O'Farrell v. Dep't of Def. , 882 F.3d 1080 ( 2018 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    MICHAEL J. O’FARRELL, JR.,
    Petitioner
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2017-1223
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. DE-4324-14-0013-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 9, 2018
    ______________________
    DANIEL CRAIG COOLEY, Finnegan, Henderson,
    Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Reston, VA, argued for
    petitioner.  Also    represented   by    J.    DEREK
    MCCORQUINDALE; SYDNEY KESTLE, JASON LEE ROMRELL,
    Washington, DC.
    JOSEPH ASHMAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
    Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
    ton, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by
    CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., DOUGLAS K.
    MICKLE.
    ______________________
    2                                  O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.
    Before DYK, MOORE, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
    WALLACH, Circuit Judge.
    Petitioner Michael J. O’Farrell, Jr. appealed to the
    Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), alleging, inter
    alia, that his employing agency, the U.S. Department of
    Defense (“DOD” or “Government”) failed to grant him
    military leave for active military service in violation of the
    Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
    Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), Pub. L. No. 103-353, 
    108 Stat. 3149
     (codified as amended at 
    38 U.S.C. §§ 4301
    –
    4333 (2012)). 1 An administrative judge (“AJ”) issued an
    initial decision denying Mr. O’Farrell’s claim and dismiss-
    ing his appeal. See O’Farrell v. Dep’t of Def. (O’Farrell I),
    No. DE-4324-14-0013-I-1, 
    2016 WL 1014371
     (M.S.P.B.
    Mar. 8, 2016) (J.A. 4–14). On review, the full MSPB
    issued an order stating that “[t]he two [MSPB] members
    cannot agree on the disposition of the petition for review,”
    such that O’Farrell I “now becomes the final decision of
    the [MSPB] in this appeal.” O’Farrell v. Dep’t of Def.
    (O’Farrell II), 
    123 M.S.P.R. 590
    , 591 (2016) (footnote
    omitted). 2
    1   Relevant here, the USERRA provides that
    [a] person who is a member of, applies to be a
    member of, performs, has performed, applies to
    perform, or has an obligation to perform service in
    a uniformed service shall not be denied . . . any
    benefit of employment by an employer on the ba-
    sis of that membership, application for member-
    ship, performance of service, application for
    service, or obligation.
    
    38 U.S.C. § 4311
    (a).
    2   Accordingly, we refer to the AJ’s and MSPB’s rea-
    soning interchangeably.
    O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.                                    3
    Mr. O’Farrell appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant
    to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9) (2012). We reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    I. Statutory Framework
    When certain reserve military personnel who are em-
    ployed by the Government are called to active duty, they
    are “entitled to leave without loss in pay, time, or perfor-
    mance or efficiency rating” that “accrues . . . at the rate of
    [fifteen] days per fiscal year.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 6323
    (a)(1)
    (2012). In addition to these fifteen days,
    an employee . . . who—(1) is a member of a Re-
    serve component of the Armed Forces . . . ; and
    (2) . . . (B) performs full-time military service as a
    result of a call or order to active duty in support of
    a contingency operation as defined in [10 U.S.C.
    §] 101(a)(13) [(2012)] . . . ; is entitled . . . to leave
    without loss of, or reduction in, pay, leave to
    which he otherwise is entitled, credit for time or
    service, or performance or efficiency rating . . .
    [that] shall not exceed [twenty-two] workdays in a
    calendar year.
    Id. § 6323(b) (emphasis added).        In turn, “contingency
    operation” is defined to include:
    a military operation that . . . (B) results in the call
    or order to, or retention on, active duty of mem-
    bers of the uniformed services under [10 U.S.C.
    §§] 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or
    12406 . . . , [10 U.S.C.] ch[.] 15 . . . , [14 U.S.C.
    §] 712 . . . , or any other provision of law . . . dur-
    ing a national emergency declared by the President
    or Congress.
    
    10 U.S.C. § 101
    (a)(13) (emphasis added). Military reserve
    personnel “call[ed] or order[ed] to active duty under a
    provision of law referred to in [§] 101(a)(13)(B) . . . shall
    4                                  O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.
    be entitled . . . to receive” payment commensurate with
    the difference between the civilian pay they would have
    received and their military pay for their period of active
    duty service. 
    5 U.S.C. § 5538
    (a).
