Arcelormittal Stainless Belgium N v. v. U.S. ( 2012 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS BELGIUM N.V.
    (now known as Aperam Stainless Belgium N.V.),
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    AND
    ALLEGHENY LUDLUM CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    __________________________
    2011-1578
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of International
    Trade in case no. 08-CV-0434, Judge Richard K. Eaton.
    __________________________
    Decided: September 7, 2012
    __________________________
    BRYAN H. DAYTON, Shearman & Sterling, LLP, of
    Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him
    on the brief was ROBERT S. LARUSSA.
    PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, Assistant Director, Commer-
    cial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
    Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for
    ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US                         2
    defendant-appellee, United States. With her on the brief
    were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, and
    JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director. Of counsel on the brief
    was DANIEL J. CALHOUN, Attorney, Office of the Chief
    Counsel for Import Administration, United States De-
    partment of Commerce, of Washington, DC.
    JEFFREY S. BECKINGTON, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP,
    of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee, Alle-
    gheny Ludlum Corporation. With him on the brief was
    DAVID A. HARTQUIST.
    __________________________
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, PLAGER, and LINN, Circuit
    Judges.
    PLAGER, Circuit Judge.
    This is an antidumping case. It involves the scope of
    the Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) antidump-
    ing duty order on certain stainless steel plate in coils
    (“SSPC”). The order states that the products subject to
    the order are those which are “4.75 mm or more in thick-
    ness.” Aperam Stainless Belgium N.V. (“ASB”), 1 a Bel-
    gian producer of SSPC, requested a scope ruling to
    determine whether its products, which have nominal
    thicknesses of 4.75 mm or more but are imported into the
    United States with actual thicknesses less than 4.75 mm,
    are included within the scope of the order.
    Commerce determined that the scope of its antidump-
    ing order encompasses SSPC having a nominal thickness
    of 4.75 mm but an actual thickness of less than 4.75 mm
    1    Aperam Stainless Belgium N.V. was formerly
    known as “ArcelorMittal Stainless Belgium N.V.,” which
    was formerly known as “Ugine & ALZ Belgium N.V.” In
    this opinion, we refer to all three entities as ASB.
    3                            ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US
    and, therefore, the order applies to ASB’s products. ASB
    appealed Commerce’s scope ruling to the Court of Inter-
    national Trade, which agreed with Commerce and af-
    firmed. 2 Because Commerce’s final scope ruling is not
    supportable since it is contrary to the plain language of
    the order, we reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    I.
    This appeal stems from an antidumping order con-
    cerning certain stainless steel plate in coils. “Dumping” is
    the sale of foreign merchandise in the United States at
    less than fair value, i.e., less than the price at which the
    merchandise is sold in the foreign producer’s home mar-
    ket. 
    19 U.S.C. § 1673
    . To curtail such dumping activity,
    Commerce is authorized to issue antidumping orders
    imposing duties on imported merchandise. 
    Id.
    A domestic industry concerned about possible dump-
    ing activity may initiate an investigation by filing a
    petition with Commerce. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b). 3 If the
    petition satisfies the statutory requirements, Commerce
    will commence an antidumping investigation.          Id.
    § 1673a(c). Commerce then collects information from
    foreign producers and makes a preliminary determination
    as to the existence and extent of dumping and the amount
    of duties that should be imposed. Id. § 1673b(b), (d).
    Meanwhile, the International Trade Commission collects
    information from the affected domestic industry and
    2   ArcelorMittal Stainless Belgium N.V. v. United
    States, No. 08-00434, 
    2011 WL 2713872
     (Ct. Int’l Trade
    July 12, 2011).
    3   Commerce can also initiate the process itself. 19
    U.S.C. § 1673a(a).
    ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US                            4
    makes a preliminary determination as to whether a
    threat of material injury exists. Id. § 1673b(a).
    After further proceedings, if Commerce makes a final
    determination that dumping has occurred, and if the
    International Trade Commission makes a final determi-
    nation of material injury, Commerce issues a final anti-
    dumping order that defines which goods are subject to
    antidumping duties and their duty rate. 19 U.S.C.
