Brigham v. Social Security Administration ( 2012 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    TAMMY R. BRIGHAM,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
    Respondent.
    __________________________
    2012-3129
    __________________________
    Petition for review of an arbitrator’s decision in Case
    Nos. BR-2011-R-0004 and BR-2011-R-0018 by Daniel L.
    Feinstein.
    __________________________
    Decided: October 4, 2012
    __________________________
    TAMMY R. BRIGHAM, of Memphis, Tennessee, pro se.
    GREGG PARIS YATES, Trial Attorney, Commercial Liti-
    gation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department
    of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him
    on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and
    REGINALD T. BLADES, JR., Assistant Director.
    __________________________
    BRIGHAM   v. SSA                                          2
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE, Circuit Judge, and
    DANIEL, Chief District Judge 1
    PER CURIAM.
    Tammy R. Brigham seeks review of an arbitrator’s
    decision holding that just cause supported the Social
    Security Administration’s decisions to 1) suspend Ms.
    Brigham for thirty days and subsequently 2) terminate
    her employment. Because the record contains substantial
    evidence to support the Arbitrator’s factual determina-
    tions and the arbitrator correctly applied the law, this
    court affirms.
    I
    Ms. Brigham began employment with the Social Secu-
    rity Administration (the “Agency”) in 1994 as a Claims
    Clerk. In October 2004, she received a promotion to the
    position of Claims Representative. While working as a
    Claims Representative, Ms. Brigham observed what she
    believed was inappropriate termination of claimants’
    benefits, and reported the situation. Ms. Brigham then
    allegedly suffered acts of retaliation for being a whistle-
    blower. She filed a grievance. The grievance ended when
    Ms. Brigham voluntarily accepted a downgrade from
    Claims Representative to Service Representative and a
    transfer to another office.
    Ms. Brigham began work at her new position in June
    2009, where she engaged in a pattern of disruptive behav-
    ior. Ms. Brigham’s interactions with co-workers and the
    public were discourteous. At the arbitration hearing in
    this case, six of Ms. Brigham’s co-workers testified regard-
    ing her unprofessional and intimidating behavior. The
    1   The Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel, Chief District
    Judge, United States District Court for the District of
    Colorado, sitting by designation.
    3                                           BRIGHAM   v. SSA
    Agency also identified several instances of substandard
    job performance, including tardiness, unscheduled ab-
    sence without leave, and Ms. Brigham’s denial of assis-
    tance to social security claimants in violation of
    instructions from her supervisor.
    On August 18, 2009, Ms. Brigham met with two of her
    supervisors, Mr. James Alford and Ms. Charlene Strong.
    They intended to discuss complaints from Ms. Brigham’s
    co-workers about her behavior. During the arbitration
    hearing, both Mr. Alford and Ms. Strong testified that Ms.
    Brigham abruptly ended the August 18, 2009 meeting.
    Their testimony recounted that Ms. Brigham bumped into
    one supervisor and pushed the other as she left the room.
    Conversely, Ms. Sharon Patrick, a union representative,
    testified that she watched the entire meeting through a
    window from the common area into the office and did not
    see Ms. Brigham take any aggressive action towards
    either Mr. Alford or Ms. Strong. Ms. Patrick testified that
    she could not hear what was said during the meeting, but
    believed she would have heard any raised voices. The
    arbitrator found the testimony of Mr. Alford and Ms.
    Strong credible, and found Ms. Patrick had not been able
    to fully observe the events of the meeting from her posi-
    tion outside the window.
    Ms. Brigham received the Agency’s notice of intent to
    suspend her without pay for thirty days for (a) discourte-
    ous behavior directed at colleagues; (b) the incident in
    which she bumped and pushed two supervisors; and (c)
    failure to perform assigned tasks. This discipline took
    effect on February 1, 2010. On March 10, 2010, immedi-
    ately upon returning from her thirty-day suspension, Ms.
    Brigham had a physical altercation with an employee who
    was assisting Ms. Brigham with setting up her voicemail.
    The employee, Ms. Nina Des Vignes, testified Ms. Brig-
    ham slapped her hand “really hard” when she reached for
    BRIGHAM   v. SSA                                          4
    Ms. Brigham’s phone. J.A. 31. Ms. Jean Vaught, an
    Operations Supervisor, and Mr. Alford both testified they
    observed a red mark on Ms. Des Vignes’s hand following
    the incident and that Ms. Des Vignes appeared shaken.
    Mr. Ennis Lee Brown, a contract security guard, similarly
    testified that he heard a slapping sound and also observed
    a red mark on Ms. Des Vignes’s hand. Ms. Brigham
    testified that her finger only brushed Ms. Des Vignes’s
    hand. The arbitrator found the testimony of Ms. Brig-
    ham’s co-workers credible and compelling, and deter-
    mined Ms. Brigham initiated the physical confrontation.
    Following the March, 10, 2010 incident, the Agency
    terminated Ms. Brigham’s employment. The American
    Federation of Government Employees, a labor union
    representing employees in the office where Ms. Brigham
    worked, invoked arbitration on her behalf. At arbitration,
    Ms. Brigham denied engaging in the charged misconduct
    and alleged that the Agency violated the Whistleblower
    Protection Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8).
    On March 27, 2012, the arbitrator issued a decision
    finding that just cause supported the Agency’s decisions
    to suspend and remove Ms. Brigham from Federal service.
    The arbitrator found the Agency carried its burden of
    proving Ms. Brigham engaged in the conduct with which
    she was charged, and found that Ms. Brigham’s perform-
    ance-related and interoffice conflicts were egregious.
    After considering the factors set forth in Douglas v. Veter-
    ans Administration, 
    5 M.S.P.R. 280
     (1981) (“Douglas
    factors”), the arbitrator concluded that the penalties were
    appropriate.
    The arbitrator did not reach the merits of Ms. Brig-
    ham’s whistleblower allegations. The arbitrator deter-
    mined that even if Ms. Brigham made protected
    disclosures and the deciding officials were aware of those
    5                                            BRIGHAM   v. SSA
    disclosures, the Agency had met its burden to show it
    would have imposed the same disciplinary measures
    regardless of such disclosures.
    II
    This court reviews an arbitrator’s decision under the
    same standard of review that is applied to decisions from
    the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”).
    
