Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States , 845 F.3d 1158 ( 2017 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellant
    ______________________
    2015-2076
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of International
    Trade in No. 1:11-cv-00266-TCS, Chief Judge Timothy C.
    Stanceu.
    ______________________
    Decided: January 9, 2017
    ______________________
    ALEXANDER SCHAEFER, Crowell & Moring, LLP, Wash-
    ington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represent-
    ed by JOHN BOWERS BREW, DAVID COOPER WOLFF;
    FRANCES PIERSON HADFIELD, New York, NY.
    AIMEE LEE, Appellate Section, International Trade
    Litigation, United States Department of Justice, New
    York, NY, argued for defendant-appellant. Also repre-
    sented by AMY M. RUBIN, Commercial Litigation Branch,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, New
    York, NY; JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, BENJAMIN C. MIZER,
    Washington, DC; MICHAEL W. HEYDRICH, EDWARD N.
    2              SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES
    MAURER, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, United States
    Customs and Border Protection, New York, NY.
    ______________________
    Before O’MALLEY, WALLACH, and TARANTO, Circuit Judg-
    es.
    WALLACH, Circuit Judge.
    The instant appeal concerns the proper classification
    of bauxite proppants imported by Appellee Schlumberger
    Technology Corporation (“Schlumberger”) in 2010. U.S.
    Customs & Border Protection (“Customs”) classified the
    subject merchandise under Subheading 6909.19.50 of the
    Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
    (“HTSUS”). 1 Schlumberger appealed Customs’s classifi-
    cation to the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”).
    The CIT rejected Customs’s classification and, instead,
    entered summary judgment that the subject merchandise
    should enter under HTSUS 2606.00.00. Schlumberger
    Tech. Corp. v. United States, 
    91 F. Supp. 3d 1304
    , 1324
    (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015).
    Appellant, the United States (“Government”), appeals.
    We possess subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(5) (2012). We affirm the CIT.
    BACKGROUND
    The parties do not dispute the facts material to the
    resolution of the classification question before us. We
    discuss in turn the facts relevant to the subject merchan-
    dise, Customs’s classification, and the CIT’s decision
    before turning to the merits.
    1   “All citations to the HTSUS refer to the 20[10]
    version, as determined by the date of importation of the
    merchandise.” LeMans Corp. v. United States, 
    660 F.3d 1311
    , 1314 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
    SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES                3
    I. The Subject Merchandise
    Schlumberger, an oil well services provider, J.A. 119,
    imported the subject bauxite proppants from the People’s
    Republic of China, J.A. 1729. Schlumberger used the
    subject merchandise in hydraulic fracturing services that
    it provided to customers in the United States. J.A. 126.
    The subject merchandise, when combined with other
    materials after importation, increased oil well productivi-
    ty by preventing fractures in rock formations from closing.
    J.A. 126, 129, 281.
    The subject bauxite proppants consisted of two mod-
    els: “S580-2040 Ceramic Proppant[s]” (“2040 Proppants”)
    and “S580-4070 Ceramic Proppant[s]” (“4070 Proppants”).
    J.A. 119–20. “S580” referred to the designation used by
    Schlumberger for bauxite proppants produced by a specif-
    ic third-party supplier, J.A. 125, and “2040” and “4070”
    referred to the “size of sieves through which the prop-
    pants can fit,” J.A. 123. Each model primarily consisted
    of “non-metallurgical bauxite,” 2 but the precise chemical
    composition of the merchandise is unknown because
    neither party retained a sample of the merchandise.
    J.A. 1729; see J.A. 498–510. Each model measured less
    than a millimeter in diameter and possessed specific
    physical characteristics with associated values for crush
    resistance (i.e., strength), specific density, roundness, and
    sphericity. J.A. 122–23.
    2  “Bauxite” refers to “an impure mixture of earthy
    hydrous aluminum oxides and hydroxides that commonly
    contains similar compounds of iron and occas[ionally] of
    manganese . . . and is the principal source of aluminum
    used in commerce and industry.” Bauxite, Webster’s
    Third New International Dictionary of the English Lan-
    guage Unabridged (1986) (“Webster’s”); J.A. 467 (similar).
