Jore Corporation v. Kouvato v. Home Depot u.s.a. ( 2005 )


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  •                 NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
    is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    04-1163,-1164
    JORE CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff-Cross Appellant,
    v.
    KOUVATO, INC.,
    Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff-
    Appellant,
    v.
    HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., THE STANLEY WORKS LIMITED,
    THE STANLEY WORKS, STANLEY LOGISTICS, INC.,
    and OLD JORE CORPORATION,
    Third Party Defendants-
    Appellees.
    ___________________________
    DECIDED: January 7, 2005
    ___________________________
    Before LOURIE, Circuit Judge, FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRYSON, Circuit
    Judge.
    BRYSON, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant Kouvato, Inc., is the assignee of a design patent on a drill bit, U.S.
    Design Patent No. 419,575 (“the ’575 patent”).      Kouvato filed an action alleging
    infringement of the ’575 patent by The Stanley Works Ltd.; The Stanley Works; Stanley
    Works Logistics, Inc. (collectively, “the Stanley defendants”); Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.;
    and a company named, at that time, Jore Corporation (“Old Jore”). Old Jore filed a
    separate action against Kouvato seeking a declaratory judgment that the ’575 patent
    was invalid and unenforceable, and that Old Jore did not infringe the patent. Old Jore
    subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and its assets and name were bought by the newly
    organized company, Jore Corporation (“Jore”). The new Jore Corporation was then
    joined as a plaintiff and counterclaim defendant. The cases were consolidated in the
    United States District Court for the District of Montana, CV 01-181-M-DWM.
    The district court subsequently granted summary judgment of non-infringement
    for the Stanley defendants.    The remainder of the case went to trial before a jury.
    Following the trial, the jury found that the ’575 patent was valid and enforceable but not
    infringed. Jore and Home Depot moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issues
    of patent invalidity and unenforceability. Kouvato filed a motion for a new trial. The
    district court denied Jore and Home Depot’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and
    Kouvato’s motion for a new trial. The court then awarded Home Depot its costs, but it
    denied costs to Jore because the court concluded that Jore was not a prevailing party.
    Kouvato appeals the determination of noninfringement. Jore cross-appeals the ruling
    that the patent is valid and enforceable and also challenges the district court’s finding
    that the corporation is not a prevailing party for purposes of awarding costs.
    During trial, Jore presented two pieces of prior art, which the company claimed
    rendered the ’575 patent obvious. The first piece was a high speed, reduced-shank
    steel helical drill bit made by the Triumph Twist Drill Co. For purposes of its argument
    that the ’575 patent would be obvious, Jore designated the Triumph bit as the “primary
    04-1163,-1164                               2
    reference” in the prior art, “the design characteristics of which are basically the same as
    the claimed design.” In re Rosen, 
    673 F.2d 388
    , 391 (CCPA 1982). A piece of prior art
    cannot serve as the primary reference if major modification would be required to make
    the reference look like the claimed design. In re Harvey, 
    12 F.3d 1061
    , 1063 (Fed. Cir.
    1993). An examination of the Triumph bit and Figure 2 of the ’575 patent makes clear
    that the two bits are almost identical:
    Figure 2 of the ’575 design patent
    Triumph prior art bit
    The sole difference between the two bits is that the Triumph bit has a cylindrical shaft,
    whereas the ’575 patent discloses a hexagonal shaft with a narrow groove at the end.
    Both parties apparently agree on that point, and therefore the Triumph bit may serve as
    the primary reference.
    Once a primary reference is identified, the party asserting obviousness may then
    present a secondary reference in an effort to show that the primary and secondary prior
    art references make the claimed design obvious to one of skill in the art. In re Borden,
    
    90 F.3d 1570
    , 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996).        For secondary references to be considered,
    04-1163,-1164                                3
    however, there must be some suggestion in the prior art to modify the basic design with
    features from the secondary references. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 
    988 F.2d 1117
    , 1124 (Fed Cir. 1993).        In this case, Jore argues that 
    U.S. Patent No. 4,818,157
     (“the ’157 patent”) teaches that a hexagonal shaft with a narrow groove at the
    end may be placed on the end of a drill bit or any other such tool that is driven by rotary
    power. 
    Id.
     at col. 3, ll. 5-7, 15-20. Furthermore, Jore contends that Figure 1 and Figure
    4 of the ’157 patent depict a drill bit having a standard-sized hexagonal shaft with a
    narrow groove in the shaft:
    Figure 1 and Figure 4 of the ’157 patent
    As Jore argues, the ’157 patent clearly contemplates that any drill bit “or other such tool”
    can receive a standard-sized hexagonal shaft with narrow groove. 
    Id.
     at col. 2, line 2;
    
