Brooks Furniture Manufacturing v. Dutailier Int'l ( 2005 )


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    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    03-1379
    BROOKS FURNITURE MANUFACTURING, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    DUTAILIER INTERNATIONAL, INC. and DUTAILIER, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    R. Bradford Brittian, Pitts & Brittian, P.C., of Knoxville, Tennessee, argued for
    plaintiff-appellee. With him on the brief were Robert E. Pitts and Melinda L. Doss.
    Kevin W. Goldstein, RatnerPrestia, of Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, argued for
    defendants-appellants. With him on the brief were Kevin R. Casey and Jacques L.
    Etkowicz.
    Appealed from:    United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
    Judge Curtis L. Collier
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    03-1379
    BROOKS FURNITURE MANUFACTURING, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    DUTAILIER INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND DUTAILIER, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    __________________________
    DECIDED: January 4, 2005
    __________________________
    Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
    NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Dutailier International, Inc. and Dutailier, Inc. (together "Dutailier"), appeal the
    decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee1 holding
    that Brooks' action for declaratory judgment that Dutailier's patent is invalid and not
    infringed constitutes an exceptional case and awarding attorney fees. The award is
    vacated.
    1      Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-072 (E.D. Tenn.
    Apr. 3, 2003); Memorandum Opinion Dec. 18, 2001; Claim Construction Sept. 4, 2001.
    BACKGROUND
    Dutailier is the owner of United States Patent No. D417,983 ("the '983 patent"), a
    design patent for rocking chair trim, issued December 28, 1999. Brooks and Dutailier are
    both in the business of manufacturing rocking chairs. In January 2000 Dutailier sent
    Brooks a cease and desist letter, alleging infringement of the '983 patent and demanding
    an orderly withdrawal from the market and payment of royalties for past and interim
    infringement. In response, Brooks filed suit in the Eastern District of Tennessee seeking a
    declaratory judgment that it did not infringe the '983 patent and that the patent was invalid,
    along with claims of unfair competition and patent mismarking. Brooks alleged that the
    action was exceptional pursuant to 
    35 U.S.C. §285
    , 
    15 U.S.C. §1117
    , and Tennessee law,
    and requested attorney fees and litigation costs. Dutailier then sued Brooks in the District
    of Delaware, asserting patent infringement, Lanham Act and common law unfair
    competition, and deceptive trade practices under state consumer protection law. After an
    unsuccessful attempt to transfer the Tennessee case to Delaware, Dutailier dismissed the
    Delaware action and filed equivalent counterclaims in the Tennessee action.
    The Tennessee district court granted Brooks' motion for summary judgment of
    noninfringement and denied as moot Brooks' motion for summary judgment of invalidity.
    By stipulated order, Brooks voluntarily dismissed its invalidity, patent mismarking, and
    Lanham Act claims, and Dutailier voluntarily dismissed its remaining counterclaims, leaving
    no outstanding issues and entering final judgment.
    The district court granted Brooks' request for attorney fees, concluding that the
    circumstances of the case were exceptional.          See 
    35 U.S.C. §285
     ("The court in
    exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.") The
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    district court held that Brooks had clearly prevailed on the infringement issue and was also
    a prevailing party to the extent that Dutailier's counterclaims had been dismissed by
    stipulated order. The court held that attorney fees were warranted under either the Patent
    or Lanham Acts, or pursuant to state consumer protection law. The court did not set the
    amount of the award, instead ordering the parties to submit papers and "confer in an effort
    to see if the amount of attorney fees can be agreed upon."
    Dutailier attempted to appeal the attorney fees decision, but this court dismissed the
    appeal as not ripe since there was no specific award. On remand, the district court
    determined the amount of the fees and Dutailier re-appealed. Dutailier challenges only its
    liability for attorney fees, not the amount.
    A
    Procedural Matters
    Dutailier argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by placing on it the
    burden of proving its good faith, instead of placing on Brooks the burden of proving bad
    faith. Dutailier cites the court's repeated descriptions of the hearing to determine whether
    the case was exceptional as a "good faith hearing." See Memorandum Opinion (Dec. 18,
    2001) ("out of an abundance of caution, the court conducted a hearing on the issue of
    defendants' good faith"). Dutailier also argues that the court failed to interpret the evidence
    in its favor as non-movant, as is required in granting a motion for summary judgment. See
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    , 587
    (1986).