    4               SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.    v. UNITED STATES
    The production of the subject merchandise involved
    the following steps. First, “[t]he raw materials of the
    subject proppants were milled or ground to a fine pow-
    der.” J.A. 126. Second, the resulting powder underwent a
    granulation process in a pan granulator, which resulted in
    “larger sized particles from the milled particles.”
    J.A. 124. Third, “the particles [were] sorted” to determine
    whether they met the required size specifications and, if
    so, the particles were dried. J.A. 124–25. Fourth, the
    particles that fell within the required size specifications
    were kiln fired. J.A. 125. Fifth, after firing, the particles
    were sorted anew to ensure that ninety percent of them
    fell within the required size specifications. J.A. 125.
    Finally, the particles that met the previous steps were
    packed in bulk in 3,200 pound bags and exported to the
    United States as the subject bauxite proppants. J.A. 125.
    II. Procedural History
    Customs classified the subject bauxite proppants un-
    der HTSUS 6909.19.50 at a duty rate of four percent ad
    valorem. J.A. 120–21. The subheading selected by Cus-
    toms covers “Ceramic wares for laboratory, chemical, or
    other technical uses; ceramic troughs, tubs and similar
    receptacles of a kind used in agriculture; ceramic pots,
    jars and similar articles of a kind used for the conveyance
    or packing of goods: Other: Other.” HTSUS 6909.19.50.
    Schlumberger contested the classification in separate
    protests, 3 arguing that the subject merchandise should
    enter duty free under HTSUS 2606.00.0060 as “Alumi-
    num ores and concentrates: Bauxite, calcined: Other.”
    J.A. 109–10; see J.A. 162, 194. Customs denied the pro-
    3  A party may protest Customs’s classification of
    merchandise under 
    19 U.S.C. § 1514
    (a)(2) (2006). The
    party may appeal Customs’s denial of the protest to the
    CIT. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1581
    (a).
    SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES                5
    tests, and Schlumberger appealed to the CIT. J.A. 107–
    12.
    Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the
    CIT rejected Customs’s classification and entered sum-
    mary judgment that the subject bauxite proppants should
    enter under HTSUS 2606.00.00. See Schlumberger, 91 F.
    Supp. 3d at 1323–24. In relevant part, the CIT reasoned
    that the applicable interpretive rules “preclude[d]” classi-
    fying the subject merchandise under HTSUS 6909.19.50
    “because the proppants are not ‘ceramic wares’ within the
    intended meaning of that term as used in [H]eading
    6909.” Id. at 1323. The CIT also found that the Govern-
    ment’s “alternate classification” under Subheading
    6914.90.80 “is incorrect because [H]eading 6914 . . . is
    confined to ‘ceramic articles’ rather than substances such
    as the proppants at issue.” Id. at 1323−24; see HTSUS
    6914.90.80 (covering “Other ceramic articles: Other:
    Other”). Having found these provisions inapplicable, the
    CIT concluded that the subject merchandise should enter
    under HTSUS 2606.00.00 based on Heading 2606’s terms,
    guidance provided in the notes accompanying HTSUS
    Chapter 26 and in other sources, and the undisputed
    material facts. See Schlumberger, 91 F. Supp. 3d at
    1316–22.
    DISCUSSION
    I. Standard of Review
    We review de novo the CIT’s decision to grant sum-
    mary judgment and apply anew the standard used by the
    CIT to assess the subject Customs classification. See
    Otter Prods., LLC v. United States, 
    834 F.3d 1369
    , 1374–
    75 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Although we review the decision[] of
    the CIT de novo, we give great weight to the informed
    opinion of the CIT . . . and it is nearly always the starting
    point of our analysis.” Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v. United
    States, 
    810 F.3d 1333
    , 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal
    quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). The
    6              SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES
    CIT “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
    that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
    and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.” U.S. CIT R. 56(a) (2015).
    The classification of merchandise involves a two-step
    inquiry. See LeMans, 
    660 F.3d at 1315
    . We first ascer-
    tain the meaning of the terms within the relevant tariff
    provision and then determine whether the subject mer-
    chandise fits within those terms.          See Sigma-Tau
    HealthSci., Inc. v. United States, 
    838 F.3d 1272
    , 1276
    (Fed. Cir. 2016). The first step presents a question of law
    that we review de novo, whereas the second involves an
    issue of fact that we review for clear error. 
