Well Luck Company, Inc. v. United States , 887 F.3d 1106 ( 2018 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    WELL LUCK COMPANY, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2017-1816
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of International
    Trade in No. 1:13-cv-00064-CRK, Judge Claire R. Kelly.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 11, 2018
    ______________________
    LUIS FERNANDO ARANDIA, JR., and ROBERT T. GIVENS,
    Givens & Johnston, PLLC, Houston, TX, argued for
    plaintiff-appellant.
    ALEXANDER J. VANDERWEIDE, International Trade
    Field Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Divi-
    sion, United States Department of Justice, New York, NY,
    argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by CHAD
    A. READLER, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, AMY M. RUBIN; SHERYL
    FRENCH, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, United
    States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, United
    States Department of Homeland Security, New York, NY.
    ______________________
    2                           WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES
    Before REYNA, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
    WALLACH, Circuit Judge.
    This appeal concerns the proper classification of cer-
    tain in-shell sunflower seeds for snacking imported by
    Appellant Well Luck Company, Inc. (“Well Luck”). U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) classified the
    subject merchandise under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
    the United States (“HTSUS”) Subheading 2008.19.90. 1
    Before the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”), Well
    Luck and Appellee United States (“the Government”) filed
    cross-motions for summary judgment, with Well Luck
    challenging Customs’ classification and arguing that
    Customs should have classified the subject merchandise
    under HTSUS Subheading 1206.00.00. The CIT denied
    Well Luck’s Cross-Motion and, instead, granted the
    United States’ Cross-Motion, determining that Customs
    properly classified the subject merchandise under HTSUS
    Subheading 2008.19.90. See Well Luck Co. v. United
    States, 
    208 F. Supp. 3d 1364
    , 1367 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017);
    see also J.A. 22 (Judgment).
    Well Luck appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012). We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    The subject merchandise “consists of three varieties of
    wet-cooked and/or roasted, salted, flavored, and/or unfla-
    vored sunflower seeds in unbroken shells: All Natural
    Flavor, Spiced Flavor, and Coconut Flavor.” Well Luck,
    1  “All citations to the HTSUS refer to the 20[10]
    version, as determined by the date of importation of the
    merchandise.” LeMans Corp. v. United States, 
    660 F.3d 1311
    , 1314 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see J.A. 30 (providing that
    the subject merchandise was entered on April 9, 2010).
    WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES                           
    3 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1367
    (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted). 2 The sunflower seeds in each flavor
    “are of the common sunflower, Helianthus annuus, and
    the seeds used by [Well Luck] are used, as is, for human
    consumption and not for the extraction of edible or indus-
    trial oils or fats.” 
    Id. at 1368
    (citations omitted). After
    initial processing and selection “for quality, size, and
    purity,” the sunflower seeds “are then further processed
    by being heated in an oven to 302 degrees Fahren-
    heit . . . for approximately [sixty-five] minutes,” and
    “[s]alt is added to the seeds during this heating process.”
    
    Id. (citations omitted).
    Finally, the sunflower seeds “are
    then cooled, and those in unbroken shells are packaged
    into finished product bags sold for consumption and [then]
    imported.” 
    Id. (citations omitted).
    The subject merchan-
    dise “is not fungible or interchangeable with” any of the
    following: (1) “raw sunflower seeds”; (2) sunflower seeds
    that “only undergo heat treatment” to preserve them, “to
    inactivate antinutritional factors,” or “to facilitate their
    use”; or (3) sunflower seeds that “are not roasted, salted[,]
    and flavored.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citations
    omitted).
    Customs classified the subject merchandise under
    HTSUS Subheading 2008.19.90 at a duty rate of 17.9% ad
    valorem. 
    Id. at 1367.