    §§ 1673d, 1673e. Upon request, the administering agen-
    cies will periodically review the existence and extent of
    dumping, the amount of the duty, and the question of
    material injury. Id. § 1675.
    After the issuance of a final antidumping order, ques-
    tions may arise regarding its scope. Commerce’s regula-
    tions provide for a procedure called a scope ruling to
    determine whether a particular product is included within
    the scope of an antidumping order. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.225
    .
    In a scope ruling proceeding “a predicate for the interpre-
    tive process is language in the order that is subject to
    interpretation.” Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States,
    
    396 F.3d 1378
    , 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Duferco Steel
    Inc. v. United States, 
    296 F.3d 1087
    , 1097 (Fed. Cir.
    2002)). If Commerce determines that the language at
    issue is not ambiguous, it states what it understands to be
    the plain meaning of the language, and the proceedings
    terminate. On the other hand, if Commerce finds that the
    scope language is ambiguous, it then looks to two sets of
    factors spelled out in its regulations to determine the
    intended scope of the order. 4 This appeal stems from such
    a scope ruling proceeding.
    4    See 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.225
    (k)(1), which requires
    Commerce to examine the history of the proceedings, and
    
    19 C.F.R. § 351.225
    (k)(2), which specifies factors includ-
    ing (i) the physical characteristics of the product; (ii) the
    5                            ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS    v. US
    II.
    On March 31, 1998, Allegheny Ludlum Corporation
    (“Allegheny”), along with other members of the domestic
    stainless steel industry, petitioned Commerce to impose
    antidumping and countervailing duties on SSPC from
    several countries, including Belgium. 5 SSPC is used in
    the fabrication of large storage tanks, process vessels, and
    other types of industrial equipment requiring corrosion
    resistance. The petition identified the foreign merchan-
    dise at issue based on the Harmonized Tariff Schedule’s
    definition of stainless steel as “alloy steels containing, by
    weight, 1.2 percent or less of carbon and 10.5 percent or
    more of chromium.” The petition employed the American
    Iron and Steel Institute’s definition of plate as “a flat-
    rolled or forged product that is 10 inches and over in
    width and 0.1875 inches and over in thickness.” In re-
    sponse to Commerce’s inquiries regarding the scope of the
    petitions, petitioners provided metric equivalents for the
    width and thickness dimensions of 254 mm and 4.75 mm,
    respectively. The petitioners noted that although “the
    precise metric equivalent of the 0.1875 inch minimum
    thickness for plate products is 4.76 mm, . . . [p]etitioners
    believe that the general practice in the industry is to refer
    to plate that is 0.1875 inch thick as also 4.75 mm thick.”
    Finding the petition satisfactory, Commerce initiated an
    antidumping duty investigation, and defined the scope of
    expectations of the ultimate purchasers; (iii) the ultimate
    use of the product; (iv) the channels of trade in which the
    product is sold; and (v) the manner in which the product
    is advertised and displayed.
    5   The other petitioners were: AK Steel Corp.; North
    American Stainless; and United Steel, Paper and For-
    estry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial
    and Service Workers International Union. The other
    countries were: Canada, Italy, South Korea, South Africa,
    and Taiwan.
    ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US                            6
    the investigation using the metric dimensions provided by
    petitioners, including the 4.75 mm thickness dimension.
    Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigations: Stainless
    Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium, Canada, Italy, Republic
    of South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan, 
    63 Fed. Reg. 20,580
     (Apr. 27, 1998).
    Although the SSPC industry recognizes two types of
    thickness measurements, nominal thickness and actual
    thickness, Commerce, when it stated the 4.75 mm dimen-
    sion in its definition of the scope of the investigation, and
    later when it issued orders based on that investigation,
    did not specify or otherwise differentiate between nominal
    and actual thickness. “Nominal thickness” is the meas-
    urement purchasers use when ordering SSPC, and “actual
    thickness” is the measured thickness of the delivered
    product. Because the manufacturing process is not per-
    fect, the industry has established “tolerance ranges”
    within which certain actual thicknesses are considered
    equivalent to the nominal thickness that was ordered. In
    other words, the actual delivered thickness may vary
    from, by being slightly under or over, the ordered or
    nominal thickness, and still meet the specifications of the
    contract order.
