St. Jude Medical, LLC v. Snyders Heart Valve LLC ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 19-2108    Document: 63    Page: 1     Filed: 10/15/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC,
    Appellant
    v.
    SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC,
    Cross-Appellant
    UNITED STATES,
    Intervenor
    ______________________
    2019-2108, 2019-2109, 2019-2140
    ______________________
    Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2018-
    00105, IPR2018-00106.
    ______________________
    Decided: October 15, 2020
    ______________________
    JOHN C. O'QUINN, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington,
    DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by HANNAH
    LAUREN BEDARD, JASON M. WILCOX; BRYAN SCOTT HALES,
    KRISTINA NICOLE HENDRICKS, Chicago, IL.
    MATTHEW JAMES ANTONELLI, Antonelli, Harrington &
    Thompson, LLP, Houston, TX, argued for cross-appellant.
    Also represented by ZACHARIAH HARRINGTON, LARRY D.
    THOMPSON, JR.; SARAH RING, Daniels & Tredennick,
    Case: 19-2108    Document: 63      Page: 2    Filed: 10/15/2020
    2         ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC
    Houston, TX.
    MELISSA N. PATTERSON, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
    United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for
    intervenor. Also represented by COURTNEY DIXON.
    ______________________
    Before NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
    TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
    Snyders Heart Valve LLC owns U.S. Patent No.
    6,540,782, which describes and claims an artificial heart
    valve and a system for inserting the valve. In October
    2017, St. Jude Medical, LLC filed two petitions with the
    United States Patent and Trademark Office, under 35
    U.S.C. §§ 311–19, seeking inter partes reviews of claims 1,
    2, 4–8, 10–13, 17–19, 21, 22, and 25–30 of the ’782 patent
    (the challenged claims) by the Office’s Patent Trial and Ap-
    peal Board. The Board, as delegee of the Director of the
    Office, 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.4, 42.108, instituted two reviews,
    each addressing all the challenged claims.
    In IPR2018-00105 (IPR-105), the Board ultimately
    ruled that St. Jude had failed to establish unpatentability
    of any of the challenged claims. Specifically, the Board re-
    jected St. Jude’s contention that all the challenged claims
    were anticipated by the Leonhardt patent and would have
    been obvious over Leonhardt plus either the Anderson pa-
    tent or the Johnson and Imachi patents. St. Jude Medical,
    LLC v. Snyders Heart Valve LLC, IPR2018-00105, 
    2019 WL 1975348
    (P.T.A.B. May 2, 2019) (IPR-105 Decision). In
    IPR2018-00106 (IPR-106), the Board found claims 1, 2, 6,
    and 8 anticipated by the Bessler patent, but it rejected St.
    Jude’s contentions as to all other claims. Specifically, it
    ruled that St. Jude had not proved, as to all but claims 1,
    2, 6, and 8, anticipation by Bessler or obviousness over
    Bessler combined with either Anderson or Johnson and
    Imachi. St. Jude Medical, LLC v. Snyders Heart Valve
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    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC          3
    LLC, IPR2018-00106, 
    2019 WL 1975349
    (P.T.A.B. May 2,
    2019) (IPR-106 Decision).
    St. Jude appeals on a subset of the challenges it pre-
    sented to the Board. For IPR-105, it argues that the Board
    erroneously rejected the contention that Leonhardt antici-
    pated claims 1, 2, 4–8, and 28, the alleged error being the
    Board’s application of the construction of the claim term
    “band.” For IPR-106, St. Jude argues that the Board erro-
    neously rejected the contention that Bessler anticipated
    claim 28, the alleged error being the Board’s finding a fail-
    ure of proof that Bessler meets claim 28’s “manipulator”
    limitation. St. Jude also argues, for IPR-106, that the
    Board erred in rejecting St. Jude’s challenge to most of the
    claims at issue (all but claims 17, 27, and 30) for obvious-
    ness over Bessler plus Johnson and Imachi. Snyders cross-
    appeals in IPR-106, arguing that the Board committed sev-
    eral errors in finding claims 1, 2, 6, and 8 anticipated by
    Bessler.
