Blodgett v. United States ( 2019 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    DIANE S. BLODGETT, TOM LINGENFELTER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2018-2398
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
    in No. 1:17-cv-02000-LAS, Senior Judge Loren A. Smith.
    ______________________
    Decided: December 3, 2019
    ______________________
    DIANE S. BLODGETT, St. Louis Park, MN, pro se.
    TOM LINGENFELTER, Doylestown, PA, pro se.
    BORISLAV KUSHNIR, Commercial Litigation Branch,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
    ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
    JOSEPH H. HUNT, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, ROBERT
    EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.
    ______________________
    2                                BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
    Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Diane S. Blodgett and Tom Lingenfelter are associates
    of T.G. Morgan, Inc., a rare coin dealer that was shut down
    by the Federal Trade Commission in the early 1990s for
    fraudulent and deceptive business practices. Shortly after
    the shutdown, TGM’s creditors forced the company into
    bankruptcy. More than 25 years later, Blodgett and Lin-
    genfelter, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit at the U.S.
    Court of Federal Claims. Their 832-page complaint alleged
    that the 1990s proceedings were part of an “egregious con-
    spiracy” perpetrated by multiple federal courts, multiple
    federal agencies, and by their own attorneys. The Claims
    Court dismissed Blodgett’s and Lingenfelter’s complaint
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, untimeliness, and
    failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
    [SA 1, 5] Because we agree with the Claims Court on each
    ground for dismissal, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    In August 1991, the Federal Trade Commission
    (“FTC”) brought fraud charges in federal district court
    against a rare coin dealer, T.G. Morgan, Inc. (“TGM”), and
    its president, Michael Blodgett. To settle the FTC action,
    TGM and its principals agreed in a signed consent order to
    transfer TGM’s assets to a “settlement estate” that would
    reimburse the victims of TGM’s fraud. TGM’s assets were
    transferred to the settlement estate “irrevocably and with-
    out the possibility of reversion to themselves or to any en-
    tity owned or controlled by them.” Fed. Trade Comm. v.
    T.G. Morgan, Inc., No. Civ. 4-91-638, 
    1992 WL 88162
    , at *4
    (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 1992). The district court explained that
    TGM and its principals had thus “waive[d] any and all
    claims that they, or entities owned or controlled by them,
    may have to the [transferred] assets.” 
    Id. at *5.
    BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES                                   3
    Shortly thereafter, TGM’s creditors forced the company
    into involuntary bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court ap-
    pointed a trustee to manage the bankruptcy estate. The
    trustee filed a motion to seize assets in the settlement es-
    tate and transfer those assets to the bankruptcy estate.
    Mrs. Diane S. Blodgett, a principle of TGM, and Mr.
    Thomas Lingenfelter, a business associate and third party
    beneficiary of TGM, objected to the transfer. The bank-
    ruptcy court rejected their arguments, finding that neither
    party had a legally cognizable claim against the settlement
    estate. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion.
    Over the next 25 years, Mrs. Blodgett and Mr. Lingen-
    felter (collectively, “Blodgett”) filed more than a dozen law-
    suits that claimed an interest in the assets seized by the
    trustee and challenged the scope and content of the bank-
    ruptcy estate. In each case, the court rejected Blodgett’s
    claims as meritless.
    On December 18, 2017, Blodgett filed an 832-page pro
    se complaint in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (“Claims
    Court”). Blodgett’s complaint, which gave rise to this ap-
    peal, alleges a 26-year government conspiracy that in-
    volves breach of contract, various torts, a Fifth Amendment
    taking, and violations of the Bankruptcy Code, the Internal
    Review Code (“IRC”), and the Employment Retirement In-
    come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
    On March 13, 2018, the Government moved to dismiss
    Blodgett’s complaint. Blodgett opposed. On July 26, 2018,
    the Claims Court granted the Government’s motion for
    three reasons. First, the Claims Court found a lack of sub-
    ject matter jurisdiction over Blodgett’s Bankruptcy Code,
    IRC, and ERISA claims. Second, the Claims Court held
    that all of Blodgett’s claims are barred by the Tucker Act’s
    six-year statute of limitations. Third, the Claims Court
    held that Blodgett failed to state a takings claim because
    Blodgett irrevocably transferred the assets-in-question to
    the settlement estate and relinquished all rights and
    4                                 BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
    property interests in those assets. The Claims Court in-
    structed the clerk to refuse any further filings or com-
    plaints from Blodgett without leave of court.
