Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron, Corp. ( 2010 )

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2009-1352
DUHN OIL TOOL, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
COOPER CAMERON CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California in case no. 1:05-CV-1411, Senior Judge Oliver W. Wanger.
Before LINN, FRIEDMAN, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
ORDER
Cooper Cameron Corp. (“Cameron”) and Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. (“Duhn”) dispute
whether the district court’s April 1, 2009 order is immediately appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1292. “[I]f the district court’s order expressly grants an injunction, the order is
appealable under § 1292(a)(1), without regard to whether the appellant is able to
demonstrate serious or irreparable consequences.” Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, the
district court’s order is an express injunction. While the court claimed to deny injunctive
relief, it specifically imposed in paragraph 3 an affirmative obligation on Cameron to
“provide instructions to its frac mandrel customers, which unambiguously state that the
lockscrews are not to be engaged during installation or use of the frac mandrel.” Duhn
Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., No. 05-CV-1411, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D. Cal. Apr.
1, 2009) (“Order”). The court thereby granted part of the relief that Duhn requested—to
prohibit Cameron from further allegedly infringing uses. Even if Cameron previously
volunteered to halt these uses, the order now prevents Cameron from changing its mind
before trial. Therefore, the order is an immediately appealable injunction, and we have
jurisdiction under § 1292(c)(1). See Cross Med., 424 F.3d at 1300.
In this case, there were insufficient grounds for the court to enjoin Cameron. A
preliminary injunction requires the moving party to show both likelihood of success on
the merits, and irreparable harm unless the injunction issues. See Amazon.com, Inc. v.
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The district court
identified “strongly conflicting evidence” about the possible frequency of Cameron’s
future infringement, and the absence of “a sufficient showing for injunctive relief of the
scope and of the nature, [sic] including the notice requirement that Plaintiffs are
seeking.” Order at 2. Duhn identifies no irreparable harm that it would suffer without
the court’s order, and does not cross-appeal the denial of the broader injunctive relief it
proposed. For these reasons alone, the injunction was improper. Therefore, we decline
Cameron’s invitation to address invalidity and noninfringement in the first instance. See
Sentry Prot. Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e do
not normally decide significant issues for the first time on appeal.”).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
2009-1352 2
Paragraph 3 of the district court’s order of April 1, 2009 is vacated, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings. No costs.
FOR THE COURT
February 19, 2010 /s/ Jan Horbaly
Date Jan Horbaly
Clerk
cc: James M. Whitelaw
Charles J. Rogers
2009-1352 3