Pak v. DVA ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 20-1845    Document: 22    Page: 1   Filed: 12/22/2020
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    JAE PAK,
    Petitioner
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2020-1845
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. CH-1221-19-0337-W-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: December 22, 2020
    ______________________
    JAE PAK, Warsaw, IN, pro se.
    ANTONIA RAMOS SOARES, Commercial Litigation
    Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
    tice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
    JEFFREY B. CLARK, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT EDWARD
    KIRSCHMAN, JR.
    ______________________
    Before DYK, CLEVENGER, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
    Case: 20-1845    Document: 22      Page: 2    Filed: 12/22/2020
    2                                                  PAK   v. DVA
    PER CURIAM.
    Mr. Jae Pak appeals from the final decision of the Merit
    Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) excluding his wit-
    nesses and evidence, and denying his individual right of
    action (“IRA”) appeal claiming that the Department of Vet-
    erans Affairs (“DVA”) engaged in prohibited conduct when
    it allegedly terminated him in retaliation for his alleged
    protected whistleblowing activities. For the reasons set
    forth below, we affirm the final judgment of the MSPB.
    I
    Mr. Pak was appointed on October 29, 2017 as a Gen-
    eral Engineer for the VA Northern Indiana Health Care
    System. His career-conditional appointment was subject to
    a one-year probationary period. During his probationary
    period, the record shows Mr. Pak failed to follow depart-
    ment protocols, received complaints from contractors re-
    garding his behavior, and interacted with a contractor in
    an unprofessional manner. J.A. 9. 1 On September 7, 2018,
    Mr. Pak was terminated because of “unacceptable conduct
    and performance.”
    On November 29, 2018, Mr. Pak filed a complaint with
    the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) regarding his termi-
    nation alleging that it amounted to prohibited personnel
    action taken in response to his protected disclosures under
    the Whistleblower Protection Act, as amended by the Whis-
    tleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
    112-19, 
    126 Stat. 1465
    . Mr. Pak asserted five disclosures
    he made that he believed were reasonable and were con-
    tributing factors to his termination. These disclosures are
    summarized as follows:
    1   “J.A. __” refers to the page in the Joint Appendix in
    this case.
    Case: 20-1845      Document: 22      Page: 3    Filed: 12/22/2020
    PAK   v. DVA                                                  3
    (1) Certain construction was outside the scope of
    the contract and unnecessary which amounted
    to a gross waste of funds and a violation of law.
    (2) A contractor was charging the agency for an ex-
    cessive number of unnecessary visits that
    amounted to a gross waste of funds.
    (3) A contractor had been improperly pre-selected
    for a contract that required Mr. Pak to revise
    the scope of the contract, which amounted to a
    violation of law.
    (4) Mr. Pak was improperly removed from a meet-
    ing and ordered to “rubber stamp” the state-
    ment of work from the pre-selected contractor,
    which amounted to an abuse of authority and
    gross mismanagement.
    (5) An employee was performing Contracting Of-
    ficer Representative duties without proper au-
    thorization, which amounted to gross
    mismanagement and a violation of law.
    Unsuccessful in receiving corrective action from OSC,
    Mr. Pak filed an IRA with the MSPB on May 1, 2019.
    On May 2, 2019, the administrative judge (“AJ”) as-
    signed to the case issued an Acknowledgment Order, in
    which Mr. Pak was informed of the requirements for estab-
    lishing Board jurisdiction over his IRA appeal, and of what
    he must prove to be entitled to corrective action. That Or-
    der clearly warned that “[i]f any party fails to follow my
    orders or the Board’s regulations, I may impose sanctions
    pursuant to 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.43
    .” J.A. 63. The parties sub-
    mitted briefs on the jurisdictional issue, and on August 21,
    2019, the AJ found that Mr. Pak had made a nonfrivolous
    allegation of at least one protected disclosure that may
    have been a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to
    take one or more personnel actions.
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    4                                                   PAK   v. DVA
    The AJ conducted a status conference on October 1,
    2019. During this status conference, the AJ ordered Mr.
    Pak to:
    provide a concise statement clarifying specific de-
    tails from his jurisdiction responses, to include: the
    dates on which he made his purported disclosures;
    the individuals to whom he made them; why his be-
    lief in the truth of those disclosures was reasona-
    ble; and why he believed his disclosure was a
    contributing factor in his probationary termina-
    tion.
    J.A. 7. Mr. Pak never provided a response to the AJ’s order.
    The AJ also issued an order on the same day which
    scheduled November 5, 2019 for the pre-hearing conference
    and set an October 30, 2019 deadline for filing pre-hearing
    submissions. Mr. Pak failed to comply with the ordered
    deadline for his pre-hearing submissions by filing them on
    November 5, 2019, less than three hours before the sched-
    uled pre-hearing conference. Initially, neither Mr. Pak nor
    his representative appeared on November 5, 2019. The AJ
    tried unsuccessfully to reach Mr. Pak by phone. But Mr.
    Pak did not answer, and his voicemail could not accept
    messages. The AJ was able to reach Mr. Pak’s representa-
    tive who attended by phone.