    We affirm the Board’s decision in IPR-105. We reverse
    the Board’s finding in IPR-106 that Bessler anticipated
    claims 1, 2, 6, and 8. We need not reach St. Jude’s antici-
    pation argument as to claim 28, and we affirm the Board’s
    obviousness rejection in IPR-106.
    I
    A
    Human hearts have four chambers and four valves that
    regulate blood flow as the heart expands and contracts.
    ’782 patent, col. 1, lines 13–18. According to the ’782 pa-
    tent, if a valve becomes damaged or diseased so as to com-
    promise healthy opening and closing, blood may flow
    backwards through the valve and blood pressure may drop
    dangerously.
    Id., col. 1, lines
    18–24. Although a damaged
    valve may be replaced with an artificial one, such replace-
    ment traditionally required invasive procedures, like open-
    heart surgery.
    Id., col. 1, lines
    25–32. Even after artificial
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    4          ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC
    valves were developed that could be installed via catheter
    without open-heart surgery, the specification states, such
    prior-art valves still involved risk-presenting surgical re-
    moval of the damaged native valve before inserting the new
    artificial one.
    Id., col. 1, lines
    32–42.
    The ’782 patent, titled “Artificial Heart Valve,” issued
    in April 2003 to Dr. Robert Snyders. It describes an artifi-
    cial heart valve that can be installed via catheter without
    invasive surgery and “without removing the damaged na-
    tive heart valve.”
    Id., col. 2, lines
    23–30. The artificial
    heart valve has three main components: a valve element, a
    frame, and a band.
    Id., col. 10, lines
    22–60. The ’782 pa-
    tent also discloses a system for installing the artificial
    valve using an instrument that consists of a holder, a ma-
    nipulator, and an ejector.
    Id., col. 3, lines
    30–44.
    Independent claim 1 of the ’782 patent recites an arti-
    ficial valve as follows:
    1. An artificial valve for repairing a damaged heart
    valve having a plurality of cusps separating an up-
    stream region from a downstream region, said ar-
    tificial valve comprising:
    a flexibly resilient frame sized and shaped for in-
    sertion in a position between the upstream region
    and the downstream region, the frame having a
    plurality of peripheral anchors for anchoring the
    frame in the position between the upstream and
    the downstream region and a central portion lo-
    cated between the plurality of peripheral anchors.
    a band attached to the frame limiting spacing be-
    tween adjacent anchors of said plurality of periph-
    eral anchors; and
    a flexible valve element attached to the central por-
    tion of the frame and adjacent the band, said valve
    element being substantially free of connections to
    the frame except at the central portion of the frame
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    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC         5
    and adjacent the band, said valve element having
    an upstream side facing said upstream region
    when the frame is anchored in the position between
    the upstream region and the downstream region
    and a downstream side opposite the upstream side
    facing said downstream region when the frame is
    anchored in the position between the upstream re-
    gion and the downstream region, said valve ele-
    ment moving in response to a difference between
    fluid pressure in said upstream region and fluid
    pressure in said downstream region between an
    open position in which the element permits down-
    stream flow between said upstream region and said
    downstream region and a closed position in which
    the element blocks flow reversal from said down-
    stream region to said upstream region, wherein the
    valve element moves to the open position when
    fluid pressure in said upstream region is greater
    than fluid pressure in said downstream region to
    permit downstream flow from said upstream region
    to said downstream region and the valve element
    moves to the closed position when fluid pressure in
    said downstream region is greater than fluid pres-
    sure in said upstream region to prevent flow rever-
    sal from said downstream region to said upstream
    region.
    Id., col. 10, lines
    22–60. Claims 2–9 depend, directly or in-
    directly, on claim 1 and therefore incorporate all of claim
    1’s limitations.
