Plante v. McDonald ( 2016 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    WESLEY DANA PLANTE,
    Claimant-Appellant
    v.
    ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF
    VETERANS AFFAIRS,
    Respondent-Appellee
    ______________________
    2016-2596
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
    Veterans Claims in No. 15-1940, Judge Margaret C.
    Bartley.
    ______________________
    Decided: December 15, 2016
    ______________________
    WESLEY DANA PLANTE, East Providence, RI, pro se.
    DAVID MICHAEL KERR, Commercial Litigation Branch,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represent-
    ed by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,
    SCOTT D. AUSTIN; CHRISTINA LYNN GREGG, BRIAN D.
    GRIFFIN, Office of General Counsel, United States De-
    partment of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
    2                                      PLANTE   v. MCDONALD
    ______________________
    Before NEWMAN, MAYER, and LOURIE, Circuit Judges.
    NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant Wesley D. Plante seeks review of the deci-
    sion of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC),
    denying his request for death pension, dependency and
    indemnity compensation (DIC), and/or other accrued
    benefits. 1 We affirm the court’s decision.
    Appellant is the grandson of Sarah Mae Plante (“Mrs.
    Plante”), who is the mother of the deceased Veteran, Dana
    G. Plante. Appellant is the nephew of the Veteran. The
    Veteran entered active duty with the United States Army
    in 1959, and died in 1959 during service. Mrs. Plante was
    granted dependency and indemnity compensation. The
    Appellant states that he has supported his grandmother
    since 1977 and was her caregiver until her death in 2010.
    He also states that he is disabled, he is (or was) a ward of
    the State of Rhode Island, and that he qualifies under
    state law as Mrs. Plante’s stepson.
    The Board of Veterans Appeals held that “[t]he appel-
    lant is the Veteran’s nephew and, thus, is not the surviv-
    ing spouse of the Veteran nor a dependent parent or child,
    as defined for VA purposes.” BVA Op. 2. The Board
    stated that “[e]ven if the Board were to accept the appel-
    lant’s argument that he should be considered the stepson
    of the Veteran’s mother (which it does not), he would still
    not be considered the dependent parent, child, or spouse
    of the Veteran for purposes of survivor benefits.” BVA
    Op. 4. The CAVC affirmed. The court also held that the
    Appellant’s application for certain benefits to which he
    may have been entitled, such as final illness and funeral
    1 Wesley Dana Plante v Robert A. McDonald, No.
    15-1940 (Vet. App. June 21, 2016).
    PLANTE   v. MCDONALD                                       3
    expenses for Mrs. Plante, was untimely because this claim
    was filed in 2013, not within the statutory period of one
    year of Mrs. Plante’s death in 2010.
    DISCUSSION
    The government argues first that the Federal Circuit
    lacks jurisdiction of this appeal because “whether an
    individual ‘is the dependent of a veteran is a question of
    fact . . . . and does not involve the validity or interpreta-
    tion of a statute or regulation.’” Gov’t Br. 5. However, no
    facts are in dispute as to the Appellant’s relationship to
    the Veteran (his uncle) or to the Veteran’s mother (his
    grandmother). Whether a person is a dependent as
    defined by statute is a question of law or interpretation of
    law, and is properly before us.
    It is not disputed that Wesley Plante is not a “surviv-
    ing spouse, child, or parent” of a deceased veteran, 
    38 U.S.C. § 101
    (14). Wesley Plante argues that he should
    receive the dependency benefits that had been paid to
    Mrs. Plante because he financially supported her from
    1977 to her death in 2010, because she designated him as
    “replacement” for her benefits, and because he is her
    stepson under state law.
    DIC and Death Pension
    By statute, dependency and indemnity compensation
    is payable to the “veteran’s surviving spouse, children,
    and parents.” 
    38 U.S.C. § 1310
    ; see also 
    38 U.S.C. § 101
    (14). Also by statute, a death pension is payable to the
    surviving spouse and children of a deceased veteran. 
    38 U.S.C. §§ 1541
    (a), 1542. “Surviving spouse,” “child,” and
    “parent” are defined by 
    38 U.S.C. §§ 101
    , 102, and 103.
    Wesley Plante does not meet these statutory definitions,
    even were he deemed to be a stepson of the Veteran’s
    mother. On careful review of the statutory framework, we
    discern no basis for an interpretation that would provide
    such payments to the Appellant. The statutes and regu-
    4                                        PLANTE   v. MCDONALD
    lations are unambiguous that DIC and death pensions are
    limited to the explicitly defined classes. See Valiao v.
    Principi, 
    17 Vet. App. 229
    , 231 (2003) (denying DIC
    benefits to veteran’s sibling). “No exception to this clear
    statutory mandate and regulation is indicated.” Haynes
    v. McDonald, 
    785 F.3d 614
    , 616 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert.
    denied, 
    136 S. Ct. 156
    , 193 (2015). Such a plan would
    require legislative action; it is not available as a statutory
    interpretation.
    Accrued Benefits
    By statute, accrued benefits may be paid to a veter-
    an’s spouse, children or dependent parents, but may also
    be paid “as may be necessary to reimburse the person who
    bore the expense of last sickness and burial,” of the Vet-
    eran or a Veteran’s beneficiary. 
    38 U.S.C. § 5121
    (a). The
    Board did not consider Wesley Plante’s application as
    including this class of benefits, and the CAVC determined
    that this was Board error. However, the CAVC held that
    the error did not change the result because Wesley
    Plante’s application was filed too late. 
    38 U.S.C. § 5121
    (c)
    requires submission of an application for accrued benefits
    “within one year after the date of death.” Wesley Plante’s
    application was filed in 2013. The CAVC held that this
    application was untimely, insofar as it could be deemed to
    encompass these expenses.
    Wesley Plante argues that the Board’s error was not
    harmless. However, he presents no argument for possible
    equitable tolling, and we perceive none. The CAVC
    applied the correct law, in holding the claim to be time-
    barred.
    On review of the issues and arguments, the decision of
    the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is
    AFFIRMED.
    No costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-2596

Judges: Newman, Mayer, Lourie

Filed Date: 12/15/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024