    HTSUS Subheading 2008.19.90
    covers “[f]ruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants,
    otherwise prepared or preserved, whether or not contain-
    ing added sugar or other sweetening matter or spirit, not
    elsewhere specified or included: [n]uts, peanuts (ground-
    nuts) and other seeds, whether or not mixed together:
    [o]ther, including mixtures: [o]ther.” Well Luck contested
    the classification by filing a protest, arguing that the
    2   The parties do not dispute the material facts. Ac-
    cordingly, we cite to the facts as recited by the CIT. See
    Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1367
    –68.
    4                            WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES
    subject merchandise should enter at a duty-free rate
    under HTSUS Subheading 1206.00.00, which covers
    “[s]unflower seeds, whether or not broken.” See J.A. 30,
    34; see also Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1367
    . Customs
    denied Well Luck’s protest, and the CIT upheld Customs’
    classification. See Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1367
    ,
    1377; see also J.A. 28–41 (Complaint).
    The CIT determined that HTSUS Subheading
    1206.00.00 covers “seeds of the common sunflower plant,
    Helianthus annuus, that are not processed in a way that
    renders them unsuitable for extraction of edible or indus-
    trial oils and fats, sowing, and other purposes,” Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1372
    , whereas HTSUS Subheading
    2008.19.90 “covers parts of plants made ready or suitable
    in advance for eating, such as by dry-roasting or fat
    roasting, whether or not containing or coated with vege-
    table oil, salt, flavors, spices or other additives, and made
    fit for future use in a manner to prevent spoilage,” 
    id. at 1375.
    Applying these interpretations to the subject
    merchandise, the CIT held that Well Luck’s “sunflower
    seeds are not classified in [HTSUS S]ubheading
    1206.00.00 . . . because it is undisputed that they are not
    suitable for general use,” 
    id., but rather
    “are prepared or
    preserved not elsewhere specified or included within the
    meaning of [HTSUS S]ubheading 2008.19.90,” 
    id. at 1377.
                            DISCUSSION
    I. Standard of Review
    We review de novo the CIT’s decision to grant sum-
    mary judgment, applying the same standard used by the
    CIT to assess Customs’ classification. See Otter Prods.,
    LLC v. United States, 
    834 F.3d 1369
    , 1374–75 (Fed. Cir.
    2016). “Although we review the decision of the CIT de
    novo, we give great weight to the informed opinion of the
    CIT and it is nearly always the starting point of our
    analysis.” Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 
    845 F.3d 1158
    , 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
    WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES                           5
    marks, alterations, and citation omitted). The CIT “shall
    grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there
    is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
    USCIT R. 56(a).
    The classification of merchandise involves a two-step
    inquiry. See 
    LeMans, 660 F.3d at 1315
    . First, we ascer-
    tain the meaning of the terms within the relevant tariff
    provision and, second, we determine whether the subject
    merchandise fits within those terms. See Sigma-Tau
    HealthSci., Inc. v. United States, 
    838 F.3d 1272
    , 1276
    (Fed. Cir. 2016). The first step presents a question of law
    that we review de novo, whereas the second involves a
    question of fact that we review for clear error. 
    Id. When, as
    here, no genuine dispute exists as to the nature of the
    subject merchandise, the two-step inquiry “collapses into
    a question of law [that] we review de novo.” 
    LeMans, 660 F.3d at 1315
    (citation omitted).
    II. The CIT Properly Granted Summary Judgment for the
    Government
    A. Legal Framework
    The HTSUS governs the classification of merchandise
    imported into the United States. See Wilton Indus., Inc.
    v. United States, 
    741 F.3d 1263
    , 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
    The HTSUS “shall be considered . . . statutory provisions
    of law for all purposes.” 19 U.S.C. § 3004(c)(1) (2012). 3
    “The HTSUS scheme is organized by headings, each of
    which has one or more subheadings; the headings set
    forth general categories of merchandise, and the subhead-
    ings provide a more particularized segregation of the
    3     However, “the tenth-digit statistical suffix-
    es . . . are not statutory.” Chemtall, Inc. v. United States,
    
    878 F.3d 1012
    , 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
    6                            WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES
    goods within each category.” Wilton 
    Indus., 741 F.3d at 1266
    . “The first four digits of an HTSUS provision consti-
    tute the heading, whereas the remaining digits reflect
    subheadings.” 