    Independent claim 28 recites a “combination” of the ar-
    tificial valve recited in claim 1—set forth in claim 28 using
    the language of claim 1 but adding the restriction that the
    “frame [is] collapsible to a configuration having a maxi-
    mum width less than about 18 mm”—and “an instrument
    for inserting the artificial valve between the upstream re-
    gion and the downstream region,” the latter further speci-
    fied as follows:
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    6          ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC
    an instrument including
    a holder having a hollow interior sized for holding
    the artificial valve when the frame is in the col-
    lapsed configuration;
    an elongate manipulator attached to the holder for
    manipulating the holder into position between the
    upstream region and the downstream region; and
    an ejector mounted in the hollow interior of the
    holder for ejecting the artificial heart valve from
    the hollow interior of the holder into position be-
    tween the upstream region and the downstream re-
    gion.
    Id., col. 13, line
    66, through col. 14, line 56. None of the
    issues before us require consideration of claim language
    outside claims 1 and 28.
    The key prior art in IPR-105 is U.S. Patent No.
    5,957,949 (Leonhardt). Leonhardt discloses an artificial
    valve that is installed via catheter to replace damaged
    valves in the heart or esophagus. ’949 patent, col. 1, lines
    4–8. It has three main components: a biological valve, a
    valve stent, and graft material.
    Id., col. 4, line
    s 
    14–16;
    id., Fig. 4. The
    graft material is made of “thin-walled biocom-
    patible, flexible and expandable, low-porosity woven fab-
    ric” and is “arranged to surround [the] stent.”
    Id., col. 5, lines
    53–55, 62–64.
    The key prior art in IPR-106 is U.S. Patent No.
    5,855,601 (Bessler). Bessler discloses an artificial heart
    valve and a method and device for installing that valve.
    ’601 patent, col. 2, lines 55–67. The artificial heart valve
    may be compressed or expanded, and the installed unit in-
    cludes a rigid stent member and a flexible valve member
    with a cuff portion.
    Id., col. 3, lines
    48–57. The system for
    installing the valve includes a catheter with the valve at
    the distal end and a pusher member to release the valve
    when the desired implant site is reached.
    Id., col. 4, line
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    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC          7
    53, through col. 5, line 12. “Alternatively, or in combina-
    tion [with the described system], the heart valve could be
    positioned over a guidewire.”
    Id., col. 5, lines
    13–14.
    In IPR-106, St. Jude also relied on two other patents in
    its argument for obviousness in combination with Bessler.
    U.S. Patent No. 4,339,831 (Johnson) discloses an artificial
    heart valve with a durable and flexible membrane. ’831
    patent, col. 4, lines 49–68. U.S. Patent No. 5,413,599
    (Imachi) discloses a medical valve apparatus that is not the
    subject of substantial discussion in this court. ’599 patent,
    Abstract.
    B
    St. Jude filed petitions for inter partes reviews of the
    ’782 patent in October 2017. J.A. 312, 2870. In IPR-105,
    St. Jude cited Leonhardt as its primary reference, arguing
    that Leonhardt anticipated claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–13, 17–19,
    21, 22, and 25–30 of the ’782 patent. J.A. 322. In IPR-106,
    St. Jude argued that the same claims were anticipated by
    Bessler, as well as unpatentable for obviousness over
    Bessler, Johnson, and Imachi. J.A. 2881. 1
    In IPR-105, the Board rejected St. Jude’s argument
    that Leonhardt anticipated the ’782 patent. IPR-105 Deci-
    sion, at *7–14. In the respect relevant on appeal, the Board
    essentially adopted St. Jude’s proposed claim construction
    of “band”: The Board’s construction was “a structure gen-
    erally in the shape of a closed strip or ring,” which slightly
    broadened St. Jude’s language by replacing St. Jude’s “cir-
    cular” with “closed” (thereby including ovals, for example).
    Id. at *5–6.
    But the Board found that St. Jude did not
    1   In IPR-105, St. Jude, besides arguing anticipation,
    presented obviousness arguments, which the Board re-
    jected and are not at issue on appeal. In IPR-106, St. Jude
    presented one obviousness combination not mentioned in
    text, which the Board rejected and is not at issue on appeal.
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    8          ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC
    prove that Leonhardt disclosed a “band” under that con-
    struction because what St. Jude alleged was the “band” in
    Leonhardt covered the entire length of the frame, like a
    “sleeve,” and was therefore not a “strip” or “ring.”