    In May of 1998, Commerce solicited information from
    ASB and the other foreign producers, instructing them to
    “[r]eport actual thicknesses; if nominal thicknesses are
    used in your normal course of business, convert these to
    actual thicknesses.” Four months later, however, Com-
    merce changed its instructions and requested the foreign
    producers to “ensure that all sales of products for which
    the nominal thickness is greater than or equal to 4.75 mm
    have been included in your . . . questionnaire response.”
    Based on the information collected during the investi-
    gation, Commerce determined that sales of foreign mer-
    7                            ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS    v. US
    chandise were being made at dumped prices, and the
    International Trade Commission determined that the
    dumped imports were a cause of injury to domestic pro-
    ducers. Accordingly, Commerce imposed antidumping
    and countervailing duty orders on the subject SSPC.
    Antidumping Duty Orders; Certain Stainless Steel Plate
    in Coils from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Republic of
    Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan, 
    64 Fed. Reg. 27,756
    (May 21, 1999). The current scope of the orders recites:
    The product covered by these orders is certain
    stainless steel plate in coils. Stainless steel is an
    alloy steel containing, by weight, 1.2 percent or
    less of carbon and 10.5 percent or more of chro-
    mium, with our without other elements. The sub-
    ject plate products are flat-rolled products,
    254 mm or over in width and 4.75 mm or more
    in thickness, in coils, and annealed or otherwise
    heat treated and pickled or otherwise descaled.
    The subject plate may also be further processed
    (e.g., cold-rolled, polished, etc.) provided that it
    maintains the specified dimensions of plate follow-
    ing such processing. Excluded form the scope of
    this order are the following: (1) Plate not in coils,
    (2) plate that is not annealed or otherwise heat
    treated and pickled or otherwise descaled, (3)
    sheet and strip, and (4) flat bars.
    The merchandise subject to this review is cur-
    rently classifiable in the Harmonized Tariff
    Schedule of the United States (HTS) at [specified]
    subheadings . . . . Although the HTS subheadings
    are provided for convenience and Customs pur-
    poses, the written description of the merchandise
    subject to these orders is dispositive.
    ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US                         8
    Notice of Amended Antidumping Duty Orders; Certain
    Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium, Canada,
    Italy, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan, 
    68 Fed. Reg. 11,520
     (Mar. 11, 2003) (emphasis added).
    Over the next five years, ASB participated in three
    administrative reviews of the antidumping duty order. 6
    In the reviews, Commerce reiterated its request that ASB
    “include in your response all sales of products for which
    the nominal thickness is greater than or equal to
    4.75 mm.” In the 2000-2001 administrative review Com-
    merce examined invoices for ASB’s products having a
    nominal thickness greater than or equal to 4.75 mm but
    an actual thickness of less than 4.75 mm, and concluded
    that such merchandise “was not subject to this review.”
    In keeping with that decision, Commerce permitted ASB
    to exclude certain nominal thickness SSPC sales during
    the 2002-2003 administrative review.
    ASB again excluded similar nominal thickness SSPC
    sales during the 2003-2004 administrative review, but
    this time Commerce concluded that such data should have
    been reported because “the scope of this Order includes
    nominal SSPC.” Commerce advised ASB that if it “be-
    lieved that the scope of this Order should have been
    amended to exclude nominal SSPC, it should have re-
    quested a scope inquiry on the issue under section
    351.225 of the Department’s Regulations.”
    ASB subsequently petitioned Commerce in May of
    2007 for a ruling regarding whether the scope of the order
    on SSPC from Belgium excludes stainless steel products
    with an actual thickness less than 4.75 mm, regardless of
    its nominal thickness. Commerce “analyzed the product
    in question pursuant to the criteria established in 19 CFR
    6    ASB withdrew during the first administrative re-
    view, and no party requested review for the third period.