    Schlumberger, 845 F.3d at 1163
    n.4.
    “[T]he headings and subheadings . . . are enumerated in
    chapters 1 through 99 of the HTSUS (each of which has
    its own section and chapter notes) . . . .” R.T. Foods, Inc.
    v. United States, 
    757 F.3d 1349
    , 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
    The HTSUS “also contains the ‘General Notes,’ the ‘Gen-
    eral Rules of Interpretation’ (‘GRI’), the ‘Additional [U.S.]
    Rules of Interpretation’ (‘ARI’),[4] and various appendices
    for particular categories of goods.” 
    Id. (footnote omitted).
        The GRI and the ARI govern the classification of
    goods within the HTSUS. See Otter 
    Prods., 834 F.3d at 1375
    . “The GRI apply in numerical order, meaning that
    subsequent rules are inapplicable if a preceding rule
    provides proper classification.” 
    Schlumberger, 845 F.3d at 1163
    . GRI 1 provides, in relevant part, that “classifica-
    tion shall be determined according to the terms of the
    headings and any relative section or chapter notes.”
    GRI 1 (emphasis added). “Under GRI 1, a court first
    construes the language of the heading, and any section or
    4    The ARI contain specific rules for use and textile
    provisions in the HTSUS. See ARI 1(a)–(d). “Because
    th[is] appeal involves eo nomine provisions,” as discussed
    below, “we find the ARI inapplicable.” 
    Schlumberger, 845 F.3d at 1163
    n.5; see infra Section II.B. “An eo nomine
    classification provision is one which describes a commodi-
    ty by a specific name,” rather than by use, Clarendon
    Mktg., Inc. v. United States, 
    144 F.3d 1464
    , 1467 (Fed.
    Cir. 1998), and “[a]bsent limitation or contrary legislative
    intent, an eo nomine provision includes all forms of the
    named article, even improved forms,” CamelBak Prods.,
    LLC v. United States, 
    649 F.3d 1361
    , 1364–65 (Fed. Cir.
    2011) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
    WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES                         7
    chapter notes in question, to determine whether the
    product at issue is classifiable under the heading.”
    
    Schlumberger, 845 F.3d at 1163
    (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). “[T]he possible headings are
    to be evaluated without reference to their subheadings,
    which cannot be used to expand the scope of their respec-
    tive headings.” R.T. 
    Foods, 757 F.3d at 1353
    (citations
    omitted). “Absent contrary legislative intent, HTSUS
    terms are to be construed according to their common and
    commercial meanings, which are presumed to be the
    same.” Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 
    195 F.3d 1375
    ,
    1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “To discern the common meaning
    of a tariff term, we may consult dictionaries, scientific
    authorities, and other reliable information sources.”
    Kahrs Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 
    713 F.3d 640
    , 644 (Fed.
    Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
    “After consulting the headings and relevant section or
    chapter notes” consistent with GRI 1, we may consider the
    relevant Explanatory Notes (“EN”). Fuji Am. Corp. v.
    United States, 
    519 F.3d 1355
    , 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 5
    “The [ENs] provide persuasive guidance and are generally
    indicative of the proper interpretation, though they do not
    constitute binding authority.” 
    Chemtall, 878 F.3d at 1019
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    When, as here, “merchandise is prima facie classifia-
    ble under two or more headings or subheadings of the
    HTSUS” and GRI 2 does not apply, “we apply GRI 3 to
    resolve the classification.” 
    LeMans, 660 F.3d at 1316
    (citation and italics omitted); see GRI 2(a) (applying to
    5    “The World Customs Organization publishes the
    EN[s] as its official interpretation of the Harmonized
    Commodity Description and Coding System, the global
    system of trade nomenclature on which the HTSUS is
    based.” 
    Schlumberger, 845 F.3d at 1163
    n.6 (internal
    quotation marks and citations omitted).
