inventors physically work together or
    at the same time, or each make the same level of contribution. 
    35 U.S.C. § 116
    ; see
    also Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 
    973 F.2d 911
    , 917 (Fed.
    Cir. 1992) (providing “one inventor seeing a relevant report and building upon it” as an
    example of joint inventive effort). A joint inventor need only “make a contribution to the
    conception of the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality, when that
    contribution is measured against the dimension of the full invention.” Fina Oil, 
    123 F.3d at 1473
    .    While the district court found that the Vanderbilt scientists made some
    contribution, it has not told us exactly what that contribution was or why that contribution
    2009-1258                                     5
    was not enough to make the Vanderbilt scientists joint inventors under the correct
    standard. If the Vanderbilt scientists made contributions, as the district court found, the
    fact that those contributions may not have been “appropriated by Dr. Labaudiniere for
    his substructure search,” Majority Op. at 15, does not foreclose the possibility that the
    Vanderbilt scientists’ contribution was sufficient to make them joint inventors.
    Because the district court’s findings were either contradictory or tainted by legal
    error, I think we must vacate the judgment of the district court and remand in order that
    the court may make factual findings under the proper law. I dissent from the majority’s
    decision to affirm what I view as an untenable district court decision.
    2009-1258                                    6