Sherman v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 530 F. App'x 940 ( 2013 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    LEELA H. SHERMAN,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2013-3015
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. SF0752120193-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: September, 12, 2013
    ______________________
    SANDRA RANDLE FORDJOUR, Randle Fordjour & Asso-
    ciates, of Arlington, Texas, for petitioner.
    KATHERINE M. SMITH, Attorney, Office of the General
    Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington,
    DC, for respondent. With her on the brief were BRYAN G.
    POLISUK, General Counsel, and KEISHA DAWN BELL,
    Deputy General Counsel.
    ______________________
    2                                           SHERMAN   v. MSPB
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and DYK, Cir-
    cuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM
    The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) dis-
    missed Leela Sherman’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction
    because her resignation from the Internal Revenue Ser-
    vice (IRS) was not involuntary. Because the Board’s
    decision is in accordance with law and supported by
    substantial evidence, this court affirms.
    I.
    Ms. Sherman was employed with the IRS as a Senior
    Internal Revenue Agent. In May 2009, she settled a
    discrimination lawsuit against the IRS in district court.
    Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the IRS
    agreed to retroactively promote Ms. Sherman to a general
    schedule (GS) 14, Step 1 as of November 2006; to retroac-
    tively promote her to Step 2 as of November 2007; and to
    retroactively promote her to Step 3 as of November 2008.
    The IRS also agreed to pay Ms. Sherman back pay. The
    settlement agreement further stated that:
    Defendants and Plaintiff agree that Plaintiff will
    retire or resign from the IRS on or about Decem-
    ber 26, 2009, but not later than the start of the
    first pay period of calendar year 2010, as a Reve-
    nue Agent, GS 14-3. Plaintiff agrees that this re-
    tirement date is irrevocable and supported by
    valuable consideration. If Plaintiff, for any rea-
    son, fails to retire from the IRS by December 26,
    2009 or the start of the first pay period of calendar
    year 2010, signature on this document shall serve
    as her resignation from employment with the IRS.
    Appellee’s App. at 63.
    Ms. Sherman did not retire or resign under the terms
    of the settlement agreement. On November 21, 2011, the
    SHERMAN   v. MSPB                                       3
    IRS generated a Notification of Personnel Action for her
    resignation, effective January 3, 2010 (the start of the
    first pay period of the 2010 calendar year). Ms. Sherman
    appealed her removal to the Board, alleging inter alia
    involuntary removal and discrimination. The IRS re-
    sponded that the 2009 settlement agreement effected Ms.
    Sherman’s removal.
    On February 13, 2012, the Administrative Judge (AJ)
    dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Ms.
    Sherman did not make a non-frivolous allegation that her
    resignation was involuntary. The AJ held that the lan-
    guage of the settlement agreement was unambiguous and
    that Ms. Sherman had voluntarily agreed to resign or
    retire by January 3, 2010. The AJ rejected Ms. Sherman’s
    argument that the IRS abandoned the stipulation or
    rendered it invalid by failing to promptly process her
    resignation. Furthermore, because the AJ determined
    that the Board lacked jurisdiction over Ms. Sherman’s
    appeal, he did not reach Ms. Sherman’s allegations of
    discrimination. The full Board affirmed the AJ’s decision,
    and Ms. Sherman appeals to this court.
    II.
    This court “must affirm the Board’s decision unless it
    is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or other-
    wise not in accordance with law, obtained without proce-
    dures required by rule, law, or regulation, or unsupported
    by substantial evidence.” Addison v. Dep’t of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    945 F.2d 1184
    , 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see
    also 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c) (2012).
    Ms. Sherman argues that the settlement agreement
    “relied upon by the AJ is labeled as ‘Proposed’ . . . and
    does not contain a signature of a Judge or Presiding
    Officer.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. Therefore, according to Ms.
    Sherman, there is “[n]o evidence . . . that the Stipulation
    was fully executed and final.” 
    Id.
    4                                           SHERMAN   v. MSPB
    Because the Board did not receive this argument, this
    court considers it waived. Sargent v. Dep’t of Health &
    Human Serv., 
    229 F.3d 1088
    , 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Our
    precedent clearly establishes the impropriety of seeking a
    reversal of the [B]oard’s decision on the basis of assertions
    never presented to the presiding official or to the
    [B]oard.”). Moreover, Ms. Sherman actually conceded to
    the Board that the settlement agreement was valid and
    fully executed. Appellee’s App. at 76 (“The appellant
    confirmed that she does not dispute that she signed the
    2009 stipulation and that she is not arguing that the
    stipulation is invalid . . . .”).
    Next, Ms. Sherman argues that “no credible evidence
    has been presented that Ms. Sherman’s removal was
    based on the purported settlement agreement,” and not
    based on some other reason for which the Board might
    have jurisdiction. Appellant’s Br. at 5. Although this
    argument did not appear before the Board either, it is
    unavailing. Soon after Ms. Sherman’s removal, the IRS’s
    Chief Counsel notified Ms. Sherman by letter that her
    removal was based on “the fully executed settlement
    agreement that resolved Ms. Sherman’s separation from
    the IRS.” Appellee’s App. at 43. Ms. Sherman has not
    offered any persuasive reason calling into question the
    credibility and effect of this letter.
    Ms. Sherman further argues that her removal was un-
    lawful because the “settlement agreement . . . conditions
    Ms. Sherman’s resignation on a future occurrence or lack
    of a future occurrence of a specific condition, namely, a
    failure to retire. [It] does not contain a present, definite
    and unequivocal intent by Ms. Sherman to resign her
    position in November 2011, retroactively.” Appellant’s Br.
    at 6. This argument lacks merit. A settlement agreement
    with conditions does not become invalid so long as the
    conditions are definite and unequivocal. See Hammond v.
    Dep’t of the Navy, 
    50 M.S.P.R. 174
    , 181 (1991). This court
    agrees with the AJ that “any reasonable person reading
    SHERMAN   v. MSPB                                      5
    [the settlement agreement] would understand that [Ms.
    Sherman] had agreed to resign. . . . [T]he resignation was
    conditional—it would take effect only if [Ms. Sherman]
    failed to retire by the start of the first pay period of
    2010. . . . T]here is no uncertainty as to what [Ms. Sher-
    man] meant.” Appellee’s App. at 4–5. Ms. Sherman did
    not retire, and this triggered her resignation effective
    January 3, 2010.
    III.
    Ms. Sherman’s remaining arguments have been care-
    fully considered and found unpersuasive. For the forego-
    ing reasons, the decision of the Board is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013-3015

Citation Numbers: 530 F. App'x 940

Judges: Rader, Newman, Dyk

Filed Date: 9/12/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024