    II. Factual Background and Procedural History
    Mr. O’Farrell served in the U.S. Army for twenty-
    eight years. 3 J.A. 174. During Mr. O’Farrell’s service, on
    September 11, 2012, President Barack Obama published
    a notice in the Federal Register “continuing for [one] year
    the national emergency . . . with respect to the terrorist
    attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continuing and
    immediate threat of further attacks on the United
    States.” Continuation of the National Emergency with
    Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks, 
    77 Fed. Reg. 56,517
    ,
    56,517 (Sept. 11, 2012). At the time, Mr. O’Farrell
    worked as a General Attorney in the Office of Counsel for
    the aviation subordinate command of the Defense Logis-
    tics Agency (“DLA”) within DOD. J.A. 174. However, on
    April 17, 2013, Mr. O’Farrell received an order from the
    U.S. Army directing him to replace a civilian attorney
    employed with the U.S. Navy’s Naval Surface Warfare
    Center (“NSWC”), Corona Division, in California.
    J.A. 114; see J.A. 175. The NSWC attorney, who also was
    a member of the U.S. Army Reserve, was replaced be-
    cause he had been deployed to Afghanistan. J.A. 175.
    The Order directing Mr. O’Farrell provided:
    You are ordered to active duty for operational sup-
    port under provision of [10 U.S.C. §] 12301 (d) . . .
    3   “[A]fter reaching [the] maximum total years of ac-
    tive commissioned service for his rank (28 years),” Mr.
    O’Farrell “was transferred to the U.S. Army Reserve
    Retired List” in October 2013. J.A. 174. It is undisputed
    that Mr. O’Farrell was a member of the U.S. Army Re-
    serve at all times relevant to this appeal. J.A. 5.
    O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.                              5
    for the period shown plus the time necessary to
    travel. You will proceed from your home or cur-
    rent location in time to report for duty on [April
    22, 2013]. Upon completion of this duty, unless
    sooner released, you will return to your home and
    upon arrival be released from active duty.
    J.A. 114 (capitalization modified) (emphasis added). The
    Order further stated that Mr. O’Farrell’s “operational
    support” would consist of his “serv[ic]e as[] legal counsel”
    at NSWC. J.A. 114 (capitalization omitted).
    After receiving the Order, Mr. O’Farrell served his ac-
    tive duty as legal counsel at NSWC for a total of 162 days
    until September 30, 2013. J.A. 174. The parties do not
    dispute that, by August 26, 2013, Mr. O’Farrell had used
    his fifteen days of military leave pursuant to § 6323(a)(1),
    as well as most of his accrued annual leave and advance
    annual leave. See J.A. 5–6. To avoid being placed on
    Military Leave Without Pay for the remainder of his
    active duty service, Mr. O’Farrell requested an additional
    twenty-two days leave pursuant to § 6323(b) in an email
    exchange with a representative at DLA. See J.A. 102–13.
    Although Mr. O’Farrell acknowledged that the Order did
    not cite any of the statutory provisions listed in
    § 101(a)(13) that qualify as support for a contingency
    operation, he explained that he was “serving under ‘any
    other provision of law . . . during a national emergency
    declared by the President or Congress,’ . . . because . . .
    [§] 12301(d) is ‘any other provision of law’ and[,] on Sep-
    tember 11, 2012[,] President Obama extended the state of
    emergency that has existed since September 11, 2001.”
    J.A. 104 (quoting 
    10 U.S.C. § 101
    (a)(13)). DLA informed
    Mr. O’Farrell by email that he was not entitled to addi-
    tional military leave pursuant to § 6323(b) because the
    Order “do[es] not state [that Mr. O’Farrell was] under
    contingency orders.”       J.A. 102.   Subsequently, Mr.
    O’Farrell submitted an Office of Personnel Management
    (“OPM”) Form 71, Request for Leave or Approved Ab-
    6                                  O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.
    sence, “[r]equest[ing] approval and use of [twenty-two]
    days . . . of additional military leave under provisions
    of . . . [§] 6323(b).” J.A. 100. DLA denied his request,
    stating that Mr. O’Farrell’s “active duty is not in support
    of a contingency operation.” J.A. 96; see J.A. 94–99.
    DISCUSSION
    This appeal concerns whether, under the proper stat-
    utory construction of § 6323(b), the MSPB erred in deny-
    ing Mr. O’Farrell’s request for twenty-two days of
    additional military leave. See Pet’r’s Br. 14; Resp’t’s Br. 1.
    After articulating the applicable standard of review, we
    first assess whether the MSPB properly construed
    § 6323(b) and then assess whether Mr. O’Farrell is enti-
    tled to additional leave under the proper construction.