    We do not share Dutailier's characterization of the district court's procedure. The
    district court received Brooks' evidence of asserted bad faith, and by "good faith hearing"
    03-1379                                        3
    gave Dutailier an opportunity to respond to this evidence. The facts relevant to the
    exceptional case analysis were largely uncontroverted, and raised no Rule 56 issue: there
    was no factual dispute about the contents of the cease and desist letter, Dutailier's size and
    conduct in the marketplace, its litigation conduct, and the opinions of counsel and design
    experts upon which Dutailier relied. Although we conclude that the district court erred in its
    legal conclusion, as we shall discuss, the court did not commit procedural error or misplace
    the burden of proof.
    B
    Prevailing Party
    Dutailier points out that many of Brooks' claims were dismissed by stipulation, and
    that the Dutailier patent remained valid; thus Dutailier argues that the district court erred in
    ruling that Brooks was the prevailing party.
    Determination of the prevailing party is based on the relation of the litigation result to
    the overall objective of the litigation, and not on a count of the number of claims and
    defenses. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School Dist., 
    489 U.S. 782
    , 789 (1989) ("'plaintiffs may be considered "prevailing parties" for attorney's fees
    purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
    benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.'") (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 433 (1983)).
    Dutailier accused Brooks of infringing its patent and demanded that Brooks cease
    producing the accused chairs. Brooks brought this declaratory action to preserve its
    position, and succeeded in doing so. Brooks raised several defenses to the charge of
    patent infringement, any of which would have achieved Brooks' goal. Thus when Brooks
    03-1379                                        4
    established its non-infringement of the Dutailier patent, it prevailed in the litigation. That
    other defenses, such as invalidity of the patent, were unsuccessful or withdrawn, does not
    change the outcome in Brooks' favor. We agree with the district court that Brooks was the
    prevailing party.
    C
    Exceptional Case
    A case may be deemed exceptional when there has been some material
    inappropriate conduct related to the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or
    inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexatious or
    unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, or like infractions. See, e.g.,
    Cambridge Prods. Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients Inc., 
    962 F.2d 1048
    , 1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
    Beckman Instruments, Inc., v. LKB Produkter AB, 
    892 F.2d 1547
    , 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
    Absent misconduct in conduct of the litigation or in securing the patent, sanctions may be
    imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith,
    and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.      Professional Real Estate Investors v.
    Columbia Pictures Industries, 
    508 U.S. 49
    , 60-61 (1993); see also Forest Labs., Inc. v.
    Abbott Labs., 
    339 F.3d 1324
    , 1329-31 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Since we conclude that the first
    requirement (subjective bad faith) is not satisfied here, we need not decide whether the
    second (objectively baseless) standard was met.2 That second inquiry does not depend on
    2     See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 
    362 F.3d 1367
    ,
    1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("A plaintiff claiming that a patent holder has engaged in wrongful
    conduct by asserting claims of patent infringement must establish that the claims of
    infringement were objectively baseless."); Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. Acres Gaming, Inc., 
    165 F.3d 891
    , 897 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("bad faith is not supported when the information is
    objectively accurate").
    03-1379                                        5
    the state of mind of the plaintiff at the time that the action was commenced, but rather
    requires an objective assessment of the merits.
    There is a presumption that the assertion of infringement of a duly granted patent is
    made in good faith. Springs Willow Fashions, LP v. Novo Indus., LP, 
    323 F.3d 989
    , 999
    (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, the underlying improper conduct and the characterization of the
    case as exceptional must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Beckman, 
    892 F.2d at 1551
    . Even for an exceptional case, the decision to award attorney fees and the
    amount thereof are within the district court's sound discretion. See S.C. Johnson & Son,
    Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 
    781 F.2d 198
    , 201 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (even an exceptional case
    does not require in all circumstances the award of attorney fees).