    On November 5, 2019, the AJ issued an Order and
    Summary of the Telephonic Prehearing Conference. The
    AJ noted that Mr. Pak failed to comply with the order set-
    ting the deadline for pre-hearing submissions. J.A. 63. The
    AJ also noted that Mr. Pak earlier defied the AJ’s October
    1, 2019, order to file the required information. 
    Id.
     The AJ
    concluded that sanctions were appropriate and warranted.
    Because Mr. Pak failed to file his pre-hearing submission
    on time and failed to establish good cause for the untimeli-
    ness, the AJ ruled that Mr. Pak failed timely to request any
    witnesses. Accordingly, as sanctions, the AJ ruled that
    while Mr. Pak could testify at his hearing, the AJ would
    Case: 20-1845     Document: 22      Page: 5   Filed: 12/22/2020
    PAK    v. DVA                                               5
    not approve any other witnesses to testify for Mr. Pak and
    would not allow Mr. Pak to introduce any of the proposed
    exhibits attached to his untimely pre-hearing submission.
    On February 20, 2020, the AJ entered an initial deci-
    sion finding that Mr. Pak “failed to prove a prima facie case
    of whistleblower retaliation as he failed to prove by prepon-
    derant evidence that he made any of his five alleged pro-
    tected disclosures.” J.A. 7. The decision was made final on
    March 26, 2020. Mr. Pak filed a timely notice of appeal to
    this court.
    It appears that Mr. Pak raises two main arguments: (1)
    that precluding his witnesses from testifying and excluding
    his exhibits from the record unfairly prejudiced him, and
    (2) that the MSPB’s decision lacked substantial evidence
    because it was based on hearsay and an incorrect weighing
    of the evidence. 2 For the reasons below, we affirm the
    MSPB’s decision.
    II
    We have jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions
    of the MSPB. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(4). Our task is to deter-
    mine whether the MSPB’s decision was arbitrary, capri-
    cious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with the
    law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c); Sandel v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    28 F.3d 1184
    , 1186
    (Fed. Cir. 1994). If not, then we must affirm the final ruling
    of the MSPB. Further, we do not disturb the MSPB’s cred-
    ibility determinations unless they are “inherently improb-
    able or discredited by undisputed fact.” Pope v. U.S. Postal
    Serv., 
    114 F.3d 1144
    , 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
    2  Although Mr. Pak’s brief was not clear as to his exact
    contentions, we have distilled his argument into these
    points.
    Case: 20-1845    Document: 22       Page: 6   Filed: 12/22/2020
    6                                                  PAK   v. DVA
    III
    Mr. Pak argues that it was “unfair and devastating” for
    the MSPB to preclude his witnesses from testifying and ex-
    clude his proposed exhibits from the record. Petitioner Re-
    ply Br. 3. According to Mr. Pak, his witnesses would have
    “clearly proven the infraction committed by DVA,” but he
    does not explain how his witnesses would have corrobo-
    rated his claims of protected disclosure. Petitioner Opening
    Br. 2. In addition to his witnesses, he asserts that the pre-
    cluded exhibits would have proved that the agency engaged
    in retaliatory actions because of his protected disclosures.
    Under 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.43
    , an administrative judge may
    impose sanctions on a party who fails to comply with the
    judge’s orders. Pursuant to that authority, the judge may
    prohibit the party “from introducing evidence concerning
    the information sought, or from otherwise relying upon tes-
    timony related to that information.” 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.43
    (a)(2). Prior to imposing any sanction, “the judge
    shall provide appropriate prior warning, allow a response
    to the actual or proposed sanction when feasible, and doc-
    ument the reasons for any resulting sanction in the record.”
    
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.43
    . Mr. Pak does not argue that the AJ
    failed to comply with the procedural requirements of
    §1201.43. Instead, he challenges the order on its merits.
    The record here is clear. The AJ sanctioned Mr. Pak for
    failing to comply with multiple orders and failing to explain
    that failure. The AJ first warned Mr. Pak in the May 2,
    2019 “Acknowledgment Order” that “[i]f any party fails to
    follow my orders or the Board’s regulations, I may impose
    sanctions pursuant to 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.43
    .” J.A. 63. Mr. Pak
    failed to respond to the AJ’s order that required him to pro-
    vide “a concise statement” to clarify the details related to
    the dates he made the alleged protected disclosures, to
    whom they were made, why his belief that the disclosures
    were true was reasonable, and why such disclosures were
    contributing factors to his termination. J.A. 7. All of these
    Case: 20-1845    Document: 22      Page: 7    Filed: 12/22/2020
    PAK   v. DVA                                               7
    requests were directly related to proving Mr. Pak’s pro-
    tected whistleblower allegations.
    The AJ again warned Mr. Pak on October 1, 2019 in
    the “Order and Notice of Hearing and Prehearing Confer-
    ence” that “[i]n presenting evidence at the hearing, you will
    be limited by your prehearing submissions, except for good
    cause shown.” J.A. 59. The order also stated that “an un-
    listed witness will usually not be permitted to testify, and
    hearing exhibits that were not reviewed during the pre-
    hearing conference will usually not be accepted into the
    record.” 
    Id.