    Id. at *8–9. 2
          In IPR-106, the Board determined that St. Jude had
    proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Bessler an-
    ticipated claims 1, 2, 6, and 8 of the ’782 patent. IPR-106
    Decision at *8–12. For claim 28, the Board determined that
    St. Jude did not prove that Bessler discloses the “manipu-
    lator” required by the claim, thus defeating St. Jude’s an-
    ticipation contention as to that claim.
    Id. at *14.
    Finally,
    the Board rejected all of St. Jude’s obviousness arguments.
    Id. at *15–20.
         St. Jude filed a timely notice of appeal for both IPRs on
    July 1, 2019. J.A. 238–40; 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 319; 37
    C.F.R. § 90.3(a)(1). Snyders filed a timely cross-appeal for
    IPR-106 on July 10, 2019. J.A. 248–50. We have jurisdic-
    tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 319.
    II
    We review the Board’s final written decision under the
    Administrative Procedure Act, “hold[ing] unlawful and
    set[ting] aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
    found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
    otherwise not in accordance with law . . . [or] unsupported
    by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706; Dickson v. Zurko,
    
    527 U.S. 150
    , 164 (1999). Anticipation is a question of fact,
    with the Board’s determination of what is taught in the
    2    The Board and the parties have followed the pa-
    tent’s use of the word “length,” see ’782 patent, col. 9, lines
    24–28;
    id., Fig. 6, to
    describe what, for material forming a
    closed loop, would ordinarily be described as the “width” of
    the material (as opposed to its thickness or its linear extent
    if cut and laid out straight).
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    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC           9
    prior art at issue reviewed for substantial evidence. Mi-
    crosoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 
    878 F.3d 1052
    , 1068 (Fed. Cir.
    2017); In re Gleave, 
    560 F.3d 1331
    , 1334–35 (Fed. Cir.
    2009). For obviousness, the ultimate determination is a le-
    gal one reviewed de novo, but underlying factual determi-
    nations are reviewed for substantial-evidence support.
    Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 
    917 F.3d 1376
    ,
    1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Board’s claim constructions,
    here under the “broadest reasonable interpretation” stand-
    ard, are determinations of law reviewed de novo where
    based on intrinsic evidence, with any Board findings about
    facts extrinsic to the patent record reviewed for substan-
    tial-evidence support. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v.
    Sandoz, Inc., 
    574 U.S. 318
    , 325–27 (2015); HTC Corp. v.
    Cellular Commc’ns Equip., LLC, 
    877 F.3d 1361
    , 1367 (Fed.
    Cir. 2017); PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical
    Commc’ns RF, LLC, 
    815 F.3d 747
    , 751 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 3
    “Substantial evidence review asks ‘whether a reasonable
    fact finder could have arrived at the agency’s decision’ and
    requires examination of the ‘record as a whole, taking into
    account evidence that both justifies and detracts from an
    agency’s decision.’” Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illu-
    mina Cambridge, Ltd., 
    821 F.3d 1359
    , 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
    (quoting In re Gartside, 
    203 F.3d 1305
    , 1312 (Fed. Cir.
    2001)).
    A
    The sole issue on appeal for IPR-105 is whether the
    Board erred in rejecting St. Jude’s argument that Leon-
    hardt anticipated claims 1, 2, 4–8, and 28. The sole alleged
    error is the Board’s rejection of St. Jude’s contention that
    Leonhardt discloses a “band”—a requirement of claim 1
    3   Because the petitions in IPR-105 and IPR-106 were
    filed in 2017, claim construction here is subject to the
    “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard. Celgene
    Corp. v. Peter, 
    931 F.3d 1342
    , 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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    10         ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC
    (and therefore of dependent claims 2 and 4–8) and claim
    28. If Leonhardt does not disclose a “band,” it does not an-
    ticipate these claims. We affirm the Board’s determination
    that Leonhardt does not disclose a band and therefore af-
    firm the Board’s decision in IPR-105.
