Perry v. PTO ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 22-1720   Document: 37     Page: 1   Filed: 08/09/2022
    NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    MOSHE A. PERRY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
    OFFICE, KATHERINE K. VIDAL, Under Secretary
    of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director
    of the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
    WENDY GARBER, Director Patent Technology Cen-
    ter 3600 No. 3649, DARNELL JAYNE, Director No.
    3649, DALE SHAW, Ombudsman, KRISTINE
    CLARETTE MATTER, Examiner, KATHERINE
    MATECKI, Group Director, Technology Center No.
    3649, LAURA MARTIN, Examiner, SHIRENE
    WILLIS BRANTLEY, Attorney Advisor at the
    USPTO Petition Department, CHARLES STEVEN
    BRANTLEY, Attorney Advisor at the USPTO Peti-
    tion Department,
    Defendants-Appellees
    ______________________
    2022-1720
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Central District of California in No. 2:19-cv-00637-RGK-
    JC, Judge R. Gary Klausner.
    Case: 22-1720    Document: 37      Page: 2    Filed: 08/09/2022
    2                                               PERRY   v. PTO
    ______________________
    ON MOTION
    ______________________
    PER CURIAM.
    ORDER
    Moshe A. Perry moves for leave to proceed in forma
    pauperis (“IFP”). For the following reasons, we dismiss.
    In January 2019, Mr. Perry filed a complaint in federal
    district court against the United States Patent and Trade-
    mark Office and various officials alleging misconduct in the
    handling of his patent applications. On February 1, 2019,
    the district court denied his IFP motion and dismissed the
    complaint as frivolous. Mr. Perry did not appeal that rul-
    ing. However, Mr. Perry subsequently did file a complaint
    raising similar allegations at the United States Court of
    Federal Claims. The Court of Federal Claims also dis-
    missed his claims. Mr. Perry appealed that decision to this
    court, and we affirmed. Perry v. United States, No. 2020-
    2084, 
    2021 WL 2935075
     (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021).
    After unsuccessfully pursuing his claims in the Court
    of Federal Claims, Mr. Perry went back to the district
    court, seeking to reopen his case. On January 20, 2022, the
    district court ordered that the motion be rejected for filing
    and returned to Mr. Perry, noting that his case had previ-
    ously been dismissed. On March 16, 2022, Mr. Perry filed
    another IFP motion with the district court. On March 21,
    2022, the district court again ordered that the document be
    rejected for filing and returned, again noting that “IFP
    [was] previously denied and [the] case closed.” ECF No. 1-
    2 at 38. On April 11, 2022, Mr. Perry filed a notice of ap-
    peal, referencing the January 20, 2022, and March 21,
    2022, orders of the district court. Id. at 5.
    Case: 22-1720      Document: 37      Page: 3     Filed: 08/09/2022
    PERRY   v. PTO                                                 3
    We lack jurisdiction over the January 20, 2022, order,
    because an appeal of that order is untimely. 1 An appeal
    from a judgment or order in a civil action against an agency
    or official of the United States must be filed within 60 days
    from the entry of the judgment or order being appealed. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2107
    (b); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). That deadline
    is jurisdictional. Bowles v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 214
    (2007). The notice of appeal here was filed more than 60
    days from the date the court issued that ruling. 2
    We also dismiss Mr. Perry’s appeal from the March 21,
    2022, order as frivolous. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for
    S. Dist. of Iowa, 
    490 U.S. 296
    , 307–08 (1989); cf. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any
    time if the court determines that . . . the . . . appeal is friv-
    olous[.]”). It is well within a district court’s authority to
    refuse to accept repetitive filings after a case has been
    closed. See Davis v. Adler, 765 F. App’x 400, 401 (9th Cir.
    2019) (citing Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 
    627 F.3d 402
    , 404 (9th Cir. 2010) and Bias v. Moynihan, 
    508 F.3d 1212
    , 1223 (9th Cir. 2007)); Gill v. Wells, 610 F. App’x
    809, 812 (11th Cir. 2015). Here, the district court declined
    to accept Mr. Perry’s second IFP motion because it had pre-
    viously dismissed his claims. Mr. Perry has failed to make
    any cogent, non-frivolous argument as to why that deter-
    mination was an abuse of discretion.
    1   To the extent that Mr. Perry is also seeking to ap-
    peal from the February 2019 order dismissing his case,
    that appeal would also be untimely.
    2    We also see no basis here to construe Mr. Perry’s
    notice of appeal as either a motion to extend the time to
    appeal or reopen the time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5) or
    (6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The notice
    of appeal does not seek such relief and was filed outside the
    applicable deadlines for filing such motions.
    Case: 22-1720      Document: 37   Page: 4      Filed: 08/09/2022
    4                                                PERRY   v. PTO
    Accordingly,
    IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    (1) Mr. Perry’s appeal is dismissed.
    (2) All pending motions are denied as moot.
    (3) Each side shall bear its own costs.
    FOR THE COURT
    August 9, 2022                     /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
    Date                           Peter R. Marksteiner
    Clerk of Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-1720

Filed Date: 8/9/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/9/2022