Silvia v. Wilkie ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 20-1097    Document: 26     Page: 1   Filed: 05/08/2020
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    DAVID A. SILVIA,
    Claimant-Appellant
    v.
    ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS
    AFFAIRS,
    Respondent-Appellee
    ______________________
    2020-1097
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
    Veterans Claims in No. 18-2625, Judge Joseph L. Toth.
    ______________________
    Decided: May 8, 2020
    ______________________
    DAVID A. SILVIA, Woonsocket, RI, pro se.
    KARA WESTERCAMP, Commercial Litigation Branch,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
    ington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
    JOSEPH H. HUNT, MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., ROBERT EDWARD
    KIRSCHMAN, JR.; CHRISTOPHER O. ADELOYE, Y. KEN LEE,
    Office of General Counsel, United States Department of
    Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
    ______________________
    Case: 20-1097    Document: 26      Page: 2    Filed: 05/08/2020
    2                                            SILVIA   v. WILKIE
    Before CHEN, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    David A. Silvia appeals a decision from the U.S. Court
    of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court), affirming
    the decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board)
    denying Mr. Silvia entitlement to a total disability evalua-
    tion based on individual unemployability (TDIU) on an ex-
    traschedular basis due to loss of vision in his left eye as a
    result of cataract surgery. We lack jurisdiction over part of
    Mr. Silvia’s appeal because neither the Board nor the Vet-
    erans Court addressed the merits of Mr. Silvia’s Vocational
    Rehabilitation and Employment (VRE) claim, which re-
    mains pending before the agency of original jurisdiction.
    Additionally, even though Mr. Silvia could no longer work
    in his preferred position, we agree with the Veterans Court
    that, under the law, Mr. Silvia needed to prove he was un-
    able to secure substantially gainful employment to be enti-
    tled to TDIU compensation on an extraschedular basis.
    Thus, we dismiss-in-part and affirm-in-part .
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Silvia served in the U.S. Coast Guard from 1973 to
    1986. In January 1998, Mr. Silvia underwent cataract sur-
    gery at a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical cen-
    ter that resulted in a detached retina in his left eye. About
    ten years after his surgery, Mr. Silvia filed for compensa-
    tion due to loss of vision in his left eye as a result of the
    detached retina, which the VA regional office (RO) granted.
    Mr. Silvia subsequently sought entitlement to TDIU
    based on his detached retina condition. For a veteran to be
    eligible for a TDIU rating, the veteran’s unemployability
    must be due to either a single service-connected disability
    rating of at least 60% or multiple disabilities yielding a
    combined rating of 70% or more. These percentages are set
    aside in cases for extraschedular consideration where the
    Case: 20-1097         Document: 26   Page: 3    Filed: 05/08/2020
    SILVIA   v. WILKIE                                            3
    veteran has been rendered unemployable. The RO denied
    Mr. Silvia’s TDIU claim on an extraschedular basis be-
    cause the record evidence did not show he was unemploya-
    ble due to the detached retina.
    Mr. Silvia timely appealed the RO’s decision to the
    Board. In July 2017, the Board denied Mr. Silvia’s TDIU
    claim, finding that although his condition prevented him
    from working in his preferred role as a commercial truck
    driver, there was no evidence that his detached retina pre-
    vented him from engaging in sedentary work or pursuing
    substantially gainful employment. Mr. Silvia appealed to
    the Veterans Court. On September 19, 2019, the Veterans
    Court affirmed the decision of the Board. Mr. Silvia then
    timely appealed to this court.
    DISCUSSION
    Our jurisdiction to review a decision of the Veterans
    Court is limited by statute. Gazelle v. Shulkin, 
    868 F.3d 1006
    , 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We have “exclusive jurisdic-
    tion to review and decide any challenge to the validity of
    any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof
    brought under this section, and to interpret constitutional
    and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and nec-
    essary to a decision.” 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (c). Our jurisdiction
    does not extend to challenges either to factual determina-
    tions or to the application of the law to the facts of a partic-
    ular case.      
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (d)(2); see Bozeman v.