    9                            ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS    v. US
    351.225(k)(1) and (2)” and concluded that “the product[s]
    subject to the scope-ruling request . . . are 254mm (10
    inches) or more in width and 4.75mm (0.1875 inches) or
    more in thickness . . . within the dimensional tolerances
    indicated in the ASTM [Standard], even if actual thick-
    ness is less than 4.75mm . . . .” 7
    ASB appealed Commerce’s decision to the Court of In-
    ternational Trade. On appeal, Commerce conceded “that
    it failed to provide an analysis of the language of the
    Orders (i.e., in order to determine, in the first instance,
    whether or not the language in the Orders is ambiguous)”
    and requested a voluntary remand. The Court of Interna-
    tional Trade agreed, and in a March 30, 2010 order,
    remanded the matter to Commerce to further develop the
    agency record in a manner consistent with our decisions
    in Duferco and Tak Fat.
    On remand, Commerce determined that the language
    of the order was ambiguous in view of what it understood
    to be the industry practice of using nominal measure-
    ments in purchases and sales of SSPC, and that the
    factors listed in 19 C.F.R § 351.225(k)(1) of its regulations
    did not clarify the ambiguity. Commerce then incorpo-
    rated its earlier analysis under 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.225
    (k)(2)
    and reiterated its conclusion that the scope of the order
    includes merchandise with a nominal thickness of
    4.75 mm regardless of the actual thickness. ASB ap-
    pealed to the Court of International Trade, and that court
    affirmed Commerce’s ruling. This appeal followed. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(5).
    7   The ASTM Standard was established by ASTM
    International, formerly known as the American Society
    for Testing and Materials, which develops and delivers
    international voluntary consensus standards. See ASTM
    International,    “ASTM     Overview,”   available  at
    http://www.astm.org/.
    ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US                         10
    DISCUSSION
    I.
    We review decisions of the Court of International
    Trade evaluating Commerce’s antidumping determina-
    tions by reapplying the standard that the Court of Inter-
    national Trade applied in reviewing the administrative
    record. Tak Fat, 
    396 F.3d at 1382
    . Accordingly, we will
    uphold Commerce’s determination unless it is “unsup-
    ported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise
    not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
    II.
    As explained, the first step in a scope ruling proceed-
    ing is to determine whether the governing language is in
    fact ambiguous, and thus requires analysis of the regula-
    tory factors previously outlined. If it is not ambiguous,
    the plain meaning of the language governs. The Court of
    International Trade held that “where, as here, the rele-
    vant industry generally defines product thickness in
    nominal terms, it is reasonable for Commerce to conclude
    that the Department’s failure to specify whether ‘4.75 mm
    in thickness’ was a nominal or actual measurement
    rendered the Orders ambiguous.” ArcelorMittal, 
    2011 WL 2713872
    , at *13.
    ASB challenges the Court of International Trade’s de-
    termination that substantial evidence supported Com-
    merce’s conclusion that the language of the SSPC
    antidumping orders are ambiguous. ASB argues that the
    plain language of the order is not ambiguous because a
    number, unless otherwise modified, means the actual
    number. Thus, ASB argues, Commerce should not have
    considered industry custom in making its threshold
    determination of ambiguity because the order’s plain
    language is dispositive.
    11                          ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US
    In response, the Government and Allegheny defend
    the Court of International Trade’s holding of ambiguity,
    arguing that Commerce reasonably turned to industry
    custom in analyzing the scope of the order. The Govern-
    ment and Allegheny contended, and the Court of Interna-
    tional Trade found, that although the phrase “4.75 mm or
    more in thickness” might refer to an actual measurement
    in everyday parlance, antidumping orders should be
    interpreted in the context of the industry in which the
    regulated merchandise is manufactured, bought, and sold.
    Both arguments have some merit. The absence of one
    thing does not prove the opposite—as we have said,
    “Commerce cannot find authority in an order based on the
    theory that the order does not deny authority.” Duferco,
    
    296 F.3d at 1096
    . Similarly, Commerce may not find a
    measurement in an order ambiguous merely because the
    value is not modified by the terms “actual” or “nominal.”