    Id.
     When, as
    here, no genuine dispute exists as to the nature of the
    subject merchandise, the two-step inquiry “collapses into
    a question of law [that] we review de novo.” LeMans, 
    660 F.3d at 1315
     (citation omitted).
    II. The CIT Properly Classified the Subject Merchandise
    The Government contests the CIT’s decision to classi-
    fy the subject bauxite proppants under HTSUS
    2606.00.00, arguing that the merchandise instead falls
    within the terms of HTSUS 6909.19.50 or, alternatively,
    HTSUS 6914.90.80. See Appellant’s Br. 17–35. The
    Government also contends that the subject merchandise
    does not meet the terms of HTSUS 2606.00.00. 
    Id.
     at 35–
    43. After discussing the applicable legal framework, we
    address these arguments in turn.
    A. Legal Framework
    The HTSUS governs the classification of merchandise
    imported into the United States. See Wilton Indus., Inc.
    v. United States, 
    741 F.3d 1263
    , 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
    The HTSUS “shall be considered to be statutory provi-
    sions of law for all purposes.”              
    19 U.S.C. § 3004
    (c)(1).
    SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES                7
    “The HTSUS scheme is organized by headings, each of
    which has one or more subheadings; the headings set
    forth general categories of merchandise, and the subhead-
    ings provide a more particularized segregation of the
    goods within each category.” 4 Wilton Indus., 741 F.3d at
    1266. “[T]he headings and subheadings . . . are enumer-
    ated in chapters 1 through 99 of the HTSUS (each of
    which has its own section and chapter notes) . . . .” R.T.
    Foods, Inc. v. United States, 
    757 F.3d 1349
    , 1353 (Fed.
    Cir. 2014) (footnote and citation omitted). The HTSUS
    “also contains the ‘General Notes,’ the ‘General Rules of
    Interpretation’ (‘GRI’), the ‘Additional [U.S.] Rules of
    Interpretation’ (‘ARI’),[5] and various appendices for
    particular categories of goods.” 
    Id.
     (footnote and citation
    omitted).
    The GRI and the ARI govern the classification of
    goods within the HTSUS. See Otter Prods., 834 F.3d at
    1375. The GRI apply in numerical order, meaning that
    subsequent rules are inapplicable if a preceding rule
    provides proper classification. See Mita Copystar Am. v.
    United States, 
    160 F.3d 710
    , 712 (Fed. Cir. 1998). GRI 1
    provides, in relevant part, that “classification shall be
    determined according to the terms of the [HTSUS] head-
    ings and any relative section or chapter notes . . . .” GRI 1
    (emphasis added). Under GRI 1, “a court first construes
    the language of the heading, and any section or chapter
    notes in question, to determine whether the product at
    issue is classifiable under the heading.” Orlando Food
    4   The first four digits of an HTSUS provision consti-
    tute the heading, whereas the remaining digits reflect
    subheadings.
    5   The ARI contain specific rules for use and textile
    provisions in the HTSUS. See ARI 1(a)–(d). Because the
    appeal involves eo nomine provisions, we find the ARI
    inapplicable. See infra Section II.B.
    8               SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES
    Corp. v. United States, 
    140 F.3d 1437
    , 1440 (Fed. Cir.
    1998). “[T]he possible headings are to be evaluated
    without reference to their subheadings, which cannot be
    used to expand the scope of their respective headings.”
    R.T. Foods, 757 F.3d at 1353 (citations omitted). “Absent
    contrary legislative intent, HTSUS terms are to be con-
    strued according to their common and commercial mean-
    ings, which are presumed to be the same.” Carl Zeiss,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    195 F.3d 1375
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
    (citation omitted). “To discern the common meaning of a
    tariff term, we may consult dictionaries, scientific author-
    ities, and other reliable information sources.” Kahrs Int’l,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    713 F.3d 640
    , 644 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
    (citation omitted).
