Case: 20-1057 Document: 33 Page: 1 Filed: 05/06/2020
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
MORGAN JOSEPH LANGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2020-1057
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:18-cv-01603-LKG, Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby.
______________________
Decided: May 6, 2020
______________________
MORGAN JOSEPH LANGAN, Cornville, AZ, pro se.
ANTHONY F. SCHIAVETTI, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN,
JR., LOREN MISHA PREHEIM.
______________________
Before CHEN, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 20-1057 Document: 33 Page: 2 Filed: 05/06/2020
2 LANGAN v. UNITED STATES
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-Appellant Morgan Joseph Langan appeals
from a judgment from the Court of Federal Claims (Claims
Court) dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Langan v. United States, No. 18-cv-01603,
2019 WL 3857044 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 16, 2019). For the reasons
explained below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Langan filed suit in the Claims Court against the
United States, the State of Arizona, and Yavapai County,
Arizona, alleging that certain banks operating in Arizona
and certain state and local county government officials in
Yavapai County improperly foreclosed upon and
confiscated his house and land. SAppx 27, 30–31. 1 Mr.
Langan alleged that he “was deprived of [his] land, home,
estate and property under operation of State non-judicial
foreclosure laws that impaired the obligations required by
[certain] contracts between the parties.” SAppx 29. His
complaint also appeared to assert claims against the
United States based upon the First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and Article 1 § 10 of the United States
Constitution. SAppx 28. As relief, Mr. Langan sought to
recover $1,398,838.05 in damages from the United States
and certain equitable relief. SAppx 38–39.
The Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of
Federal Claims. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, No. 18-cv-01603
(Fed. Cl. Dec. 10, 2018), ECF No. 7 at 1–2. In response to
the Government’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Langan raised a
breach of contract claim against the United States and
1 Mr. Langan and the Government submitted their
own appendices, which will be referred to with the prefixes
“Appx” and “SAppx,” respectively.
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LANGAN v. UNITED STATES 3
asserted a violation of an alleged federal land patent. Pl.’s
Resp. Mot. Dismiss, No. 18-cv-01603 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 11,
2019), ECF No. 18 at 1. Mr. Langan also identified
28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(1), 1493, 1498, and
42 U.S.C. § 1983
as the jurisdictional bases for his claims and cause of action
against the United States. Id. at 4.
The Claims Court granted the Government’s motion to
dismiss, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr.
Langan’s claims on various grounds. Langan,
2019 WL
3857044, at *8. The court explained that it lacked
jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Langan’s complaint because
he asserted claims against parties other than the United
States, did not establish the existence of a contract with the
United States, and pleaded various other claims outside
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at *5–7. The
court later denied Mr. Langan’s motion for reconsideration.
Langan v. United States, No. 18-cv-01603,
2019 WL
4643746, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 24, 2019).
Mr. Langan appealed. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the Claims Court’s legal conclusion
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Stephens v.
United States,
884 F.3d 1151, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing
Coast Prof’l, Inc. v. United States,
828 F.3d 1349, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). As the plaintiff, Mr. Langan “bears the
burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Estes Exp. Lines v. United
States,
739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Reynolds
v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv.,
846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)). When reviewing a Claims Court’s decision on
a “motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
[we] accept[] as true all uncontroverted factual allegations
in the complaint, and construe[] them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.”
Id. (citing Cedars–Sinai Med.
Ctr. v. Watkins,
11 F.3d 1573, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
Case: 20-1057 Document: 33 Page: 4 Filed: 05/06/2020
4 LANGAN v. UNITED STATES
The Claims Court was correct to dismiss Mr. Langan’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Tucker
Act, the Claims Court has jurisdiction over “any claim
against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Claims Court’s jurisdiction under
the Tucker Act “is confined to the rendition of money
judgments in suits brought for that relief against the
United States,” United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584,
588 (1941), and Mr. Langan’s complaint does not allege any
claim within the court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.
Under the Tucker Act, the Claims Court only has
jurisdiction to hear “claim[s] against the United States.”
§ 1491(a)(1); Sherwood,
312 U.S. at 588. “[I]f the relief
sought is against others than the United States[,] the suit
as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of
the court.” Sherwood,
312 U.S. at 588. The essence of Mr.
Langan’s complaint appears to relate to actions by banks
and certain state and local government officials in Arizona.
SAppx 27, 30–31. To the extent the complaint sought relief
against defendants other than the United States, including
private parties and state and county entities, the Claims
Court correctly dismissed those claims. See Sherwood,
312
U.S. at 588 (The Claims Court is “without jurisdiction of
any suit brought against private parties.”); Conner v.
United States, 407 F. App’x 428, 430 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (The
Claims Court “does not have jurisdiction [over] claims
against Virginia, its entities, or its employees.”).
Further, the Tucker Act is “only a jurisdictional
statute.” United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).
That means it “does not create a substantive cause of
action,” but instead requires the plaintiff to identify a
“money-mandating” source of law, i.e., “a separate source
of substantive law that creates the right to money
Case: 20-1057 Document: 33 Page: 5 Filed: 05/06/2020
LANGAN v. UNITED STATES 5
damages.” Fisher v. United States,
402 F.3d 1167, 1172
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to
invoke the court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction must identify an
independent source of a substantive cause of action for
money damages from the United States arising out of a
contract, statute, regulation, or constitutional provision.
Id.; Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,
525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In this case, the
Claims Court correctly concluded that Mr. Langan’s
complaint was not based upon a money-mandating
provision of law, or a contract with the United States.