    The Board determined that Leonhardt’s graft mate-
    rial—the component in Leonhardt that St. Jude argued
    was the required “band”—did not meet the band limitation.
    St. Jude challenges that determination on the ground that,
    in making it, the Board failed “to apply its own construc-
    tion, and instead appl[ied] a narrower implicit construc-
    tion” of “band.” St. Jude Opening Br. at 28. We disagree. 4
    In the respect relevant on appeal, the Board adopted as
    the governing claim construction for “band” the proposal
    that St. Jude itself advanced, except for making one small
    change that broadened, rather than narrowed, St. Jude’s
    proposal. St. Jude proposed that “band” be construed to
    mean “‘[a] structure generally in the shape of a circular
    strip or ring; a band can be integrated with the frame.’”
    IPR-105 Decision at *5. Relying on a district court’s anal-
    ysis in related litigation, the Board rejected the “can be in-
    tegrated with the frame” portion of St. Jude’s proposal, and
    St. Jude does not dispute that conclusion.
    Id. at *5–6.
    As
    to the rest, the Board concluded that “circular” was too lim-
    iting, as it might exclude oval shapes, so it substituted
    “closed” to arrive at its construction: “a structure generally
    in the shape of a closed strip or ring.”
    Id. St. Jude 4
     Snyders also argues that—even if Leonhardt’s
    graft material constitutes a band—we should affirm the
    Board’s decision on the alternative grounds that (1) the
    graft material does not limit spacing between peripheral
    anchors and (2) Leonhardt does not disclose a valve ele-
    ment attached to the central portion of the frame. Snyders
    Response Br. at 34–35. We need not and do not reach those
    issues.
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    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC           11
    expressly accepts that construction. St. Jude Opening Br.
    at 21 (“St. Jude agrees with this construction—it is entirely
    consistent with the claim language itself and the specifica-
    tion’s description of a band.”).
    The Board later concluded that the Leonhardt graft
    material does not qualify, because, like a sleeve, it extends
    in width (or “length,” in the patent’s language) over the en-
    tire structure it wraps around. IPR-105 Decision at *8–9.
    In reaching this conclusion, the Board relied on the terms
    “strip” and “ring”—which came from and are accepted by
    St. Jude.
    Id. (“graft material 24
    cannot be considered a
    strip or ring”). St. Jude’s argument is that this conclusion
    changed the claim construction. But the Board in fact ex-
    pressly relied on the now-accepted claim construction.
    St. Jude’s argument that the Board must have changed
    the construction is meritless. St. Jude argues that no
    width restriction can be part of the ordinary skilled arti-
    san’s understanding of the term “band”—that no matter
    how wide (or “long,” in the patent’s terms) is the material
    making a loop around a structure (here, the frame), it nec-
    essarily counts as a “band.” In support, St. Jude quotes a
    dictionary definition of “band” (“[a] thin strip of flexible ma-
    terial used to encircle or bind one object or to hold a number
    of objects together”) and contends that the specification
    “explicitly disclaims any restriction on the length of a
    band.” St. Jude Opening Br. at 30–31.
    One problem with these contentions is that they are
    flawed on their own terms. The dictionary definition does
    not exclude any width constraint from being part of the rel-
    evant understanding. Indeed, “thin strip” in the quoted
    definition suggests the possibility of such a constraint, as
    do the words “strip or stripe” and “narrow strip” in the im-
    mediately succeeding definitions in the same dictionary en-
    try for “band.” American Heritage Dictionary of the
    English Language 143 (3d ed. 1992). And the specification
    material cited by St. Jude goes no further than showing
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    12         ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC
    that the specification does not affirmatively specify any
    particular limit on a band’s width (“length,” in the patent’s
    terms). See ’782 patent, col. 9, lines 24–28 (reciting exam-
    ples of certain “lengths” and adding that a band “may have
    other lengths”). The specification does not “explicitly dis-
    claim[] any restriction on the length of a band.” St. Jude
    Opening Br. at 31.
    The more fundamental problem with St. Jude’s basis
    for its argument, however, is that it simply does not ad-
    dress the terms “strip” and “ring,” which St. Jude itself pro-
    posed and now accepts as the defining terms of the claim
    construction. The relied-on dictionary definitions and spec-
    ification passages address “band” but not “strip” or “ring.”