    “After consulting the headings and relevant section or
    chapter notes” consistent with GRI 1, we may consider the
    Explanatory Notes (“EN”) attendant to the relevant
    HTSUS headings. 6 Fuji Am. Corp. v. United States, 
    519 F.3d 1355
    , 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The
    EN provide persuasive guidance and “are generally indic-
    ative of the proper interpretation,” though they do not
    constitute binding authority. Kahrs, 713 F.3d at 645
    (citations omitted).
    B. The Subject Merchandise Does Not Fall Within the
    Terms of Heading 6909 or 6914
    According to the Government, the subject merchan-
    dise constitutes “ceramic wares” under Heading 6909 or,
    6  The World Customs Organization publishes the
    EN as its “official interpretation of the Harmonized
    Commodity Description and Coding System,” the “global
    system of trade nomenclature on which the HTSUS is
    based.” Kahrs, 713 F.3d at 644 n.2; Michael Simon De-
    sign, Inc. v. United States, 33 Ct. Int’l Trade 1003, 1004–
    05 (2009) (discussing the HTSUS’s historical backdrop).
    SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES              9
    alternatively, “other ceramic articles” under Heading
    6914. See Appellant’s Br. 21–35. The CIT disagreed. See
    Schlumberger, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 1310–16. We agree with
    the CIT.
    We first must assess whether the subject Headings
    constitute eo nomine or use provisions because different
    rules and analysis will apply depending upon the heading
    type. Compare Kahrs, 713 F.3d at 645–46 (eo nomine
    analysis), with Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States, 
    671 F.3d 1310
    , 1312−16 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (principal use analy-
    sis). An eo nomine provision “describes an article by a
    specific name,” whereas a use provision describes articles
    according to their principal or actual use. Aromont, 671
    F.3d at 1312 (citation omitted); see id. at 1313. Heading
    6909 covers “Ceramic wares for laboratory, chemical, or
    other technical uses; ceramic troughs, tubs and similar
    receptacles of a kind used in agriculture; ceramic pots,
    jars and similar articles of a kind used for the conveyance
    or packing of goods.” Although Heading 6909 recites the
    use of ceramic products for certain purposes, the operative
    question here asks whether the subject merchandise
    constitutes a “ceramic ware” under the Heading’s terms.
    As a result, we treat the Heading as eo nomine. See
    Sigma-Tau, 838 F.3d at 1278 (treating an HTSUS provi-
    sion as eo nomine, despite the provision disclosing certain
    uses, when the interpretation centered on the terms
    describing an article by a specific name). Heading 6914,
    which recites “Other ceramic articles,” is unquestionably
    eo nomine because it describes the articles it covers by
    name. See Aromont, 671 F.3d at 1312. Because the
    subject Headings are eo nomine, our analysis starts with
    their terms. See R.T. Foods, 757 F.3d at 1354.
    Neither the HTSUS nor the applicable legislative his-
    tory defines “ceramic wares” under Heading 6909 or
    “other ceramic articles” under Heading 6914. However,
    the notes accompanying HTSUS Chapter 69 inform our
    construction of the subject Headings. Note 1 to HTSUS
    10              SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES
    Chapter 69 explains that the Chapter’s provisions, includ-
    ing Heading 6909 and Heading 6914, “appl[y] only to
    ceramic products which have been fired after shaping.”
    HTSUS 69, Note 1. The Note does not define “shaping,”
    so we look to the dictionary to understand its common
    meaning. See Sigma-Tau, 838 F.3d at 1279. The infini-
    tive form of the verb “shape” means “to give a particular
    or proper form to by or as if by molding or modeling from
    an undifferentiated mass” or “to give definite or finished
    shape to . . . .” Shape, Webster’s (emphases added). 7
    The Government contends that the granulation pro-
    cess provides the requisite shape to the subject merchan-
    dise. Appellant’s Br. 23−25. The undisputed facts show
    that it does not. As the CIT observed,
    [w]hen the granules emerge from th[e] granula-
    tion process, they range so substantially in size
    that sieving is necessary to eliminate granules
    that do not fall within the desired size range.
    Even after the proppants are sieved so that 90% of
    the proppants fall within the desired size range,
    each of the two ranges characterizing the subject
    merchandise still permits 100% variation in size.