    8                            WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES
    “article[s] incomplete or unfinished” and “article[s] com-
    plete or finished . . . , presented unassembled or disas-
    sembled”);     GRI 2(b)     (applying  to   “mixtures      or
    combinations of . . . material[s] or substance[s]” and
    providing that “[t]he classification of goods consisting of
    more than one material or substance shall be according to
    the principles of [GRI 3]”); GRI 3 (providing for classifica-
    tion “[w]hen, by application of [GRI] 2(b) or for any other
    reason, goods are, prima facie, classifiable under two or
    more headings” (emphasis added) (italics omitted)). GRI
    3(a) provides that “[t]he heading which provides the most
    specific description shall be preferred to headings provid-
    ing a more general description.” GRI 3(a).
    Once the court determines the appropriate heading,
    the court applies GRI 6 to determine the appropriate
    subheading. See GRI 6; see also Orlando Food Corp. v.
    United States, 
    140 F.3d 1437
    , 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rely-
    ing on GRI 6 when turning to the subheadings). GRI 6
    provides that “the classification of goods in the subhead-
    ings of a heading shall be determined according to the
    terms of those subheadings and any related subheading
    notes and, mutatis mutandis, to the above [GRIs], on the
    understanding that only subheadings at the same level
    are comparable.” GRI 6 (first emphasis added).
    B. The Subject Merchandise Falls Within the Terms of
    HTSUS Headings 1206 and 2008
    1. HTSUS Heading 1206
    According to Well Luck, the subject merchandise “are
    prima facie classifiable as ‘sunflower seeds’” under
    HTSUS Heading 1206 because it “contains an unambigu-
    ous and unlimited eo nomine tariff provision” and “lexico-
    graphic authorities and published industry sources
    support a broad common and commercial meaning of
    ‘sunflower seeds’ that includes snacking seeds.” Appel-
    lant’s Br. 12 (italics omitted); see 
    id. at 12–25.
    The Gov-
    ernment responds that, inter alia, “Well Luck has failed
    WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES                           9
    to establish that the common and commercial meaning of
    the tariff term ‘sunflower seeds’ includes” the subject
    merchandise. Appellee’s Br. 17; see 
    id. at 14–17.
    We
    conclude that the subject merchandise is prima facie
    classifiable under HTSUS Heading 1206.
    “We first must assess whether the subject [h]eading[]
    constitute[s an] eo nomine or use provision[] because
    different rules and analysis will apply depending upon the
    heading type.” 
    Schlumberger, 845 F.3d at 1164
    (first
    citing 
    Kahrs, 713 F.3d at 645
    –46 (eo nomine analysis);
    then citing Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States, 
    671 F.3d 1310
    , 1312–16 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (principal use analysis)).
    HTSUS Heading 1206, which recites “[s]unflower seeds,
    whether or not broken,” “is unquestionably eo nomine
    because it describes the articles it covers by name,” and,
    thus, “our analysis starts with [its] terms.” Schlumberg-
    
    er, 845 F.3d at 1164
    .
    Neither the HTSUS, nor legislative history, nor Chap-
    ter Notes inform our construction of “sunflower seeds” as
    used in HTSUS Heading 1206. Therefore, “we look to the
    dictionary to understand its common meaning.” 
    Id. The common
    meaning of “sunflower seed” is “the hard-shelled
    edible seed of a plant of the daisy family, yielding an oil
    used in cooking and margarine.” Sunflower Seed, New
    Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010); see Sunflower
    Seed, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2018) (defining
    “sunflower seed” as “any of the edible, oil-rich grey seeds
    of a sunflower; the fruit (an achene with a thin, hard
    shell) containing such a seed; (as a mass noun) such seeds
    or fruits collectively”), available at http://www.oed.com/
    view/Entry/194102; see also Sunflower, The American
    Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed.