    St. Jude has offered nothing at all to indicate that “strip”
    and “ring” cannot have any width (“length,” in the patent’s
    terms) constraint in the relevant skilled artisan’s under-
    standing. If St. Jude wanted to argue that “band” pre-
    cludes any such constraint, it should have proposed a claim
    construction that did so. It did not. The adopted claim con-
    struction therefore governs, and St. Jude has no persuasive
    argument that all width constraints are alien to the key
    terms of that construction, “strip” and “ring.” Nor has St.
    Jude made any argument that, if some width constraint is
    within a skilled artisan’s understanding of “strip” or “ring,”
    the Board lacked substantial evidence to find that the full-
    length sleeve-like covering of Leonhardt does not qualify.
    We therefore reject St. Jude’s challenge to the decision
    in IPR-105.
    B
    Both parties challenge aspects of the Board’s decision
    in IPR-106. We begin by addressing the challenge pre-
    sented by Snyders, in its cross-appeal, to the Board’s find-
    ing that Bessler anticipated claims 1, 2, 6, and 8. We then
    address St. Jude’s argument that the Board erred in not
    finding claim 28 anticipated. Lastly, we address St. Jude’s
    obviousness challenge.
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    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC        13
    1
    In its cross-appeal, Snyders alleges three errors under-
    lying the Board’s finding that Bessler anticipated claim 1
    and dependent claims 2, 6, and 8. It argues that the
    Board’s construction of the claim 1 limitation concerning
    how the frame is “sized and shaped” is incorrect because it
    covers frames sized and shaped for installation with the
    native valve removed, rather than only with the troubled
    native valve remaining in place. Snyders also challenges
    the Board’s construction of claim 1’s “attached” limitation,
    arguing that the limitation must be construed to exclude
    indirect methods of attaching the valve element and the
    frame. Finally, Snyders argues that the Board incorrectly
    found that the cuff in Bessler satisfies the claim 1 require-
    ment that the band “limit[] spacing” between adjacent
    frame anchors.
    We agree with Snyders that the Board erred in constru-
    ing the “sized and shaped” limitation and that Bessler
    therefore does not anticipate claims 1, 2, 6, and 8. We do
    not reach the other cross-appeal arguments.
    In finding that Bessler anticipated claims 1, 2, 6, and
    8, one of the limitations the Board found satisfied by
    Bessler is the claim 1 limitation requiring a “frame sized
    and shaped for insertion between the upstream region and
    the downstream region.” IPR-106 Decision at *8–9. The
    Board determined that “[t]he claim language does not re-
    quire the frame be sized and shaped for insertion into a
    damaged heart valve,” but “only that the frame is sized and
    shaped for insertion in a position between the upstream re-
    gion and the downstream region.”
    Id. at *9.
    For that rea-
    son, the Board, without disputing the express assertion by
    Snyders that Bessler requires removal of the native valve
    for installation of the replacement valve, found that
    Bessler’s valve satisfies the limitation.
    Id. Claim 1 of
    the ’782 patent recites an “artificial heart
    valve for repairing a damaged heart valve having a
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    14         ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC
    plurality of cusps, separating an upstream region from a
    downstream region . . . comprising . . . a flexibly resilient
    frame sized and shaped for insertion between the upstream
    region and downstream region.” ’782 patent, col. 10, lines
    22–27. The language provides some support for the read-
    ing advanced by Snyders in preference to the Board’s con-
    struction. The requirement that the frame be “sized and
    shaped” a certain way suggests a focus on how the frame is
    fitted to the surrounding material (which depends on
    whether the native valve remains), a focus that goes be-
    yond mere linear “position” between two regions, IPR-106
    Decision at *9. The claim’s reference to “repairing a dam-
    aged heart valve,” without any reference to removal, sug-
    gests that the native valve remains. So too does the claim’s
    reference to the damaged heart valve “having a plurality of
    cusps,” which appears superfluous if claim 1 is interpreted
    to include embodiments where the damaged valve and its
    cusps are removed. See Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto.