    Schlumberger, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 1313 (citing J.A. 123–25)
    (internal citations omitted). The Government does not
    contest the CIT’s observations. See generally Appellant’s
    Br. Indeed, an industry authority submitted by the
    Government corroborates the CIT’s observations.
    J.A. 480 (listing “Granulation” as a step that occurs prior
    7  The EN to Chapter 69 provide substantively simi-
    lar guidance, explaining in relevant part that “[t]he
    manufacturing process of the ceramic products” classifia-
    ble under Chapter 69 include a “[s]haping” step whereby
    the material “is . . . shaped as nearly as possible to the
    desired form.” EN 69, General (emphasis added).
    SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES              11
    to “Forming”). Thus, because the subject merchandise’s
    size varied to such a significant degree after the granula-
    tion process, the undisputed facts counsel against finding
    that the merchandise possessed the requisite definite
    shape following the granulation process. Possessing some
    shape does not equate to the definite shape required to
    enter under HTSUS Chapter 69, and a “desired form”
    cannot be any form at all since it would be impossible to
    shape something “as nearly as possible” to an indefinite
    standard.
    The principle of noscitur a sociis confirms our conclu-
    sion that the subject bauxite proppants do not fall within
    the terms of either Heading 6909 or Heading 6914. That
    principle teaches “a word is known by the company it
    keeps,” which “avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning
    so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying
    words.” Yates v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 1074
    , 1085
    (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
    Bilski v. Kappos, 
    561 U.S. 593
    , 604 (2010) (“[A]n ambigu-
    ous term may be given more precise content by the neigh-
    boring words with which it is associated.” (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Jewelpak
    Corp. v. United States, 
    297 F.3d 1326
    , 1331, 1337 (Fed.
    Cir. 2002) (affirming the use of noscitur a sociis to inter-
    pret an HTSUS provision). 8 Heading 6909 covers “Ce-
    ramic wares for laboratory, chemical, or other technical
    8     A canon related to noscitur a sociis, ejusdem gene-
    ris, instructs that “where general words follow an enu-
    meration of specific items, the general words are read as
    applying only to other items akin to those specifically
    enumerated.” Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 
    446 U.S. 578
    ,
    588 (1980). We also have relied upon the principle of
    ejusdem generis when interpreting HTSUS provisions.
    See, e.g., Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC v. United States,
    
    769 F.3d 1102
    , 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
    12              SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES
    uses; ceramic troughs, tubs and similar receptacles of a
    kind used in agriculture; ceramic pots, jars and similar
    articles of a kind used for the conveyance or packing of
    goods.” The EN provide that Heading 6909 “covers a
    range of very varied articles,” such as “crucibles and
    crucible lids,” “mortars and pestles,” “beakers,” “contain-
    ers with single or double walls,” “[c]ontainers of the kinds
    used for the commercial transport or packing of goods,”
    and “[t]roughs, tubs and similar containers of the type
    used in agriculture.” EN 69.09. The listed “wares” and
    “articles” concern individual products with definite forms.
    See id.; see also EN 69, General (requiring products
    imported under HTSUS Chapter 69 to be “shaped as
    nearly as possible to the desired form”). As explained
    above, the subject merchandise does not possess a definite
    form. J.A. 125–26. Because the subject merchandise does
    not have a definite form, it cannot fall within that Head-
    ing’s terms. See Yates, 
    135 S. Ct. at 1085
    .
    The inclusion of “grinding apparatus and balls, etc.,
    for grinding mills” in the EN accompanying Heading 6909
    does not require a different conclusion. But see Appel-
    lant’s Br. 30–31. The Government has not provided any
    evidence demonstrating that the subject bauxite prop-
    pants and “grinding apparatus and balls” vary in shape to
    a similar degree, such that the subject proppants similar-
    ly should fall within Heading 6909. The Government’s
    speculation cannot prevent the entry of summary judg-
    ment against it. See First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities
    Serv. Co., 
    391 U.S. 253
    , 290 (1968) (finding entry of
    summary judgment appropriate because of “the absence of
    any significant probative evidence” in support of a claim).
    Finally, an examination of the EN accompanying
    Heading 6914 yields the conclusion that the subject
    bauxite proppants do not fall within that Heading’s terms.
