Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc. ( 2012 )


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  •     NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE INC. AND GENENTECH,
    INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    APOTEX INC. AND APOTEX CORP.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    AND
    WATSON LABORATORIES, INC., WATSON
    PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
    WATSON PHARMA, INC., COBALT
    PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
    AND COBALT LABORATORIES, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    AND
    MYLAN INC., MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
    GENPHARM INC. (NOW KNOWN AS GENPHARM
    ULC), AND GENPHARM, L.P.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    __________________________
    2012-1270, -1271, -1272
    __________________________
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE   v. APOTEX                             2
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
    District of New Jersey in Nos. 07-CV-4417, 07-CV-4539,
    and 07-CV-4661, Judge Stanley R. Chesler.
    ____________________________
    Decided: October 11, 2012
    ____________________________
    MARK E. WADDELL, Loeb & Loeb LLP., of New York,
    New York, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. With him on
    the brief were WARREN K. MACRAE and JOHN M. GRIEM,
    JR. Of counsel on the brief were JONATHAN S. FRANKLIN,
    Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., of Washington, DC; and
    MICHAEL R. GRIFFINGER, DAVID E. DE LORENZI and
    SHEILA F. MCSHANE, Gibbons P.C., of Newark, New Jer-
    sey.
    DEANNE M. MAZZOCHI, Rakoczy Molino Mazzochi Si-
    wik LLP, of Chicago, Illinois, argued for all defendants-
    appellees. With her on the brief were WILLIAM A.
    RAKOCZY, TARA M. RAGHAVAN and ERIC R. HUNT for Wat-
    son Laboratories, Inc, et al. Of counsel on the brief were
    STEVEN E. FELDMAN, JAMES P. WHITE, DANIEL R. CHERRY,
    PHILIP D. SEGREST, LOUISE T. WALSH and SHERRY L.
    ROLLO, Husch Blackwell LLP, of Chicago Illinois, for
    Apotex Inc., et al; and EDGAR H. HAUG and RICHARD R.
    PARKE, Frommer Lawrence & Haugh LLP, of New York
    New York, for Maylan Inc. et al.
    __________________________
    Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit
    Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge LOURIE.
    Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN.
    3                            HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE   v. APOTEX
    LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
    Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. (“Roche”) appeals from the
    decision of the United States District Court for the Dis-
    trict of New Jersey, denying Roche’s motion for a prelimi-
    nary injunction. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex
    Inc., No. 2:07-CV-04417, 
    2012 WL 869572
     (D.N.J. Mar.
    14, 2012) (“Preliminary Injunction Order”). Because the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Roche’s request for a preliminary injunction, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    I.
    This patent appeal relates to methods of treating os-
    teoporosis in post-menopausal women. Roche owns U.S.
    Patents 7,410,957 (“the ’957 patent”) and 7,718,634 (“the
    ’634 patent”), which cover the administration of Roche’s
    osteoporosis drug, Boniva®. The ’957 patent is the parent
    patent of the ’634 patent. Both patents disclose and claim
    methods of treating osteoporosis by orally administering
    once a month a tablet that contains about 150 mg of a salt
    of ibandronic acid, which is the active ingredient in
    Boniva®. Claim 1 of the ’634 patent is representative of
    the claims on appeal:
    1. A method for treating or inhibiting
    postmenopausal osteoporosis in a
    postmenopausal woman in need of
    treatment or inhibition of post-
    menopausal osteoporosis by admini-
    stration of a pharmaceutically
    acceptable salt of ibandronic acid,
    comprising:
    (a) commencing the administration of the
    pharmaceutically acceptable salt of
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE   v. APOTEX                             4
    ibandronic acid by orally adminis-
    tering to the postmenopausal
    woman, on a single day, a first dose
    in the form of a tablet, wherein the
    tablet comprises an amount of the
    pharmaceutically acceptable salt of
    ibandronic acid that is equivalent to
    about 150 mg of ibandronic acid;
    and
    (b) continuing the administration by orally
    administering, once monthly on a
    single day, a tablet comprising an
    amount of the pharmaceutically ac-
    ceptable salt of ibandronic acid that
    is equivalent to about 150 mg of
    ibandronic acid.
