Hunter v. Department of the Air Force , 211 F. App'x 962 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                       NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2006-3355
    CLINTON A. HUNTER,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
    Respondent.
    Clinton A. Hunter, of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, pro se.
    Captain Melinda Greene, Trial Attorney, Air Force Legal Services Agency, United
    States Air Force, for respondent. Of counsel were David M. Cohen, Director; Deborah
    A. Bynum, Assistant Director; and Tara K. Hogan, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation
    Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington.
    Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection Board
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2006-3355
    CLINTON HUNTER,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
    Respondent.
    ___________________________
    DECIDED: January 11, 2007
    ___________________________
    Before MICHEL, GAJARSA, and DYK Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Clinton Hunter appeals a Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) decision in
    DA0752060258-I-1 approving a settlement agreement and dismissing the appeal.1 We
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On February 17, 2006, Mr. Hunter was removed from his position as a Tools and
    Parts Attendant at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. He was removed because he
    allegedly threatened two other employees.           The Department of the Air Force (“Air
    Force”) deemed that removal was the proper penalty because Mr. Hunter had been
    previously suspended for periods of five and fourteen days respectively for failing to
    1
    We note that in briefing this appeal, the government, contrary to our rules,
    cited a nonprecedential opinion issued before January 1, 2007. See Fed. Cir. R.
    32.1(c).
    work during overtime hours, misusing a government computer, and leaving the work
    area without permission.
    On February 10, 2006, Mr. Hunter filed a timely appeal to the Board. He was
    represented on appeal by his attorney, Tony Gould. After negotiations, on May 19,
    2006, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement. The agreement was
    executed by Mr. Hunter, Mr. Gould, and a representative from the Air Force. Pursuant
    to the settlement agreement, Mr. Hunter agreed to, inter alia, withdraw his appeal to the
    Board with prejudice, resign from his position with the Air Force, not reapply for
    employment with the Air Force for five years, and not apply for unemployment
    compensation based on his Air Force employment. In return, the Air Force agreed to
    amend all personnel documents to state that Mr. Hunter resigned for personal reasons,
    remove all records of his suspensions from his personnel file, tell all potential employers
    that Mr. Hunter’s performance was “acceptable,” and pay $10,000 in attorney’s fees to
    Mr. Gould.
    On the same day the parties executed the settlement agreement, an
    Administrative Judge (“AJ”) approved the agreement stating that “I find that the
    agreement appears lawful on its face, the parties freely entered into it, and they
    understand its terms.” Resp’t App. 11. Accordingly, the AJ dismissed the appeal with
    prejudice pursuant to 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.41
    (c)(2) (2006). [RB App 11] The decision
    became final on June 23, 2006, thirty five days after the AJ’s decision. See 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
     (2006). [RB App 12] There is no indication that the petitioner challenged the
    voluntariness of the agreement before the Board.
    2006-3355
    2
    A timely appeal to this Court followed.      We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9) (2000).
    DISCUSSION
    The Board’s decision must be affirmed unless it is found to be arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained
    without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation; or unsupported by substantial
    evidence. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c) (2000); Yates v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    145 F.3d 1480
    ,
    1483 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    On appeal, petitioner argues that the settlement should be set aside as
    involuntary. There is no claim that the petitioner raised the question of voluntariness
    before the Board. We held specifically in Sargent v. Department of Health and Human
    Services, 
    229 F.3d 1088
    , 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000), that this court is precluded from
    reviewing a claim that was never presented to the presiding official or the Board. In that
    case, the petitioner sought to invalidate an oral settlement agreement that was
    approved by an AJ. 
    Id. at 1090
    . He did not raise any objection to the agreement before
    the AJ or petition for review to the full Board. 
    Id. at 1091
    . Because the issue was not
    raised below, we did not consider the petitioner’s argument that the settlement
    agreement was involuntary. 
    Id.
     Sargent is directly on point. As Mr. Hunter did not first
    challenge the settlement agreement before the full Board, we cannot consider his
    argument.
    Additionally, even if Mr. Hunter’s claims had been properly raised below, his
    allegations, assuming he could prove them, would be insufficient to support a claim for
    involuntariness.   Mr. Hunter claims that two days before he signed the settlement
    2006-3355
    3
    agreement, Mr. Gould informed him that he could not continue to represent him on
    appeal unless Mr. Hunter paid $4,000 to $5,000 in legal fees. On May 18, 2006, Mr.
    Gould sent Mr. Hunter a copy of the settlement agreement. Mr. Gould allegedly stated
    by telephone that “if [Mr. Hunter] didn’t [sign the agreement] the agency would rescind it
    and . . . [he would] still lose [the] appeal because [Mr. Gould] wouldn’t be representing
    [him].” Mr. Hunter signed the settlement agreement that same day.
    The petitioner bears a “heavy burden” in proving that a settlement agreement
    should be invalidated. Asberry v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    692 F.2d 1378
    , 1380 (Fed. Cir.
    1982).     To “set aside a settlement agreement, an appellant must show that the
    agreement is unlawful, was involuntary, or was the result of fraud or mutual mistake.”
    Sargent, 229 F.3d at 1091.        Mr. Hunter has not met this burden.      The potential
    withdrawal of Mr. Gould as Mr. Hunter’s attorney did not render the settlement
    agreement involuntary. If Mr. Hunter wished to continue his appeal, he could have done
    so pro se.     Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Hunter is arguing that he signed the
    agreement under economic duress, we have consistently held that financial hardship is
    an insufficient reason to set aside a settlement agreement. See Asberry, 
    692 F.2d at 1381
    .     As this court stated in Asberry, “Every loss of employment entails financial
    hardship.    If that alone were sufficient to establish economic duress, no settlement
    involving it would ever be free from attack.” 
    Id.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision.
    No costs.
    2006-3355
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2006-3355

Citation Numbers: 211 F. App'x 962

Judges: Michel, Gajarsa, Dyk

Filed Date: 1/11/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024