Johnson v. Shinseki ( 2011 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON,
    Claimant-Appellant,
    v.
    ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS
    AFFAIRS,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    __________________________
    2011-7123
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
    Veterans Claims in case no. 09-0673, Judge William A.
    Moorman.
    _________________________
    Decided: October 7, 2011
    _________________________
    DOUGLAS JOHNSON, of Medon, Tennessee, pro se.
    DANIEL B. VOLK, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litiga-
    tion Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee.
    With him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attor-
    ney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and STEVEN
    J. GILLINGHAM, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the
    JOHNSON   v. DVA                                          2
    brief were DAVID J. BARRANS, Deputy Assistant General
    Counsel, and TRACEY P. WARREN, Staff Attorney, United
    States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington,
    DC.
    __________________________
    Before NEWMAN, MAYER, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Douglas H. Johnson, pro se, appeals the decision of
    the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
    (“Veterans Court”) affirming a Board of Veteran’s Appeals
    (“Board”) decision that denied Mr. Johnson’s claim for
    service-connected benefits for a back condition. Because
    Mr. Johnson challenges only the Board’s factual finding
    that his back condition was not connected to his military
    service, he does not raise an issue within our jurisdiction.
    Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdic-
    tion.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Johnson served in the United States Army from
    1978 to 1985. Following separation from service, Mr.
    Johnson submitted an application for compensation for
    low back pain, a condition for which he received treat-
    ment during his military service. Mr. Johnson attributed
    his back pain to moving desks during his service. In
    connection with his claim, he underwent a VA examina-
    tion in which the examiner found that Mr. Johnson’s back
    was normal, a finding that was confirmed by x-rays. In
    an April 1986 decision, the VA regional office (“RO”)
    denied Mr. Johnson’s claim for lack of a currently diag-
    nosed disability, a decision that Mr. Johnson did not
    appeal. A subsequent VA examination in March 1992
    also did not result in a diagnosis of a back condition.
    3                                           JOHNSON   v. DVA
    Mr. Johnson’s first diagnosis for a back condition oc-
    curred during a May 2001 VA examination in which the
    examiner diagnosed Mr. Johnson with a low back strain.
    At his examination, Mr. Johnson reported that his back
    pain was due to sit-ups during his military service, but he
    also said that his work as a floor cleaner caused pain in
    his back. A June 2002 MRI at a VA medical center led to
    a diagnosis of degenerative disc disease (“DDD”) with a
    small herniation on the left side.
    In October 2004, Mr. Johnson requested that the VA
    reopen his claim based on new and material evidence. In
    a February 2005 decision, the RO found that new and
    material evidence warranted reopening the claim, but
    denied the claim on the merits. Mr. Johnson filed a
    timely notice of disagreement.
    Among the new evidence Mr. Johnson submitted on
    appeal to the Board was a July 2006 letter from a private
    physician stating that Mr. Johnson’s DDD and disc herni-
    ation were the result of an injury Mr. Johnson experi-
    enced while on active military duty. The Board concluded
    that Mr. Johnson presented new and material evidence
    sufficient to reopen his claim, and then proceeded to
    address the merits of his claim.
    As to the merits, the Board found that Mr. Johnson
    established that he had a current disability based on his
    diagnosis of DDD, as well as a June 2008 VA examination
    diagnosing him with spondylosis of the lumbosacral spine.
    The Board also found that Mr. Johnson’s separation
    examination, in which the examiner noted mild left
    paravertebral tenderness to palpation, showed that Mr.
    Johnson “experienced an injury or event during his mili-
    tary service to which his current disability might be
    related.” Appendix (“A”) 17.
    The Board concluded, however, that there was insuffi-
    JOHNSON   v. DVA                                           4
    cient evidence to demonstrate a nexus between Mr. John-
    son’s disability and his military service. In reaching its
    decision, the Board focused on: (1) the fact that Mr. John-
    son is not qualified to opine on the etiology of his disabil-
    ity; (2) a finding that Mr. Johnson’s recollections are
    unreliable given that he attributed his pain at various
    times to several different incidents in service, none of
    which were documented in service treatment records; (3)
    several long gaps in Mr. Johnson’s medical records during
    which he did not seek treatment for back pain, viewing
    those gaps as negative evidence tending to disprove that
    his injury had its onset during service; and (4) a July 2008
    VA examination report in which the examiner opined that
    it was “less likely than not” that Mr. Johnson’s in-service
    back strain caused his current back problems. A 21. The
    Board found that the 2008 VA examination report was
    more probative and more persuasive than the July 2006
    letter from Mr. Johnson’s private physician, in large part
    because the July 2006 physician letter was “conclusory,
    with no evidence to support his opinion.” A 21.