    ’634 patent, col.7 ll.23–39. According to the specification,
    treating osteoporosis with orally-administered ibandro-
    nate was known in the art. 
    Id.
     col.1 ll.59–66, col.2 ll.10–
    29. However, when administered orally on a continuous
    basis, ibandronate was known to cause skin irritations
    and result in digestive tract side effects. 
    Id.
     To remedy
    those problems, the inventors discovered that a once-
    monthly dose of 150 mg, among other infrequent dosing
    regimens, was effective at treating osteoporosis in post-
    menopausal women. 
    Id.
     at col.2 ll.43–59, col.3 ll.13–24.
    In 2005, the United States Food and Drug Administration
    (“FDA”) approved once-monthly Boniva® to treat osteopo-
    rosis in post-menopausal women.
    II.
    In 2007, the Defendants submitted Abbreviated New
    Drug Applications (“ANDAs”) to the FDA for approval to
    engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of
    generic versions of once-monthly ibandronate products to
    5                             HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE   v. APOTEX
    treat osteoporosis. Thereafter, Roche sued the Defen-
    dants in the United States District Court for the District
    of New Jersey, asserting, inter alia, that the Defendants
    infringed various claims of the ’957 and ’634 patents
    under 
    35 U.S.C. § 271
    (e)(2) by submitting their ANDA
    filings.
    During the pretrial proceedings, Roche filed a motion
    for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the mo-
    tion, finding that Roche failed to establish a reasonable
    likelihood that it would prevail against the Defendants’
    obviousness challenge. In so finding, the district court
    relied on six prior art references: (1) the “Update: Biphos-
    phonates” article in the Spring 1999 issue of “Lunar
    News” (“the Lunar News article”); (2) a 1996 research
    report by Ravn et al. in the journal “Bone” (“the Ravn
    study”); (3) U.S. Patent 6,432,932 (“Daifotis”); (4) U.S.
    Patent 6,143,326 (“Möckel”); (5) a 2001 research report by
    Reiis et al. published in the “Journal of Bone and Mineral
    Research” (“the Reiis study”); and (6) U.S. Patent Applica-
    tion Publication No. 2003/0118634 (“Schofield”).
    The court issued a series of findings concerning the
    likelihood that Roche would defeat the Defendants’ obvi-
    ousness challenge. Regarding the Lunar News article, the
    court found that the article, in discussing that ibandro-
    nate can be given as an oral agent “once/month” and still
    be “quite potent” to effectively treat osteoporosis, taught
    two of the three key limitations in the asserted claims: (1)
    the oral administration of ibandronate, and (2) once-
    monthly, for the treatment of osteoporosis. Preliminary
    Injunction Order, 
    2012 WL 869572
    , at *3–4. The only
    limitation that the Lunar News article failed to disclose
    was the 150 mg dose. Id. at *4.
    The court found that the remaining references, in
    combination with the Lunar News article, showed that
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE   v. APOTEX                             6
    Roche was not likely to prevail on the merits of its in-
    fringement claim. First, the court found that the Ravn
    study concluded that daily dosing of ibandronate to post-
    menopausal women at 2.5 mg and 5 mg levels was an
    effective treatment, and noted that those two dose levels
    yield total monthly doses of 75 mg and 150 mg respec-
    tively. Id. at *4. Second, the court found that Daifotis
    taught that “a once weekly dose of ibandronate in the
    amount of 35 mg, 40 mg, or 50 mg” would have been
    “useful for inhibiting bone resorption,” and that those
    skilled in the art would have likely observed that 35 mg
    per week corresponds to 5 mg a day, similar to Ravn’s
    finding that 5 mg per day was an effective dose. Id. at
    *4–5. Third, the court found that Möckel disclosed “the
    use of oral ibandronate to treat osteoporosis, and teaches
    that a single dose of ibandronate should be in the range of
    .1 mg to 250 mg.” Id. at *5. Fourth, the district court
    found that the Reiis study disclosed that intermittent
    dosing of ibandronate with a total dose was as effective as
    continuous administration for treating osteoporosis in
    postmenopausal women. Id.
    The district court found that Schofield’s disclosure
    was “very, very close” to the patented treatment methods.