    I. Standard of Review
    We affirm an MSPB decision unless, inter alia, it con-
    stitutes “an abuse of discretion.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c)(1).
    “The MSPB abuses its discretion when the decision is
    based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, on factu-
    al findings that are not supported by substantial evi-
    dence, or represents an unreasonable judgment in
    weighing relevant factors.” Tartaglia v. Dep’t of Veterans
    Affairs, 
    858 F.3d 1405
    , 1407–08 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted). “We review the
    [MSPB]’s legal determinations, including its interpreta-
    tion of a statute, de novo.” Archuleta v. Hopper, 
    786 F.3d 1340
    , 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
    II. The MSPB Misinterpreted 
    5 U.S.C. § 6323
    (b)
    Without engaging in the appropriate statutory analy-
    sis, the MSPB summarily determined that § 6323(b)
    requires that “a specific contingency operation should be
    identified in military orders when an employee is activat-
    ed under [§] 12301(d) in order for the employee to be
    entitled to [twenty-two] days of additional military leave
    under [§] 6323(b).” J.A. 8. The MSPB, however, failed to
    O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.                                7
    assess what qualifies as “support” or as a “contingency
    operation” under the relevant statutory provisions.
    Therefore, we interpret § 6323(b) and § 101(a)(13) to
    determine the meaning of these respective terms, as well
    as whether these statutes require that the order calling
    the service member to active duty must identify the
    specific contingency operation.
    We begin our statutory interpretation with the plain
    language of § 6323(b). See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States,
    
    541 U.S. 176
    , 183 (2004). As an initial matter, the statute
    requires that the service member “perform[] full-time
    military service as a result of a call or order to active duty
    in support of a contingency operation.”             
    5 U.S.C. § 6323
    (b)(2)(B) (emphasis added); it does not, however,
    specify the types of “support” that qualify. Therefore, we
    interpret “support” in accordance with its “ordinary,
    contemporary, common meaning,” Sandifer v. U.S. Steel
    Corp., 
    134 S. Ct. 870
    , 876 (2014) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted), which broadly encompasses
    “an act of helping a person or thing to hold firm or not to
    give way; provision of assistance or backing,” Support,
    The Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2012) (emphasis
    added), available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
    194673; see Support, The New Oxford American Diction-
    ary (2005) (“To give assistance to, esp. financially; enable
    to function or act.” (emphasis added)); Support, The
    American Heritage Dictionary (2000) (“To aid the cause,
    policy or interests of.”). Contrary to the Government’s
    assertions, see Resp’t’s Br. 22–23, § 6323(b) imposes no
    requirement that the service member provide direct, as
    opposed to indirect, support to the contingency operation.
    Section 101(a)(13), in turn, defines what constitutes a
    “contingency operation” for purposes of § 6323(b). A
    8                                  O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.
    contingency operation must be a “military operation,” 4 
    10 U.S.C. § 101
    (a)(13), and the military operations that
    qualify as contingency operations include, as relevant
    here, those that “result[] in the call or order to, or reten-
    tion on, active duty of members of the uniformed services
    under [certain listed statutory provisions], or any other
    provision of law . . . during a national emergency declared
    by the President,” 
    id.
     § 101(a)(13)(B) (emphases added).
    Section 101(a)(13)(B) thus requires that service members
    be called to, or retained on, active duty pursuant to a
    “provision of law . . . during a national emergency.” While
    § 101(a)(13)(B) lists specific statutory provisions under
    which a service member may be ordered to active duty,
    the subsection’s use of the word “any” indicates that this
    list of statutory provisions is non-exhaustive and that
    “other provision[s] of law” should be interpreted broadly.
    See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
    552 U.S. 214
    , 219 (2008)
    (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive mean-
    ing, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever
    4    Neither § 101(a)(13) nor the remainder of Title 5
    of the U.S. Code define “military operation.” In addition,
    the parties neither request that we interpret that term
    nor contend that the armed forces of the United States’
    actions in Afghanistan in conjunction with the national
    emergency arising from the terrorist attacks of September
    11, 2001, are not related to a contingency operation. See
    
    10 U.S.C. § 101
    (a)(13); Continuation of the National
    Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks, 77
    Fed. Reg. at 56,517; cf. Oral Arg. at 15:41–45,
    http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=
    2017-1223.mp3 (acknowledging that the armed forces
    “have been in open hostilities since at least 2001”). See
    generally Pet’r’s Br.; Resp’t’s Br. At the very least, how-
    ever, a military operation by the armed forces of the
    United States includes engagement in open hostilities
    against the nation’s enemies.