    Sys., Inc., 
    853 F.3d 1272
    , 1288 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“It is
    highly disfavored to construe terms in a way that renders
    them void, meaningless, or superfluous.”); Bicon, Inc. v.
    Straumann Co., 
    441 F.3d 945
    , 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
    (“[C]laims are interpreted with an eye toward giving effect
    to all terms in the claim.”).
    We turn to the ’782 patent’s specification, which we
    conclude resolves the interpretive question in this case un-
    der the standard requiring the “broadest reasonable inter-
    pretation in light of the specification.”        37 C.F.R.
    § 42.100(b) (2016); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
    415 F.3d 1303
    , 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (explaining that the
    specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a
    disputed term”). The specification states that “the frame is
    sized and shaped for insertion between the plurality of
    cusps C of the damaged heart valve in a position between
    an upstream region and a downstream region.” ’782 pa-
    tent, col. 5, lines 48–51 (emphasis added). That language
    indicates that “sized and shaped” is not meant to refer only
    Case: 19-2108    Document: 63      Page: 15     Filed: 10/15/2020
    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC          15
    to placement in a position between the upstream and down-
    stream regions, but also to fitting between the cusps of the
    intact native valve.
    Moreover, the specification stresses that the artificial
    heart valve it discloses can be inserted without removing
    the native valve and that this is an improvement on the
    prior art. See ’782 patent, col. 1, lines 37–42 (“[M]any [pre-
    vious] valves also require the damaged native heart valve
    to be removed prior to implanting the artificial valve.”);
    id., col. 1, lines
    40–42 (“Removing the native valve increases
    the risk that a portion of the valve will migrate through the
    body and block vessels downstream from the heart.”);
    id., col. 2, lines
    21–25 (“Among the several objects and features
    of the present invention may be noted the provision of an
    artificial heart valve which accommodates implantation
    without removing the damaged native heart valve . . . .”).
    Of particular note, the specification expressly describes
    Bessler as presenting problems that the Snyders invention
    overcomes, stating that the procedure disclosed in Bessler
    is too invasive because it “includes excision, vacuum re-
    moval of the native valve, cardiopulmonary bypass and
    backflushing of the coronary arterial tree.”
    Id., col. 2, lines
     14–20 (emphasis added).
    The specification passages, including its specific de-
    scription of overcoming deficiencies in Bessler, go beyond
    stating a general preference for leaving the native valve in-
    tact. Those passages make it unreasonable to read the
    “sized and shaped for insertion” claim language as covering
    an artificial valve fitted for the space left after removing
    the native valve.
    This conclusion precludes anticipation by Bessler on
    the record of IPR-106. Before the Board, in responding to
    the argument by Snyders on this claim limitation, St. Jude
    relied only on its claim-construction argument that the ’782
    claims cover the situation of a removed native valve; it did
    not dispute the express assertion by Snyders that Bessler
    Case: 19-2108     Document: 63      Page: 16     Filed: 10/15/2020
    16         ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC
    “‘requires removal of the native heart valve.’” IPR-106 De-
    cision at *9 (quoting Patent Owner’s Response at 17–18);
    J.A. 3289–90 (Reply to Patent Owner’s Response at 3–4). 5
    St. Jude therefore has not preserved any argument that
    Bessler taught a non-removal alternative that satisfied the
    “sized and shaped” limitation. See Novartis AG v. Torrent
    Pharms. Ltd., 
    853 F.3d 1316
    , 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re
    Baxter Int’l, Inc., 
    678 F.3d 1357
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    Because we reject St. Jude’s (and the Board’s) claim
    construction, we conclude that Bessler does not meet this
    limitation and therefore cannot anticipate claims 1, 2, 6,
    and 8. See 
    Biscotti, 878 F.3d at 1069
    (“[A] prior art refer-
    ence must provide every element of the claimed invention
    arranged as in the claim in order to anticipate.”). Accord-
    ingly, we hold that claims 1, 2, 6, and 8 are not anticipated
    by Bessler, and we reverse the Board’s contrary determi-
    nation.