    Id. at *6. Specifically, the court found that Schofield
    expressed the “total dose concept” for treating osteoporo-
    sis, namely, that one may treat osteoporosis by adminis-
    tering a particular amount of ibandronate “as a daily
    dose, or one may administer the proportionally equivalent
    amount intermittently,” including a monthly dose that
    has an equivalent daily dose of between 5 mg and 10 mg,
    i.e., a 150 mg to 300 mg monthly dose. Id. at *5–6.
    In addition to those references, the district court con-
    sidered extensive expert testimony, including concessions
    by Roche’s technical expert. According to the district
    court, Roche’s expert made five key concessions: (1) that
    7                             HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE    v. APOTEX
    the Lunar News article provided a motivation to investi-
    gate monthly dosing with bisphosphonates such as iban-
    dronate; (2) that in the 2000–02 timeframe the art was
    trending away from daily dosing and toward longer inter-
    val dosing; (3) that, by the critical date, a skilled artisan
    would have reason to investigate treatment with monthly
    ibandronate; (4) that once one chooses a particular treat-
    ment agent and a particular dosing time interval, deter-
    mining a dose within the broad therapeutic range is a
    relatively routine matter; and (5) that, by May 2002, one
    skilled in the art would have expected that a once-
    monthly dose of 150 mg of ibandronate would have had
    some effectiveness. Id. at *6–7.
    Finally, the district court rejected Roche’s evidence of
    teaching away and secondary considerations. The court
    found that while the prior art showed there were uncer-
    tainties in the field, “the field as a whole appeared to be
    moving toward osteoporosis treatment regimens involving
    intermittent dosing,” and one-month periods between
    dosing were “well-known.” Id. at *7. Regarding Roche’s
    evidence of secondary considerations, the court found that
    Roche “had not detailed its position on secondary consid-
    erations in briefing” its motion for a preliminary injunc-
    tion and had not “substantively pointed out such
    evidence.” Id. The court also specifically considered and
    rejected Roche’s evidence of commercial success. Id. at *7
    n.6.
    In considering all the evidence presented, the district
    court found that Roche failed to prove a likelihood that it
    would successfully defend against the Defendants’ obvi-
    ousness challenge. Roche timely appealed from the
    decision, and while its appeal was pending, the district
    court concluded on summary judgment that claims 1–8 of
    the ’634 patent would have been obvious to those of skill
    in the art, relying on the prior art submitted during the
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE    v. APOTEX                              8
    motion for preliminary injunction as well as three addi-
    tional references. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex
    Inc., No. 2:07-CV-04417, 
    2012 WL 1637736
     (D.N.J. May 7,
    2012). No judgment has yet been entered on that deci-
    sion, and any such judgment will be subject to appeal. We
    thus express no opinion on the summary judgment pro-
    ceedings in the context of this appeal. We have jurisdic-
    tion over Roche’s appeal of the denial of its motion for a
    preliminary       injunction     pursuant       to      
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1292
    (a)(1) and (c)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    I.
    The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction under
    
    35 U.S.C. § 283
     lies within the sound discretion of the
    district court. Novo Nordisk of N. Am., Inc. v. Genentech,
    Inc., 
    77 F.3d 1364
    , 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Accordingly,
    when a preliminary injunction is denied, to obtain rever-
    sal the patentee must show “not only that one or more of
    the findings relied on by the district court was clearly
    erroneous, but also that denial of the injunction amounts
    to an abuse of the court’s discretion upon reversal of
    erroneous findings.” Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 
    32 F.3d 1552
    , 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
    As the moving party, Roche had to establish a right to
    a preliminary injunction in light of four factors: (1) a
    reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irrepa-
    rable harm if a preliminary injunction is not granted; (3)
    the balance of hardships tipping in its favor; and (4) the
    impact of the injunction on the public interest. Novo
    Nordisk, 
    77 F.3d at 1367
    . Regarding the likelihood of
    success on the merits, it was Roche’s burden to show, in
    light of the burdens and presumptions that will inure at
    trial, that it will likely prove infringement and that it will
    likely withstand any invalidity challenge to the patent.