    O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.                               9
    kind.’” (citation omitted)).      Therefore, § 101(a)(13)(B)
    instructs that a service member may be called to active
    duty “in support of a contingency operation” pursuant to
    § 6323(b), even if the service member were ordered to
    active duty pursuant to a provision of law that is not
    explicitly listed in § 101(a)(13)(B).
    We next consider § 6323(b) in the context of the over-
    all statutory scheme. See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treas-
    ury, 
    489 U.S. 803
    , 809 (1989). While 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 6321
    –
    6329c, the subchapter of Title 5 of the U.S. Code involving
    “Other Paid Leave,” generally describes circumstances
    under which a service member may qualify for paid leave,
    none of these provisions inform our interpretation of “in
    support of” or “contingency operation.” However, 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 5101
    –5949, the subpart of Title 5 of the U.S. Code
    involving “Pay and Allowances,” specifies that a service
    member must have provided direct support for a contin-
    gency operation to qualify for certain benefits. See, e.g., 
    5 U.S.C. § 5742
    (b)(2)(B)(ii)(I)(bb) (providing that an agency
    may pay transportation costs of a deceased employee
    when the employee, inter alia, died as a result of harm
    suffered in the performance of official duties “in direct
    support of or directly related to a military operation,
    including a contingency operation (as defined in
    [§] 101(a)(13) . . . ) or an operation in response to an
    emergency declared by the President” (emphasis added)).
    Congress knew how to require direct support of contin-
    gency operations but declined to include such a qualifier
    in § 6323(b). See Sebelius v. Cloer, 
    569 U.S. 369
    , 378
    (2013) (“We have long held that where Congress includes
    particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
    in another section of the same Act, it is generally pre-
    sumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
    the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotation
    marks, brackets, and citation omitted)).
    We also may look to the relevant regulatory scheme to
    inform our interpretation of § 6323(b). See Bragdon v.
    10                                  O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.
    Abbott, 
    524 U.S. 624
    , 642 (1998). While related statutory
    provisions contemplate the promulgation of regulations,
    see 
    5 U.S.C. § 6322
    (c) (“[OPM] may prescribe regulations
    for the administration of this section.”); 
    id.
     § 6324(b)
    (providing that “[t]he determination of whether an injury
    or illness resulted from the performance of duty shall be
    made under regulations prescribed by” relevant councils
    and secretaries), no relevant agency “has (under any other
    statutory authority) promulgated a formal rule setting
    forth its implementation of [§] 6323,” Butterbaugh v. Dep’t
    of Justice, 
    336 F.3d 1332
    , 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The
    regulatory scheme thus does not aid our interpretation of
    the terms “in support of” or “contingency operation.”
    However, it does illuminate whether a service member
    ordered to active duty must identify a specific contingency
    operation when requesting additional leave. Indeed, the
    sole relevant regulation identified by the court states that
    a service member “must be permitted, upon request, to
    use any . . . military leave under 5 U.S.C. [§] 6323 . . . , if
    appropriate, during . . . service.”    
    5 C.F.R. § 353.208
    (2016). The use of the mandatory term “must” indicates
    that OPM is required to provide service members with
    additional leave “upon request,” id.; see Kingdomware
    Techs., Inc. v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1969
    , 1977 (2016)
    (stating that “the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a require-
    ment” and equating “shall” with “must”), as long as leave
    is “appropriate” under the requirements set forth in
    § 6323, 
    5 C.F.R. § 353.208
    . Moreover, contrary to the
    Government’s assertions, see Resp’t’s Br. 13 (arguing that,
    to be entitled to additional leave pursuant to § 6323(b), a
    service member must “identify the military operation that
    their service supported” and “show how his or her service
    supported a military operation”), no regulation places
    requirements on the form of the service member’s request,
    see, e.g., 
    5 C.F.R. § 353.208
    .