    2011) (defining “sunflower” as, inter alia, “[a]ny of several
    plants of the genus Helianthus . . . , especially H. an-
    nuus, . . . that produce edible seeds rich in oil” (emphasis
    added)); Sunflower, Webster’s New World College Dic-
    tionary (4th ed. 2009) (defining “sunflower” as “any of a
    10                           WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES
    genus (Helianthus) of tall plants of the composite family,
    having large, yellow, daisylike flowers . . . containing
    edible seeds that yield an oil” (emphasis added)). The
    common meaning of “sunflower seeds” as used in HTSUS
    Heading 1206 thus is unambiguously “edible, oil-rich
    seeds of a sunflower,” 6 and there is no reasonable dispute
    that this broad definition covers the subject merchandise.
    See Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1368
    (stating as an
    uncontroverted fact that “[t]he sunflower seeds in all
    varieties of [Well Luck]’s imported merchandise are of the
    common sunflower, Helianthus annuus, and the seeds
    used by [Well Luck] are used, as is, for human consump-
    tion” (citations omitted)).
    Having considered the Heading, legislative history,
    and Chapter Notes consistent with GRI 1, we may turn to
    the relevant ENs. 
    Fuji, 519 F.3d at 1357
    . As the CIT
    explained, see Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1371
    –72, the
    General EN to Chapter 12 provides a narrowed definition
    for seeds, stating that Headings 1201–07 cover:
    (1) “seeds . . . used for the extraction . . . of edible or
    6   This definition is consistent with the definition at
    the time of the HTSUS’s enactment. See Airflow Tech.,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    524 F.3d 1287
    , 1291 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
    2008). Moreover, in accordance with our precedent, see
    Carl 
    Zeiss, 195 F.3d at 1379
    (providing that the “common
    and commercial meanings [of an HTSUS term] . . . are
    presumed to be the same” and that “[o]ne who argues that
    a tariff term should not be given its common or dictionary
    meaning must prove that it has a different commercial
    meaning that is definite, uniform, and general throughout
    the trade”), this definition is consistent with the commer-
    cial meaning reflected in the industry dictionaries prof-
    fered by Well Luck, see Appellant’s Br. 19–20, and
    surveyed by the CIT, see Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1370
    & nn.6–7.
    WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES                         11
    industrial oils and fats” but not seeds “primarily used for
    other purposes”; and (2) seeds that “have undergone heat
    treatment” but “only if [the heat treatment] does not alter
    the character of the seeds . . . as natural products” and
    “does not make them suitable for a specific use rather
    than for general use.” EN 12, General. However, by
    relying on the “narrower interpretation” provided by the
    EN to determine that HTSUS Heading 1206 does not
    cover the subject merchandise, Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1373
    ; see 
    id. (stating that
    “[n]othing in the language of
    the HTSUS heading itself clarifies whether this broad
    definition or a narrower definition applies” and adopting
    the “narrower interpretation” provided by the EN), the
    CIT ran afoul of our instruction that a court “shall not
    employ [the ENs’] limiting characteristics, to the extent
    there are any, to narrow the language of the classification
    heading itself.” 
    Sigma-Tau, 838 F.3d at 1281
    (quoting
    Rubie’s Costume Co. v. United States, 
    337 F.3d 1350
    , 1359
    (Fed. Cir. 2003)); cf. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United
    States, 
    561 F.3d 1308
    , 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (declining to
    afford ENs “any weight” when inconsistent with a tariff
    provision’s plain meaning (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted)). We decline to repeat the CIT’s error
    here. Therefore, we conclude that the subject merchan-
    dise is prima facie classifiable under HTSUS Heading
    1206.
    2. HTSUS Heading 2008
    Well Luck contends that, because the subject mer-
    chandise is prima facie classifiable under HTSUS Head-
    ing 1206, our inquiry ends. See Appellant’s Br. 37
    (stating that “Well Luck’s snacking sunflower seeds are
    properly classifiable as ‘sunflower seeds’ under [HTSUS]
    Heading 1206” and, thus, “[u]nder conventional tariff
    classification analysis, nothing more is required”). How-
    ever, imports may be prima facie classifiable under multi-
    ple HTSUS headings. See GRI 3 (governing situations
    where “goods are, prima facie, classifiable under two or
    12                          WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES
    more headings” (italics omitted)); see also 
    LeMans, 660 F.3d at 1316
    (“When merchandise is prima facie classifia-
    ble under two or more headings or subheadings of the
    HTSUS, we apply GRI 3 to resolve the classification.”
