Tatum v. Dept. Of Veterans Affairs ( 2011 )


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  • NOTE: This order is nonprecedentia1.
    United States Court of AppeaIs
    for the FederaI Circuit
    WILLIE E. TATUM,
    Claimant-Appellant,
    V.
    ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS
    AFFAIRS, ~
    Resp0ndent-Appellee.
    2011-7()70 _
    Appea1 from the United States Court of Appeals for
    Veterans C1ai1ns in case no. 08-3782, Chief Judge Bruce
    E. Kaso1d.
    ON MOTION
    Before NEWMAN, SCHALL and DYK, Circuit Judges.
    NEWMAN, Circuit Jucige.
    ORDER
    The Secretary of Veterans Affairs moves to waive the
    requirements of Fed. Ci1'. R. 27(f) and dismiss Wi1lie E.
    Tatum’s appea1. Tatu1n opp0ses. The Secretary rep1ies.
    TATUM V. DVA 2
    Tatum served on active duty from May 1958 to March
    1980 ln February 2002, Tatum filed a claim with the
    Department of Veterans Affairs regional office (RO)
    seeking compensation for a disability resulting from
    prostate cancer associated with herbicide exposure during
    his service, and residual disability resulting from surgery
    and treatment he had undergone for his cancer
    The RO awarded Tatum a staged rating consisting of
    a 100% disability rating award through May 2002, and a
    10% disability rating effective thereafter based on a
    medical examiner’s report that Tatum’s condition had
    impr0ved. The Board sustained the RO’s staged-rating
    award, which Tatum appealed to the United States Court
    of Appeals for Veterar1s Claims. '
    On appea1, the court set aside the Board’s determina-
    tion not to award Tatum entitlement to a rating award of
    higher than 10% after l\/lay 2002, and remanded the
    matter for additional proceedings ln doing so, the court
    held that the Board did not adequately address whether
    Tatum’s 100% disability rating should have continued
    pursuant to applicable regulations based on a local reoc-
    currence or metastasis or continued treatment for malig-
    nant neoplasms.
    The court rejected Tatum’s argument that he was cur-
    rently entitled to a l00% disability rating award based on
    an argument that the Department failed to fulfill its
    obligations under 
    38 C.F.R. § 3.105
    (e) in notifying him
    that his rating was going to be reduced. The court ex-
    plained that Tatum’s argument ignored § 3.105(e)’s clear
    directive that notice was only warranted when there is a
    reduction in "compensation payments currently being
    made,” and that it was undisputed that Tatun1 was not
    receiving compensation at the time the staged rating was
    4
    3 TATUM V. DVA
    assigned thereby rendering the regulation’s requirement
    inapplicable.
    The Secretary moves to dismiss Tatum’s appeal from
    the court’s remand order as non-final. Our review of
    decisions of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is
    governed by 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    . While that statute does
    not explicitly impose a final judgment requirement, we
    have nonetheless “generally declined to review non-final
    orders of the Veterans Court” on prudential grounds.
    William,s v. Principi, 
    275 F.3d 1361
    , 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
    Williams establishes a three-part test for deviation from
    the strict rule of finality:
    (1) there must have been a clear and final deci-
    sion of a legal issue that (a) is separate from the
    remand proceedings, (b) will directly govern the
    remand proceedings or, (c) if reversed by this
    court, would render the remand proceedings un-
    necessary; (2) the resolution of the legal issues
    must adversely affect the party seeking review;
    and, (3) there must be a substantial risk that the
    decision would not survive a remand, i.e., that the
    remand proceeding may moot the issue.
    
    Id. at 1364
     (footnotes omitted).
    Our precedent confirms that to take up a remand or-
    der on appeal, the appellant must challenge a remand
    action that itself would independently violate the rights of
    the veteran, for example, where a remand would be
    barred by statute. C0mpare J0yce v. Nicholson,, 
    443 F.3d 845
    , 849-50 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (dismissing appeal from
    remand order); J0nes o. Nicholson, 
    431 F.3d 1353
    , 1359
    (Fed. Cir. 2005) (same); Myore v. Principi, 
    323 F.3d 1347
    ,
    1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Same); Winn v. Br0wn, 
    110 F.3d 56
    , 57 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (same) with Stevens v. Principi,
    TATUM V. DVA 4
    
    289 F.3d 814
    , 817 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (deciding merits of
    appeal from remand order where veteran challenged
    court’s authority to remand); Adams u. Principi, 
    256 F.3d 1318
    , 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (same).
    This requirement is notably absent here. Tatum does
    not seek to challenge the basis for remand, but a separate
    issue_that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’
    interpretation of § 3.105(e)’s notice obligations errone-
    ously denied him entitlement to a 100% disability rating
    award effective immediately. '
    The right to appeal a remand order does not_despite
    Tatum’s objections_hinge on the possibility that a rever-
    sal by this court could eliminate the need for a remand to
    the agency. ln Myore, the veteran sought to appeal a
    remand order in which the Court of Appeals for Veterans
    CIaims addressed and rejected the appellants contention
    that 
    38 U.S.C. § 1310
    (a) cannot be interpreted to deny her
    dependency and indemnity compensation because of
    misconduct by the veteran. We dismissed, explaining:
    The mere fact that the Veterans Court as part of
    a remand decision may have made an error of
    law that will govern the remand proceeding-
    even one that, if reversed, would lead to a deci-
    sion in favor of the claimant_does not render
    that decision final. Rather, ‘there must be a sub-
    stantial risk that the decision would not survive
    a remand.’
    
    323 F.3d at 1352
     (qu0nng william 
    275 F.3d at
    571
    We see no sound reason to treat this case differently.
    J ust as in Myore, if Tatum does not obtain all the benefits
    he seeks before the Board and the Board’s decision is
    affirmed by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,
    then Tatum may seek review of the court’s interpretation
    3
    5 TATUM V. DVA
    of § 3.105 on what will then be a final judgment We
    therefore dismiss the appeal.
    Accordingly,
    IT ls 0RoEREo THA'r:
    (1) The Secretary's motions are granted
    (2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
    FoR THE CoURT
    _j\j\_ 7 2011
    /s/ J an Horbaly
    Date J an Horbaly
    Clerk
    cc: Sandra E. Booth, Esq. __
    Michael P. Goodman, Esq.
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