Comaper Corporation v. Antec, Inc. ( 2013 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    COMAPER CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ANTEC, INC., BEST BUY CO., INC., AND MICRO
    ELECTRONICS, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ______________________
    2013-1147
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania in No. 05-CV-1103,
    Judge Petrese B. Tucker.
    ______________________
    Decided: September 6, 2013
    ______________________
    STEPHEN J. DRISCOLL, Saul Ewing, LLP, of Philadel-
    phia, Pennsylvania, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Of
    counsel was JOSEPH F. POSILLICO, Fox Rothschild, LLP, of
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
    ROBERT P. ANDRIS, Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley,
    of Redwood City, California, argued for defendants-
    appellees. With him on the brief was LAEL D. ANDARA.
    ______________________
    2                      COMAPER CORPORATION    v. ANTEC, INC.
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, CLEVENGER, and MOORE,
    Circuit Judges.
    RADER, Chief Judge.
    After a jury verdict upholding the claims of U.S. Pa-
    tent No. 5,955,955 (the ’955 patent), the United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    granted a JMOL motion rendering some claims invalid as
    anticipated. Because the district court erred in conclud-
    ing that the jury verdict lacked substantial evidence, this
    court reverses and remands.
    I.
    Comaper Corporation (Comaper) is the owner of
    the ’955 patent. Filed in 1994 and issued in 1999, the ’955
    patent claims a device to cool a computer’s drive bay
    region. See App. 60. The invention is a device inserted
    into a drive bay via a slot in the housing of the computer.
    Id. In 2005, Comaper filed suit against Antec, Inc. and
    others (collectively, Antec), alleging infringement of
    the ’955 patent. See Appellant’s Br. 4. Following a trial
    in 2007, this court affirmed the district court’s claim
    construction and a jury verdict of willful infringement.
    Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 
    596 F.3d 1343
    , 1347–49
    (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, because of an inconsistent
    verdict on invalidity (the jury found dependent claims, but
    not claims they depended from, to have been obvious),
    this court remanded in part. 
    Id.
     at 1354–55.
    In a second trial in 2011, the parties presented evi-
    dence only on issues of validity under 
    35 U.S.C. §§ 102
    and 103. The jury heard substantial testimony from the
    inventor (Mr. Corcoran) and Antec’s two expert witnesses,
    a computer collector (Mr. Ismail) and a computer histori-
    an (Mr. Bickley). During the week-long trial, Antec
    argued that several prior art devices and references
    rendered the claims invalid. However, by agreement, only
    the invalidity of the two independent claims of the ’955
    patent, claims 1 and 12, was submitted to the jury. App.
    3. The jury found that Antec did not prove invalidity. 
    Id.
    COMAPER CORPORATION   v. ANTEC, INC.                     3
    Antec properly moved for JMOL under §§ 102 and
    103, relying on four prior art devices. On April 2, 2012,
    the district court granted Antec’s motion for JMOL under
    § 102, holding that two prior art devices anticipated both
    asserted claims. Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 
    867 F. Supp. 2d 663
     (E.D. Pa. 2012); see App. 10–11, 20. The
    trial court did not reach § 103. Comaper appeals. This
    court has jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    II.
    This court reviews claim construction without defer-
    ence. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 
    138 F.3d 1448
    , 1456
    (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). In contrast, anticipation is a
    question of fact. Rapoport v. Dement, 
    254 F.3d 1053
    , 1058
    (Fed. Cir. 2001). A prior art device anticipates only if
    there is clear and convincing evidence that the prior art
    device “disclosed, either expressly or inherently, all the
    structural limitations contained in the asserted apparatus
    claims.” Old Reliable Wholesale, Inc. v. Cornell Corp., 
    635 F.3d 539
    , 545 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see Applied Med. Res.
    Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 
    147 F.3d 1374
    , 1380 (Fed.
    Cir. 1998) (a prior art device does not anticipate “simply
    by possessing identically named parts, unless these parts
    also have the same structure or otherwise satisfy the
    claim limitations”).
    This court reviews a district court’s grant of JMOL
    under regional circuit law. Frolow v. Wilson Sporting
    Goods Co., 
    710 F.3d 1303
    , 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “The
    Third Circuit exercises plenary review of the grant of a
    motion for JMOL,” and follows the rule that a motion for
    JMOL “should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is
    no question of material fact for the jury and any verdict
    other than the one directed would be erroneous under the
    governing law.” 