    5 U.S.C. § 7121
    (f); Johnson v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
    
    625 F. 3d 1373
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, the arbitra-
    tor’s decision must be affirmed unless it is “(1) arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
    accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures
    required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed;
    or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c); Johnson, 
    625 F. 3d at 1376
    .
    This court’s review of an agency’s penalty determina-
    tion is “highly deferential.” Bieber v. Dep’t of the Army,
    
    287 F. 3d 1358
    , 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The court will not
    overturn the penalty determination unless it is “grossly
    disproportionate to the offense charged.” 
    Id.
     (quotation
    omitted).
    In cases involving retaliation for whistleblowing, the
    employee must first demonstrate by a preponderance of
    the evidence that she made a protected disclosure under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8)(A). The burden then shifts to the
    agency to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
    it would have taken the action even in the absence of the
    protected disclosure. 
    5 U.S.C. § 1221
    (e)(2). The Board
    looks at three factors in assessing whether the agency has
    met its burden: (1) “the strength of the agency’s evidence
    in support of its personnel action”; (2) “the existence and
    strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the
    agency officials who were involved in the decision”; and
    (3) “any evidence that the agency takes similar actions
    BRIGHAM   v. SSA                                         6
    against employees who are not whistle-blowers but who
    are otherwise similarly situated.” Carr v. Soc. Sec.
    Admin., 
    185 F.3d 1318
     (Fed. Cir. 1999).
    III
    This record contains substantial evidence to support
    the arbitrator’s determination that the Agency properly
    decided to suspend and later terminate Ms. Brigham. Ms.
    Brigham’s primary argument on appeal is that she did not
    engage in any of the conduct with which she was charged.
    The arbitrator, however, personally observed the testi-
    mony of Ms. Brigham, her witnesses, and the supervisors
    and co-workers who testified against her. The arbitrator
    found the testimony of Ms. Brigham’s co-workers and
    supervisors credible and compelling. Having weighed the
    conflicting testimony, the arbitrator found Ms. Brigham
    violated direct instructions from supervisors in dealing
    with social security claimants, was intimidating and
    unprofessional in her behavior with colleagues, and
    engaged in two incidents of workplace violence. Absent
    compelling reasons to protect against manifest injustice,
    this court must credit the credibility determinations
    entrusted to a fact-finder. See, e.g., Gibson v. Dep’t of
    Veterans Affairs, 
    160 F.3d 722
    , 725 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Ms.
    Brigham has not identified any evidence that demon-
    strates the testimony of her colleagues and managers was
    “inherently improbable or discredited by undisputed
    evidence or physical fact.” 
    Id. at 726
     (citations omitted).
    Ms. Brigham also disputes that suspension and re-
    moval were appropriate punishments for the charged
    conduct. The arbitrator, however, engaged in an express
    weighing of the Douglas factors. The arbitrator found
    that some factors “mitigate against strong discipline,”
    including Ms. Brigham’s long history of federal employ-
    ment without prior disciplinary problems, and the possi-
    7                                            BRIGHAM   v. SSA
    bility that “some of the routine interruptions of colleagues
    may have been mitigated through a more rigorous
    on-board[ ] training process.” Arbitrator Op. at 16-17.
    The arbitrator also noted Ms. Brigham “suffers from a
    diagnosed mental health condition” and considered this as
    a mitigating circumstance in Ms. Brigham’s favor which
