Baney v. Merit Systems Protection Board ( 2011 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    JOHN-PIERRE BANEY,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent,
    and
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Intervenor.
    __________________________
    2010-3097
    __________________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in Case No. DA1221090479-W-1.
    ____________________________
    Decided: January 19, 2011
    ____________________________
    JOHN-PIERRE BANEY, Seagoville, Texas, pro se.
    STEPHANIE M. CONLEY, Attorney, Office of General
    Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington,
    DC, for respondent. With her on the brief were JAMES M.
    BANEY   v. MSPB                                           2
    EISENMAN, General Counsel, and KEISHA DAWN BELL,
    Deputy General Counsel.
    COURTNEY S. MCNAMARA, Trial Attorney, Commercial
    Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Depart-
    ment of Justice, of Washington, DC, for intervenor. With
    her on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney
    General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and FRANKLIN E.
    WHITE, JR., Assistant Director.
    __________________________
    Before LOURIE, LINN, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    John-Pierre Baney appeals from the final decision of
    the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) dis-
    missing for lack of jurisdiction his Individual Right of
    Action (“IRA”) appeal under the Whistleblower Protection
    Act of 1989 (“WPA”), 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8). Baney v. Dept.
    of Justice, No. DA-1221-09-0479-W-1 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 18,
    2009) (“Initial Decision”), (M.S.P.B. Jan. 10, 2010) (“Final
    Order”). Because we conclude that Baney failed to meet
    his jurisdictional burden, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Baney is employed as a cook supervisor for the De-
    partment of Justice (“DOJ”), Federal Bureau of Prisons
    (“BOP”) in Seagoville, Texas. On May 12, 2009, Baney
    filed an IRA appeal with the Board alleging that he had
    been retaliated against for engaging in whistleblowing
    activities. Specifically, Baney alleged that his life had
    been threatened in retaliation for his participation in an
    earlier Board appeal. On May 18, 2009, the Board issued
    an order notifying Baney that a threat to his life is not an
    action appealable to the Board. The order also informed
    3                                              BANEY   v. MSPB
    Baney that to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an
    IRA appeal, he needed to show that he had exhausted his
    administrative remedies before the Office of Special
    Counsel (“OSC”) and make nonfrivolous allegations that
    (1) he engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a
    protected disclosure; and (2) his disclosure was a contrib-
    uting factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take
    a personnel action.
    In response to the Board’s order, Baney submitted a
    letter dated June 2, 2009, and several documents, none of
    which identified any protected disclosure or any personnel
    action taken against him. One document, a letter from
    the OSC dated April 8, 2009, indicated that the OSC was
    closing its inquiry into Baney’s whistleblowing complaint
    against the BOP because Baney had confirmed that no
    relevant personnel action had been taken against him by
    the agency and thus the OSC had no cause of action to
    pursue on his behalf. Another letter from the OSC, dated
    April 23, 2009, indicated that Baney’s file had been
    closed.
    The Board, on July 13, 2009, issued a second, more
    detailed jurisdictional order. The order included a list of
    specific information items Baney needed to submit to
    establish the Board’s jurisdiction over his IRA appeal.
    Baney responded with a motion for an extension of time,
    along with copies of orders issued in another appeal in
    which he alleged retaliation for his military service under
    the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
    Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 
    38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333
    .
    The Board granted the motion for an extension of time
    and once again notified Baney that he had not provided
    the necessary information to establish the Board’s juris-
    diction over his IRA appeal. In response, Baney filed a
    motion to request a formal hearing. The motion included
    BANEY   v. MSPB                                            4
    a list of forty witnesses to whom Baney claimed to have
    made a protected disclosure, but it failed either to identify
    the disclosure or to identify any personnel action taken
    against him by the BOP in retaliation for the disclosure.
    In an initial decision on August 18, 2009, the Board
    dismissed Baney’s IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    Initial Decision at 1. The Board found that although
    Baney had exhausted his administrative remedies at the
    OSC, he had failed to describe any protected disclosure he
    allegedly made, failed to provide any details on the al-
    leged threat on his life, and failed to identify any person-
    nel action that the DOJ took, did not take, or threatened
    to take or not take in response to his alleged disclosure.
    
