Applied Companies v. Secretary of the Army ( 2006 )


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    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    05-1511
    APPLIED COMPANIES,
    Appellant,
    v.
    Francis J. Harvey,
    SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,
    Appellee.
    Peter B. Jones, Jones & Donovan, of Newport Beach, California, argued for
    appellant.
    James W. Poirier, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
    States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for appellee. With him on the
    brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen, Director, and
    Donald E. Kinner, Assistant Director.
    Appealed from:    Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    05-1511
    APPLIED COMPANIES,
    Appellant,
    v.
    Francis J. Harvey,
    SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,
    Appellee.
    _________________________
    DECIDED: July 14, 2006
    _________________________
    Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and RADER, Circuit Judges.
    MICHEL, Chief Judge.
    Applied Companies (“Applied”) appeals the decision of the Armed Services
    Board of Contract Appeals (“Board”) denying the majority of its claim under the Value
    Engineering clause of its contract with the United States Army. Applied Co., 
    ASBCA No. 50593
    , 
    04-2 BCA P32,786
     (Nov. 2, 2004). Because the Board correctly concluded
    that Applied was not entitled to share in future savings on air conditioner (“AC”) models
    not covered by Applied’s contract with the Army, we affirm.
    I
    In 1985, Applied entered into a contract with the United States Army Troop
    Support Command (“TROSCOM”) to supply 36,000 (“36k”) BTU/HR horizontal ACs
    (“Applied ACs”).   The contract incorporated by reference the 1984 version of FAR
    52.248-1, entitled “Value Engineering” (“VE clause”), which provides that “[t]he
    Contractor is encouraged to develop, prepare, and submit value engineering change
    proposals (VECP’s) voluntarily. The Contractor shall share in any net acquisition
    savings realized from accepted VECP’s, in accordance with the incentive sharing rates
    in paragraph (f) below.”   For a fixed-price contract such as Applied’s, paragraph (f)
    provides that the contractor shall be entitled to fifty percent of the net acquisition
    savings under the instant contract and future contracts.
    In 1989, Applied’s CEO, Barney Klinger, suggested to Col. Clarence Mills, then
    the Deputy Commander for Procurement and Readiness at TROSCOM, and to a Mr.
    Mabrey, TROSCOM’s Director of Procurement and Production, that certain parts in the
    Applied AC could be replaced with commercial parts at significant savings.       A few
    months later, Col. Mills met with Mr. Klinger at a trade conference and suggested that
    Applied submit a VECP.       Following several additional meetings with TROSCOM,
    Applied submitted a VECP on July 7, 1989, which contained a list of specific
    commercial part substitutions for the Applied AC. The Army Contracting Officer (“CO”)
    conditionally accepted the VECP on July 25, 1989, pending successful testing of the
    “commercialized” ACs. The CO unconditionally accepted Applied’s VECP on October
    15, 1990, and calculated the “Contractor Share of Net Instant Acquisition Savings” to be
    $1,540,181.
    On January 9, 1995, Applied submitted a claim to the Army for “one half
    anticipated savings of the total of $81 million to be realized by the Army” owing to the
    Army’s “abandonment of ‘specified source control’ vendors” in favor of commercially
    available parts for all twenty-three air conditioning models covered by military
    05-1511                                     2
    specification MIL-A-52767.1 Applied conceded that its VECP was limited to the Applied
    AC, and that the VECP “effectively excluded the collateralized savings expected” from
    the application of commercialization to the entire family of ACs, yet argued that it was
    entitled to share in cost savings for “the concept proposed by Applied in the VECP.” In
    a follow-up letter, Applied reiterated that, in its VECP, it had “agreed to forego
    collateralized savings on other Army contracts wherein commercial components would
    be substituted.” Nonetheless, Applied argued that it was entitled to VE savings for all
    AC models to which the Army had applied the commercialization concept included in
    Applied’s VECP.
    On November 27, 1996, the CO denied Applied’s claim for lack of proof of
    entitlement. In October 2001, the parties settled the matter of instant savings, leaving in
    dispute only future savings, for which Applied sought $19,806,796.2 The Board held an
    evidentiary hearing on November 11, 2001, at which Col. Mills, Mr. Mabrey, and Mr.
