Mata v. Opm , 652 F. App'x 931 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ROBERTO A. MATA,
    Petitioner
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2016-1244
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. SF-0831-15-0397-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: June 13, 2016
    ______________________
    ROBERTO A. MATA, San Narciso, Zambales, Philippi-
    nes, pro se.
    MICHAEL DUANE AUSTIN, Commercial Litigation
    Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represent-
    ed by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSHMAN, JR.,
    CLAUDIA BURKE.
    ______________________
    Before DYK, PLAGER, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
    2                                             MATA   v. OPM
    PER CURIAM.
    Roberto A. Mata appeals pro se a final order of the
    Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) affirming the
    Office of Personnel Management’s (“OPM”) denial of
    entitlement to an annuity under the Civil Service Retire-
    ment System (“CSRS”). We conclude that substantial
    evidence supports the Board’s determination that Mr.
    Mata did not serve in a covered position for purposes of
    entitlement to a civil-service-retirement annuity under
    the CSRS. We affirm the Board’s final order denying
    entitlement to an annuity under the CSRS.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Mata worked as a planner and estimator with the
    Department of the Navy from 1968 until 1992. His ser-
    vice was continuous for over two decades until his invol-
    untary separation in 1992. As a non-citizen, Mr. Mata
    received several Standard Forms 50 for the CSRS, indi-
    cating each time that his retirement code was either
    “None” or “Other,” as opposed to “Civil Service.” J.A. 7,
    17–39. Upon involuntary separation, the Standard Form
    50 effectuating separation stated that he was “entitled to
    24 months severance pay based on 24 years, and 4 days
    [of] creditable service.” J.A. 41. The Standard Forms 50
    made no mention of any entitlement to CSRS benefits.
    In July 2013, Mr. Mata submitted an application to
    OPM, seeking annuity benefits under the CSRS for his
    federal service. On December 6, 2013, OPM denied Mr.
    Mata’s application because he “never in served in a posi-
    tion subject to the [CSRS].” J.A. 44. Mr. Mata requested
    reconsideration, and on February 9, 2015, OPM issued its
    final decision denying entitlement to an annuity because
    Mr. Mata did not have the minimum years of covered
    service. J.A. 48. Mr. Mata appealed the final decision to
    the Board. On September 21, 2015, the Board issued a
    final order denying entitlement to an annuity under the
    CSRS.
    MATA   v. OPM                                             3
    Mr. Mata appeals.        We have jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
    DISCUSSION
    We may hold unlawful and set aside an agency action
    found to be “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
    tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained
    without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation
    having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial
    evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).
    Mr. Mata argues that his lengthy federal service
    “vested” his eligibility rights in a retirement annuity
    under the CSRS. Pet’r’s Informal Br. at 8. Citing Herrera
    v. United States, 
    849 F.2d 1416
    (Fed. Cir. 1988), Mr. Mata
    seeks to receive a reduced CSRS annuity and receive 10%
    of the amount he “should have deposited, plus interest”
    during his service. 
    Id. at 2,
    4, 9. Mr. Mata contends that
    his service is creditable, and that certain changes in the
    law during his service converted his position into a cov-
    ered position. 
    Id. at 9,
    14. Mr. Mata maintains that the
    deposit to which he seeks entitlement from past service is
    “self-executing” and arises whenever a federal employee
    decides to not make a deposit. 
    Id. at 3.
    Mr. Mata also
    requests that we reject the reasoning from or overrule
    several past cases. See, e.g., Aquino v. Office of Pers.
    Mgmt., 451 F. App’x 941 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ragados v.
    Office of Pers. Mgmt., 180 F. App’x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
    De Guzman v. Dep’t of Navy, 
    231 Ct. Cl. 1005
    (1982). We
    discern nothing arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise errone-
    ous with the Board’s final order.
    A federal employee seeking retirement benefits must
    demonstrate by preponderant evidence that he or she is
    entitled to the benefits.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2);
    Cheeseman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    791 F.2d 138
    , 141
    (Fed. Cir. 1986). An employee becomes eligible for annui-
    ty benefits under the CSRS by completing five years of
    “creditable” service with at least one of the last two years
    4                                               MATA   v. OPM
    prior to separation in a position “covered” by the CSRS.
    5 U.S.C. § 8333(a)–(b). An employee credited with civil
    service who has not made CSRS retirement deductions
    may make a deposit with interest to the CSRS. See §
    8333(c). The relevant regulation defines employees able
    to make a deposit as (1) those currently employed in a
    position subject to the CSRS or (2) those formerly em-
    ployed “who retain[] civil service retirement annuity
    rights based on a separation from a position in which
    retirement deductions were properly withheld and remain
    . . . in the [CSRS fund].” 5 C.F.R. § 831.112(a). In other
    words, the regulation “allows a ‘former employee’ to make
    a deposit only if that former employee is already covered
    by the CSRS.” Dela Rosa v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    583 F.3d 762
    , 765 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Mr. Mata does not contend
    that he is currently employed in a position subject to the
    CSRS, or that he has ever had retirement deductions
    withheld under the CSRS.
    Although Mr. Mata proved that he had more than
    twenty years of service as an employee, he has failed to
    show that he served in a position covered by the CSRS.
    Mr. Mata’s Standard Forms 50 show that he was appoint-
    ed as a non-citizen who “may be recruited overseas and
    appointed to overseas positions without regard to the
    Civil Service Act.” 5 C.F.R. § 8.3. His Standard Forms 50
    only indicated “None” or “Other,” and he offers no evi-
    dence that the forms contained errors or were otherwise
    incomplete. The record evidence shows that Mr. Mata
    was not in a covered position when the civil-service-
    retirement statute was enacted or when the regulations
    were promulgated, nor did he later attain such a covered
    position. J.A. 17–41. Mr. Mata fails to demonstrate how
    changes in the law affected him relevant to this appeal.
    Although Mr. Mata may have been entitled to certain
    benefits as a result of his involuntary separation, entitle-
    ment to those benefits does not vest entitlements under
    the CSRS or “convert a non-covered position into a cov-
    MATA   v. OPM                                            5
    ered position.” Quiocson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    490 F.3d 1358
    , 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“His receipt of benefits under
    a non-CSRS plan indicates that his service was not cov-
    ered under the CSRS.”).
    The Board concluded, upon reviewing the Standard
    Forms 50 of record, that none of Mr. Mata’s service was
    covered service subject to the CSRS. Mr. Mata fails to
    demonstrate how this finding is unsupported by substan-
    tial evidence. This outcome is consistent with Herrera,
    the case Mr. Mata cites for support. See 
    Herrera, 849 F.2d at 1418
    (holding that “the record before us establish-
    es that his service does not meet” the statutory require-
    ments for a deferred annuity). We decline to revisit or
    reconsider the precedent cited in Mr. Mata’s informal
    brief because Mr. Mata fails to explain why those deci-
    sions were incorrectly decided or how those decisions are
    enabled for review by this panel without en banc consid-
    eration.
    The Board’s final order is supported by substantial ev-
    idence, not arbitrary or capricious, and in accordance with
    law. We affirm the Board’s final order.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.