    Id. at 3-4
    . Accordingly, the Board concluded that Baney
    had failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he was
    subject to a personnel action in retaliation for protected
    activity, and thus had failed to establish the Board’s
    jurisdiction. 
    Id. at 4
    . On January 12, 2010, the Board
    denied Baney’s petition for review, rendering the dis-
    missal of his IRA appeal final. Final Decision at 2.
    Baney timely appealed to this court. We have juris-
    diction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9) and 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (b)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    This court reviews a determination by the Board that
    it lacks jurisdiction de novo. Delalat v. Dep’t of Air Force,
    
    557 F.3d 1342
    , 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Baney, as appellant
    below, bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a
    preponderance of the evidence. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.56
    (a)(2)(i);
    Delalat, 
    557 F.3d at 1343
    . In this case, the Board has
    jurisdiction over Baney’s IRA appeal only if he has made a
    nonfrivolous allegation that (1) he engaged in whistle-
    5                                              BANEY   v. MSPB
    blowing activity by making a protected disclosure under 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(8); and (2) the disclosure was a contrib-
    uting factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take
    a personnel action as defined by 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (a). See
    Yunus v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
    242 F.3d 1367
    , 1371
    (Fed. Cir. 2001). Whether an appellant has made a
    nonfrivolous allegation is determined on the basis of the
    written record, without a jurisdictional hearing. Spencer
    v. Dep’t of Navy, 
    327 F.3d 1354
    , 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    Baney argues nothing on appeal that establishes that
    the Board erred in dismissing his IRA appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction. Baney first argues that the Board failed to
    take into account the fact that he has been in the Coast
    Guard Reserve for nineteen years while working for the
    DOJ, and that he has been working for the BOP for
    twenty-three years. The government responds, and we
    agree, that these facts, even if true, have no bearing on
    the issue of the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal.
    As the Board repeatedly informed Baney, he was required
    to make a nonfrivolous allegation regarding a protected
    disclosure and a personnel action taken by the DOJ in
    retaliation. That he has served in the Coast Guard Re-
    serve while working of the DOJ or that he has been
    employed at the BOP fails to allege either a protected
    disclosure or a personnel action overlooked by the Board.
    Baney also argues that the Board (1) applied the
    wrong law, listing the Whistleblower Act, USERRA Law,
    Due Process, and the No Fear Act; and (2) failed to con-
    sider as other important grounds of relief discrimination,
    anti-discrimination and retaliation, defamation of charac-
    ter, workplace violence, adverse action, and reprisal.
    Also, according to Baney, the Board’s decision was wrong
    for conflict of interest, intimidation, coercion, and perjury.
    The government responds, and we again agree, that the
    BANEY   v. MSPB                                            6
    Board correctly applied the WPA to the issue of the
    Board’s jurisdiction, requiring Baney to make a nonfrivo-
    lous allegation that (1) he engaged in whistleblowing
    activity by making a protected disclosure, and (2) the
    disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s deci-
    sion to take or fail to take a personnel action. See Yunus,
    
    242 F.3d at 1371
    . When Baney failed to identify any
    protected disclosure made by him and any personnel
    action taken by the DOJ in retaliation, he failed to make
    the requisite jurisdictional showing under the WPA.
    Regarding the other laws, grounds for relief, and er-
    rors Baney suggests the Board made, Baney fails to
    explain their relevance either to the jurisdictional issue or
    to the Board’s decision. Baney failed to adequately raise
    any issue other than retaliation for whistleblowing before
    the Board, and thus they have been waived. Moreover,
    once the Board determined that Baney had failed to
    establish jurisdiction, the Board lacked jurisdiction to
    take any further action in this case. Baney’s unexplained
    lists of laws, grounds of relief, and errors provide no basis
    for a different result. Accordingly, we affirm the final
    order of the Board dismissing Baney’s IRA appeal for lack
    of jurisdiction.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2010-3097

Judges: Lourie, Linn, Dyk

Filed Date: 1/19/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024