    (citation and italics omitted)). We hold that the subject
    merchandise also is prima facie classifiable under HTSUS
    Heading 2008.
    HTSUS Heading 2008 covers “[f]ruit, nuts and other
    edible parts of plants, otherwise prepared or preserved,
    whether or not containing added sugar or other sweeten-
    ing matter or spirit, not elsewhere specified or included:
    [n]uts, peanuts (ground-nuts) and other seeds, whether or
    not mixed together.” It is “eo nomine because it describes
    the articles it covers by name,” and, thus, “our analysis
    starts with [its] terms.” 
    Schlumberger, 845 F.3d at 1164
    .
    Neither the HTSUS, nor legislative history, nor Chap-
    ter Notes inform our construction of HTSUS Heading
    2008. Therefore, “we look to the dictionary to understand
    its common meaning.” 
    Id. Because there
    is no dispute
    that the subject merchandise is “seeds” under HTSUS
    Heading 2008, see Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1368
    (citations omitted), we must determine the common
    meaning of “edible” and “prepared or preserved.” First,
    “edible” means “fit to be eaten.” Edible, Webster’s New
    World College Dictionary (4th ed. 2009); see Edible, The
    American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
    (5th ed. 2011) (defining “edible” as “[f]it to be eaten,
    especially by humans”); Edible, New Oxford American
    Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (defining “edible” as “fit to be
    eaten (often used to contrast with unpalatable or poison-
    ous examples)”). Second, the definition of “prepared”
    includes “to be made ready.” See Prepare, The American
    Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011) (defining “prepare” to
    mean, inter alia, “[t]o make ready beforehand for a specif-
    ic purpose” and “[t]o put together or make by combining
    various elements or ingredients”); Prepare, New Oxford
    American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (defining “prepare” to
    WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES                          13
    mean, inter alia, “make (something) ready for use” and
    “make (food or a meal) ready for cooking or eating”);
    Prepare, Webster’s New World College Dictionary (4th ed.
    2009) (defining “prepare” to mean, inter alia, “to make
    ready, usually for a specific purpose” and “to put together
    or make out of ingredients, parts, etc., or according to a
    plan or formula”). And the definition of “preserve” in-
    cludes “treat[ing] or refrigerat[ing] (food) to prevent its
    decomposition or fermentation.”        Preserve, The New
    Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010); see Preserve,
    The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011) (defin-
    ing “preserve” to mean “prepare (food) for storage or
    future use, as by canning or salting”); Preserve, Webster’s
    New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 2009) (defining
    “preserve” to mean, inter alia, “to prepare (food), as by
    canning, pickling, salting, etc., for future use”). Taken
    together, HTSUS Heading 2008 covers “seeds” that are
    “fit to be eaten” and either “made ready” for consumption
    or       “treat[ed]     or     refrigerate[d] . . . to   pre-
    vent . . . decomposition or fermentation.”  7     The subject
    merchandise indisputably is made ready for consumption
    through processing, flavoring, and packaging. See Well
    
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1368
    .
    Having considered the Heading, legislative history,
    and Chapter Notes consistent with GRI 1, we turn to the
    relevant ENs. 
    Fuji, 519 F.3d at 1357
    . The EN to HTSUS
    Heading 2008 confirms our conclusion. It provides that
    HTSUS Heading 2008 covers “fruit, nuts and other edible
    parts of plants, whether whole, in pieces or
    crushed, . . . prepared or preserved” including, inter alia,
    certain nuts that are “dry-roasted, oil-roasted or fat-
    roasted, whether or not containing or coated with vegeta-
    7   This definition is consistent with the definition at
    the time of the HTSUS’s enactment. See 
    Airflow, 524 F.3d at 1291
    n.2.