Mr. Langan’s complaint appeared to allege violations of
his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and Article 1 § 10 of the United States
Constitution. SAppx 28. As the Claims Court correctly
noted, the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Article
1 § 10 cannot support jurisdiction under the Tucker Act
because none of these constitutional provisions are money-
mandating. United States v. Connolly,
716 F.2d 882, 887
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment, standing
alone, cannot be so interpreted to command the payment of
money.”); LeBlanc v. United States,
50 F.3d 1025, 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (The Fourteenth Amendment is not “a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction because [it] do[es] not
mandate payment of money by the government.”); Olajide
v. United States, No. 16-01594,
2017 WL 3225048, at *4
(Fed. Cl. July 31, 2017) (Article I § 10 is “not money-
mandating and do[es] not create a duty for the government
to pay.”). While the Claims Court may consider takings
claims based upon the Fifth Amendment, the complaint
asserted no factual predicate for the conclusion that the
banks or state and local government officials acted on
behalf of the United States in connection with the
foreclosure of Mr. Langan’s property. Therefore, the
Claims Court correctly concluded that Mr. Langan failed to
identify a cognizable property interest that had been taken
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6 LANGAN v. UNITED STATES
by the United States. See Langan,
2019 WL 3857044, at
*6.
The Claims Court also correctly dismissed Mr. Langan’s
breach of contract claim against the United States for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Langan failed to
plausibly establish the existence of an express or implied
contract with the United States. See Langan,
2019 WL
3857044, at *5–6 (citing Crewzers Fire Crew Transp., Inc.
v. United States,
741 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“To
invoke the Court of Federal Claims’[] jurisdiction under the
Tucker Act, a [plaintiff] must first show that its claims
arose out of a valid contract with the United States.”)). As
the plaintiff, Mr. Langan bears the burden of proving the
existence of a valid contract with the United States. Kam-
Almaz v. United States,
682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2012). “The party alleging a contract must show a mutual
intent to contract including an offer, an acceptance, and
consideration.” Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States,
104
F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “A contract with the
United States also requires that the Government
representative who entered or ratified the agreement had
actual authority to bind the United States.”
Id. As the
Claims Court correctly concluded, Mr. Langan failed to
point to any evidence to plausibly establish these elements
of a contract with the United States.
Mr. Langan referred to an alleged federal land patent.
But, as the Claims Court correctly noted, see Langan,
2019
WL 3857044, at *6, “[h]olding a land patent, like any
ownership interest in property, . . . is not sufficient on its
own to give rise to a cause of action,” Daniels v. United
States, No. 17-01598,
2018 WL 1664476, at *8 (Fed. Cl.
Apr. 6, 2018); see also Ioane v. United States, 4 F. App’x
762, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A] Federal Land Patent is a
deed and gives . . . no rights against the United States.”).
Mr. Langan has not identified any independent money-
mandating provision of law basis for his land patent claim,
as is required to invoke the Claims Court’s jurisdiction
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LANGAN v. UNITED STATES 7
under the Tucker Act. Nor does Mr. Langan identify any
adverse action taken by the United States in regard to his
land patent.
Next, the Claims Court correctly concluded it lacked
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Langan’s statutory claims
because the statutes relied upon were either outside the
court’s jurisdiction or inapplicable to his claims. See
Langan,
2019 WL 3857044, at *7. Mr. Langan identified
the Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), as the jurisdictional
basis for his case, but as previously discussed, this is “only
a jurisdictional statute” and “does not create any
substantive right enforceable against the United States for
money damages.” Testan,
424 U.S. at 398. He also relied
on
28 U.S.C. § 1493, but that statute was repealed in 1953.
Also, as the Claims Court correctly noted,
28 U.S.C. § 1498
is inapplicable to Mr. Langan’s claims because it addresses
the court’s jurisdiction regarding invention patents, not
land patents. See Langan,
2019 WL 3857044, at *7; see
also Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp.,
LLC,
138 S. Ct. 1365, 1376 n.3 (2018) (“Modern invention
patents . . . are meaningfully different from land patents.”).
Mr. Langan further identified
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a
substantive cause of action, but the Claims Court does not
possess jurisdiction to hear claims for violations of this
statute. See
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (providing that exclusive
jurisdiction to hear civil rights claims resides in the federal
district courts); Kennedy v. United States,
138 Fed. Cl. 611,
618 (2018) (“[O]nly federal district courts possess
jurisdiction to entertain claims alleging civil rights
violations” such as claims brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.), appeal dismissed, 748 F. App’x 335 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
Finally, the remainder of Mr. Langan’s demands,
which are for equitable relief, are also outside the
jurisdiction of the Claims Court. The complaint sought,
among other things, that the Claims Court “decree a fair
and equitable process to command specific performance for
Case: 20-1057 Document: 33 Page: 8 Filed: 05/06/2020
8 LANGAN v. UNITED STATES
officers of the government including Yavapai County and
the State of Arizona.” SAppx 39. Mr. Langan also asserted
a “right to redeem [his land] in equity” based on “unjust
enrichment.” Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 18 at 2.
The Claims Court lacks general equity jurisdiction and can
only award equitable relief “incident of and collateral to” a
money judgment. See
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2); Roth v.
United States,
378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
Court of Federal Claims does not possess general equity
jurisdiction.”); Martinez v. United States,
333 F.3d 1295,
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (same). Further, Mr. Langan’s unjust
enrichment claim, as an equitable cause of action, is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Claims Court. 8x8, Inc. v.
United States,
854 F.3d 1376, 1383 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Langan’s remaining
arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing
reasons, the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over Mr.
Langan’s claims, and properly dismissed the complaint.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