    Klinger testified.   Three years later, the Board issued a plurality opinion awarding
    Applied nearly $1 million, representing fifty percent of the savings on future purchases
    of 36k BTU/HR horizontal ACs. The plurality denied the remainder of Applied’s claim
    1
    Military specification MIL-A-52767 covered a total of twenty-three air
    conditioning models in five sizes (6k, 9k, 18k, 36k, and 60k BTU/HR), vertical and
    horizontal configurations, and various electric power classes. Each of the twenty-three
    models had its own detailed design drawing package. The components of each model
    were basically the same, but varied in size, capacity, and shape.
    2
    The Board quantified Applied’s claim by taking fifty percent of Applied’s
    initial demand for a share of the Army’s $81 million cost savings, or $40.5 million, and
    splitting that amount equally between the two Applied VECP claims appealed to the
    Board. (The second claim related to another VECP, submitted under a separate
    contract for 36k BTU/HR vertical ACs, and was settled in October 2001.) Accordingly,
    Applied originally sought $20.25 million in this suit. Following the October 2001 partial
    settlement, that claim was reduced to the present figure.
    05-1511                                     3
    because Applied failed to prove the “future unit cost savings” for ACs other than the 36k
    BTU/HR horizontal model. Thus, the plurality held that the VE savings was applicable
    only to future purchases of 36k BTU/HR horizontal ACs, and not to ACs of any other
    size or configuration.
    Applied filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Board committed legal
    error in placing upon it the burden of proving future unit cost reduction. On June 13,
    2005, the Board issued a reconsideration opinion affirming its original decision. Applied
    Co., 
    ASBCA No. 50593
    , 
    05-2 BCA P32,986
     (June 13, 2005) (“Reconsideration”). This
    appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(10).
    II
    The dispositive issue on appeal is to which AC models the VECP applies; this
    inquiry involves both the regulatory language of the VE clause and the language of
    Applied’s agreement with the Army.       Interpretation of regulations and contracts are
    questions of law that we review de novo. Lane v. Principi, 
    339 F.3d 1331
    , 1339 (Fed.
    Cir. 2003) (regulatory interpretation); Lockheed Martin IR Imaging Sys. v. West, 
    108 F.3d 319
    , 322 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (contract interpretation).
    A
    Part (b) of the VE clause defines “Acquisition savings” as “savings resulting from
    the application of a VECP to contracts awarded by the same contracting office or its
    successor . . . for essentially the same unit.” It defines “Unit” as “the item or task to
    which the Contracting Officer and the Contractor agree the VECP applies.” Part (c) of
    the VE clause, which discusses VECP preparation, instructs that the Contractor “shall
    include in each VECP . . . (3) Identification of the unit to which the VECP applies.” The
    05-1511                                     4
    language of the regulation is unambiguous.      It is incumbent upon the contractor to
    propose a definition of “unit”, and thus to propose any additional models for which it
    seeks to share in cost savings, in its VECP. As with any other contract term, the parties
    may then negotiate from the contractor’s proposal until a final agreement is reached.
    To determine the scope of VE savings, the proper focus of the analysis is the
    agreement between the CO and the contractor. Here, that “agreement” consists of:
    Applied’s VECP; mod P9, which conditionally accepted the VECP; and mod P15, which
    unconditionally accepted the VECP.
    The language of the VECP is unambiguous. It names only the contract for the
    Applied AC, and indeed specifies only the Applied AC’s unique drawing set.           After
    submitting its VECP, Applied sent three subsequent letters of correction and
    clarification, none of which purported to alter the scope of the VECP, and two of which
    referred specifically to “the commercialization of the 36k Horizontal [AC].”       As AJ
    Kienlen rightly noted in his opinion concurring with the Board’s reconsideration decision,
    the VE clause “clearly allow[s] the parties to agree that the VECP applies to the entire
    family [of ACs].” Reconsideration, slip op. at 11 (Kienlen, A.J., concurring). But the
    parties here clearly did not reach such an agreement. Rather, their agreement could
    embrace no more than the Applied AC, for that is all Applied proposed, and all that the
    modifications accepted.
    Likewise, the language of mod P9 is unambiguous.           In mod P9, the parties
    agreed that the VECP was accepted conditionally as applicable to “[horizontal AC]
    36,000 BTU/HR”. Of particular note, mod P9 also provided that there would be “zero”
    05-1511                                     5
    future units scheduled for delivery during the sharing period and stated: “It is mutually
    understood and agreed that there will be no future contract sharing provisions.”
