In Re ADOBE INC. ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 20-126    Document: 17     Page: 1    Filed: 07/28/2020
    NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    In re: ADOBE INC.,
    Petitioner
    ______________________
    2020-126
    ______________________
    On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States
    District Court for the Western District of Texas in No. 6:19-
    cv-00527-ADA, Judge Alan D. Albright.
    ______________________
    ON PETITION
    ______________________
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, MOORE and HUGHES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PROST, Chief Judge.
    ORDER
    Adobe Inc. petitions for a writ of mandamus asking this
    court to direct the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Texas to grant its motion to transfer
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the United States Dis-
    trict Court for the Northern District of California. Syn-
    Kloud Technologies, LLC opposes. Adobe replies.
    Case: 20-126    Document: 17     Page: 2    Filed: 07/28/2020
    2                                           IN RE: ADOBE INC.
    BACKGROUND
    SynKloud brought this suit against Adobe, a company
    headquartered in San Jose, California, alleging infringe-
    ment of six patents by various Adobe products related to
    cloud storage. The complaint stated that SynKloud is a
    company organized under the laws of Delaware, with its
    principal place of business in Milton, Delaware.
    Adobe moved the district court to transfer the case to
    the Northern District of California where it is headquar-
    tered pursuant to § 1404(a), which authorizes transfer
    “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the in-
    terest of justice.” Adobe argued that “[o]ther than this lit-
    igation, SynKloud does not appear to have any connection
    whatsoever to Texas,” noting that SynKloud’s President re-
    sides in New York, SynKloud was not registered to do busi-
    ness in Texas, and it did not appear to have any operations,
    employees, or customers in Texas. A.198.
    Adobe further urged that the Northern District of Cal-
    ifornia would be clearly more convenient. In support,
    Adobe submitted sworn declarations attesting to the fact
    that the teams responsible for the development, marketing,
    and sales of the accused services are primarily based in the
    Northern District of California. See, e.g., A.264–68, 405–
    08. Adobe noted that its own witnesses who would likely
    testify about the design, marketing, and sales of the ac-
    cused products overwhelmingly reside in the transferee fo-
    rum. Adobe further argued that, while it has two offices in
    Austin, Texas, those offices “have nothing to do with the
    design, development, or operation of the Accused Products”
    that were at issue in the case. A.199.
    Adobe additionally noted that the inventor of the as-
    serted patents, Sheng Tai Tsao, and his company, STT
    WebOS, Inc., which had assigned the patents to SynKloud,
    are located in the Northern District of California, and
    hence were only subject to the subpoena power of the trans-
    feree court. Adobe argued that “Mr. Tsao and STT WebOS
    Case: 20-126     Document: 17      Page: 3    Filed: 07/28/2020
    IN RE: ADOBE INC.                                                  3
    have advertised that they had ‘demonstratable’ products
    ‘protected by’ most, if not all, of the patents-in-suit prior to
    the earliest filing date of the asserted patents, potentially
    invalidating them by violating the statutory on-sale bar,”
    and thus “have highly relevant information related to the
    validity issues in this case.” A.197.
    After a hearing, the district court denied Adobe’s mo-
    tion from the bench. With regard to the relative ease of
    access to sources of proof factor, the district court found
    that the convenience of having Adobe’s, the inventor’s, and
    STT WebOS’s documents in the Northern District of Cali-
    fornia outweighed SynKloud’s purported convenience in
    the location of SynKloud’s documents in New York and Vir-
    ginia. The district court acknowledged a disagreement be-
    tween the parties as to whether any Adobe employee in
    Austin, Texas had relevant knowledge. However, the court
    found that “even if I conclude and resolve this factual con-
    flict in favor of SynKloud,” it would still find “that this fac-
    tor slightly favors transfer.” A.1112.
    The district court also concluded that the compulsory
    process factor “slightly favors transfer,” noting that while
    “[w]itnesses related to the power of assignment and prior
    art rarely testify,” “it [is] almost certain that one party or
    the other would want the inventor to testify.” A.1113. The
    court noted a disagreement between the parties as to
    whether former Adobe employees in Austin, Texas had rel-
    evant information. But the court again explained that even
    if it resolved that conflict in SynKloud’s favor, it seemed
    unlikely that all four identified individuals would testify
    and did not ultimately sway the court to weigh this factor
    in favor of retaining the case. The court also found that the
    local interest factor “is neutral to slightly favors transfer,”
    given that “Adobe has facilities in both districts,” and “Syn-
    Kloud does not.” A.1114.
    The single factor that the court weighed in favor of re-
    taining the case was the court congestion factor. The court
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    4                                            IN RE: ADOBE INC.
    noted that it “had a year and a half of experience in terms
    of setting schedules and timing of cases and trials” and had
    “an order governing proceedings that I use in virtually
    every case that specifies that the trial will occur within
    roughly 44 to 47 weeks after a Markman hearing,” and that
    “[t]o the best of my recollection,” the court had no difficulty
    “setting a trial within that anticipated window.” A.1114.
    While the court acknowledged that the Northern District
    of California “might be more convenient,” it still decided to
    deny Adobe’s motion. A.1115.
    DISCUSSION
    Applying Fifth Circuit law in cases from district courts
    in that circuit, this court has held that mandamus may be
    granted to direct transfer for convenience upon a showing
    that the transferee forum is clearly more convenient, and
    the district court’s contrary ruling was a clear abuse of dis-
    cretion. See In re Genentech, Inc., 
    566 F.3d 1338
    , 1348
    (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 
    551 F.3d 1315
    ,
    1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also In re Radmax, Ltd., 
    720 F.3d 285
    , 287 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
    