    Blodgett timely appealed pro se. We have jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
    DISCUSSION
    We review de novo whether the Claims Court has
    properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to
    state a claim, both of which are questions of law. Turping
    v. United States, 
    913 F.3d 1060
    , 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2019). To
    survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
    which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain suf-
    ficient factual allegations that, if true, would state a claim
    to relief that is plausible on its face. Call Henry, Inc. v.
    United States, 
    855 F.3d 1348
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
    To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
    ter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
    ance of the evidence that the court possesses jurisdiction.
    
    Id. When determining
    whether subject matter jurisdiction
    exists, we generally “accept as true all undisputed facts as-
    serted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable
    inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    659 F.3d 1159
    , 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
    While pro se pleadings, like those here, are to be liberally
    construed, that does not alleviate a plaintiff’s burden to es-
    tablish jurisdiction. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch.
    Serv., 
    846 F.2d 746
    , 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
    The jurisdiction of the Claims Court is limited in two
    ways: by subject matter and by timing. First, the Tucker
    Act limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the Claims
    Court to claims against the United States for money dam-
    ages other than those sounding in tort, including those
    arising from a contract, the Constitution, or a federal stat-
    ute or regulation. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Because the
    Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of
    BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES                                   5
    action, a plaintiff must identify a separate money-mandat-
    ing source of substantive law that creates the right to
    money damages. Fisher v. United States, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    ,
    1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
    Second, all claims brought before the Claims Court
    “shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within
    six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
    See Holmes v. United States, 
    657 F.3d 1303
    , 1317 (Fed. Cir.
    2011) (explaining that “[c]ompliance with the statute of
    limitations is a jurisdictional requirement”). A cause of ac-
    tion “first accrues” when “all the events have occurred that
    fix the alleged liability of the government and entitle the
    claimant to institute an action.” 
    Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1317
    .
    For example, “[i]n the case of a breach of a contract, a cause
    of action accrues when the breach occurs.” 
    Id. We begin
    with Blodgett’s claims that are based on vio-
    lations of the Bankruptcy Code, the IRC, and the ERISA.
    We conclude that the Claims Court properly dismissed
    each claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    Blodgett appears to assert three bankruptcy-related
    claims, each arising under Title 11: (i) the court-appointed
    trustee failed to perform his fiduciary duties in violation of
    11 U.S.C. § 704, (ii) the bankruptcy court performed an im-
    proper offset in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7); and (iii)
    TGM’s creditors filed involuntary bankruptcy filing in bad
    faith in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 303. S.A. 126, 137, S.A.
    249; S.A. 607. We conclude that the Claims Court properly
    dismissed each of Blodgett’s bankruptcy claims for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction because district courts—and
    not the Claims Court—have “original and exclusive juris-
    diction of all cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
    Blodgett’s IRC-based claim appears to assert that the
    government conducted unauthorized tax collections by vir-
    tue of the 1990s FTC proceedings and consent order. S.A.
    167, S.A. 595. We conclude that the Claims Court properly
    dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
    6                                 BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
    because claims for damages based on allegedly unauthor-
    ized tax collections must be brought “exclusively before a
    district court of the United States.” Ledford v. United
    States, 
    297 F.3d 1378
    , 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
    Blodgett’s ERISA-based claim appears to assert that
    the bankruptcy court violated ERISA’s anti-alienation pro-
    visions by alienating “Blodgett’s fully funded, fully vested,
    fully compliant ERISA pension” and subjecting it to a con-
    structive trust. S.A. 24. See also S.A. 14, 51, 69 (claiming
    the FTC “loot[ed] the Blodgett’s TGM fully funded ERISA
    pension fund”). We conclude that the Claims Court
    properly dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter ju-
    risdiction because the Claims Court “shall not have juris-
    diction [over] any claim for a pension.” 28 U.S.C. § 1501.
    We likewise conclude that the Claims Court lacked
    subject matter jurisdiction over Blodgett’s torts claims.