    Heading 6914 covers “Other ceramic articles.” The EN
    explain that Heading 6914 covers, inter alia, “[s]toves and
    other heating apparatus,” “non-decorative flower pots,”
    SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES              13
    “fittings for doors, windows, etc.,” “[l]etters, numbers,
    sign-plates and similar motifs for shop signs and shop
    windows,” ceramic “[s]pring lever stoppers,” “jars and
    containers for laboratories,” and “other articles such as
    knife handles, school inkwells, humidifiers for radiators[,]
    and bird cage accessories.” EN 69.14. The listed exam-
    ples concern individual products shaped into definite
    forms. See id.; see also EN 69, General (requiring prod-
    ucts imported under HTSUS Chapter 69 to be “shaped as
    nearly as possible to the desired form”). Unlike the
    examples provided in the EN, the subject proppants are
    bulk substances that lack a definite form. J.A. 125–26.
    Because the subject proppants do not possess the requi-
    site definite form like the products listed in Heading
    6914, they cannot fall within that Heading’s terms. See
    Yates, 
    135 S. Ct. at 1085
    .
    C. The Subject Merchandise Falls Within the Terms of
    Heading 2606
    Having found the subject bauxite proppants outside
    the terms of Heading 6909 and Heading 6914, we next
    examine Heading 2606. The Government argues that the
    CIT erred by finding the subject merchandise classifiable
    under that Heading. Appellant’s Br. 35–43. We disagree.
    Heading 2606 covers “Aluminum ores and concen-
    trates.” The provision is eo nomine because it describes
    the merchandise it covers by name. See Aromont, 671
    F.3d at 1312. Neither the HTSUS nor the applicable
    legislative history defines “aluminum ore” under Heading
    2606. The notes accompanying HTSUS Chapter 26
    inform our construction of the subject Heading, providing
    two criteria. First, Note 2 to HTSUS Chapter 26 explains
    that “the term ‘ores’ means minerals of mineralogical
    species actually used in the metallurgical industry for the
    extraction of” certain metals, “even if they are intended
    for nonmetallurgical purposes.” HTSUS 26, Note 2.
    Second, the Note states that HTSUS 2606 does not “in-
    14             SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES
    clude minerals which have been submitted to processes
    not normal to the metallurgical industry.” Id.
    The subject bauxite proppants meet each criterion.
    With respect to the first, the subject merchandise contains
    a mineral of a mineralogical species used in the metallur-
    gical industry for the extraction of a particular metal. EN
    26.06 provides that Heading 2606 “covers bauxite (hy-
    drated aluminum oxide containing variable proportions of
    iron oxide, silica, etc.).” The parties agree that “[t]he
    subject proppants are produced from non-metallurgical
    grade bauxite,” meaning that the subject proppants
    contain the requisite mineral of a mineralogical species.
    J.A. 1729. Moreover, the undisputed facts demonstrate
    that the industry uses bauxite in the extraction of alumi-
    num. J.A. 121 (“Metallurgical grade bauxite is used in
    the metallurgical industry for the extraction of alumi-
    num.”), 1729 (discussing the “commercial extraction of
    aluminum metal from bauxite”).
    The Government counters that the subject merchan-
    dise cannot meet the first criterion because Schlumberger
    used the subject merchandise “only for hydraulic fractur-
    ing” and not the extraction of a particular metal. Appel-
    lant’s Br. 37. However, the Government overlooks a
    relevant passage of Note 2 to HTSUS Chapter 26, which
    explains that the Chapter covers ores “even if they are
    intended for non-metallurgical purposes,” so long as the
    industry uses the ores for the extraction of metal. HTSUS
    26, Note 2. As stated above, it is undisputed that the
    industry uses bauxite to extract aluminum. J.A. 121,
    1729.