    McDonald, 
    814 F.3d 1354
    , 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explain-
    ing that the Veterans Court’s “application of law to fact” is
    “a question over which we lack jurisdiction”). We interpret
    the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally. See Durr v. Ni-
    cholson, 
    400 F.3d 1375
    , 2380 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
    Mr. Silvia argues that the VA should have but failed to
    provide him with appropriate rehabilitation and employ-
    ment training, given his detached retina. Appellant’s Br.
    at 1. Mr. Silvia would be provided with this type of assis-
    tance under the VRE program. See generally 38 U.S.C.
    Case: 20-1097    Document: 26      Page: 4    Filed: 05/08/2020
    4                                            SILVIA   v. WILKIE
    § 3100; 
    38 C.F.R. § 21.70
    . The Board referred Mr. Silvia’s
    VRE claim to the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ), be-
    cause the AOJ had not previously rendered a decision as to
    the VRE claim and therefore the matter was not ready for
    Board review. S.A. 28; see also 
    38 C.F.R. § 19.9
    (b) (“The
    Board shall refer to the [AOJ] for appropriate consideration
    and handling in the first instance all claims reasonably
    raised by the record that have not been initially adjudi-
    cated by the [AOJ], except for claims over which the Board
    has original jurisdiction.”). Because neither the Board nor
    Veterans Court addressed the VRE issue, which we under-
    stand remains pending before the AOJ, we lack jurisdiction
    over the matter. See Jackson v. Wilkie, 732 F. App’x 872,
    875 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We lack jurisdiction over [the vet-
    eran’s] VRE claims that were not before the Veterans Court
    or decided by the Board.”).
    Mr. Silvia also argues that there was evidence in the
    record that the Board never considered. Appellant’s Br. at
    1. But Mr. Silvia does not specify which evidence the Board
    failed to consider. Although this court generally interprets
    the arguments of a pro se appellant liberally, this particu-
    lar argument is simply too undeveloped for us to consider.
    See Harlston v. Shinseki, 455 F. App’x 992, 994 (Fed. Cir.
    2012); see also Henke v. United States, 
    60 F.3d 795
    , 799
    (Fed. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, we “presume that a fact
    finder reviews all the evidence presented unless he explic-
    itly expresses otherwise.” Medtronic Inc. v. Daig Corp., 
    789 F.2d 903
    , 906 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
    To the extent Mr. Silvia is arguing that the Board in-
    appropriately credited or weighed the evidence, those are
    factual issues over which this court lacks jurisdiction. King
    v. Shinseki, 
    700 F.3d 1339
    , 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The
    evaluation and weighing of evidence and the drawing of ap-
    propriate inferences from it are factual determinations
    committed to the discretion of the fact-finder.”) (internal
    quotations and citation omitted).
    Case: 20-1097         Document: 26    Page: 5   Filed: 05/08/2020
    SILVIA   v. WILKIE                                           5
    To the extent Mr. Silvia is claiming the Veterans Court
    misinterpreted 
    38 C.F.R. § 4.16
    (b), we disagree. Under
    that regulation, a claim for TDIU compensation on an ex-
    traschedular basis requires Mr. Silvia to demonstrate that
    his injury precludes him from securing substantially gain-
    ful employment. 
    38 C.F.R. § 4.16
    (b); Cushman v. Shinseki,
    
    576 F.3d 1290
    , 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Whether the veteran
    can work in his or her preferred or current position is not
    the standard. Smith v. Shinseki, 
    647 F.3d 1380
    , 1382-83
    (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming a decision of the Board noting
    that although the veteran could no longer be employed as
    a laborer, he was still capable of substantially gainful em-
    ployment that involved sedentary employment or light
    manual labor). Additionally, “[t]he DVA may find that a
    veteran is physically capable of substantially gainful em-
    ployment even if he is not currently engaged in such em-
    ployment.” Cushman, 
    576 F.3d at 1302
    . Therefore, the
    Veterans Court did not err in affirming the Board’s deci-
    sion, even though Mr. Silvia is unable to work as a truck
    driver.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Mr. Silvia’s remaining arguments
    and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the appeal from
    the final judgment of the Veterans Court is
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND DISMISSED-IN-PART
    COSTS
    No costs.