    14                          WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES
    ble oil, salt, flavours, spices or other additives”; and
    explains that the products under HTSUS Heading 2008
    “are generally put up in . . . airtight containers.” EN,
    Heading 2008. Thus, the EN provides that the seeds may
    be “prepared” using the very processes performed on the
    subject merchandise. See Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1367
    (stating that the subject merchandise “consists of
    three varieties of wet-cooked and/or roasted, salted, fla-
    vored and/or unflavored sunflower seeds in unbroken
    shells” (emphases added) (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted)); see also 
    id. at 1368
    (discussing the
    processes of roasting, salting, flavoring, and packaging
    the subject merchandise), 1377 (“It is undisputed that all
    varieties of [Well Luck]’s imported merchandise are
    roasted and salted.” (citations omitted)). The subject
    merchandise thus is prima facie classifiable under
    HTSUS Heading 2008, as Well Luck now concedes. Oral
    Arg. at 6:13–19, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/
    default.aspx?fl=2017-1816.mp3 (Q: “Is your product not
    classifiable under [HTSUS Heading] 2008?” A: “It is.”).
    C. GRI 3(a) Dictates that the Subject Merchandise
    Properly Is Classified Under HTSUS Heading 2008
    Given that the subject merchandise is prima facie
    classifiable under both HTSUS Headings 1206 and 2008,
    “the question is which is the more appropriate classifica-
    tion.” Archer 
    Daniels, 561 F.3d at 1317
    . Because GRI 2
    does not apply to the subject merchandise, see GRI 2(a)–
    (b), we proceed to GRI 3, see GRI 3; see also Oral Arg. at
    6:37–59 (acknowledging, by Well Luck’s counsel, that
    where neither GRI 2(a) nor 2(b) applies, GRI 3 would
    apply, as is the situation here); 
    id. at 18:43–19:39
    (ac-
    knowledging the same by the Government).
    GRI 3(a) provides that “[t]he heading which provides
    the most specific description shall be preferred to head-
    ings providing a more general description.” GRI 3(a).
    When applying GRI 3(a), “the court should determine
    WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES                              15
    which heading is most specific, comparing only the lan-
    guage of the headings and not the language of the sub-
    headings.” JVC Co. of Am. v. United States, 
    234 F.3d 1348
    , 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In addi-
    tion, “we look to the provision with requirements that are
    more difficult to satisfy and that describe the article with
    the greatest degree of accuracy and certainty.” 
    LeMans, 660 F.3d at 1316
    (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    We determine that HTSUS Heading 2008 is more spe-
    cific than HTSUS Heading 1206. HTSUS Heading 1206
    covers “[s]unflower seeds, whether or not broken,” where-
    as HTSUS Heading 2008 covers “[f]ruit, nuts and other
    edible parts of plants, otherwise prepared or preserved,
    whether or not containing added sugar or other sweeten-
    ing matter or spirit, not elsewhere specified or included:
    [n]uts, peanuts (ground-nuts) and other seeds, whether or
    not mixed together.” HTSUS Heading 2008’s requirement
    that the subject merchandise be “prepared or preserved”
    renders it more difficult to satisfy than sunflower seeds in
    HTSUS Heading 1206 because preparation and preserva-
    tion “involve[] some degree of processing or addition of
    ingredients.” Orlando 
    Food, 140 F.3d at 1441
    . “There-
    fore, because the requirements of [HTSUS Heading 2008]
    are more difficult to satisfy, it is the more specific head-
    ing, and under [GRI 3(a)], it governs the classification of
    the [subject merchandise].” Id.; see 
    id. (finding an
    HTSUS
    heading “for preparations for sauces, [to be] more specific
    than [an HTSUS heading] which covers prepared and
    preserved tomatoes” because “producing a preparation for
    a sauce necessarily involves some degree of processing or
    addition of ingredients,” while “prepared or preserved
    tomatoes . . . mandate[] only minimal processing,” such
    that the former is “more difficult to satisfy”); see also Faus
    Grp., Inc. v. United States, 
    581 F.3d 1369
    , 1374 (Fed. Cir.