    9                             HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE    v. APOTEX
    Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 
    566 F.3d 1372
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
    One ground of invalidity is obviousness. Under the
    Patent Act, “[a] patent may not be obtained . . . if the
    differences between the subject matter sought to be
    patented and the prior art are such that the subject
    matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
    the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
    in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 
    35 U.S.C. § 103
    (a). Although the ultimate determination of
    obviousness under § 103 is a question of law, it is based
    on several underlying factual findings, including (1) the
    scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary
    skill in the pertinent art; (3) the differences between the
    claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) evidence of
    secondary factors, such as commercial success, long-felt
    need, and the failure of others. Graham v. John Deere
    Co., 
    383 U.S. 1
    , 17–18 (1966).
    II.
    Roche does not take issue with the preliminary in-
    junction framework that the district court employed.
    Indeed, Roche concedes that the district court adhered
    carefully to the framework that we set forth in Titan Tire.
    
    566 F.3d at 1376
    . Instead, Roche raises two primary
    arguments directed at the district court’s obviousness
    analysis. First, Roche argues that the court erred by
    applying an “obvious to try” standard because the prior
    art taught multiple possible dosing regimens with unpre-
    dictable results. To support that argument, Roche points
    to evidence that its success was not predictable. Second,
    Roche argues that the district court erred by failing to
    consider Roche’s evidence of unexpected results.
    We disagree. Rather than apply an unsupported “ob-
    vious to try” analysis, the district court carefully evalu-
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE    v. APOTEX                             10
    ated each reference and the testimony of Roche’s expert.
    It was not clear error for the district court to find that the
    cited references disclose every claim limitation and that,
    while uncertainties remained, the field was trending
    towards intermittent dosing based on the total dosing
    concept, including a once-monthly dose of 150 mg. In-
    deed, Roche’s expert essentially conceded as much, and
    the references disclose that it was advantageous to inter-
    mittently dose ibandronate to treat osteoporosis in post-
    menopausal women, including a once-monthly dose; that
    an effective amount of the intermittent dose can be calcu-
    lated by multiplying the daily dose by the dosing period;
    and that 150 mg would be an effective once-monthly dose.
    Thus, the district court concluded that only “a finite
    number of identified, predictable solutions” existed. KSR
    Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
    550 U.S. 398
    , 421 (2007). On the
    record before it, the district court’s conclusion was not
    clear error.
    Second, Roche’s argument that the district court erred
    by failing to consider evidence of unexpected results lacks
    merit. It is true in the context of obviousness that “a
    district court must always consider any objective evidence
    of nonobviousness presented in a case.” Transocean
    Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors
    USA, Inc., 
    617 F.3d 1296
    , 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also
    In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release
    Capsule Patent Litig., 
    676 F.3d 1063
    , 1075–80 (Fed. Cir.
    2012). However, in denying Roche’s motion for a prelimi-
    nary injunction, the district court expressly found that
    Roche failed to detail its secondary considerations posi-
    tion in its briefing or “substantively point[] out such
    evidence.”     Preliminary Injunction Order, 
    2012 WL 869572
    , at *7. That finding was not clearly erroneous.
    It appears that the secondary considerations evidence
    that Roche points to on appeal was not submitted or
    11                            HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE    v. APOTEX
    mentioned as part of its motion for a preliminary injunc-
    tion. Instead, Roche attempted, in a single line near the
    end of its reply brief, to “incorporate by reference” its
    entire forty-page brief relating to a separate motion, J.A.
    21958, a brief that, among numerous arguments, con-
    tained a few conclusory sentences with citations to por-
    tions of Roche’s evidence of unexpected results. J.A.
    24834–36. “District judges are not archaeologists,” and it
    was not the court’s burden to “excavate masses of papers
    in search of revealing tidbits” to help Roche satisfy its
    burden to obtain a preliminary injunction. Nw. Nat’l Ins.
    Co. v. Baltes, 
    15 F.3d 660
    , 662–63 (7th Cir. 1994). In any
    event, a cursory review of Roche’s unexpected results
    evidence fails to show that the district court clearly erred
    in light of the references and Roche’s expert’s testimony.
    The dissent asserts that “the panel majority mounts a
    one-sided argument against patent validity” and that the
    “arguments presented by [her] colleagues were previously
    considered and rejected during patent reexamination.”