    On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Johnson argued
    that the Board erred by: (1) relying on the July 2008 VA
    examination because the examiner did not provide a
    rationale for his opinion; and (2) failing to provide ade-
    quate reasons or bases for assigning greater weight to the
    2008 VA examination than the 2006 private physician
    opinion. 1 The Veterans Court rejected these arguments,
    1    Mr. Johnson, who was represented by counsel be-
    fore the Veterans Court, did not challenge the Board’s
    decision to address the merits of his claim in the same
    decision in which it reopened it, as opposed to remanding
    the claim to the RO to consider any new evidence in the
    first instance. The Veterans Court found that any proce-
    dural argument on those grounds had been waived. Mr.
    Johnson likewise does not challenge the procedure the
    Board used in this appeal, and we do not address it.
    5                                           JOHNSON   v. DVA
    noting first that they relate to factual findings and weigh-
    ing of evidence, which are within the Board’s province.
    The Veterans Court concluded that the Board’s factual
    findings as to the adequacy of the 2008 examination
    report were not clearly erroneous, and that the Board
    provided a sufficient statement of reasons or bases for
    giving greater weight to the 2008 examination report than
    the 2006 private physician letter. Accordingly, the Veter-
    ans Court affirmed the Board’s decision. Mr. Johnson
    filed a timely notice of appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    Our review of Veterans Court decisions is limited by
    statute. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), we may review “the
    validity of a decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of
    law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any interpreta-
    tion thereof (other than a determination as to a factual
    matter) that was relied on by the Court in making the
    decision.” Unless the appeal presents a constitutional
    issue, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual
    determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as
    applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. §
    7292(d)(2). We review legal determinations by the Veter-
    ans Court under a de novo standard. See Arzio v. Shin-
    seki, 
    602 F.3d 1343
    , 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
    On appeal, Mr. Johnson reiterates his position that
    his current back condition resulted from an injury he
    suffered during military service. He states that his injury
    first occurred when he was performing physical training
    in the military, and that it progressed into a chronic
    condition. He contends that early tests did not reveal his
    condition because only a more advanced MRI test could
    detect his injury. Finally, he states that “[t]he Physicians
    in the Family Practice Clinic may not have had a trained
    eye for this type of injury. Perhaps if I would have seen
    JOHNSON   v. DVA                                          6
    an Orthopedic Specialist there would have been a differ-
    ent outcome upon examination of my back.” Appellant’s
    June 4, 2011 Letter, Attached to Informal Brief. In
    response, the government argues that Mr. Johnson’s
    appeal raises only factual issues outside of this court’s
    jurisdiction, and argues that we must dismiss this appeal.
    We agree with the government.
    As stated above, this court cannot review challenges
    to factual determinations or applications of law to fact.
    See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). Mr. Johnson effectively asks
    this court to reconsider the evidence and his medical
    history to conclude that there is a nexus between his back
    condition and his military service. That is a quintessen-
    tial factual determination that we are without jurisdiction
    to make. See Maxson v. Gober, 
    230 F.3d 1330
    , 1333 (Fed.
    Cir. 2000) (finding that the weighing of a veteran’s “entire
    medical history, including the lengthy period of absence of
    complaint directed to the condition he now raises . . . is
    not within our appellate jurisdiction”). To the extent Mr.
    Johnson continues to challenge the Board’s decision to
    give more weight to the 2008 VA medical examination
    than the 2006 private physician opinion, that is also a
    challenge that we lack jurisdiction to consider. See
    Bastien v. Shinseki, 
    599 F.3d 1301
    , 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
    (“The evaluation and weighing of evidence and the draw-
    ing of appropriate inferences from it are factual determi-
    nations committed to the discretion of the fact-finder. We
    lack jurisdiction to review these determinations.”).
    Finally, it is unclear to what Mr. Johnson is referring
    when he states that his condition would have been de-
    tected earlier if an orthopedic specialist had examined
    him instead of the “Family Practice Clinic.” If he is
    arguing that the VA did not comply with its duty to assist
    under 38 U.S.C. § 5013A because it did not provide a
    competent physician for an examination, we find no merit
    7                                           JOHNSON   v. DVA
    to that argument. Even putting aside that Mr. Johnson
    did not make this argument to the Veterans Court, VA
    examiners are presumed to be competent absent evidence
    to the contrary, and Mr. Johnson does not raise any
    challenge to the competence of the examiner in this case.
    See Rizzo v. Shinseki, 
    580 F.3d 1288
    , 1290–91 (Fed. Cir.
    2009) (“[T]he VA need not affirmatively establish [an]
    expert’s competency” absent a challenge to the expert’s
    competence or qualifications); Cox v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.
    App. 563, 569 (2007) (“[T]he Board is entitled to assume
    the competence of a VA examiner.” (citation omitted)).
    Accepting Mr. Johnson’s argument would not change the
    outcome of this case, however, because the issue is not the
    timing or existence of a diagnosis of a back condition, but
    whether there is a nexus between Mr. Johnson’s back
    condition and his military service.
    Accordingly, we find that Mr. Johnson does not raise
    any arguments that are within our jurisdiction to review,
    and we must dismiss this appeal.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, this appeal is dismissed.
    DISMISSED
    COSTS
    Each party shall bear its own costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011-7123

Judges: Newman, Mayer, O'Malley

Filed Date: 10/7/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024