    The Board plurality found the conditional nature of mod P9 to make it inherently
    ambiguous, primarily because mod P9 lacked cost savings and price adjustment
    calculations, which could only be determined after the completion of testing. The Board
    also found mod P9’s language that “the negotiated settlement method shall be the
    ‘Lump-Sum Settlement Method’” to contradict language indicating that Applied would
    not be entitled to future savings, because the VE clause only mentions a lump-sum
    settlement method as an option with future contract savings.          See FAR 52.248-
    1(h)(5)(i)(4).   Accordingly, the Board proceeded to discern the parties’ intent with
    respect to future savings.
    The failure of mod P9 to include certain key terms does not render the parties’
    agreement ambiguous. To the contrary, mod P9 explicitly stated that “after submission
    of [testing] data and pursuant to the Value Engineering clause of the contract, the
    savings will be negotiated and contractually definitized by modification.” That latter
    modification was mod P15, which unconditionally accepted Applied’s VECP and
    contained the cost savings information missing from mod P9. Mod P15 included the
    total net instant acquisition savings, and broke that figure into the government’s share
    and the contractor’s share. Consistent with mod P9, mod P15 indicated “N/A” in all
    fields referring to future contract savings. The inclusion in mod P9 of language referring
    to the lump-sum payment method for future contract savings was, at most, irrelevant,
    given the clarity with which both documents indicated that no future savings would be
    05-1511                                     6
    awarded. Accordingly, we hold that mod P9 and mod P15, read together harmoniously,
    clearly provide that Applied is not entitled to share in future savings.
    Because there is no ambiguity in Applied’s agreement with the Army, there is no
    role in this case for parol evidence. Applied’s counsel asserted at oral argument that
    Col. Mills not only discussed the idea that later led to this VECP, but also negotiated this
    VECP, and Col. Mills offered “uncontroverted” testimony that the Army intended
    Applied’s VECP concept to apply to the entire family of ACs. If Col. Mills intended to
    include additional AC models within the scope of the VECP, then he should have
    communicated that intent to the CO, so that it could have been incorporated into the
    writings. If the contract modifications proferred by the Army failed to state accurately
    the oral agreement entered into with Col. Mills, Applied should not have agreed to them.
    Moreover, if the agreement had been ambiguous, which it is not, then the CO—the
    party specifically tasked by the regulation with entering into an agreement with the
    contractor regarding VECP scope—would have been the proper Army representative to
    offer clarification as to the parties’ intent. Col. Mills was not a party to any contract.
    B
    We also reject Applied’s contention that it is entitled to share in VE savings for
    additional AC models because the “purpose” of its VECP was “commercialization.”
    Applied argues that although its VECP was directed solely to the Applied AC, the
    concept behind the VECP was generally to “replace source . . . controlled items with . . .
    commercial items” under military specification MIL-A-52767.             In its original claim,
    Applied explained that it was seeking to share in the cost savings for all AC models
    based on a “unilateral new policy initiated by the President and implemented by the
    05-1511                                        7
    Department of Defense Secretary . . . requiring the Pentagon to use commercial
    standards rather than the complex and detailed military standards”, which, it stated, “is
    exactly the concept proposed by Applied in the VECP.”
    Applied’s contention that a contractor may share in cost savings from a proposed
    “concept” may seem to some appealing; arguably, it may provide a greater incentive for
    contractors to develop cost-saving initiatives than does the current system.
    Unfortunately, Applied’s position is not only unsupported by the regulatory language, it
    is also contrary to this court’s precedent. In M. Bianchi of Cal. v. Perry, 
    31 F.3d 1163
    (Fed. Cir. 1994), we held that a VECP for packing pantsuit coats more efficiently in
    shipping boxes did not entitle the contractor to share in contract savings from the
    military’s use of this packing method with other products. We explained that “the ‘items’
    referred to in the contract are the ones manufactured and shipped pursuant to the
    contract”, and thus, that “the submission of a VECP does not confer any proprietary
    right in the ‘concept’ of the proposal.” 
    Id. at 1168
    . Cf. John J. Kirlin, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    827 F.3d 1538
    , 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[T]he first contractor to propose a
    change based on a particular idea acquires no proprietary rights in the proposal that
    would allow him priority over a subsequent proposal based on the same idea.”).
    III
    Because the agreement between Applied and the Army provided unambiguously
    that Applied was not entitled to share in any future savings, the Board correctly declined
    to award Applied a share of future savings for additional AC models. Accordingly, the
    decision of the Board is
    AFFIRMED.
    05-1511                                     8