    Blodgett asserts that the government committed “hun-
    dreds of torts” and “years of unending torts,” including
    “bad faith torts,” and “torts in court filings.” S.A. 9, S.A.
    14, S.A. 18, S.A. 40, S.A. 69. As a result, Blodgett contends,
    “the United States must now pay the bill.” S.A. 107. We
    conclude that the Claims Court properly dismissed these
    claims because the Claims Court “lacks jurisdiction over
    tort actions against the United States.” Brown v. United
    States, 
    105 F.3d 621
    , 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C.
    § 1491(a) (excluding from the Claims Court’s jurisdiction
    cases “sounding in tort”)).
    Blodgett’s remaining claims—a breach of contract
    claim and Fifth Amendment taking claim—are barred by
    the Claims Court’s six-year statute of limitations.
    Blodgett’s contract claim appears to assert that
    Blodgett entered into a “settlement contract with the FTC”
    when Mrs. Blodgett signed the FTC consent order and
    “fully funded 50% of the consent settlement on December
    31, 1991.” S.A. 8, S.A. 12. Blodgett alleges that the bank-
    ruptcy trustee’s 1992 seizure of funds from the settlement
    BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES                                 7
    estate breached the contract “by interference with Ms.
    Blodgett’s access to untainted personal assets.” S.A. 118,
    801. The contract claim thus “first accrued” in 1992, when
    Blodgett contends the breach occurred. 
    Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1317
    . As a result, Blodgett’s contract claim is barred
    because it was filed in 2017, more than six years after it
    first accrued. 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
    Blodgett’s Fifth Amendment taking claim appears to
    assert that the FTC’s acquisition and liquidation of assets
    in 1991 and 1992 constituted a taking of personal property
    “without just compensation.” S.A. 39, S.A. 258–259, S.A.
    392–393. A takings claim under the Fifth Amendment “ac-
    crues when the taking action occurs.” Navajo Nation v.
    United States, 
    631 F.3d 1268
    , 1273–74 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
    Nw. La. Fish & Game Pres. Comm’n v. United States, 
    446 F.3d 1285
    , 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A taking occurs when
    governmental action deprives the owner of all or most of its
    property interest.”). Construing Blodgett’s complaint lib-
    erally, the takings claim first accrued in 1992, when the
    FTC placed TGM’s assets in the settlement estate. As a
    result, Blodgett’s Fifth Amendment takings claim is barred
    because it was filed in 2017, more than six years after it
    first accrued. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 1
    Blodgett attempts to circumvent the six-year statute of
    limitations by arguing that Blodgett “first sued under the
    Tucker Act in December 1994, thus arguably timely pre-
    serving their claims back to 1991.” S.A. 1990. See also
    1    We also agree with the Claims Court that Blodgett
    failed to state a Fifth Amendment takings claim upon
    which relief can be granted. Because TGM irrevocably
    transferred the assets-in-question and “waive[d] any and
    all claims” to those assets, T.G. Morgan, 
    1992 WL 88162
    ,
    at *4–*5, Blodgett cannot “identify a legally cognizable
    property interest.” Am. Bankers Ass’n v. United States, 
    932 F.3d 1375
    , 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
    8                                  BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
    Appellant Br. at 13–14 (asserting that the 1994 complaint
    “tolled any statute of limitations”). As we have explained,
    the Claims Court’s six-year statute of limitations “is juris-
    dictional and may not be waived or tolled.” FloorPro, Inc.
    v. United States, 
    680 F.3d 1377
    , 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (the
    six-year period “cannot be extended even in cases where
    such an extension might be justified on equitable
    grounds.”). Nor can Blodgett argue that the instant com-
    plaint is timely under the “relate back doctrine” of Rule
    15(c) of the Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, be-
    cause Rule 15(c) expressly applies only to amended com-
    plaints, not newly filed complaints.
    Because all of Blodgett’s claims are outside the scope of
    the Tucker Act or time-barred, we conclude that the Claims
    Court properly dismissed Blodgett’s complaint.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Blodgett’s other arguments and
    find them unpersuasive. We conclude that the Claims
    Court properly dismissed Blodgett’s complaint for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction, untimeliness, and failure to
    state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.