Baney v. Departmen of Justice , 476 F. App'x 260 ( 2012 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    JOHN-PIERRE BANEY,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Respondent.
    __________________________
    2011-3212
    __________________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in MSPB Docket No. DA4324110135-I-1.
    ____________________________
    Decided: April 6, 2012
    ____________________________
    JOHN-PIERRE BANEY, of Seagoville, Texas, pro se.
    MICHAEL D. AUSTIN, Trial Attorney, Commercial Liti-
    gation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department
    of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him
    on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General,
    JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and STEVEN J.
    GILLINGHAM, Assistant Director.
    __________________________
    BANEY   v. JUSTICE                                       2
    Before LOURIE, DYK and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    John-Pierre Baney seeks review of the final decision
    of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”). See
    Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, No. DA4324110135-I-1 (M.S.P.B.
    June 10, 2011). Because the Board did not err, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Baney was employed by the Bureau of Prisons
    (“BOP”) as a cook supervisor at a federal correction facil-
    ity in Seagoville, Texas. At the time of his employment,
    Baney was a member of the Coast Guard Reserve, and
    during the course of his employment, he filed a number of
    actions alleging violations the Uniformed Services Em-
    ployment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”),
    e.g., Baney v. Dep’t of Justice, 327 F.App’x 895 (Fed. Cir.
    2009), in addition to actions involving the Whistleblower
    Protection Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, among
    others.
    This case focuses on two sets of events that occurred
    in late 2009 and 2010. The first set relates to Baney’s
    suspension and resulting settlement agreement.         In
    February 2010, Baney was suspended for two days for
    unprofessional conduct, and, in March, he filed a formal
    grievance through the collective bargaining agreement
    process. Prior to an arbitration hearing scheduled for
    October, Baney entered into a settlement agreement that
    reclassified the suspension as a letter of reprimand and
    awarded Baney back pay. These events are not before us.
    The second set of events relates to Baney’s absent
    without leave (“AWOL”) status that resulted from his
    absence on November 21, 2010. On December 2, 2009,
    Baney received an email from the Food Service Adminis-
    trator with the approved leave schedule for 2010. The
    3                                         BANEY   v. JUSTICE
    schedule approved Baney to take leave on November 19th
    and 20th but did not approve his request to take leave on
    November 21st.
    On November 2, 2010, Baney received a confirmation
    email from the Assistant Food Service Administrator that
    contained the work schedule for the upcoming pay peri-
    ods. Specifically, the calendar document attached to the
    email showed that Baney would be on annual leave on
    November 19th and 20th, but that he was scheduled to
    work the night shift on November 21st.
    Baney failed to report to work on November 21st. In-
    stead, he was attending a Civil War Reenactment event.
    As a result of Baney’s absence, another employee was
    required to cover for him. Ultimately, the BOP placed
    Baney in an AWOL status for that day.
    Thereafter, Baney initiated proceedings at the Board,
    raising a number of issues relating to the settlement
    agreement and his AWOL classification. Specifically,
    Baney argued that the motivating factor for placing him
    on AWOL was his military status, military service, or the
    prior exercise of his rights under USERRA.
    After issuing several orders for Baney to show cause
    that the Board possessed jurisdiction over Baney’s appeal,
    the administrative judge (“AJ”) assigned to the appeal
    held a hearing. At the hearing, witnesses who worked
    with Baney explained the process for requesting leave,
    recounted that Baney did not obtain leave for November
    21st because he did not timely request it, and testified
    that Baney’s prior USERRA appeals and his military
    status had no influence on the BOP’s decision to classify
    Baney as AWOL for November 21st. In light of this
    testimony, the AJ’s initial decision denied Baney’s request
    to correct his AWOL classification. Specifically, the AJ
    found that Baney had failed to show that a substantial
    BANEY   v. JUSTICE                                        4
    factor in placing him in AWOL status was his military
    status or the prior exercise of his rights under USERRA.
    In addition, the AJ dismissed the remaining issues raised
    by Baney, including his claims relating to the settlement
    agreement. After the period for full Board review lapsed,
    the AJ’s initial decision became the decision of the Board.
    Baney timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursu-
    ant to 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    DISCUSSION
    The scope of our review in an appeal from a Board de-
    cision is limited. We can only set aside the Board’s deci-
    sion if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2)
    obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or
    regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
    substantial evidence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c); see Briggs v.
    Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    331 F.3d 1307
    , 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    The Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
    “if it is supported by such relevant evidence as a reason-
    able mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
    sion.” Brewer v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    647 F.2d 1093
    , 1096
    (Ct. Cl. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Baney raises a number of arguments on appeal. First,
    Baney argues that the Board failed to consider whether
    he was subjected to an improper “practice in labor arbi-
    tration.” Second, Baney argues that his constitutional
    rights to a fair trial and due process of law were violated.
    Third, Baney argues that the BOP and the Board ob-
    structed justice, improperly sought to divert attention
    away from the truth, and that the BOP’s witnesses com-
    mitted perjury. In light of these alleged errors, Baney
    seeks a remand to the Board to conduct a fair hearing
    away from his work place.
    5                                         BANEY   v. JUSTICE
    We disagree. Baney’s allegations on appeal are con-
    clusory and do not identify any instance of misconduct by
    the Board or the BOP. Nor does a review of the record
    indicate that the Board or the BOP acted improperly or
    violated Baney’s due process rights. Instead, the Board
    simply credited the testimony of the BOP’s witnesses and
    found Baney’s testimony to lack credibility, a determina-
    tion that is “virtually unreviewable on appeal.” Bieber v.
    Dep’t of the Army, 
    287 F.3d 1358
    , 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
    Regarding the other issues Baney raised before the Board,
    which Baney does not raise on appeal, a review of the
    record indicates that the Board properly dismissed those
    claims.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-3212

Citation Numbers: 476 F. App'x 260

Judges: Dyk, Lourie, Moore, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 4/6/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024