    Id.
     (quoting McGreevy v. Stroup, 
    413 F.3d 359
    , 363–64 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)). As
    Antec recognizes, in the Third Circuit it “is only in rare
    instances that a jury’s verdict in a civil case should be
    overturned.” Pitts v. Delaware, 
    646 F.3d 151
    , 152 (3d Cir.
    4                       COMAPER CORPORATION    v. ANTEC, INC.
    2011). See Appellees’ Br. at 20. Accordingly, this court
    can affirm only if, viewing the evidence most favorably to
    Comaper, the record shows clear and convincing evidence
    of invalidity such that no reasonable jury could find a
    claim was not anticipated. For the following reasons, this
    court does not discern that clear and convincing evidence
    in this record and thus must reverse.
    III.
    The need to cool computer components is as old as
    computers themselves. See Appellees’ Br. 5–7. The ’955
    patent describes a cooling device [100] designed to be
    inserted through a slot defined in the housing of a com-
    puter [150] into its drive bay [151]. See ’955 patent fig. 1.
    The asserted claims are not limited to specific types of
    computers, but Figure 1 of the ’955 patent gives some
    context to the claim language:
    Only independent claims 1 and 12 are on appeal.
    Claim 1 claims the cooling device alone, and claim 12
    claims a computer in combination with the device:
    1. A cooling device for a computer, said computer
    having a drive bay region with at least one drive
    COMAPER CORPORATION   v. ANTEC, INC.                       5
    bay slot adapted       to   receive[]   said   device
    com[p]rising:
    a case configured to mount within said
    drive bay slot of said computer such that
    said case occupies substantially the entire
    drive bay slot, said case having at least a
    first opening [shown as wavy slots in
    [100]] and at least a second opening, when
    mounted within said drive bay, said first
    opening being exposed to ambient air and
    said second opening being within said
    drive bay region of said computer;
    at least one air movement device mounted
    within said case, said air movement device
    being configured in one of two ways, a first
    way in which said air movement device
    draws cooling air through said first open-
    ing and exhausts substantially all of said
    cooling air from said case though said sec-
    ond opening into said drive bay region, a
    second way in which said air movement
    device draws air into said case through
    said second opening from and [sic] drive
    bay region and exhausts it through said
    first opening; and
    power supply means for supplying power
    to said air movement device.
    12. In a computer having a drive bay region with
    at least one drive bay slot adapted to receive a
    drive, an improvement comprising:
    a case mounted within said drive bay slot
    of said computer such that said case occu-
    pies substantially the entire drive bay
    slot, said case have [sic] at least a first
    opening and at least a second opening,
    said first opening being exposed to ambi-
    ent air and said second opening being
    6                       COMAPER CORPORATION    v. ANTEC, INC.
    within said drive bay region of said com-
    puter;
    at least one air movement device mounted
    within said case, said air movement device
    being configured in one of two ways, a first
    way in which said air movement device
    draws cooling air from said first opening
    and exhausts substantially all of said cool-
    ing air th[r]ough said case th[r]ough said
    second opening into said drive bay region,
    a second way in which said air movement
    device draws air into said case through
    said second opening from said drive bay
    region and exhausts it through said first
    opening; and
    power supply means for supplying power
    to said air movement device.
    In the prior appeal, this court affirmed the district
    court’s construction of several terms. One of these con-
    structions is dispositive of all issues here: this court held
    that “drive bay slot” means “the relatively narrow opening
    in the housing of the computer that leads to the drive
    bay.” Comaper, 
    596 F.3d at 1349
    .
    Despite this interpretation, the district court held in
    the JMOL order now on appeal that no reasonable jury
    could find that the asserted claims were not anticipated
    by two prior art 19-inch rack-mounted drive bay modules.