    545 F.3d 304
    , 311 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
    “A motion to transfer venue pursuant to § 1404(a)
    should be granted if ‘the movant demonstrates that the
    transferee venue is clearly more convenient,’ taking into
    consideration” the relevant private and public forum non
    conveniens factors. 
    Radmax, 720 F.3d at 288
    (quoting
    
    Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315
    ); see also In re Nintendo Co.,
    Ltd., 
    589 F.3d 1194
    , 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “in
    a case featuring most witnesses and evidence closer to the
    transferee venue with few or no convenience factors favor-
    ing the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the trial court should
    grant a motion to transfer”).
    In denying Adobe’s motion to transfer here, the district
    court committed several errors. First, the district court
    failed to accord the full weight of the convenience factors it
    considered and weighed in favor of transfer. Second, the
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    IN RE: ADOBE INC.                                                 5
    court overlooked that the willing witness factor also fa-
    vored transferring the case. Third, the court ran afoul of
    governing precedent in giving dispositive weight to its abil-
    ity to more quickly schedule a trial. Taken together, we
    agree that the district court’s denial of transfer here was a
    clear abuse of discretion.
    First, the district court failed to accord proper weight
    to the convenience of the transferee venue. The court, by
    its own assessment, found that no private convenience fac-
    tor here favored retaining the case in the Western District
    of Texas and several such factors favored transfer. In par-
    ticular, the court noted that in addition to Adobe, the in-
    ventor and his company were in Northern California, and
    hence transfer would make providing testimony or docu-
    mentary evidence more convenient or allow a party to sub-
    poena such information. The court also declined to credit
    any potential witness or location in the Western District of
    Texas as having relevant evidence. Clearly, “[w]hen fairly
    weighed,” here, the compulsory process and sources of proof
    factors together tip “significantly in” favor of transferring
    the case. In re Google Inc., No. 2017-107, 
    2017 WL 977038
    ,
    at *3 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2017); see also In re Acer Am. Corp.,
    
    626 F.3d 1252
    , 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (determining that sub-
    poena power of the transferee court “surely tips in favor of
    transfer” notwithstanding the possibility that some poten-
    tial witnesses were within subpoena range of the transferor
    court). However, the district court only weighed those fac-
    tors as “slightly” favoring the transferee forum.
    Second, and relatedly, the district court failed to weigh
    the cost of attendance for willing witnesses factor in its dis-
    cussion, yet this factor also favors transfer. Adobe identi-
    fied a significant number of its own employees as potential
    witnesses who reside in the Northern District of California.
    On the other hand, SynKloud’s own employees will be com-
    ing from outside both districts. See In re Toyota Motor
    Corp., 
    747 F.3d 1338
    , 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The compari-
    son between the transferor and transferee forums is not
    Case: 20-126    Document: 17      Page: 6    Filed: 07/28/2020
    6                                            IN RE: ADOBE INC.
    altered by the presence of other witnesses and documents
    in places outside both forums.”). Although SynKloud in-
    sisted that there may be Adobe employees working from its
    Austin, Texas office that may have relevant information,
    the district court found elsewhere in its analysis that, even
    if it could give SynKloud the benefit of the doubt here with
    regard to those sources of evidence, Northern California
    would still be more convenient.
    Third, the district court erred in denying transfer
    based solely on its perceived ability to more quickly sched-
    ule a trial. In Genentech, we granted mandamus where,
    like here, there was a stark contrast in convenience be-
    tween the two 
    forums. 566 F.3d at 1348
    . There, the dis-
    trict court found that the court congestion factor weighed
    against transfer based solely on its assessment of the aver-
    age rate of disposition of cases between the two forums.
    Id. at 1347.
    We questioned whether the court congestion fac-
    tor was relevant under the circumstances and held that
    even without disturbing the court’s suggestion that it could
    dispose of this case more quickly than the transferee venue,
    where “several relevant factors weigh in favor of transfer
    and others are neutral, then the speed of the transferee dis-
    trict court should not alone outweigh all of those other fac-
    tors.”
    Id. The same conclusion
    follows here. Like the district
    court’s analysis in Genentech, the district court’s assess-
    ment of the court congestion factor here does not withstand
    scrutiny. The factor concerns whether there is an appre-
    ciable difference in docket congestion between the two fo-
    rums. See Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 
    375 U.S. 71
    , 73 (1963); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 
    743 F.2d 1325
    ,
    1337 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The real issue is . . . whether a trial
    may be speedier in another court because of its less
    crowded docket.”). Nothing about the court’s general abil-
    ity to set a schedule directly speaks to that issue. Nor does
    the record demonstrate an appreciable difference in docket
    congestion between the forums that could legitimately be
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    IN RE: ADOBE INC.                                               7
    worthy of consideration under this factor. * Yet even with-
    out disturbing the court’s suggestion that it could more
    quickly resolve this case based on its scheduling order, with
    several factors favoring transfer and nothing else favoring
    retaining this case in Western Texas, the district court
    erred in giving this factor dispositive weight.
    In short, retaining this case in the Western District of
    Texas is not convenient for the parties and witnesses. It is
    not in the interest of justice or proper administration. And
    the district court’s contrary determination amounted to a
    clear abuse of discretion. We therefore grant Adobe’s peti-
    tion for a writ of mandamus to direct transfer.
    Accordingly,
    IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    The petition is granted.
    FOR THE COURT
    July 28, 2020                 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
    Date                    Peter R. Marksteiner
    Clerk of Court
    s35
    *   SynKloud merely referred to the district court’s
    own statement in another case, Fintiv, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
    No. 6:18-cv-00372-ADA, 
    2019 WL 4743678
    , at *7 (W.D.
    Tex. Sept. 13, 2019), in which the court relied on the same
    scheduling order to state that it averaged a 25% faster time
    to trial when compared to the Northern District of Califor-
    nia.