    Respectfully, the dissent appears to be sitting as a trial
    court and assumes the majority is also. But we are an
    appellate court, reviewing, not what the Patent Office
    decided, but what the district court decided.
    We are assuredly aware of the effort and cost of devel-
    oping a new drug. But we owe the district court deference
    on review of the grant or denial of a preliminary injunc-
    tion unless it abuses its discretion or makes clearly erro-
    neous findings that affected the exercise of its discretion.
    While the dissent makes its own argument for the nonob-
    viousness of the claimed invention, we do not find that the
    district court made clearly erroneous findings in its de-
    termination that Roche did not show a likelihood of suc-
    cess on the question of obviousness, referring to the record
    presented to the district court at that stage of the proceed-
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE   v. APOTEX                            12
    ings. Ultimately, we decline to find that the district court
    abused its discretion.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Roche’s remaining arguments
    and conclude that they are without merit. For the forego-
    ing reasons, the decision of the district court is
    AFFIRMED
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE INC. AND GENENTECH,
    INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    APOTEX INC. AND APOTEX CORP.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    AND
    WATSON LABORATORIES, INC., WATSON
    PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
    WATSON PHARMA, INC., COBALT
    PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
    AND COBALT LABORATORIES, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    AND
    MYLAN INC., MYLAND PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
    GENPHARM INC. (NOW KNOWN AS GENPHARM
    ULC), AND GENPHARM, L.P.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    __________________________
    2012-1270,-1271,-1272
    __________________________
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE    v. APOTEX                               2
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    District of New Jersey in Nos. 07-CV-4417, 07-CV-4539, and
    07-CV-4661, Judge Stanley R. Chesler.
    __________________________
    NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
    The only issue on this appeal is whether to preserve the
    status quo during this litigation, or whether to change it
    irretrievably. The Supreme Court has reminded us that the
    grant or denial of a preliminary injunction requires consid-
    eration of the equities as between the parties, as well as the
    probable outcome of the case upon trial. Winter v. Natural
    Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    555 U.S. 7
    , 20 (2008); eBay Inc. v.
    MercExchange, LLC, 
    547 U.S. 388
    , 391 (2006). In a case in
    which the outcome is uncertain at the preliminary stage, the
    equities may nonetheless loom large. With respect to this
    case, although the panel majority mounts a one-sided argu-
    ment against patent validity, the patent carries the pre-
    sumption of validity, and the arguments presented by my
    colleagues were previously considered and rejected during
    patent examination.
    In contrast, the equities in this case weigh on the side of
    preserving the status quo during the litigation. The pat-
    entee Roche had established, for the first time, that the
    medicament ibandronate can be effectively and safely ad-
    ministered once a month in the dosage of 150 mg, and
    conducted the panoply of biological and clinical evaluations
    needed to bring such a product to public benefit. It was
    necessary to establish not only that once-a-month admini-
    stration is effective, but also to find the effective monthly
    dosage, and to establish that this dose can safely be ingested
    all at once, without undesirable side effects. To establish
    this efficacy and safety and dosage, the proceedings for
    regulatory approval consumed millions of dollars, in three
    3                              HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE     v. APOTEX
    “phases” of clinical trials involving thousands of post-
    menopausal women, and requiring 12 years of costly effort.
    Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. 4. Roche’s successful
    product Boniva® was the result of heavy risk-laden invest-
    ment—investment for which the defendants now seek the
    benefits, having borne neither the cost, nor the risk of
    failure.
    As equitable factors, the patentee’s initiative and com-
    mitment and investment, as compared with the defendants
    who seek only the successful products of others, warrant
    appropriate weight in deciding whether the status quo
    should be preserved until the challenge to patent validity is
    decided. Economic factors are not irrelevant to the equities.
    Cf. Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo, 
    456 U.S. 305
    , 312 (1982)
    (“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of
    the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the
    necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than
    rigidity has distinguished it.” (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
    
    321 U.S. 321
    , 329 (1944))). In determining whether Roche
    must share the benefits of its efforts before expiration of the
    patent on which Roche relied in making these efforts, the
    economic equities should not be ignored.
