Estate of Cox v. Office of Personnel Management , 208 F. App'x 844 ( 2006 )


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  •                  NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
    is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    06-3156
    THE ESTATE OF BETTY L. COX,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
    Respondent.
    __________________________
    DECIDED: November 9, 2006
    __________________________
    Before MAYER, BRYSON, and LINN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    The Estate of Betty L. Cox (“Cox”) petitions for review of a final decision of the
    Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) affirming the Office of Personnel
    Management’s (“OPM”) decision that Cox was not eligible to apply for and receive
    survivor annuity benefits. Estate of Cox v. Office Pers. Mgmt., No. DA-0831-05-0558-I-
    1 (M.S.P.B. Nov. 23, 2005) (“Order”). Because the Board’s decision is in accordance
    with law and does not otherwise contain reversible error, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Earl Cox retired from the Department of Justice on February 1, 1978. At the time
    of his retirement, Earl Cox elected a survivor annuity for his wife, Betty H. Cox, pursuant
    to the Civil Service Retirement System (“CSRS”). Earl Cox died on October 30, 2003.
    His death was not reported to OPM, which continued to deposit his annuity into a bank
    account. Betty H. Cox died on September 7, 2004. After her death, Kenneth E. Cox,
    the executor of her estate, notified OPM that both his mother and father had died and
    sought survivor benefits on behalf of his mother for the period of time between their
    deaths. OPM determined that benefits were not payable because the application for
    survivor benefits was not filed during the lifetime of Betty H. Cox. Order, slip op. at 2.
    Cox filed a petition for review of OPM’s decision with the Board. In an initial
    decision, the administrative judge affirmed OPM’s decision, citing 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 8345
    (e),
    8331(11),1 
    5 C.F.R. § 831.643
    , and our decision in Davis v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 
    918 F.2d 944
     (Fed. Cir. 1990). Order, slip op. at 3-5. The administrative
    judge’s initial decision became the final decision of the Board on December 28, 2005
    when Cox chose not to petition the Board for review. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    . This
    appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    1
    Section 8345 of the statute provides, in relevant part, that
    after the death of an employee, Member, or annuitant, no benefit based on
    his service shall be paid from the Fund unless an application therefore is
    received in the Office of Personnel Management within 30 years after the
    death or other event which gives rise to title to the benefit.
    
    5 U.S.C. § 8345
    (i)(2). A survivor annuitant is defined as “a survivor who files
    claim for annuity.” 
    Id.
     § 8331(11).
    06-3156                                   2
    DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    This court must affirm a Board decision unless it is: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an
    abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without
    procedures required by law, rule or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported
    by substantial evidence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c); see also Hayes v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
    727 F.2d 1535
    , 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The burden of establishing reversible error in a
    Board decision rests upon the petitioner. Harris v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
    142 F.3d 1463
    , 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    B. Analysis
    On appeal, Cox argues that our decision in Simpson v. Office of Personnel
    Management, 
    347 F.3d 1361
     (Fed. Cir. 2003), overturned our previous decision in
    Davis. Alternatively, Cox argues that Davis conflicts with earlier precedent, Roebling v.
    Office of Personnel Management, 
    788 F.2d 1544
     (Fed. Cir. 1986), and was therefore
    wrongly decided.
    As Cox acknowledges, the facts in Davis are very similar to those at issue in this
    case. In Davis, the annuitant elected a survivor annuity for his wife. 
    918 F.2d at 945
    .
    The annuitant died, and his wife died shortly thereafter without having filed a survivor’s
    claim to an annuity. 
    Id.
     We held that 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 8345
    (e), 8331(11) and the relevant
    regulations provide that a right to a survivor annuity “does not vest automatically; an
    application must first be filed before there is any entitlement to a survivor annuity.” 
    Id. at 946
    . We also held that the application must be filed before the survivor’s death. 
    Id.
    06-3156                                   3
    “Accordingly, if a potential survivor annuitant does not make application during his or
    her lifetime, there can be no accrual of any unpaid annuity.” 
    Id.
    Cox argues that Simpson renders Davis inapplicable by creating a general duty
    on OPM to advise individuals of their retirement rights. We disagree. In Simpson, we
    noted that OPM had a statutory duty to inform an annuitant of the requirements that
    must be met to reelect a spousal annuity after a divorce. 
    347 F.3d at 1364
    . Because
    “OPM’s notices of record fail[ed] to comply with the statutory requirement of notice,” we
    reversed the Board’s denial of the former spouse’s application for a survivor annuity. 
    Id. at 1364, 1367
     (emphasis added). However, as we acknowledged in Davis, “[t]here is no
    statutory duty imposed on OPM to notify potential survivor annuitants of the requirement
    to file a claim for an annuity.” 
    918 F.2d at 946
    . Because Cox was a potential survivor
    annuitant, and not an annuitant, Simpson is inapposite.
    Cox’s remaining alternative arguments are unpersuasive.        The administrative
    judge correctly applied 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 8345
    (e), 8331(11), 
    5 C.F.R. § 831.643
    , and our
    decision in Davis. Because the Board’s decision is in accordance with law and does not
    otherwise contain reversible error, we affirm.
    06-3156                                  4