    We also may look to the legislative history to inform
    our interpretation of § 6323(b). See Thunder Basin Coal
    O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.                               11
    Co. v. Reich, 
    510 U.S. 200
    , 207 (1994). By the 1960s,
    Congress grew concerned that service members increas-
    ingly were being called to active duty in response to “civil
    disturbances,” requiring them to “take annual leave or go
    on leave without pay,” and that this caused substantial
    hardship for “enlisted men, who in private life may earn
    substantially more than their pay as Guardsmen or
    reservists.” S. Rep. No. 90-1443, at 4289 (1968). Con-
    gress thus amended § 6323 to provide additional leave to
    service members. See Pub. L. No. 90-588, § 2(a), 
    82 Stat. 1151
    , 1151–52 (1968). When Congress again amended
    § 6323 to provide additional leave for service members
    ordered to active duty in support of contingency opera-
    tions, see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 1113, 
    117 Stat. 1392
    ,
    1635 (2003) (adding the “in support of a contingency
    operation” language), it expressed concern that a service
    member serving “in a contingency operation in support of
    our troops in Afghanistan or Iraq combat zones happens to
    be left out” of certain benefits, 149 Cong. Rec. S12,582
    (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2003) (statement of Sen. Lincoln) (em-
    phasis added) (discussing tax benefits enacted contempo-
    raneously with the amendments to § 6323). In addition,
    when Congress added a definition of “contingency opera-
    tion” in § 101(a)(13) in 1991, it did so in response to, inter
    alia, its assessment that “[DOD] . . . was not sufficiently
    sensitive to the sacrifices made by reservists called or
    ordered to active duty in connection with the Persian Gulf
    conflict and by the families, employers, and communities
    of those reservists.” National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub L. No. 102-190,
    § 555(a)(1), 
    105 Stat. 1290
    , 1372 (1991) (emphasis added).
    This legislative history indicates that Congress continual-
    ly updated § 6323 and § 101(a)(13) to provide for increas-
    ing numbers of service members to receive additional
    compensation in response to the changing nature of
    military conflicts.
    12                                O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.
    As relevant here, these statutory provisions, regula-
    tions, and legislative history collectively instruct that
    under the current landscape: (1) “in support of” includes
    indirect assistance to a contingency operation, 
    5 U.S.C. § 6323
    (b)(2)(B); see Support, The Oxford English Diction-
    ary (3d ed. 2012); Support, The New Oxford American
    Dictionary (2005); Support, The American Heritage
    Dictionary (2000); (2) “contingency operation” includes a
    military operation that results in service members being
    called to active duty under any provision of law during a
    national emergency, 
    10 U.S.C. § 101
    (a)(13); (3) upon
    request, a service member is entitled to additional leave
    as long as leave is “appropriate” under the requirements
    set forth in § 6323, 
    5 C.F.R. § 353.208
    ; and (4) the service
    member’s request for additional leave need not take any
    particular form or use any particular language, see, e.g.,
    
    id.
     5
    III. The MSPB Abused Its Discretion in Determining that
    Mr. O’Farrell Is Not Entitled to Additional Leave Under
    § 6323(b)
    Applying its erroneous interpretation of § 6323(b), the
    MSPB determined that Mr. O’Farrell “failed to meet his
    burden of proving his rights under USERRA were violated
    when [DLA] denied him [twenty-two] days of additional
    leave under . . . § 6323(b).” J.A. 8. As discussed above,
    see supra Section II, the MSPB based its conclusion on its
    erroneous construction of § 6323(b), see J.A. 8, which
    constitutes an abuse of discretion, see Tartaglia, 858 F.3d
    at 1407–08. Under the proper construction of § 6323(b),
    5   Our holding today does not mean that all reserv-
    ists called to active duty during a national emergency will
    be entitled to additional leave. Instead, they must
    demonstrate that their call to active duty was “in support
    of a contingency operation,” as properly construed.
    O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.                             13
    we conclude that Mr. O’Farrell is entitled to additional
    leave.
    It is undisputed that the armed forces of the United
    States are engaged in military operations in Afghanistan
    in conjunction with a national emergency declared by the
    President that constitutes a contingency operation. See
    supra n.4. Instead, the parties dispute whether Mr.
    O’Farrell was called to active duty “in support of” that
    contingency operation. See Pet’r’s Br. 26–27; Resp’t’s Br.
    21–23. The record is clear that he was because Mr.
    O’Farrell replaced an NSWC attorney who directly sup-
    ported the contingency operation through his deployment
    to Afghanistan. See J.A. 114, 175; see also Resp’t’s Br. 3
    (“Mr. O’Farrell’s service was required in order to replace a
    Navy civilian attorney who had been activated from
    reserve status and deployed to Afghanistan.”). We also
    note that, in replacing that attorney, Mr. O’Farrell pro-
    vided assistance to the Navy’s warfighting capabilities
    while serving on active duty at NSWC. See J.A. 184–86
    (describing NSWC’s objectives and mission as, inter alia,
    “provid[ing] the fleet, program managers[,] and acquisi-
    tion community with the objective assessment needed for
    the Navy to gauge the warfighting capability of ships and
    aircraft, assess warfare training[,] and analyze new
    defense systems” and as “[s]erv[ing] warfighters and
    program managers as the Navy’s independent perfor-
    mance assessment agent throughout systems’ lifecycles by
    gauging the Navy’s warfighting capability of weapons and
    integrated combat systems, from unit to force level”), 190
    (commending Mr. O’Farrell for “facilitat[ing the] smooth
    workflow and assured success in the legal aspects of
    NSWC[’s] . . . mission”). Indeed, the Order calling Mr.