    The district court, in considering the likelihood of out-
    come, apparently refused to consider Roche’s evidence of
    unpredictable results. The district court simply found that
    a single 150 mg once-a-month dosage of ibandronate would
    have been obvious because 150 mg is 30 times 5 mg, which
    was a daily dose disclosed in the prior art. One must won-
    der at the need for twelve years of experimental determina-
    tion of efficacy and safety, were the result as clear and
    inexorable as the judges now find.
    Roche’s expert, Dr. Anastasia Daifotis, explained that
    the oral absorption of ibandronate is non-linear for doses
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE   v. APOTEX                             4
    larger than 50 mg, testifying that “orally administered
    Boniva® resulted in similar bioavailability in amounts up to
    50 mg” but “the serum levels of ibandronate increase dis-
    proportionately if doses greater than 50 mg are adminis-
    tered.” J.A. 38127–28 ¶108. Dr. Daifotis cited data which
    show the disproportionate uptake of ibandronate into the
    blood stream for a monthly 150 mg dose over monthly 50 mg
    and 100 mg doses, and over a mixed regimen consisting of a
    50 mg first dose, followed by two monthly oral doses of 100
    mg (50/100 mg):
    J.A. 38132 ¶112 (Reginster et al., Monthly Oral Ibandronate
    Is Well Tolerated and Efficacious in Postmenopausal
    Women: Results From the Monthly Oral Pilot Study, J. Clin.
    5                              HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE    v. APOTEX
    Endocrin. Metab., Vol. 90, pp. 5018–24 (2005)). Dr. Daifotis
    explained that “[t]his was a surprising finding concerning
    the disproportionate amount of ibandronate that becomes
    available from oral administration of amounts above about
    50 mg, and it was unknown as of May 2002,” J.A. 38127–28
    ¶108. Dr. Daifotis explained that “[t]he benefit of this
    surprising result was that a patient could receive higher
    than thought possible amounts of active drug to be available
    to inhibit osteoclasts, while at the same time not adversely
    affecting the safety profile of a 150 mg dose of ibandronate,”
    J.A. 38133 ¶115.
    Dr. Daifotis stated that later clinical testing showed
    that the 150 mg dose monthly is superior to the 2.5 mg daily
    dosage of ibandronate that had been approved for the
    treatment and prevention of postmenopausal osteoporosis.
    J.A. 38133–35 ¶¶116–19. She cited clinical trial data show-
    ing that a 150 mg monthly dose of ibandronate is “superior”
    at increasing bone density in the lumbar spine of postmeno-
    pausal women, as compared to 100 mg and 50/50 mg
    monthly doses and a 2.5 mg daily dose:
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE   v. APOTEX                             6
    J.A. 38135 ¶118 (Miller et al., Monthly Oral Ibandronate
    Therapy in Postmenopausal Osteoporosis: 1-Year from the
    Mobile Study, J. Bone Miner. Res., Vol. 20, pp. 1315–22
    (2005)). This experimental evidence refutes the defendants’
    contention, apparently accepted by my colleagues, that the
    150 mg once-a-month dose was a matter of simple arithme-
    tic. The evidence was that the dosage amount and effec-
    tiveness were unexpected and unpredicted, and required
    extensive clinical testing, due to ibandronate’s unique
    pharmacokinetic and bioavailability profile in the human
    body.
    My colleagues state that the district court properly de-
    clined to consider this evidence, arguing that Roche only
    “incorporate[d] by reference” arguments from its concurrent
    summary judgment briefs. Maj. op. at 11. However, both
    parties referred the district court to their summary judg-
    7                             HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE    v. APOTEX
    ment briefs. 1 See Pls.’ Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. 8
    (“To avoid repetition, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference
    their opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judg-
    ment of obviousness.”); Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. Prelim.
    Inj. 21 (“Defendants have already addressed the matters in
    Defendants’ Obviousness Brief and will be addressing them
    further in their reply brief.”). The record states that the
    district court approved this practice. See D.Ct. op. at 6
    (“The parties reference the briefs filed in regard to a pend-
    ing motion for summary judgment that the ’634 patent is
    invalid based on obviousness.”).