    might weigh in favor of less severe discipline. Id. at 16.
    Ms. Brigham asserts that the arbitrator improperly
    referred to her mental health condition, but this court
    detects no prejudice to Ms. Brigham or her case in the
    arbitrator’s consideration of her condition.
    Ms. Brigham suggests her performance issues were
    caused by the Agency’s failure to provide proper training
    when she moved to her new office and position in June
    2009. As noted by the Arbitrator, “the purported failure
    of the Agency to provide ‘expectations discussions’ was
    previously grieved but not appealed to arbitration.”
    Arbitrator Op. at 17 n.6. This court will not review issues
    that were not presented to the Arbitrator in the first
    instance. To the extent Ms. Brigham argues the lack of
    formal training is a mitigating factor favoring a lesser
    penalty, the Arbitrator considered and correctly rejected
    this argument. Ms. Brigham received and did not heed
    numerous warnings regarding her unprofessional behav-
    ior with co-workers. Moreover, physical confrontations
    with co-workers are unacceptable in almost any event.
    Ms. Brigham argues she was denied procedural due
    process because Mr. Alford and Ms. Strong, the two
    officials who proposed and implemented the thirty day
    suspension, were both involved in the physical confronta-
    tion that occurred August 18, 2009. The Agency respected
    Ms. Brigham’s due process rights by giving her notice and
    an opportunity to be heard with respect to her suspension
    and removal. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
    
    470 U.S. 532
    , 546 (1985) (explaining the requirements of
    BRIGHAM   v. SSA                                        8
    due process). In any event, the charges against Ms.
    Brigham received corroboration from several non-
    supervisor colleagues, which further weighs against Ms.
    Brigham’s claim that the adverse personnel actions were
    motivated by bias. Accordingly, Ms. Brigham did not
    present sufficient evidence of bias to prove any violation
    of her due process rights.
    Ms. Brigham also points out that she had not experi-
    enced any disciplinary problems until after she reported a
    supervisor’s alleged inappropriate termination of claimant
    benefits, which this court interprets as an appeal of the
    denial of Ms. Brigham’s claim of whistleblower retalia-
    tion. The arbitrator gave Ms. Brigham’s whistleblower
    retaliation claim due consideration by assuming, without
    deciding, that Ms. Brigham had made a protected disclo-
    sure. The Arbitrator determined, however, that the
    Agency established it would have proposed the same
    penalties absent any protected disclosures Ms. Brigham
    may have made. Likewise, the record adequately sup-
    ports this conclusion.
    Based on witness testimony, the arbitrator found the
    Agency compellingly proved that Ms. Brigham engaged in
    a physical confrontation with two supervisors. Immedi-
    ately upon return from a suspension imposed for unpro-
    fessional conduct, Ms. Brigham slapped a co-worker. The
    latter incident was established through the testimony of
    three witnesses, two of whom were non-management
    co-workers with no motivation to engage in reprisal over
    any alleged whistleblowing by Ms. Brigham. The record
    contains substantial evidence to support the arbitrator’s
    determination that the Agency would have proposed the
    same penalties for any employee who engaged in such
    disruptive and physically violent conduct. See Carr, 
    185 F.3d at 1318
    .
    9                                            BRIGHAM   v. SSA
    For the reasons stated above, this court affirms the
    final decision of the arbitration decision holding that just
    cause supported the Social Security Administration’s
    decisions to 1) suspend Ms. Brigham for 30 days and 2)
    terminate her employment.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    Each party shall bear its own costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2012-3129

Judges: Rader, Lourie, Daniel

Filed Date: 10/4/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024