    O’Farrell to active duty pursuant to § 12301(d), which
    undoubtedly qualifies as a “provision of law,” states that
    he will provide “operational support” for this mission.
    J.A. 114 (emphasis added).
    14                                O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.
    The Government’s counterarguments are unpersua-
    sive. First, the Government contends that, “[u]nlike other
    similarly situated Federal civilian employees ordered to
    active duty under [§] 12301(d), Mr. O’Farrell’s orders did
    not indicate that the Navy considered his service to be in
    support of a contingency operation.” Resp’t’s Br. 22.
    Compare J.A. 114 (Mr. O’Farrell’s Order), with J.A. 115
    (ordering another service member to active duty in sup-
    port of a “contingency,” i.e., “Operation Enduring Free-
    dom” (capitalization modified)).           However, the
    Government acknowledges that our inquiry is not limited
    to the text of an ambiguous order and that we may con-
    sider other relevant evidence as to whether Mr. O’Farrell
    was ordered to active duty “in support of a contingency
    operation,” see Resp’t’s Br. 15 (“An employee’s orders are
    an obvious starting point for the inquiry, but if it is not
    clear on their face how her active duty service supported a
    military operation related to a declared national emer-
    gency, the employee may present evidence demonstrating
    that the requirement was satisfied.” (citation omitted)),
    and, as explained above, Mr. O’Farrell was called to active
    duty “in support of” a “contingency operation” pursuant to
    a “provision of law” and “during a national emergency,”
    which is all the relevant statutory provisions require, see
    supra Section II.
    Second, and relatedly, the Government asserts that
    “Mr. O’Farrell did not argue before the [MSPB] that his
    service was in support of a specific military operation
    connected to a declared national emergency,” Resp’t’s
    Br. 17 (emphasis added), such that “he cannot do so on
    appeal,” id. at 20 (citation omitted). However, the rele-
    vant inquiry is whether Mr. O’Farrell was called to active
    duty “in support of a contingency operation,” not whether
    he identified the specific contingency operation. See supra
    Section II. Moreover, before both DLA and the MSPB,
    Mr. O’Farrell argued that he was entitled to additional
    leave pursuant to § 6323(b) on the grounds that he was
    O’FARRELL   v. DEP’T OF DEF.                             15
    called to active duty in support of a contingency operation
    during a national emergency declared by the President.
    See J.A. 104 (arguing before DLA that, “during a national
    emergency declared by the President” as required by
    § 101(a)(13), he was ordered to active duty pursuant to
    § 12301(d), which is a “provision of law” (citation omit-
    ted)), 322 (arguing before the MSPB that, “during the
    period during which [Mr. O’Farrell] was serving on active
    duty in support of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Navy was
    engaged in the performance of military operations
    throughout the world, many of which were ‘contingency
    operations’”).
    Third, the Government avers that Mr. O’Farrell pro-
    vided only “loosely-connected ‘indirect support’” and “the
    record does not show the necessary connection between
    Mr. O’Farrell’s service and a military operation connected
    with a declared national emergency.” Resp’t’s Br. 23.
    However, we concluded above that indirect support for
    contingency operations is sufficient under § 6323(b). See
    supra Section II. Moreover, although not necessary to our
    analysis, if there were any “interpretative doubt” as to
    whether § 6323(b) imposed the additional requirements
    sought by the Government, it would be “resolved in [Mr.
    O’Farrell]’s favor.” Kirkendall v. Dep’t of the Army, 
    479 F.3d 830
    , 846 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quota-
    tion marks and citation omitted); see King v. St. Vincent’s
    Hosp., 
    502 U.S. 215
    , 220 n.9 (1991) (“[P]rovisions for
    benefits to members of the Armed Services are to be
    construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.” (citation omitted)).
    Thus, it would be particularly improper to read these
    additional requirements into the statute’s plain language.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered the Government’s remaining ar-
    guments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the
    Final Decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is
    REVERSED