    Because the subject bauxite proppants satisfy the first
    criterion articulated in Note 2 to HTSUS Chapter 26, we
    turn to the second to determine whether the subject
    merchandise underwent processes not normal to the
    metallurgical industry. Neither the HTSUS nor the
    applicable section and chapter notes provide guidance as
    SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES            15
    to what constitutes a “normal” process in the metallurgi-
    cal industry. However, the EN to Chapter 26 state that
    aluminum ore classifiable under Heading 2606 may
    undergo, inter alia, “crushing,” “grinding,” “screening,”
    “agglomeration of powders . . . into grains, balls or bri-
    quettes,” and “drying.” EN 26, General. As stated above,
    the subject bauxite proppants underwent these very steps
    during the production process. J.A. 124–25. Thus, the
    CIT properly concluded that these processes “must be
    considered normal to the metallurgical industry and not
    the sort of processing that would cause exclusion from
    [C]hapter 26 by operation of [N]ote 2 to [C]hapter 26,
    HTSUS.” Schlumberger, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 1318.
    The Government contends that the CIT improperly
    found the processes normal to the metallurgical industry
    despite the fact that the processes were “not for the pur-
    pose of preparing the proppants for the extraction of
    metal.” Appellant’s Br. 42. Note 2 to HTSUS Chapter 26
    provides only that the minerals may not be submitted to
    processes other than those normal to the metallurgical
    industry; it does not require that any processing be un-
    dertaken “for the purpose” of extracting metal. HTSUS
    26, Note 2. Indeed, the Note expressly contemplates that
    a product imported under the Chapter can be “intended
    for non-metallurgical purposes.” Id.
    The Government contends further that dopants were
    added to the bauxite powder during the proppant manu-
    facturing process and that the addition of dopants is not
    normal to the metallurgical industry. 9 Appellant’s Br.
    37–40. As a result, the Government contends that the
    9    The noun “dopant” means “an impurity added
    usually in minute amounts to a pure substance to alter its
    properties.” J.A. 79. The identity of the dopants remains
    proprietary. Schlumberger, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 1318 n.18.
    16              SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES
    subject merchandise cannot meet the second element in
    Note 2 of HTSUS Chapter 26. See id.
    The addition of dopants to the bauxite powder does
    not necessitate a different conclusion. The EN to Chapter
    26 explain that a process may remain normal to the
    industry so long as it does “not alter the chemical compo-
    sition of the basic compound which furnishes the desired
    metal.” EN 26, General. The Government has not offered
    any evidence demonstrating the extent to which the
    dopants changed the chemical composition of the bauxite
    powder; indeed, the Government was unable to state that
    the dopants’ underlying chemicals at the exact levels
    found in the subject merchandise would not themselves
    exist naturally in bauxite ore. Oral Argument at 12:07–
    14:24, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx
    ?fl=2015-2076.mp3.      Thus, the Government did not
    demonstrate that the basic bauxite compound changed
    from consisting primarily of aluminum oxide so as to
    offend EN 26, and its speculation may not foreclose the
    entry of summary judgment. See First Nat’l Bank of
    Ariz., 
    391 U.S. at 290
    .
    Finally, the Government avers that the subject baux-
    ite proppants do not fall within Heading 2606 because
    they are “finished manufactured products immediately
    usable upon importation” and “not a ‘material’ or natural-
    ly occurring ‘substance.’” Appellant’s Br. 35. According to
    the Government, Heading 2606 is limited to “primary
    materials which will be further processed after importa-
    tion.” Id. at 1; see also id. at 17 (arguing that the CIT
    failed to consider the subject merchandise in its “condition
    as imported” (capitalization omitted)).
    The terms of Heading 2606 do not support the Gov-
    ernment’s argument. Under GRI 1, we must look to “the
    terms of the [HTSUS] headings and any relative section
    or chapter notes.” As the CIT observed, “[n]othing in the
    terms of the heading, the section or chapter notes, or the
    SCHLUMBERGER TECH. CORP.   v. UNITED STATES            17
    relevant [EN] supports a conclusion that a product ready
    for the intended use in the condition as imported is out-
    side the scope of the heading.” Schlumberger, 91 F. Supp.
    3d at 1320. That conclusion comports with the principle
    that “an eo nomine provision” like Heading 2606 “includes
    all forms of the named article.” Kahrs, 713 F.3d at 646
    (citation omitted). Thus, we decline the Government’s
    invitation to imbue Heading 2606 with a meaning not
    supported by the Heading’s text or the accompanying
    section and chapter notes.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered the Government’s remaining ar-
    guments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the
    final judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade is
    AFFIRMED