    In the section of the Plaintiffs’ summary judgment brief
    entitled “Unexpected Results,” Roche discusses evidence
    that “it was unexpected that the 150 mg monthly oral dose
    of ibandronate was found superior to 2.5 mg daily ibandro-
    nate.” J.A. 24835. Of record were the reports of Roche’s
    experts Dr. Bilezikian, Dr. Daifotis, and Dr. Harris, and
    Roche explained that “each opines that, at the time of the
    inventions, a POSA would not have had any reasonable
    expectation of succeeding with a safe, effective, and well-
    tolerated once-monthly oral dosage of ibandronate in an
    amount as large as 150 mg.” J.A. 24836. At the prelimi-
    nary injunction hearing Dr. Bilezikian, Plaintiffs’ expert
    witness, corrected the Defendants’ mistaken premise that
    oral bioavailability of amino bisphosphonates is fixed,
    explaining that “there’s a huge range” based in part on
    “absorption kinetics.” J.A. 205.
    1   Apotex’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Feb. 10, 2012); Roche’s
    Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (Feb. 11, 2012); Apotex’s Resp. to Mot.
    for Prelim. Inj. (Feb. 21, 2012); Roche’s Resp. to Mot. for
    Summ. J. (Feb. 21, 2012); Apotex’s Resp. to Mot. for Summ.
    J. (Feb. 29, 2012); Roche’s Reply to Mot. for Prelim. Inj.
    (Feb. 29, 2012); Apotex’s Reply to Mot. for Summ. J. (March
    2, 2012).
    HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE    v. APOTEX                               8
    By not considering this evidence, “the district court con-
    travened this court's precedent requiring that a fact finder
    consider all evidence relating to obviousness before finding a
    patent invalid on those grounds.” In re Cyclobenzaprine
    Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 
    676 F.3d 1063
    , 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    In view of the presumption of validity, 
    35 U.S.C. § 282
    ,
    “an alleged infringer who raises invalidity as an affirmative
    defense has the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove
    invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, as well as the
    initial burden of going forward with evidence to support its
    invalidity allegation.” Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Hol-
    land, Inc., 
    566 F.3d 1372
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Tech.
    Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 
    545 F.3d 1316
    , 1327 (Fed.
    Cir.2008)). “If the trial court determines that the chal-
    lenger's evidence is sufficient to raise ‘a substantial ques-
    tion’ of invalidity, the trial court must then afford the
    patentee the opportunity to show that the invalidity defense
    ‘lacks substantial merit.’” Titan Tire, 
    545 F.3d at 1378
    .
    Such evidence must be considered, whether the issue is of
    likelihood or of finality. See Cyclobenzaprine, 676 F.3d at
    1078 (all evidence relevant to obviousness or nonobvious-
    ness must be considered).
    Moreover, it is harder for the party asserting invalidity
    to meet its burden “when . . . the infringer attempts to rely
    on prior art that was before the patent examiner during
    prosecution.” Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 
    376 F.3d 1339
    , 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). In this
    case, all of the references considered by the district court
    were previously considered by the PTO and rejected. See
    D.Ct. op. at 16 (“Weighing in favor of Plaintiffs is the undis-
    puted fact that all of the prior art brought forward by De-
    fendants on this motion was before the examiner during
    prosecution of the patents.”). Thus the finding that the
    9                              HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE     v. APOTEX
    examiner considered and rejected the asserted prior art
    weighs strongly against a preliminary finding that the
    patented subject matter is likely to be ruled obvious as a
    matter of law.
    Although the issue at this stage is solely that of likeli-
    hood, the panel majority opinion recites only the evidence
    that weighs on the side of invalidity, ignoring the contrary
    evidence, and discarding the effect of the burden of proof.
    No mention is made of the equities that apply at the pre-
    liminary injunction stage. When the equities are consid-
    ered, and on an objective view of the facts of patent validity,
    the fair and just action is to preserve the status quo during
    the litigation. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
    Ltd., 
    678 F.3d 1314
     (Fed. Cir. 2012) (in determining
    whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the court must
    consider the equitable factors of hardship and public inter-
    est along with the likelihood that the patent is invalid).
    From my colleagues’ unbalanced analysis of the issue of
    obviousness, and their failure to consider the equitable
    factors that weigh heavily for preserving the status quo
    during the litigation, I respectfully dissent.