    Rather, as the Court of International Trade observed
    during oral argument, “[i]t seems to me that not having
    actual or nominal leans toward actual.” Transcript of
    Oral Argument at 21, AcelorMittal, 
    2011 WL 2713872
    (No. 08-00434). Thus, Commerce logically could treat
    unmodified dimensions in antidumping duty orders as
    actual measurements, and conclude that there is no
    ambiguity.
    On the other hand, we agree with the Government
    and Allegheny that antidumping orders should not be
    interpreted in a vacuum devoid of any consideration of the
    way the language of the order is used in the relevant
    industry. As the Court of International Trade also ob-
    served, “[c]ourts have long recognized the importance of
    considering context, including industry custom, in inter-
    preting written language.”      ArcelorMittal, 
    2011 WL 2713872
    , at *9 n.8. Because the primary purpose of an
    antidumping order is to place foreign exporters on notice
    ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US                        12
    of what merchandise is subject to duties, the terms of an
    order should be consistent, to the extent possible, with
    trade usage. Thus, a finding of no ambiguity for unmodi-
    fied numbers may be rebutted by sufficient evidence
    showing that actual measurements are not customarily
    used in the relevant industry. 8
    As earlier explained, the SSPC industry uses both
    nominal and actual values; nominal measurements reflect
    what was ordered, while actual measurements reflect
    what was delivered. Commerce concluded that the indus-
    try’s practice of using nominal thicknesses when ordering
    SSPC rendered the scope of the antidumping duty order
    ambiguous. ArcelorMittal, 
    2011 WL 2713872
    , at *3. But
    antidumping duty orders apply to goods as imported, not
    as they may have been ordered. Thus, the proper context
    in which to interpret the scope of the antidumping duty
    order is the industry practice regarding delivered prod-
    ucts.
    Furthermore, it turns out that Commerce had previ-
    ously interpreted the very language in question. In Notice
    of Final Determination of Sales Less than Fair Value:
    Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from South
    Africa, 
    62 Fed. Reg. 61,731
     (Nov. 19, 1997) (“Carbon Steel
    Plate”), Commerce had determined “that ‘4.75 mm in
    thickness’ was an actual measurement that excluded
    merchandise with an actual thickness of less than
    8    However, consideration of industry jargon is not
    the same as conducting a full-fledged analysis of the
    factors embodied in 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.225
    (k)(2). In answer-
    ing the initial question of whether a measurement recited
    in an antidumping duty order is subject to interpretation,
    the question Commerce asks is whether the measurement
    has an industry-accepted meaning that weighs against
    presumptively treating it as an actual measurement.
    13                            ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS     v. US
    4.75 mm from its scope.”       See ArcelorMittal, 
    2011 WL 2713872
    , at *11.
    Carbon Steel Plate involved an investigation of certain
    cut-to-length carbon steel plate from South Africa. The
    scope of the investigation included “certain iron and non-
    alloy steel flat-rolled products not in coils . . . 4.75 mm or
    more in thickness . . . .” 62 Fed. Reg. at 61,731. The
    petitioners in Carbon Steel Plate requested that Com-
    merce clarify the scope of the investigation to include
    products “sold as having a 3/16” nominal thickness but
    ‘rolled light’ to an actual thickness of just under 4.75 mm
    (the boundary of the tariff classifications set forth in the
    scope description of the preliminary determination)
    (‘light-rolled 3/16” plate’).” Id. at 61,740, cmt.13. According
    to the petitioners, “any customer ordering a
    3/ ” . . . plate . . . would be willing to accept any thickness
    16
    within the tolerance for that size plate. Thus, any plate
    within the tolerance for 4.75mm nominal thickness plate
    will compete directly with any other plate within the
    tolerance.” Id.
    Commerce, however, rejected petitioners’ request, id.
    at 61,741, “given the clarity of the original scope,” Memo-
    randum on Scope of Investigations on Carbon Steel Plate,
    Joseph Spetrini to Robert S. LaRussa, 3 (Oct. 24, 1997)
    (“Carbon Plate Memorandum”). Thus, five months before
    initiating the SSPC investigation in this case, Commerce
    had already decided that the phrase “4.75 mm or more in
    thickness” reflects an actual measured thickness.