    The district court found that Dutailier had acted in bad faith in sending the cease and
    desist letter and filing the Delaware suit against Brooks. The court based its opinion
    largely, but not solely, on what it considered the frivolousness of the infringement claim.
    The court also considered the behavior of Dutailier in the marketplace and its policy of
    suing and acquiring its competitors, most of whom were significantly smaller than Dutailier
    and, according to the court, little able to afford to defend themselves. Taken together,
    Brooks argues, these factors render the case exceptional. We address each in turn.
    D
    Infringement
    Dutailier states that it had a good faith belief in the strength of its infringement claim,
    and that it had conducted a thorough investigation of the accused chairs before sending
    Brooks the cease and desist letter and filing the infringement counterclaims. Dutailier
    states that its investigation included analyses by its marketing staff and designers, followed
    03-1379                                         6
    by infringement opinions by Canadian and United States patent attorneys, and then
    evaluations by two independent experts in the field of rocking chair design. All of the
    experts and attorneys that Dutailier consulted concluded that there was substantial
    similarity between the accused chairs and the design set forth in the '983 patent.
    The district court did not find this activity adequate to establish a good faith belief
    that Brooks was infringing the '983 patent. The court began its infringement analysis by
    construing the scope of the '983 patent. It did this by describing in words the design shown
    in the drawings of the patent, and then reading the resulting verbal limitations on the
    accused chair. In reciting the differences between the '983 design and the accused chair,
    the court placed particular significance on the backward bulge in the rear edge of the
    upright trim. The court said:
    This court also previously determined that "[t]here can be no doubt that the
    contours of the rear surface of the rear element constitute limitations which
    cannot be ignored in determining the scope of the '983 patent. . . . The
    accused product's rearward element simply does not have a 'trailing edge
    descending in a gentle "s" curve, which is substantially parallel to the "s"
    curve of the forward edge, resulting in a slightly widened planar face, as the
    trailing edge descends to the base portion.' . . . The limitation requiring the
    gentle 's' curve on the trailing edge is not met by the accused chair. The
    limitation which requires the gentle 's' curve to be parallel to the 's' curve of
    the forward edge is not met. And, the limitation which requires that there be
    only a slight widening of the planar face is not met."
    Brooks Furniture, Memorandum Opinion at 17, quoting claim construction of Sept. 4, 2001.
    The court explained that design patents are entitled to almost no scope beyond the
    precise content of the patent drawings. Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 
    67 F.3d 1571
    , 1577
    (Fed. Cir. 1995). Applying this principle, the court concluded that no reasonable jury as the
    ordinary observer, and certainly no reasonable expert in chair design, would consider the
    accused chairs to be infringing. The court rejected Dutailier's argument that it reasonably
    03-1379                                       7
    relied on opinions of counsel that there probably was infringement, as well as the opinions
    of its internal officers and outside design experts that the accused chair was substantially
    the same as that shown in the patent. The court referred to the infringement opinion by
    one of the patent attorneys Dutailier consulted, and stated that "at first glance, one might
    actually find this opinion to be reasonable, comprehensive and competent," and that the
    attorney "also adequately considered the prior art in this instance," that the attorney
    "detailed the components and embodiments" of the patent and application he was
    considering, and that he "provided a detailed review of the proper procedure one must
    follow in determining infringement, and then lengthy application of this procedure in
    comparing the Brooks and Town Square chairs to Dutailier's designs." Memorandum Op.
    at 11-14. The court concluded that the attorney "adequately analyzed the scope of the
    patent claims" and applied the test set forth in Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
    511 (1871) to the infringement question. Id. at 14-15. Nonetheless, the court held that
    "despite all of [the attorney's] thoroughness in his infringement review and in his
    comparison of the Brooks chair and the Dutailier chair, [he] has failed to address several of
    the most important aspects of this infringement action which, therefore, requires the court
    to find that his opinion of infringement is, in fact, unreasonable." Id. at 15. The court cited
    the differences in the two chair designs, in particular the "s" curve on the trailing edge of the
    upright member, as aspects of the infringement analysis that the attorney's opinion failed to
    consider. The court found that the opinion, and the opinions of the other experts Dutailier
    had consulted, were unreasonable in their conclusions, and thus that Dutailier's reliance on
    these opinions was also unreasonable. Such unreasonable reliance, the court held,
    established bad faith on Dutailier's part in instituting the conflict with Brooks.