    Those two rack mounts for computer resources were
    known at trial as the “Fujitsu device” and the “CDC Nova
    3 Mini Module Device.” See Appellees’ Br. 13, 15. Alt-
    hough in the 1980s the standard in personal computers
    (PC) was for PCs to use disk drives that were about 5.25
    inches wide, some computer systems used separate mod-
    ules (hard drives, tape drives, processors, etc.) mounted in
    “racks.” See Appellant’s Br. 9. “Racks” are frames, or
    computer cabinets, with some electrical structure that can
    hold computing equipment designed for stacking on racks.
    COMAPER CORPORATION   v. ANTEC, INC.                      7
    Id.; see Appellees’ Br. 6–7. In the prior appeal, this court
    held that rack-mounted systems were analogous art.
    Comaper, 
    596 F.3d at 1351
    .
    In its JMOL opinion, the district court perceived only
    one difference between each asserted claim and the CDC
    Nova 3 Mini Module Device and Fujitsu devices: “the size
    of the devices.” App. 18. It reasoned that because the size
    of the device was “a specification not found anywhere in
    the ’955 patent itself, nor in [the district court’s] claim
    construction,” this difference did not preclude a finding of
    anticipation. 
    Id.
     For that reason, the district court held
    each device anticipated. 
    Id.
    In light of the prior claim construction and the record
    in this proceeding, this court disagrees. While the claims
    do not recite the size of the device or computer, the rela-
    tive size of the drive bay slot does matter in terms of the
    claim language, context, and meaning. The record, in-
    cluding photographs and testimony from Mr. Corcoran,
    shows that both prior art devices fit into an opening
    which extended virtually the entire width of the rack. See
    Appellees’ Br. 20; Appellant’s Br. 26, 30–31. Thus, nei-
    ther prior art device had a relatively narrow opening in
    the housing of the computer. On that basis alone, sub-
    stantial evidence supports the jury’s factual finding of a
    difference between the claimed invention and the prior
    art. The difference would preclude anticipation and
    support the jury verdict. Although there are other differ-
    ences between each of these two devices and each properly
    construed claim, this difference alone makes the grant of
    JMOL incorrect.
    IV.
    As alternate bases to affirm, Antec argues that two
    other devices it identified in its JMOL motion anticipate
    each claim. Further, Antec asserts that the jury verdict
    rejecting its obviousness defense lacked substantial
    evidence. This court disagrees.
    8                       COMAPER CORPORATION   v. ANTEC, INC.
    The third device Antec asserts as anticipatory is the
    PCC2000, a 19-inch wide extraction fan designed for rack-
    mounting. See App. 1563. The evidence showed, howev-
    er, that prior to the critical date, this device had been
    affixed to the rear of rack systems containing only modu-
    lar hard drives. See Appellant’s Br. 15, 32. For that
    reason alone, ample evidence supports the jury verdict
    that this device does not anticipate claim 12, because the
    record contains no evidence that the prior art device was
    ever mounted within the drive bay slot of a “computer.”
    See Appellant’s Br. 32. With respect to both asserted
    claims, for the same reasons as with the first two devices,
    the record shows that the extraction fan was not config-
    ured to mount in the relatively narrow opening of a drive
    bay slot. Thus, this court cannot affirm on this alternate
    ground.
    The fourth device Antec asserts as anticipatory is the
    AS/400 device. See Appellees’ Br. 17. The jury’s finding
    that this device did not anticipate either independent
    claim is amply supported by the record, since the housing
    of the AS/400 has no “slot” in it, and thus lacks a drive
    bay slot. See App. 1547. Instead, the module is behind a
    solid computer housing that lacks any slots. Further,
    even with the housing removed, a metal grate with no slot
    covers the module. For these and other reasons, this
    court cannot affirm on this alternate basis.
    Finally, this court rejects Antec’s argument that the
    record supports granting JMOL of obviousness by this
    court on appeal. The record shows again that the jury
    verdict of nonobviousness has ample support. Among
    other things, the verdict finds support in the clear differ-
    ences between each claim and the prior art along with
    testimony about the lack of motivation to combine, the
    discovery of the specific problem, objective criteria, and
    other facts. See Appellant’s Br. 41–43. Antec has not
    shown that, viewing the evidence favorably to Comaper,
    any aspect of the jury verdict lacked substantial evidence.
    COMAPER CORPORATION   v. ANTEC, INC.                   9
    Thus, this court remands with instructions to enter a
    final judgment for Comaper according to the jury verdict.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED