Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp. , 681 F.3d 1358 ( 2012 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    TOSHIBA CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    IMATION CORP., MOSER BAER INDIA LTD.,
    GLYPHICS MEDIA, INC.,
    CMC MAGNETICS CORP., HOTAN CORP.,
    KHYPERMEDIA CORP.,
    RITEK CORP., AND ADVANCED MEDIA, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    __________________________
    2011-1204
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Wisconsin in case no. 09-CV-0305,
    Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker.
    ___________________________
    Decided: June 11, 2012
    ___________________________
    DEANNE E. MAYNARD, Morrison & Foerster LLP, of
    Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With her
    on the brief were G. BRIAN BUSEY, BRIAN R. MATSUI, MARC
    A. HEARRON and ADAM A. ELTOUKHY; and KARL J.
    KRAMER, of Palo Alto, California.
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                            2
    ALAN D. SMITH, Fish & Richardson P.C., of Boston,
    Massachusetts, argued for defendants-appellees. With
    him on the brief were CHRISTOPHER DILLON, STEPHEN A.
    MARSHALL, SAMUEL SHERRY and MAUREEN M. BRENNER.
    __________________________
    Before DYK, SCHALL, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MOORE.
    Opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part filed by
    Circuit Judge DYK.
    MOORE, Circuit Judge.
    Toshiba Corporation accused Imation Corporation et
    al. (collectively, Appellees) of infringing claims of U.S.
    Patent nos. 5,892,751 (’751 patent) and 5,831,966 (’966
    patent) relating to optical disc technology. The district
    court granted summary judgment of non-infringement for
    the asserted claims under both patents except for a de
    minimis claim of direct infringement that was later
    dismissed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm-in-
    part and vacate-in-part the grant of summary judgment of
    non-infringement and remand.
    BACKGROUND
    DVDs are optical discs used to store data or digital
    content such as movies. DVDs are made in several for-
    mats, which are governed by technical standards that
    allow for compatibility among DVD players and recorders.
    Appellees manufacture or sell recordable blank DVDs
    that comply with these standards. The DVD standards
    generally organize a disc into three areas: a “lead-in area”
    which contains information about the DVD’s structure
    and properties; a “data area” where data is recorded and
    stored; and a “lead-out area” which indicates the func-
    tional end of the data area. E.g., J.A. 2356.
    3                             TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    There are two methods to record data onto DVDs:
    disc-at-once mode and multisession mode. The disc-at-
    once mode writes all of the data to the disc in a single
    session, including the lead-in area containing a test
    pattern and the lead-out area. Multisession mode allows
    a user to record some data in one session and then later
    record additional data to the DVD in another session.
    Once a user records all of the data on the DVD, the user
    may choose to “finalize” the DVD, which writes the test
    pattern in the lead-in area and writes the lead-out area.
    Prior to finalization, the DVD does not contain the test
    pattern or the lead-out area. The district court identified
    as an undisputed fact that a recordable DVD “can be
    played in the drive in which it was recorded without
    finalization, but not on other recorders or conventional
    DVD players.” Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., No. 09-cv-
    305-slc, slip op. at 13 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 28, 2010). A final-
    ized DVD, however, can be played on any standardized
    DVD player or drive.
    Toshiba accused Appellees of infringing claims of the
    ’751 and ’966 patents. Appellees moved for summary
    judgment that they did not indirectly infringe the ’751
    patent. The district court granted the motion, concluding
    that the use of unfinalized DVDs was a substantial non-
    infringing use. The court held that “[b]oth theories of
    ‘indirect infringement’ – that is, contributory and induc-
    ing infringement – fail if there are any ‘substantial’ non-
    infringing uses.” Toshiba Corp., No. 09-cv-305-slc, slip op.
    at 25-26 (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Phillips
    Corp., 
    363 F.3d 1263
    , 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
    Appellees also moved for summary judgment that
    they did not infringe the ’966 patent. Asserted claim 1 of
    the ’966 patent requires that the lead-in area contain
    information identifying the structure of the recording
    medium. The district court construed terms of claim 1 to
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                           4
    require that such information have the purpose of identi-
    fying information for the entire recording medium. To-
    shiba Corp., No. 09-cv-305-slc, slip op. at 22. Because the
    district court held that the identifying information on the
    accused DVDs did not have the purpose of providing
    information for the entire recording medium, the court
    granted summary judgment of non-infringement as to the
    ’966 patent. Id. at *22, 24.
    The parties stipulated to dismissal of the remaining
    de minimis claim of direct infringement. J.A. 22246.
    Toshiba appeals from the district court’s grant of sum-
    mary judgment of non-infringement for both patents and
    its construction of certain ’966 patent claim terms. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judg-
    ment de novo. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 
    620 F.3d 1321
    ,
    1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate
    when, drawing all justifiable inferences in the non-
    movant’s favor, there exists no genuine issue of material
    fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
    
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986). A dispute about a material fact
    is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
    could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Ander-
    son, 
    477 U.S. at 248
    .
    I.    ’751 Patent
    The ’751 patent is directed to how data is written onto
    DVDs. The claims of the ’751 patent, like the DVD stan-
    dards, require a lead-in area, data area, and lead-out
    area. E.g., ’751 patent cl.1. The asserted claims also
    require that the optical discs (e.g., DVDs) have a test
    pattern included in the lead-in area. 
    Id.
     DVD players
    5                             TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    may use the test pattern to ensure data is read properly
    from the DVD, and to make adjustments if not. 
    Id.
     ab-
    stract & col.2 ll.34-44. The test pattern and the lead-out
    area are only written when the disc is recorded in disc-at-
    once mode or finalized; unfinalized DVDs do not contain
    the test pattern or the lead-out area. Toshiba does not
    dispute that unfinalized DVDs do not infringe the ’751
    patent. See Appellant’s Br. 10.
    The district court concluded “the evidence establishes
    that recording DVDs without finalizing them is a non-
    infringing use, and there is no evidence that this use is
    not substantial.” Toshiba Corp., No. 09-cv-305-slc, slip op.
    at 26. The district court noted that there is evidence of a
    “commonsensical and efficient” reason not to finalize a
    disc: a user may continue recording new material on the
    disc, and as long as the user keeps the disc in the same
    machine, the user can read all of the recorded material
    without finalizing the disc. Id. at *27. The court also
    noted that although manuals and other marketing mate-
    rials recommended finalizing DVDs, they do not suggest
    that finalization is the only proper way to use DVDs or
    that use of unfinalized DVDs is “aberrant” or “occasional.”
    Id. at *28. The materials, according to the district court,
    simply explain that finalization is required for using
    DVDs in a different recorder or player. Id. Finally, the
    court noted that Toshiba failed to introduce evidence
    showing that playback in other recorders or players is a
    use preferred over playback in the same DVD recorder,
    which does not require finalization. Id. The district court
    thus held that Toshiba failed to introduce any evidence to
    create a genuine issue of material fact that using unfinal-
    ized DVDs is not a substantial non-infringing use. Id. at
    *29.
    The court granted summary judgment of non-
    infringement for Toshiba’s contributory and induced
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                             6
    infringement allegations, holding that both infringement
    theories “fail if there are any ‘substantial’ non-infringing
    uses.” Id. at *26, 30. Toshiba appeals the ruling that
    there is a substantial non-infringing use and that a
    substantial non-infringing use precludes liability for
    induced infringement.
    A. Contributory Infringement
    To establish contributory infringement liability, the
    patent owner must show, among other things, that there
    are no substantial non-infringing uses.          
    35 U.S.C. § 271
    (c). “[N]on-infringing uses are substantial when
    they are not unusual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical,
    occasional, aberrant, or experimental.” Vita-Mix Corp. v.
    Basic Holding, Inc., 
    581 F.3d 1317
    , 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
    In assessing whether a use is substantial, the fact-finder
    may consider “the use’s frequency, . . . the use’s practical-
    ity, the invention’s intended purpose, and the intended
    market.” i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 
    598 F.3d 831
    ,
    851 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
    Toshiba argues that the intended use of DVDs is the
    long-term storage of data that may be accessed on any
    industry-standard DVD player or recorder, and that
    Appellees instruct their users that finalization is neces-
    sary to accomplish this. Appellant’s Br. 29, 31-33. For
    example, the accused DVDs are advertised as compliant
    with industry standards, which, according to Toshiba,
    require that the DVDs be finalized. Id. at 30-31. Toshiba
    contends that unfinalized DVDs recorded in multisession
    mode are merely an interim step in the process of re-
    cording data, and that finalization is necessary to achieve
    the intended result. Id. at 35. Toshiba argues that the
    use of unfinalized DVDs is “unintended” and “impracti-
    cal,” and thus not substantial.
    7                             TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    Appellees contend there is no evidence that the re-
    cording and playing of unfinalized DVDs is not a substan-
    tial non-infringing use. Appellees’ Br. 41. Appellees
    argue that the evidence shows that users choose not to
    finalize the DVDs so that they can continue recording
    data to the disc and that the standards support the use of
    unfinalized DVDs. Id. at 42-43. Appellees also argue
    there are good reasons not to finalize: finalization pre-
    vents users from adding more data; it takes time; and it is
    not necessary in order to use the DVD in the device in
    which it was recorded. Id. at 43. Appellees claim that
    even if it were true that they recommended finalizing
    DVDs, recommending an infringing use (finalizing) is not
    evidence that the non-infringing use is not substantial.
    Id. at 44. Appellees note that Toshiba has no admissible
    expert testimony regarding unfinalized DVDs, no end
    user testimony regarding the use of unfinalized DVDs,
    and no documents or other evidence showing that the use
    of unfinalized DVDs is unusual, far-fetched, illusory,
    impractical, occasional, aberrant, or experimental. Id. at
    43-44. Appellees thus argue Toshiba failed to create a
    genuine issue of fact whether the use of unfinalized DVDs
    constitutes a substantial non-infringing use.
    We agree with Appellees that Toshiba failed to proffer
    evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact.
    Because Toshiba had the burden to prove the lack of
    substantial non-infringing uses, Toshiba was required to
    put forth evidence showing that the use of unfinalized
    DVDs was not substantial. See Golden Blount, Inc. v.
    Robert H. Peterson Co., 
    438 F.3d 1354
    , 1363 (Fed. Cir.
    2006). There is, however, insufficient evidence in the
    record to create a genuine issue of fact. Toshiba does not
    contest that unfinalized DVDs do not infringe. Toshiba
    admits that users may record data on the accused DVDs
    without ever finalizing the DVDs, and that such DVDs
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                            8
    may be read in the recorder in which the data was writ-
    ten. Appellant’s Br. 10. Toshiba presented no survey,
    expert, or other evidence showing how frequently users
    choose not to finalize DVDs. Toshiba did not introduce
    evidence showing that using unfinalized DVDs is “un-
    usual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical, occasional, aber-
    rant, or experimental.” See Vita-Mix, 
    581 F.3d at 1327
    .
    Toshiba cites the DVD standards, which it claims require
    finalization, but even the DVD standards recognize that
    users may record to DVDs without finalization. See, e.g.,
    Ecma Int’l, Standard ECMA-359, at 75 (1st ed. 2004) (J.A.
    2378) (identifying disc status bits indicating the disc was
    recorded in multisession mode and is unfinalized). To-
    shiba did not introduce evidence showing how often users
    will later finalize the DVDs, thereby making the use of
    unfinalized DVDs an interim step. The evidence Toshiba
    cites merely shows that it is recommended that users
    finalize their DVDs. Recommending one use over another
    does not mean the non-recommended use is not substan-
    tial. Moreover, even Toshiba’s own user manual provides
    evidence that users may also choose not to finalize DVDs
    because it is a laborious process. See Toshiba, DVD Video
    Recorder DR430KU: Owner’s Manual, at 8 (2010) (J.A.
    12979). Toshiba had the burden of proof, but failed to
    introduce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
    material fact as to whether using unfinalized DVDs was
    not a substantial non-infringing use. Therefore, the
    district court did not err in granting summary judgment
    of no contributory infringement.
    B. Induced Infringement
    “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent
    shall be liable as an infringer.” 
    35 U.S.C. § 271
    (b). To
    prove induced infringement, the patentee “must show
    direct infringement, and that the alleged infringer ‘know-
    9                              TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    ingly induced infringement and possessed specific intent
    to encourage another’s infringement.’” i4i, 
    598 F.3d at 851
     (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
    Materials Silicon Corp., 
    420 F.3d 1369
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir.
    2005)).
    The district court held that the existence of a substan-
    tial non-infringing use precludes a finding of induced
    infringement. See Toshiba Corp., No. 09-cv-305-slc, slip
    op. at 26. The court stated that “[b]oth theories of ‘indi-
    rect infringement’ – that is, contributory and inducing
    infringement – fail if there are any ‘substantial’ non-
    infringing uses.” 
    Id.
     The district court erred as a matter
    of law. The existence of a substantial non-infringing use
    does not preclude a finding of inducement. Erbe Elek-
    tromedizin GmbH v. Canaday Tech. LLC, 
    629 F.3d 1278
    ,
    1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Appellees attempt to recast the
    district court’s error by suggesting it was “directed at the
    theory Toshiba advanced in this case, and is not a general
    statement of the law of inducement.” Appellees’ Br. 36.
    The district court’s opinion, however, is clear on its face
    and contains no language suggesting its statement was
    anything other than a general statement of the law.
    Toshiba Corp., No. 09-cv-305-slc, slip op. at 26.
    Appellees alternatively argue that we should affirm
    the grant of summary judgment of no inducement because
    Toshiba introduced no evidence of direct infringement.
    Appellees’ Br. 34. Direct infringement is a required
    element to establish induced infringement. i4i, 
    598 F.3d at 851
    . Appellees argue that Toshiba failed to create a
    genuine issue of material fact as to whether users directly
    infringed the ’751 patent. See 
    id.
     To satisfy the direct
    infringement requirement, the patentee “must either
    point to specific instances of direct infringement or show
    that the accused device necessarily infringes the patent in
    suit.” ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                          10
    1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Dynacore, 
    363 F.3d at 1275-76
    ). Appellees argue that because users must
    choose either to use the disc-at-once mode or to finalize
    the disc in order to infringe, Toshiba must come forward
    with evidence of specific instances of infringement. See
    Appellees’ Br. 34. Appellees contend that the record
    shows that the “only person who ever finalized a disc was
    Toshiba’s expert.” Id. at 35.
    We conclude that it would not be correct to affirm on
    this alternative basis. There is sufficient evidence to
    create a genuine issue of material fact. “Direct infringe-
    ment can be proven by circumstantial evidence.” Vita-
    Mix, 
    581 F.3d at
    1326 (citing Moleculon Research Corp. v.
    CBS, Inc., 
    793 F.2d 1261
    , 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see also
    Alco Standard Corp v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 
    808 F.2d 1490
    ,
    1503 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Although the evidence of in-
    fringement is circumstantial, that does not make it any
    less credible or persuasive.”). Circumstantial evidence
    must show that at least one person directly infringed an
    asserted claim during the relevant time period. See
    Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 
    580 F.3d 1301
    , 1317
    (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] finding of infringement can rest on
    as little as one instance of the claimed method being
    performed during the pertinent time period.”).
    The claims at issue require discs to have a lead-in
    area, data area, and lead-out area, wherein the lead-in
    area includes a test pattern. E.g., ’751 patent cl.1. Users
    may record data onto DVDs using either the disc-at-once
    mode or multisession mode. Every time a user selects the
    disc-at-once mode to record data, the DVD infringes
    because the disc-at-once mode automatically writes the
    lead-in area with the test pattern, the data area, and the
    lead-out area. The disc-at-once mode does not contain a
    separate finalization option. Thus, when the disc-at-once
    mode is used, the DVD necessarily infringes. Users
    11                             TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    alternatively may record DVDs in multisession mode. In
    multisession mode, users have the option to record some
    data but not finalize the DVD, in which case the recorder
    does not write the test pattern or the lead-out area. If a
    user chooses not to finalize a DVD, however, only the
    recorder that wrote the DVD will be able to play or read
    from the DVD. To ensure the DVD is readable by other
    recorders or players, a user must finalize the DVD.
    Although some users may use multisession mode and
    choose not to finalize, such use is contrary to Appellees’
    instructions to users that they must finalize the DVDs to
    ensure compatibility. E.g., J.A. 12850 (“Discs must be
    finalized for playback in DVD players.”). Some materials
    even recommended against using multisession mode –
    which allows a user not to finalize the DVD – stating,
    “For the best compatibility with Data [DVDs], do not use
    the multisession option.” J.A. 12805, 13164. Appellees
    also designed the DVDs to comply with the standards,
    which provide that a DVD “shall” be divided into three
    areas: a lead-in area, a data area, and a lead-out area.
    E.g., Ecma Int’l, Standard ECMA-359, at 53 (J.A. 2356).
    The lead-out area is only written when the disc is final-
    ized or written in the disc-at-once mode. The purpose of
    the DVD standards is to provide compatibility among
    various disc drives, which requires using the disc-at-once
    mode or finalizing the DVDs. See, e.g., J.A. 3696. In light
    of all of the evidence in the record regarding why someone
    would finalize or use the disc-at-once mode, we hold there
    is enough to preclude summary judgment of non-
    infringement.
    This is not the first time we have concluded that
    where an alleged infringer designs a product for use in an
    infringing way and instructs users to use the product in
    an infringing way, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to
    find direct infringement. For example in Lucent, like in
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                            12
    this case, the accused infringer designed its products to
    practice the claimed invention and instructed its custom-
    ers to use the accused product in an infringing way. 
    580 F.3d at 1318
    . We held that this was sufficient to support
    the jury’s verdict that someone other than Lucent’s expert
    used the product in an infringing way. 
    Id.
     Similar to
    Lucent, Appellees designed the DVDs to be used in an
    infringing way and instructed users to use them in the
    infringing way by finalizing the DVDs or using the disc-
    at-once mode. This is sufficient to preclude summary
    judgment.
    Appellees contend this case is more like Fujitsu and
    ACCO. Argument at 17:05-17:55, 20:00-20:25, Toshiba
    Corp. v. Imation Corp., No. 2011-1204, available at
    http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20
    11-1204.mp3; Appellees’ Br. 34. In Fujitsu, the accused
    products would infringe only when a user chose an option
    in the accused software. 620 F.3d at 1328. Unlike this
    case, however, the infringing option in Fujitsu was dis-
    abled by default, and the relevant standard and user
    manuals simply described how to use the product in an
    infringing manner. Id. We held that the evidence in
    Fujitsu showed that the device was “capable of” infringing
    but did not suggest that users actually used it in an
    infringing way. Id. at 1329. In the present case, however,
    recording DVDs in disc-at-once mode or multisession
    mode with finalization is not disabled by default, and
    Appellees go beyond describing the infringing mode; they
    recommended that customers use the infringing mode.
    Further, the DVD standards require a lead-out area,
    which is only written when the disc is finalized or written
    using the disc-at-once mode. Thus, the evidence in this
    case goes beyond showing that the accused DVDs are
    “capable of” infringing; the evidence is sufficient to create
    13                            TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    a genuine issue of material fact, thus precluding summary
    judgment.
    ACCO also involved an accused product that was “ca-
    pable of” infringing. 501 F.3d at 1313-14. In ACCO, there
    were instructions describing the infringing use and differ-
    ent instructions describing the non-infringing use. Id. at
    1312-13. The products in ACCO, however, were sold only
    with instructions describing the non-infringing use. Id. at
    1313. The only other evidence relied on by the patentee
    in ACCO was its expert testimony that the infringing
    mode was the “natural and intuitive way” to operate the
    device. Id. ACCO’s expert, however, “had no opinion” on
    whether others used the device in an infringing mode. Id.
    Unlike the situation in ACCO, Appellees recommended
    that their users use the DVDs in the infringing mode.
    Some materials even recommended against using the non-
    infringing mode. Toshiba also presented evidence con-
    cerning industry standards, and expert evidence that
    compliance with such standards is “a commercial neces-
    sity.” See J.A. 5034-35 (“It is necessary, and expected by
    the marketplace, that the discs within a particular format
    comply with the standards so that they can be used
    interchangeably.”); see also Appellant’s Br. 30-31. Again,
    the evidence in this case shows more than the fact that
    the accused DVDs are merely “capable of” infringing.
    We hold there is sufficient evidence such that a “jury
    in the present case could . . . reasonably conclude[] that,
    sometime during the relevant period . . . more likely than
    not one person somewhere in the United States” finalized
    DVDs or used the disc-at-once mode. See Lucent, 
    580 F.3d at 1318
    . Appellees designed their DVDs to comply
    with the DVD standards, instructed users to use them in
    an infringing manner, and some recommended against
    using the DVDs in a non-infringing manner. Appellees
    also advertised their DVDs as compliant with the indus-
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                          14
    try standards. To satisfy the purpose of the standards
    (compatibility), the DVDs must be finalized or written
    using the disc-at-once mode. This is sufficient evidence to
    create a triable issue of fact of whether users finalized
    DVDs or used the disc-at-once mode.
    On appeal, Appellees ask us to reach additional issues
    not addressed by the district court. We leave it to the
    district court to reach those issues in the first instance.
    II. ’966 Patent
    Toshiba appeals the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment of non-infringement and its construction of two
    terms in claim 1 of the ’966 patent. We review claim
    construction de novo. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 
    138 F.3d 1448
    , 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The words
    of a claim are generally given their ordinary and custom-
    ary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill
    in the art when read in the context of the specification
    and prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
    415 F.3d 1303
    , 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
    The ’966 patent describes a recording medium (e.g., a
    DVD) containing a “management region” with informa-
    tion about the structure of the medium. ’966 patent at
    [57]. DVDs may be one-sided or two-sided, meaning data
    can be recorded on only one side or on both sides. A DVD
    may also have one or more layers on a single side for
    recording data. The DVD standards require the lead-in
    area of DVDs to include data that indicate the number of
    layers on the current side of the disc (via bits b5 and b6)
    and identify the current layer (via bit b24). E.g., J.A.
    3707, 3712. Claim 1 requires that the disc provide identi-
    fying information for the medium:
    A recording medium comprising:
    15                            TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    at least one recording plane, wherein each re-
    cording plane on which data is recorded in-
    cludes:
    a data region in which data is recorded; and
    a management region including number-of-
    recording planes identifying information
    that represents the number of recording
    planes of the recording medium and re-
    cording-plane identifying information that
    uniquely identifies that recording plane.
    ’966 patent cl.1 (emphasis added). The district court
    construed the “number-of-recording planes identifying
    information” to mean “information whose purpose is to
    identify the number of recording planes on the recording
    medium.” Toshiba Corp., No. 09-cv-305-slc, slip op. at 22.
    The court construed the “recording-plane identifying
    information that uniquely identifies that recording plane”
    as “information whose purpose is to identify the recording
    plane being reproduced.” 
    Id.
    Toshiba accused only single-sided DVDs of infringing
    the ’966 patent. In single sided DVDs, there are recording
    planes on only one side of the disc. As a result, the num-
    ber of planes on the single side is also the number of
    planes on the medium as a whole. The accused DVDs
    comply with the standards by providing the identifying
    information via bits b5, b6, and b24. Toshiba alleged that
    bits b5 and b6 meet the “number-of-recording planes”
    limitation because they identify the number of layers on
    the medium (since they are single-sided discs), and that
    bit b24 meets the “recording-plane identifying informa-
    tion.”
    Because the purpose of the bits (b5, b6, and b24) on
    the accused devices was to identify information for only
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                             16
    one side of the disc, the district court held that they do not
    serve the purpose of identifying information for the disc
    as a whole, and thus do not infringe. 
    Id. at *24
    . The
    court recognized that the bits on the accused discs provide
    identifying information as to the entire medium, but
    reasoned that “the purpose of the bits on the accused
    products is merely to identify the number of planes and
    the recording plane on a given side of a disc,” not the
    entire medium. 
    Id. at *23-24
    . The court stated, “[t]he
    fact that the bits on the accused discs happen to have the
    same information as they would if the standards properly
    distinguished two-sided discs does not establish that
    these bits satisfy the required claim elements.” 
    Id.
    Toshiba appeals the district court’s construction, ar-
    guing that the court improperly read a “purpose” re-
    quirement into claim 1. Appellant’s Br. 37. Toshiba
    contends that each limitation should have been given its
    plain and ordinary meaning, as recited in the claim itself.
    
    Id. at 38
    . The plain meaning, according to Toshiba,
    simply requires that the identifying information represent
    the number of (or identity of) the planes on the medium
    regardless of any particular purpose or intent. 
    Id. at 39
    .
    Toshiba also argues that the district court’s construction
    improperly imported a limitation from the specification
    into the claim. 
    Id. at 43
    . Toshiba contends that depend-
    ent claims 3 and 5 captured the disc side requirements
    discussed in the specification and prosecution history. 
    Id. at 43-46
    . Toshiba notes that “planes,” as recited in claim
    1, are not the same as “sides.” 
    Id. at 48
    . Toshiba thus
    argues the district court erred in granting summary
    judgment of non-infringement based on an erroneous
    construction.
    Appellees argue that the district court properly con-
    strued the terms and that the court’s inclusion of the word
    “purpose” did not read a limitation into the claim. Appel-
    17                            TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    lees’ Br. 53, 58. Appellees contend that it was inserted to
    resolve a dispute as to whether the claim requires that
    the information be intended to convey the number of (or
    identity of) the recording planes on the medium, or
    whether it is sufficient that the information “coinciden-
    tally” corresponds to the number of (or identity of) the
    planes on the medium. 
    Id. at 58
    . Appellees argue that
    the language of the claims, the specification, and the
    prosecution history explain that the purpose of the limita-
    tions is to identify information as to the entire medium.
    
    Id. at 53-56
    . Because the identifying information on the
    accused single-sided discs does not have the purpose of
    providing information as to the entire medium, Appellees
    contend they do not infringe. 
    Id. at 59-63
    .
    We agree with Toshiba that the district court improp-
    erly read a “purpose” requirement into claim 1. The plain
    language of the claim requires that the number-of-
    recording planes identifying information “represents the
    number of recording planes of the recording medium.”
    ’966 patent cl.1 (emphasis added). Similarly, the claim
    requires that the recording-plane identifying information
    “uniquely identifies that recording plane.” 
    Id.
     The lan-
    guage of the claim only requires that the information
    “represents” the number of recording planes or “uniquely
    identifies” the recording plane. These are structural
    limitations. There is no dispute that the accused single-
    sided, single-layer DVDs have these structural elements.
    The district court expressly acknowledged that the ac-
    cused devices did have these structural elements. To-
    shiba Corp., No. 09-cv-305-slc, slip op. at 24 (“The fact
    that the bits on the accused discs happen to have the
    same information as they would if the standards properly
    distinguished two-sided discs does not establish that
    these bits satisfy the required claim elements.”); see also
    
    id. at *22-23
     (“Plaintiff continues to contend that defen-
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                            18
    dants’ single-sided, single layer discs meet the claim
    language because these discs indicate the total number of
    planes on the disc (one) and which plane is reproduced
    (the only one). However, as defendants point out, even
    though this may be literally true, it is only because plain-
    tiff has carefully circumscribed the accused products to
    those where a single side of the disc is the entire disc.”).
    Bits b5 and b6 on the accused DVDs accurately represent
    that the DVDs have one recording plane. Bit b24 on these
    DVDs uniquely identifies that the recording plane is the
    DVD’s single recording plane. Appellees do not dispute
    the fact that these bits accurately reflect that the accused
    single-sided, single-layer DVDs contain one recording
    plane. See Appellees’ Br. 57-58.
    Appellees argue that these facts are insufficient be-
    cause the patent contemplates two-sided discs. For
    example, Appellees cite to figure 2 in the specification and
    to the prosecution history, both of which refer to multi-
    sided discs. Appellees’ Br. 54-56. Figure 2 describes a
    “number-of-disc-sides identifier” and a “disc side identi-
    fier.” ’966 patent fig.2. The number-of-disc-sides identi-
    fier “represents whether the disc is a double-sided disc or
    a single-sided disc,” and the disc side identifier indicates
    which side of a double-sided disc is being reproduced.
    ’966 patent col.6 ll.25-28. The prosecution history also
    refers to the number-of-disc-sides identifying information.
    J.A. 761-62 (“It is clear that this information must be
    provided on each side of the disc – i.e., each recording
    plane – in order for the disc side identifier 3 to serve its
    purpose of identifying which side is being re-
    corded/reproduced.” (emphasis added)).
    Claim 1, however, is not limited to multi-sided discs,
    but instead is written more broadly. The number-of-disc-
    sides identifier and disc side identifier are not limitations
    in claim 1. The plain language of claim 1, which is writ-
    19                             TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    ten in terms of “planes,” is distinct and different from the
    number of (or identity of) the disc sides disclosed in the
    specification. This is especially clear in light of dependent
    claim 5, which adds an additional requirement of indicat-
    ing the number of disc sides. Claim 5 recites:
    The recording medium as in claim 1, wherein: the
    number-of-recording-planes identifying informa-
    tion indicates that the recording medium is one of
    a single-sided disc and a double-sided disc.
    ’966 patent cl.5. Claim 1 is not so limited. Appellees
    cannot overcome the plain meaning of claim 1 by pointing
    to an embodiment disclosed in the specification or prose-
    cution history. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 
    288 F.3d 1359
    , 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (An accused infringer
    cannot overcome the plain meaning of a claim term “sim-
    ply by pointing to the preferred embodiment or other
    structures or steps disclosed in the specification or prose-
    cution history.”). It is “not enough that the only embodi-
    ments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular
    limitation.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,
    
    669 F.3d 1362
    , 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CCS Fit-
    ness, 
    288 F.3d at 1366
     (“[O]ur case law makes clear that a
    patentee need not ‘describe in the specification every
    conceivable and possible future embodiment of his inven-
    tion.’” (citation omitted)). We do not read limitations from
    the specification into claims.
    Appellees do not argue that there was a disclaimer
    limiting the scope of claim 1. Appellees also do not argue
    that the patentee acted as its own lexicographer. Absent
    disclaimer or lexicography, the plain meaning of the claim
    controls. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (There are “two
    exceptions” to the general rule that the plain meaning of
    the claim controls: “1) when a patentee sets out a defini-
    tion and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                          20
    patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in
    the specification or during prosecution.” (citing Vitronics
    Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 
    90 F.3d 1576
    , 1580 (Fed. Cir.
    1996))). This is not a case where the number of recording
    planes necessarily pre-supposes two-sided discs. The
    claim is broad enough to read on both single-sided and
    double-sided discs.
    Toshiba accused only single-sided, single-layer DVDs
    of infringing claim 1. The identifying information in an
    accused single-sided, single-layer DVD “represents” and
    “uniquely identifies” information as to the entire disc.
    “[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a
    device does.” Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 
    566 F.3d 1075
    , 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Hewlett-
    Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 
    909 F.2d 1464
    , 1468
    (Fed. Cir. 1990)). We thus reject Appellees’ arguments
    that the accused DVDs do not infringe because the identi-
    fying information in the DVDs do not have the “purpose”
    of identifying information as to the entire medium.
    The dissent suggests that the majority’s construction,
    Appellant’s construction, Appellees’ construction, and the
    district court’s construction are all in error, and instead
    argues for a completely different construction of its own.
    The dissent argues that the “number-of-recording planes”
    limitation in claim 1 requires identifying both the number
    of disc sides and the number of layers per side. Dissent
    Op. at 2. The Appellant’s and Appellees’ dispute concerns
    whether the limitations must have the “purpose” of identi-
    fying information as to the entire medium. Both parties
    reject the notion that claim 1 requires differentiation
    between one-sided and two-sided discs. Appellant’s Br.
    43; Appellees’ Br. 65-67. Appellees, who defend the
    district court’s construction on appeal, specifically argue
    that the district court’s construction does not contain any
    such requirement, stating: “nowhere in the [district
    21                             TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    court’s] claim construction order is there a statement or
    even a suggestion that the terms in claim 1 require identi-
    fying whether the recording medium is single-sided or
    double-sided.” Appellees’ Br. 65; see also Appellees’ Br. 65
    (“Nothing in these constructions relates to the sides of the
    medium.”); Appellees’ Br. 66 (“[T]here is nothing in the
    court’s decision that limits Claim 1 to sides. The court’s
    orders simply state that the identifiers have to account for
    all recording planes on the medium.”); Appellees’ Br. 66
    (arguing that the district court’s summary judgment
    decision clarifies that “the ‘purpose’ of the bits is to iden-
    tify the number of recording planes on the medium – and
    not to differentiate between single-sided and double-sided
    discs”); Appellees’ Br. 67 (“The [district] court did not
    construe Claim 1 as requiring differentiation between
    single-sided and double-sided discs.”). Neither party has
    ever argued for the dissent’s construction.
    The dissent makes three main arguments in support
    of its construction: 1) that the references to disc sides in
    the specification and prosecution history show that an
    ordinary artisan would interpret “number-of-recording
    planes identifying information” to require identifying both
    the number of recording layers and the number of disc
    sides, 2) that the applicant equated a “recording plane” to
    “a side of the disc” to overcome a 
    35 U.S.C. § 112
     rejection
    during prosecution, and 3) that the principles of claim
    differentiation do not support a different result because
    dependent claim 5 narrows claim 1 by covering only
    embodiments with one layer per side. Dissent Op. at 2-5.
    We address each argument in turn.
    First, as explained above, the number-of-recording
    planes limitation in claim 1 only requires “information
    that represents the number of recording planes of the
    recording medium.” ’966 patent cl.1. Identifying the
    number of planes on a recording medium does not require
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                              22
    identifying the number of disc sides. It is not enough that
    the only embodiment in the specification describes identi-
    fying disc sides. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366. Claim 1
    recites “planes,” not “disc sides.” The dissent’s proposed
    construction improperly reads in a limitation from the
    specification. Dependent claim 5 captures the additional
    number-of-disc-sides identifier limitation. ’966 patent
    cl.5. Claim 1, the only asserted claim, does not require
    indicating the number of disc sides.
    With regard to the dissent’s second argument, to over-
    come a 
    35 U.S.C. § 112
     rejection during prosecution, the
    applicant explained:
    As illustrated in FIG. 2 and described in the
    Specification at 12-13 a number-of-disc-sides iden-
    tifier 2 and a disc side identifier 3 are recorded in
    . . . the disc. It is clear that this information must
    be provided on each side of the disc – i.e., each re-
    cording plane – in order for the disc side identifier
    3 to serve its purpose of identifying which side is
    being recorded/reproduced.
    J.A. 761-62 (citations omitted). A statement in the prose-
    cution history can only amount to disclaimer if the appli-
    cant “clearly and unambiguously” disavowed claim scope.
    3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 
    350 F.3d 1365
    , 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
    This language is not a clear and unambiguous disavowal
    of claim scope. When the applicant stated “each side of
    the disc – i.e., each recording plane,” the applicant was
    merely explaining that in the example in figure 2, a side
    of the disc constitutes a recording plane. It does not
    follow that a recording plane is to be equated with a disc
    side in all instances or that a number of recording planes
    identifier must also indicate the number of disc sides. In
    fact, two weeks after the applicant made this statement,
    23                              TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    the examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance shows
    that the examiner did not interpret this statement as
    limiting recording planes to disc sides. The examiner
    stated:
    [N]one of the cited prior art shows . . . a disk hav-
    ing at least one recording plane . . . and a man-
    agement region including the number of recording
    planes identifying the number of recording planes
    on the disk and a separate recording plane identi-
    fying information that uniquely identify that re-
    cording plane (such as side A or side B or upper
    surface or lower surface).
    J.A. 756 (emphasis added). The dissent claims that this
    shows that the examiner viewed the “number-of-recording
    planes identifying information” to require identification of
    the number of sides as well as the number of surfaces (i.e.,
    layers) on each side. Dissent Op. at 4. The dissent,
    however, mischaracterizes the examiner’s statement. The
    examiner stated that recording plane identifying informa-
    tion may indicate “side A or side B or upper surface or
    lower surface.” J.A. 756 (emphasis added). Had the
    examiner understood that identifying both were required,
    the examiner would have used “and” rather than “or.”
    Instead, this language shows that the examiner under-
    stood that recording plane identifying information is not
    limited to identifying disc sides.
    Finally, the dissent argues that claim differentiation
    does not support a different result. The dissent incor-
    rectly concludes that claim 5 narrows claim 1 by covering
    only embodiments with one layer per side. Dissent Op. at
    5. In our view, this construction is at odds with the plain
    language of claim 5. In addition, it has not been advo-
    cated by any party. Claim 5 recites:
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                           24
    The recording medium as in claim 1, wherein: the
    number-of-recording-planes identifying informa-
    tion indicates that the recording medium is one of
    a single-sided disc and a double-sided disc.
    ’966 patent cl.5. Claim 5 narrows claim 1 by additionally
    requiring identification of the number of disc sides. Claim
    5 thus covers discs with identifying information that
    indicates both the number of planes on the medium and
    the number of sides. The prosecution history shows that
    the applicant added claim 5 “in order to claim further
    aspects of the invention,” namely to add a limitation
    “indicating whether the recording medium is a single-
    sided or a double-sided disc.” J.A. 1380; see also J.A. 1380
    (“The ability to determine which side of the disc that a
    recording layer is on facilitates reproduction because, for
    example, if a recording plane on side A of a double-sided
    disc is to be reproduced, the apparatus can determine
    which side of the disc is side A.”). This limitation is not
    present in claim 1.
    In sum, claim 1 does not require identifying the num-
    ber of disc sides nor does it require that the identifying
    information have the purpose of providing information for
    the whole disc. We thus hold that the district court erred
    in its construction of both claim terms and in granting
    summary judgment of non-infringement.
    CONCLUSION
    The district court correctly granted summary judg-
    ment of non-infringement as to contributory infringement
    of the asserted claims of the ’751 patent. However, the
    court erred in granting summary judgment of non-
    infringement as to induced infringement of the asserted
    claims of the ’751 patent and in granting summary judg-
    ment of non-infringement of claim 1 of the ’966 patent
    based on an erroneous claim construction. We therefore
    25                              TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    affirm-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand to the district
    court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, and
    REMANDED
    COSTS
    Costs to Plaintiff-Appellant.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    TOSHIBA CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    IMATION CORP., MOSER BAER INDIA LTD.,
    GLYPHICS MEDIA, INC.,
    CMC MAGNETICS CORP., HOTAN CORP.,
    KHYPERMEDIA CORP.,
    RITEK CORP., AND ADVANCED MEDIA, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    __________________________
    2011-1204
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Wisconsin in case no. 09-CV-0305,
    Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker.
    __________________________
    DYK, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
    part.
    Although I join the majority opinion on the issues of
    contributory and induced infringement with respect to the
    ’751 patent, I respectfully dissent as to the claim con-
    struction and infringement analysis for claim 1 of the ’966
    patent.
    Claim 1 of the ’966 patent covers:
    1. A recording medium comprising:
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                            2
    at least one recording plane, wherein each
    recording plane on which data is recorded
    includes:
    a data region in which data is recorded; and
    a management region including number-
    of-recording-planes identifying informa-
    tion that represents the number of re-
    cording planes of the recording medium
    and recording-plane identifying informa-
    tion that uniquely identifies that re-
    cording plane.
    ’966 patent col.1 ll.21-29 (filed Sept. 5, 1996) (emphasis
    added). As I discuss below, the specification and the
    prosecution history of the ’966 patent make clear that the
    central objective of the patent was to identify whether an
    optical disc was a one-sided disc or a two-sided disc.
    While claim 1 is broadly written so that it requires both a
    number-of-sides identifier and a number-of-layers per side
    identifier (i.e., whether the disc has one or two layers per
    side), the accused product here does not have a number of
    sides identifier and thus does not infringe.
    First, repeated and consistent references to disc sides
    in the specification and the prosecution history clearly
    show that “number-of-recording-planes identifying infor-
    mation” requires the identification of disc sides.
    When describing the shortcomings of the prior art, the
    specification stated that “conventional management
    information does not include information that distin-
    guishes” between “single-sided discs” and “double-sided
    discs.” ’966 patent col.1 ll.22-27. Improving upon the
    prior art, an “object of the present invention [wa]s to
    provide a recording medium and a reproducing apparatus
    thereof that determine the number of recording sides and
    3                              TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    a recording surface thereof.” ’966 patent col.2 ll.11-14.
    “Thus, according to the present invention, different types
    of recording mediums that are for example single-sided
    type and double-sided type can be handled.” ’966 patent
    col.3 ll.1-3.
    The embodiment illustrated in Figure 2 refers to a
    “number-of-disc-sides identifier” and a “disc side identi-
    fier.” ’966 patent fig.2. As shown in Figure 2, “[t]he
    number-of-disc-sides identifier 2 represents whether the
    disc is a double-sided disc or a single-sided disc.” ’966
    patent col.6 ll.25-26. Figure 2 and its accompanying text
    are the only references in the specification for the terms
    “number-of-recording-planes identifying information” and
    “recording-plane identifying information,” and thus
    inform the meaning that an ordinary artisan would attach
    to those terms. There is no relevant embodiment in the
    specification that does not have a number-of-disc-sides
    identifier, nor any description of such an embodiment.
    Any doubt left by the specification as to the proper
    construction of the disputed terms is resolved by the
    prosecution history. In addition to prior art rejections
    under 
    35 U.S.C. § 102
    , the examiner also rejected all
    pending claims under § 112 in the last office action prior
    to allowance. The examiner stated, among other things,
    that “[t]he specification as originally filed does not provide
    support for the limitation ‘each recording plane . . . num-
    ber of recording plane . . . planes identifying information.’”
    J.A. 761 (second and third alterations in original). In
    response to the § 112 rejection, Toshiba showed support
    for the claimed “number-of-recording planes identifying
    information” by equating a “recording plane” to a “side of
    the disc”:
    As illustrated in FIG. 2 and as described in the
    Specification . . . a number-of-disc-sides identifier
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                              4
    2 and a disc side identifier 3 . . . must be provided
    on each side of the disc—i.e., each recording
    plane—in order for the disc side identifier 3 to
    serve its purpose of identifying which side is being
    recorded/reproduced.
    J.A. 761-62 (emphasis added). The examiner subse-
    quently allowed the claims. In the reasons for allowance,
    the examiner stated that:
    [N]one of the cited prior art shows . . . a disk hav-
    ing at least one recording plane . . . and a man-
    agement region including the number of recording
    planes identifying the number of recording planes
    on the disk and a separate recording plane identi-
    fying information that uniquely identify that re-
    cording plane (such as side A or side B or upper
    surface or lower surface)
    J.A. 756. Given the examiner’s withdrawal of the § 112
    rejection and the stated reasons for allowance, it is clear
    that the examiner viewed “number-of-recording-planes
    identifying information” as including both a number of
    sides identifier and a number of layers per side identifier.
    The majority suggests that the examiner’s use of “or” in
    the parenthetical shows that identification of disc sides is
    not necessarily required. But Toshiba’s representation is
    explicit that the number of recording planes identifying
    information must identify the number of sides and the
    number of layers on a side. The examiner’s statement as
    to the recording plane identifying information does noth-
    ing to alter that meaning.
    Given the repeated references in the specification to
    disc sides and the prosecution history, including the
    examiner’s finding that the identification of recording
    planes “such as side A or side B or upper surface or lower
    surface” is what distinguishes the prior art, it is clear that
    5                             TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP
    “number-of-recording-planes identifying information”
    requires the identification of the number of sides as well
    as the number of surfaces (i.e., layers) on each side. Thus,
    it is not sufficient that the “number-of-recording-planes
    identifying information” only identify the number of
    layers on a disc just because the disc happens to be a one-
    sided disc.     Rather, the “number-of-recording-planes
    identifying information” has to identify whether the disc
    is a one-sided disc or a two-sided disc.
    The principles of claim differentiation do not support
    a different result. The majority appears to suggest that, if
    a side identifier is required by claim 1, then claim 5 is
    adding something that is already within claim 1, and that
    the claims would then have the same scope. However, the
    majority fails to recognize that claim 5 narrows claim 1 by
    covering only embodiments with one layer per side. Here,
    claim 5 recites:
    5. The recording medium as in claim 1, wherein:
    the number-of-recording-planes identifying in-
    formation indicates that the recording me-
    dium is one of a single-sided disc and a
    double-sided disc.
    ’966 patent col.16 ll.59-62. Whereas claim 1 can cover
    embodiments with any number of layers on a side, de-
    pendent claim 5 appears to cover only embodiments with
    one layer per side. In such embodiments, the identifica-
    tion of the number of sides necessarily identifies the
    number of recording planes on a disc. In any event, “the
    doctrine of claim differentiation does not allow unre-
    strained expansion of claims beyond the description of the
    invention in the specification, and explanations and
    representations made to the PTO in order to obtain al-
    lowance of the claims.” Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
    Comm’n, 
    831 F.2d 1017
    , 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
    TOSHIBA CORP   v. IMATION CORP                           6
    While I agree that appellees’ argument in this case
    regarding the correct claim construction is confusing, this
    court is not bound by the parties’ views of the proper
    claim construction. Exxon Chem. Patents Inc. v. Lubrizol
    Corp., 
    64 F.3d 1553
    , 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995). As described
    above, the specification and the prosecution history, as
    well as the language of claim 1 itself, clearly establish
    that claim 1 requires that an accused DVD be able to
    identify whether the DVD has one recording side or two
    recording sides.
    For these reasons, I would affirm the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of the
    ’966 patent.