Efthimiadis v. Department of the Army , 126 F. App'x 468 ( 2005 )

NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
is not citable as precedent.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-3373
CLEA B. EFTHIMIADIS,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
Respondent.
___________________________
DECIDED: March 14, 2005
___________________________
Before RADER, Circuit Judge, PLAGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and PROST,
Circuit Judge.
RADER, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) decided that the Department
of the Army (Army) did not violate veterans’ preference law when it did not select
petitioner Clea B. Efthimiadis for the position of Attorney-Advisor, United States
Army Garrison-Miami. Clea B. Efthimiadis v. Dep’t of Army, No. AT-0330-03-
0349-I-1 (MSPB June 26, 2003) (“Initial Decision”); Clea B. Efthimiadis v. Dep’t
of Army, No. AT-0330-03-0349-I-1 (MSPB May 27, 2004) (Final Order). Because
the Board’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, this court affirms
the decision of the Board.
II. BACKGROUND
Ms. Efthimiadis joined the Navy in 1985 and received an honorable
discharge in 1992. In July 2001, the United States Army South Base Ops
Support, Office of the Commander in Miami, Florida, advertised an available
position in the excepted service as an attorney at the U.S. Army Garrison-Miami,
Florida. The advertisement included a requirement that applicants include a DD-
214 Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, or equivalent, “if
claiming 5-point veteran preference” or a DD-214, SF-15, and VA/Service
Document certifying service-connected disability” if claiming 10-point Veterans
Preference [sic].” Ms. Efthimiadis, who was one of twenty-three applicants for
this position, included a DD-214 Certificate with her application.
The selecting official was Colonel James Willey, Commander, U.S. Army
Garrison-Miami. Col. Willey sought the help of the Office of the Staff Judge
Advocate of U.S. Southern Command in the selection process. The Staff Judge
Advocate established a three-member panel, including two attorneys, to rank the
candidates and identify the best four or five. In making its recommendations the
panelists considered only legal qualifications, not service or disability history.
Each panel member evaluated the candidates using a numerical matrix system.
Once the reviews were completed, the scores given by each panelist were
averaged and the applications ranked. Appellant placed ninth in this panel
ranking.
Col. Willey reviewed the scores for all applicants and decided that only the
five highest-rated individuals would be interviewed by his Deputy, Michael
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Norman. After conducting the interviews, Mr. Norman made recommendations to
Col. Willey, whose choice of the successful candidate was based on several
merit factors relating to legal experience and research and writing skills. The top
four applicants were preference-eligible veterans. In December, 2001, Col.
Willey selected Victoria Sheffield, who had ranked fourth and was a disabled
veteran, for the position.
Ms. Efthimiadis subsequently received information regarding the reasons
for her non-selection for the attorney position through a Freedom of Information
Act request related to a concurrent complaint of age discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Because none of the information she
obtained explicitly indicated the application of veterans’ preference during the
selection process, Ms. Efthimiadis then filed a complaint with the Department of
Labor claiming that the application of veterans’ preference in the selection
process was “unclear,” and asked that an investigation be made as to whether
the Army had “complied with the law.” After an investigation, the Department
notified Ms. Efthimiadis in January 2003 that her claim had no merit. Ms.
Efthimiadis then appealed to the Board, alleging under the Veteran Employment
Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA) that her veterans’ preference rights under the
Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 (VPA) had been violated, and that the Army
had violated 5 C.F.R. § 301.010(c) (2000) by not providing her with the reason
she was not selected. She also argued, citing 5 C.F.R. § 302.101(c), that the
application of the principle of veterans’ preference in attorney hiring had
improperly been left to the Army’s discretion by the Office of Personnel
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Management (OPM). In its Initial Decision, the Board administrative judge found
no violation of Ms Efthimiadis’s veterans’ preference rights.. Regarding the
propriety of OPM’s regulations, the Board found “that the Army has the discretion
to determine the procedure that it will follow in filling such positions so long as
they do not deprive a preference eligible of an opportunity to compete for the
position” (citing Ramsey v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 87 M.S.P.R. 98, ¶ 9 (2000)
(plain language of VEOA statute only prohibits the Army from denying a
preference eligible or veteran the opportunity to compete)). Furthermore, the
Board found that 5 C.F.R. § 302.101(c) “does not require the Army to apply the
procedures to positions which have been expressly exempted by the regulations,
even if by doing so the appellant would have gained an advantage.” Cf. Whitney
v. Dep’t of Army, 92 M.S.P.R. 423, ¶ 10 (2002) (actions taken under merit
promotion plan are not subject to veterans’ preference). Thereafter, the Board
issued a Final Order, denying Ms. Efthimaidis’ petition for review and upholding
the Initial Decision as final. This appeal followed.
III. Analysis
This court affirms a decision of the Board unless it is arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without
procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
unsupported by substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000); Marino v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 243 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Ms. Efthimiadis alleges generally a violation of her veterans’ rights under
VPA, and brings her claim under VEOA, which creates a right of redress for
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actions taken after October 30, 1998 that violate an individual’s veterans’
preference rights. 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a) and (d) (2000); see also Campion v. Merit
Sys. Prot. Bd., 326 F.3d 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
People may be employed in the Army in the “competitive service” or the
“excepted service.” Veterans eligible for preferences are defined in 5 U.S.C.
§ 2108(3) (2000) as “preference eligible” and in the competitive service, five
points may be added to added to a veteran’s quantitative total, and ten to a
disabled veteran’s total, in an evaluation for a position. 5 U.S.C. § 3309(1)
(2000) and 5 C.F.R. § 337.101(b) (2000).
Ms. Efthimiadis argued to the Board that, as a preference-eligible veteran,
points should have been given to her during the evaluation of her application.
Initial Decision, slip op. at 2. However, such a specific preferential method is not
required in the excepted service. Section 5 of the C.F.R. 302.101(c)(9) states
that for attorney positions, “the principle of veteran preference [should be
followed] as far as administratively feasible . . . :” The legislative history of the
The Board’s final judgment must be sustained if this court determines that
substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that the Army has proven
its case by a preponderance of the evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see also
5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(1)(ii) (2004); Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,
620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). This court finds, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that the
Army did follow “the principle of veteran preference as far as administratively
feasible.”
04-3373 5
The VPA establishes veterans’ preference in 5 U.S.C § 1302 (2000),
stating that “preference shall be given to preference eligibles . . . in appointment
. . . in the excepted service.” The legislative history of VPA supports a flexible,
nonprocedural standard for attorney hiring practices. see, e.g., Report of the
President’s Committee on Civil Service Improvement, H. Doc. 118, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess.
In discussing the relationship of § 302.101(c) to Ms. Efthimiadis’s case, the
Board stated, “In sum, the agency complies with the law by considering a
preference eligible’s service as a positive factor in her application, even if it does
not assign points to veterans in ranking applicants for attorney positions.” Initial
Decision, slip op. at 3. The Board did not, however, cite any explicit evidence in
the record that shows the Army viewed Ms. Efthimiadis’s veterans’ preference
eligibility (or that of any other candidate) as a “positive factor.” Ms. Efthimiadis
was ranked ninth during the selection process; like her, the top four candidates
were also preference-eligibles. The application of the principle of veterans’
preference to Ms. Efthimiadis would not have changed her position in relation to
the top four candidates during the selection process. Therefore, Ms. Efthimiadis
was not harmed by the ultimate decision. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(3) (2004)
(definition of harmful error); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A) (2000).
Because the Initial Decision of the Board is supported by substantial
evidence, the decision of the Board is affirmed.
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