    03-1379                                        8
    On review, we do not share the view that the opinions of counsel and the opinions of
    the other experts were inadequate and their conclusions unreasonable. The legal criterion
    for infringement of a design patent is substantial identity, whereby "in the eye of an ordinary
    observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially
    the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to
    purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other."
    Gorham v. White, 81 U.S. at 528. In evaluating such resemblance, it is not necessary that
    every aspect of the designs be identical. See id. at 526-27 ("We are now prepared to
    inquire what is the true test of identity of design. Plainly, it must be sameness of
    appearance, and mere difference of lines in the drawing or sketch, a greater or smaller
    number of lines, or slight variances in configuration, if sufficient to change the effect upon
    the eye, will not destroy the substantial identity.")
    The fact that an infringement opinion may not have mentioned every detail of the
    patented or the accused design does not necessarily render the opinion wrong or
    unreliable.   The district court described the attorney's opinion as appearing to be
    "reasonable, comprehensive and competent." Such an opinion cannot be transformed into
    the opposite extreme of unreliability and incompetence, simply because the court reached a
    different conclusion on the merits of infringement. Bringing an infringement action does not
    become unreasonable in terms of '285 if the infringement can reasonably be disputed.
    Infringement is often difficult to determine, and a patentee's ultimately incorrect view of how
    a court will find does not of itself establish bad faith. The several opinions of counsel and
    other expert opinions obtained by Dutailier are not charged with having been obtained for
    specious "cosmetic" purposes, and their analysis of the designs is not unreasonable. We
    03-1379                                        9
    conclude that there was not clear and convincing evidence of bad faith by Dutailier in
    charging Brooks with infringement and in pressing this charge in litigation.
    E
    Other Conduct
    The district court supported its ruling that this was an exceptional case with several
    ancillary observations. For example, the court observed that one of the opinion letters was
    by an attorney in the same firm that conducted the litigation, the court concluding that this
    rendered it less reliable than an opinion by a completely unrelated attorney. The court also
    referred to the harsh terms of the cease and desist letter, which demanded withdrawal of
    the accused products from the marketplace, identification of the customers who had
    purchased them, and a response within two weeks. The court cited Dutailier's disinterest in
    granting Brooks a license. The court also looked to Dutailier's conduct with respect to other
    competitors, the lawsuits it filed against them, and the fact that it acquired one competitor
    after suing it. The court also observed that Dutailier was substantially larger than Brooks.
    None of these facts supports the district court's conclusion that Dutailier acted in bad
    faith in asserting its patent. The substance and thoroughness of the legal opinions could
    support a reasonable belief that the patent was being infringed. A duly granted patent is a
    grant of the right to exclude all infringers, not just those of comparable size. See United
    States v. United States Steel Corp., 
    251 U.S. 417
    , 451 (1920) ("the law does not make
    mere size an offense"). The record states that while Dutailier enforces its patents, it sues
    its larger competitors as well as the smaller ones.
    Patent rights are useful only if they can legally exclude others from the patented
    subject matter. That Dutailier is a larger company than Brooks, that it has sued others, and
    03-1379                                      10
    that it was unwilling to grant a license, are not indicative of bad faith. Although the entirety
    of a patentee's conduct may be considered, enforcement of patent rights that are
    reasonably believed to be infringed does not entail special penalty when the patentee is
    unsuccessful. See generally National Presto Indus., Inc. v, West Bend Co., 
    76 F.3d 1185
    ,
    1197 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The trial judge's discretion in the award of attorney fees permits the
    judge to weigh intangible as well as tangible factors: the degree of culpability of the
    infringer, the closeness of the question, litigation behavior, and any other factors whereby
    fee shifting may serve as an instrument of justice.").
    The finding that Dutailier acted in bad faith is reversed. Since this was material to
    the finding that this was an exceptional case, that finding is reversed, and the award of
    attorneys fees based thereon is vacated.
    No costs.
    REVERSED; FEE AWARD VACATED
    03-1379                                       11