     Mr. Pak failed to attend his pre-hearing confer-
    ence. Mr. Pak also failed to timely submit his pre-hearing
    submission, instead filing the submission less than three
    hours before the hearing and failing to provide an explana-
    tion for the delay. The AJ properly excluded the evidence
    and witness testimony under § 1201.43(a) due to these fail-
    ures to comply with the MSPB’s orders. See Harp v. Dep’t
    of Army, 
    791 F.2d 161
    , 163 (Fed. Cir. 1986)(holding that
    presiding official properly excluded evidence due to re-
    spondent’s failure to comply with an order).
    Mr. Pak now explains that he was “under tremendous
    financial and career pressure” because of his termination
    and the start of a new job, while also acknowledging that
    such unfamiliarity “is no excuse” for the delay. Petitioner
    Opening Br. 1. This is the first time that Mr. Pak offers an
    explanation, but in any case his explanation is insufficient.
    See Turner v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 681 F. App’x 934, 937
    (Fed. Cir. 2017)(stating that financial difficulties do not
    “excuse [respondent’s] failure to respond to repeated or-
    ders.”).
    We have even found that similar failures to comply
    with orders were sufficient to justify an administrative
    judge’s termination of an entire hearing. See, e.g., Ahlberg
    v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 
    804 F.2d 1238
     (Fed. Cir.
    1986)(upholding Board’s decision to dismiss appeal be-
    cause respondent failed to comply with an order); Nasuti v.
    Case: 20-1845    Document: 22      Page: 8    Filed: 12/22/2020
    8                                                  PAK   v. DVA
    Dep’t of State, 675 F. App’x 975, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2017)(hold-
    ing that the administrative judge did not abuse his discre-
    tion in cancelling the hearing “only after Mr. Nasuti
    refused to comply with the administrative judge’s discovery
    orders on two separate occasions—and only after Mr. Na-
    suti was warned that continued refusal would result in
    cancellation.”). Thus, we find that the MSPB did not abuse
    its discretion when it excluded Mr. Pak’s evidence and wit-
    nesses from the hearing due to his repeated failures to com-
    ply with the AJ’s orders.
    IV
    We also reject Mr. Pak’s challenge to the MSPB’s denial
    of his whistleblower allegations. In order for Mr. Pak to
    prevail, he has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
    that he made a protected disclosure and that his disclosure
    was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take
    an adverse action against him. Morgan v. Dep’t of Energy,
    
    424 F.3d 1271
    , 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2005). To be a protected dis-
    closure, Mr. Pak must have reasonably believed that such
    disclosure evidenced (i) a violation of law, rule, or regula-
    tion or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds,
    an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
    to public health or safety. 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (a)(2)(D), (b)(8).
    The MSPB’s determination that Mr. Pak failed to prove
    whistleblowing was based on substantial evidence. The
    MSPB found that for each of Mr. Pak’s alleged protected
    disclosures (i.e. improper performance of out-of-scope work,
    excessive contractor visits, improper pre-selection of a con-
    tractor, improper rubber-stamping and exclusion from
    meetings, and unauthorized performance of duties), the
    record either failed to show that he made the disclosure,
    show what information he specifically disclosed and to
    whom and when that information was disclosed, or show
    that such disclosure evidenced any reasonable belief of
    wrongdoing, such as a violation of law or gross mismanage-
    ment. The MSPB reviewed the evidence before it and
    Case: 20-1845      Document: 22   Page: 9    Filed: 12/22/2020
    PAK   v. DVA                                              9
    determined that aside from Mr. Pak’s testimony there was
    no evidence supporting his allegations. According to the
    MSPB, however, Mr. Pak’s testimony was “vague,” “indi-
    rect,” and “speculative and lacking in corroboration,”
    whereas the testimony of the DVA’s witnesses was “direct
    and responsive” and “unbiased.” J.A. 24, 30.
    Mr. Pak takes issue with the MSPB relying on hearsay
    and its weighing of the evidence in making its findings. The
    MSPB may rely on hearsay as “substantial evidence in an
    administrative proceeding . . . if the hearsay is inherently
    truthful and more credible than the evidence offered
    against it.” Sanders v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    801 F.2d 1328
    ,
    1331 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As the MSPB determined, the testi-
    mony of the DVA’s witnesses proved to be more credible
    and truthful than Mr. Pak’s testimony and evidence. Mr.
    Pak does not provide any reason for why the MSPB’s cred-
    ibility determinations were “inherently improbable or dis-
    credited by undisputed fact.” Pope, 
    114 F.3d 1149
    .
    Furthermore, as discussed above, the MSPB’s determina-
    tion that Mr. Pak failed to meet his burden in proving that
    he engaged in protected whistleblowing activity was based
    on substantial evidence, and we cannot reweigh such evi-
    dence. See Parker v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    819 F.2d 1113
    , 1115
    (Fed. Cir. 1987)(“[T]he standard is not what the court
    would decide in a de novo appraisal, but whether the ad-
    ministrative determination is supported by substantial ev-
    idence on the record as a whole.”).
    V
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
    the Merit Systems Protection Board.
    AFFIRMED
    No costs.