    id.
     at col. 3, ll. 15-20. Therefore, the ’157 patent itself contains an express motivation to
    combine the ’157 patent with a design such as that disclosed in the Triumph drill bit.
    Kouvato counters that combining the Triumph bit with the teaching of the ’157
    patent would not have rendered its patent obvious. Kouvato first argues that unlike the
    04-1163,-1164                                4
    ’575 patent, the ’157 patent does not show a hexagonal shaft that is reduced in
    diameter compared to the helical “working portion” of the drill bit. For that reason,
    Kouvato contends that the ’575 patent would not have been obvious in light of the ’157
    patent. That argument fails, however, because the Triumph drill bit itself contains a
    reduced shaft. Therefore, there is no need for the ’157 patent to teach that feature as
    well.
    In the alternative, Kouvato contends that even if the ’157 patent and the Triumph
    bit teach a bit containing a reduced, hexagonal shaft, there is no indication in either
    piece of prior art of how to combine that shaft with the cylindrical working portion of the
    bit.    Kouvato maintains that the manner in which the shaft joins the larger working
    portion is a design choice. Kouvato supports that argument with testimony from its
    expert, Professor Ralph Barnett, who stated that other prior art “taught away” from
    simply joining the shaft with the working portion to create a 90 degree transition
    between the two. Specifically, Professor Barnett stated that a particular bit sold by a
    company known as Insty Bit showed a transition from shaft to working portion that
    consisted of a “collar” that was thicker than either the shaft or the working portion of the
    bit. According to Professor Barnett, the Insty Bit collar therefore “taught away” from
    simply adjoining the hexagonal shaft with the working portion of the bit.
    What a piece of prior art teaches is a question of fact. Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg.
    Mich. Inc., 
    192 F.3d 1353
    , 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).            However, Professor Barnett’s
    assertion that the Insty Bit design “taught away” from the ’575 patent was based on a
    legal misconception. Simply because a piece of prior art contains a feature that is not
    present in the patent does not mean that the prior art teaches away from the patent.
    04-1163,-1164                                 5
    Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Imps. Int’l, Inc., 
    73 F.3d 1085
    , 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
    A reference teaches away only when a person of ordinary skill, upon examining the
    reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or
    would be led in a direction different from the path that was taken by the applicant. In re
    Gurley, 
    27 F.3d 551
    , 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
    Nothing in the evidence in this case suggests that the Insty Bit design would lead
    persons of skill in the art to join a smaller shaft and larger working portion of the bit only
    by using a collar. To the contrary, Professor Barnett admitted that there was an entire
    class of bits that did not use a collar as a transition between a smaller shaft and larger
    working portion. Furthermore, the president of Insty Bit testified at trial that other Insty
    Bit brand drill bits did not use a collar, and the evidence included many pieces of prior
    art, including the Triumph bit itself, that used a direct 90 degree transition between a
    smaller shaft and larger working portion. Most damaging of all, the inventor of the ’575
    patent admitted that the drill bit shown in the ’157 patent would look like his claimed drill
    bit if the working portion of the drill bit in the ’157 patent had a larger diameter.
    In denying Jore’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of
    invalidity, the district court relied on two pieces of evidence to uphold the jury’s verdict of
    nonobviousness. The court relied on Professor Barnett’s conclusion that the Insty Bit
    taught away from the patented design and that there was a long-felt need for the
    design. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 
    383 U.S. 1
     (1966). As we discussed above,
    the prior art did not actually teach away from the ’575 patent. Moreover, the “long-felt
    need” to which the district court referred was based on the fact that, according to
    Professor Barnett, reduced hexagonal shafts had been “around forever” but the exact
    04-1163,-1164                                  6
    configuration of the ’575 patent was new.          That testimony, however, does not
    demonstrate a long-felt need. If the fact of a new design in an old art field demonstrated
    a long-felt need for the new design, long-felt need would not be a meaningful indicator
    of nonobviousness but would merely be another way of saying that a particular design is
    novel.
    Kouvato also introduced a press release that Jore had sent out regarding the
    accused device.     The press release described the accused bit as being among its
    “exciting new products.” Kouvato argues that the press release demonstrates that there
    was a long-felt need for the patented design. However, the fact that Jore touted the
    accused bit as one of its “new products” does not suggest that the design of the bit was
    novel, and it certainly does not prove that there was any long-felt need for the patented
    design.
    There was no other evidence to indicate that the ’575 patent would not have
    been obvious. On appeal, Kouvato suggests that Old Jore copied the ’575 patent’s
    design. There is no evidence in the record to support that allegation, however. The
    evidence presented at trial showed that Old Jore was designing and selling the accused
    drill bit at least five months before anyone at the company became aware of the ’575
    patent. In sum, Jore showed by clear and convincing evidence that the ’575 patent
    would have been obvious, and that showing went unrebutted at trial. While we give
    considerable deference to a jury’s factual findings, Markman v. Westview Instruments,
    Inc., 
    52 F.3d 967
    , 975 (Fed. Cir. 1995), we must still determine “if those findings support
    the legal conclusion drawn by the jury in reaching its verdict,” Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
    United States Gypsum Co., 
    195 F.3d 1322
    , 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In this case, the
    04-1163,-1164                               7
    ultimate determination of obviousness is a question of law, which Jore proved by
    unrefuted clear and convincing evidence. Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson
    Co., 
    365 F.3d 1054
    , 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Therefore, the district court should have
    granted Jore’s motion for a judgment of invalidity notwithstanding the verdict.
    In light of our determination that the ’575 patent is invalid, it is unnecessary for us
    to address the questions of infringement or unenforceability. We therefore affirm the
    judgment of the district court, albeit on a different ground. However, because Jore is
    plainly a prevailing party, we vacate the district court’s denial of an award of costs to
    Jore; on remand the trial court should revisit the question of costs.
    04-1163,-1164                                 8