    The Court of International Trade distinguished Car-
    bon Steel Plate on the grounds that it “resolved a different
    issue based on a different administrative record.” Arce-
    lorMittal, 
    2011 WL 2713872
    , at *11. According to the
    Court of International Trade:
    ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US                          14
    Carbon Steel Plate did not squarely address the
    question before the court in this case. That is, no
    argument was made that the scope language was
    ambiguous because of the absence of the words
    “actual” or “nominal.” Indeed, Carbon Steel Plate
    did not involve a dispute over the meaning of the
    scope language in the order at issue at all. To the
    contrary, that determination involved the peti-
    tioners’ request to amend the scope of the order.
    
    Id.
     But this is a distinction without a difference. Neither
    the procedural posture of Carbon Steel Plate nor the
    particular question Commerce was asked to address in
    that case changes the fact that in reaching its decision,
    Commerce recognized that the phrase “4.75 mm or more
    in thickness” unambiguously refers to an actual meas-
    urement. It belies common sense for Commerce to now
    conclude that the exact same phrase in the SSPC orders
    at issue in this case is ambiguous.
    It is true that we have said elsewhere that only a “low
    threshold [is] needed to show that Commerce here justi-
    fiably found an ambiguity . . . .” Novosteel SA v. United
    States, 
    284 F.3d 1261
    , 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, as
    the Court of International Trade itself noted, “it is not
    justifiable to identify an ambiguity where none exists.”
    ArcelorMittal, 
    2011 WL 2713872
    , at *9 (quoting Allegheny
    Bradford Corp. v. United States, 
    342 F. Supp. 2d 1172
    ,
    1184 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004)). Here, Commerce’s broad
    reading of the SSPC order is in conflict with the plain
    language of the order itself, which unambiguously pre-
    cludes nominal merchandise meeting the specified dimen-
    sion when read in light of industry practice regarding
    delivered products and Commerce’s previous decision in
    Carbon Steel Plate. Thus, Commerce was not justified in
    finding the order ambiguous.
    15                           ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS    v. US
    III.
    Finally, we take note of Commerce’s apparently shift-
    ing views regarding the scope of the antidumping duty
    order at issue in this case. Over the course of five years,
    Commerce repeatedly reassured ASB that nominal mer-
    chandise as such was excluded from the scope of the
    order. Then, without warning, Commerce reversed course
    and attempted to make it appear in an “Issues and Deci-
    sion Memorandum for the Final Results of the Fifth
    Administrative Review” that the scope had included
    nominal SSPC all along. We do not agree with the Court
    of International Trade’s conclusion that Commerce’s
    request for sales of products having a nominal thickness
    of 4.75 mm or more “indicated that it interpreted the
    scope measurements to be nominal.” ArcelorMittal, 
    2011 WL 2713872
    , at *17. Commerce’s discretion to define and
    clarify the scope of an investigation is limited by concerns
    for transparency of administrative actions. If Commerce
    chooses to modify the scope of an order during an investi-
    gation, it must make its intentions explicit. A mere
    request for additional data, without more, does not consti-
    tute a scope clarification.
    The Court of International Trade did not give full
    weight to the manifest injustice of enlarging the scope of
    the proceeding in this off-hand manner. To do what
    Commerce has done here is to invite arbitrariness and
    uncertainty into the process by which Commerce adminis-
    ters its antidumping duty orders. Commerce is not at
    liberty to ignore the plain terms of an order in what
    appears to be, in retrospect, an effort to better reflect the
    intent of the petitioners. If Commerce is concerned about
    circumvention of the SSPC antidumping order, it should
    conduct a circumvention inquiry under 19 U.S.C. § 1677j.
    What it cannot do is “interpret” the order in a manner
    ARCELORMITTAL STAINLESS   v. US                      16
    that changes its scope, as it did here. See Duferco, 
    296 F.3d at 1095
    .
    CONCLUSION
    We reverse the Court of International Trade’s judg-
    ment that substantial evidence supported Commerce’s
    determination that the SSPC order is ambiguous, and
    hold that the plain meaning of the orders regarding the
    4.75 mm thickness is a reference to actual thickness of
    products subject to the orders.
    REVERSED