    2009) (reiterating Orlando Food’s holding that the “head-
    ing [that] is more difficult to satisfy . . . [is] more specific”
    16                          WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES
    and holding that a heading that “covers only processed
    products” “encompasses a narrower range of items and
    uses” than a heading that “covers a large variety of pro-
    cessed and unprocessed fiberboard products”). 8 Accord-
    ingly, GRI 3(a) dictates that classification under HTSUS
    Heading 2008 is preferred. 9
    Having determined that the subject merchandise
    properly is classified under HTSUS Heading 2008, we
    apply GRI 6 to determine the appropriate subheading.
    8   Our conclusion is unaltered by the EN to GRI
    3(a)’s statement that “[a] description by name is more
    specific than a description by class,” EN (IV)(a), GRI 3(a),
    and by the fact that HTSUS Heading 1206 identifies
    “[s]unflower seeds” by name. Instead, we have previously
    recognized that the “[ENs] are not legally binding,”
    StoreWALL, LLC v. United States, 
    644 F.3d 1358
    , 1362
    (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), and the particular EN
    at issue itself acknowledges that this general rule regard-
    ing specificity does not always apply, see EN (IV), GRI
    3(a) (stating that “[i]t is not practicable to lay down hard
    and fast rules by which to determine whether one heading
    more specifically describes the goods than another”).
    9   If HTSUS Headings 1206 and 2008 were equally
    specific, we would turn to GRI 3(b), which would not apply
    here because it only applies to “[m]ixtures, composite
    goods consisting of different materials or made up of
    different components, and goods put up in sets for retail
    sale.” GRI 3(b). Thus, we would apply GRI 3(c), which
    provides that, “[w]hen goods cannot be classified by
    reference to [GRI] 3(a) or 3(b), they shall be classified
    under the heading which occurs last in numerical order
    among those which equally merit consideration.” GRI 3(c)
    (emphasis added). Because HTSUS Heading 2008 occurs
    “last in numerical order,” it would govern the classifica-
    tion.
    WELL LUCK CO.   v. UNITED STATES                         17
    See GRI 6 (applying to “the classification of goods in the
    subheadings” and explaining that “only subheadings at
    the same level are comparable”); see also Orlando 
    Food, 140 F.3d at 1442
    . At the six-digit subheading level, the
    subject merchandise does not fall within the terms of
    HTSUS Subheading 2008.11, which covers “[p]eanuts
    (ground-nuts),” so we turn to HTSUS Subheading
    2008.19, which covers “[o]ther, including mixtures” and
    aptly describes the subject merchandise. Because the
    subject merchandise does not fall within any of the eight-
    digit level subheadings preceding HTSUS Subheading
    2008.19.90, it properly is classified under HTSUS Sub-
    heading 2008.19.90, which covers “[o]ther, including
    mixtures: [o]ther.” See Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States,
    
    282 F.3d 1349
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that, where
    merchandise properly is classified under a particular
    heading but does not fall within a specific subheading, it
    properly is classified under the relevant heading’s “bas-
    ket” or “catch-all” provision). Indeed, the parties do not
    contest the CIT’s conclusion that, if the subject merchan-
    dise properly is classified under HTSUS Heading 2008,
    then it falls within HTSUS Subheading 2008.19.90. See
    Well 
    Luck, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 1377
    ; see also Appellee’s
    Br. 1 (arguing that the subject merchandise properly is
    classified under HTSUS Subheading 2008.19.90). See
    generally Appellant’s Br. (failing to argue for the applica-
    tion of any other Subheading under HTSUS Heading
    2008). Therefore, we conclude that the subject merchan-
    dise properly is classified under HTSUS Subheading
    2008.19.90.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Well Luck’s remaining arguments
    and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Judgment
    of the U.S. Court of International Trade is
    AFFIRMED