    2
    St. Jude’s first contention in its appeal in IPR-106 is
    that the Board committed substantive and procedural er-
    rors when it found claim 28 not anticipated by Bessler be-
    cause St. Jude did not prove that Bessler discloses the
    “manipulator” required by claim 28. We need not and do
    not reach this challenge. Claim 28 contains exactly the
    same “sized and shaped” limitation for the valve as does
    claim 1, requiring a valve meeting that limitation (among
    others) in combination with an instrument used to install
    the valve. ’782 patent, col. 13, line 66, through col. 14, line
    5   In its briefing in this court, St. Jude appears to sug-
    gest at one place that, before the Board, it responded to the
    “sized and shaped” contention of Snyders by arguing that
    Bessler does not require native-valve removal. See St. Jude
    Response & Reply Br. at 40–41. Its citations to the record
    do not support the suggestion.
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    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC          17
    56. Because we hold that Snyders is correct that Bessler
    does not meet the “sized and shaped” limitation, Bessler
    cannot anticipate claim 28 regardless of whether it meets
    the additional requirement of a “manipulator” component
    relating to the insertion instrument.
    3
    St. Jude’s second contention in its appeal in IPR-106
    challenges the Board’s conclusion that St. Jude failed to
    prove that claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28,
    and 29 of the ’782 patent would have been obvious over
    Bessler, Johnson, and Imachi. We reject this challenge.
    The Board agreed with St. Jude that a relevant skilled
    artisan would have been motivated to combine Bessler and
    Johnson, given that Johnson disclosed a more durable
    valve than Bessler’s valve, while Bessler disclosed a stent
    that could be installed via catheter (not open-heart sur-
    gery). IPR-106 Decision at *18. But the Board found that
    St. Jude failed to prove that a relevant artisan would have
    made the particular combination St. Jude proposed—re-
    taining the “cuff” from Bessler (but not its valve) to provide
    the “band” required by the claims at issue.
    Id. at *19. 6
    The
    Board found that Bessler’s cuff is “an integral portion of the
    valve member” and that its purpose is “attaching the valve
    to the stent.”
    Id. It therefore concluded
    that St. Jude had
    not shown why a relevant artisan “when replacing
    Bessler’s valve with Johnson’s valve would remove the leaf-
    let portion of B[e]ssler’s valve but retain the cuff portion.”
    Id. 6
       Before the Board, St. Jude proposed an alternative
    combination that would use a feature of Johnson (not the
    cuff of Bessler) as the claim-required band, but the Board
    rejected that alternative, IPR-106 Decision at *19, and St.
    Jude does not challenge that rejection on appeal.
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    18         ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC
    The Board’s determination on this point—whether a
    skilled artisan would be motivated to make the proposed
    combination to arrive at the claimed invention—is a fac-
    tual one that we review for substantial-evidence support.
    See Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc.,
    
    876 F.3d 1350
    , 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017). It was St. Jude’s bur-
    den to support its assertion by a preponderance of the evi-
    dence. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l,
    Ltd., 
    829 F.3d 1364
    , 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We conclude
    that the Board did not lack substantial-evidence support in
    finding a failure of proof by St. Jude.
    As the Board noted, Bessler describes its cuff as ex-
    tending from the periphery of the circular and leaflet por-
    tions of its valve, and attaching to the stent to hold the
    valve and stent together. ’601 patent, col. 5, lines 15–25,
    38–42. In St. Jude’s proposed combination of Johnson and
    Bessler, however, the leaflet portion of Bessler’s valve
    would be removed in favor of Johnson’s valve, while retain-
    ing the cuff portion of Bessler’s valve. Pet. for Inter Partes
    Review at 68, J.A. 2946. The Board explained, however,
    that “the cuff is an integral portion of the valve member,”
    that “the purpose of the cuff portion [is] for attaching the
    valve to the stent,” and that, “[o]nce the leaflet portion of
    Bessler’s valve is removed, the cuff serves no purpose.”
    IPR-106 Decision at *19. The Board found no “adequate[]”
    or “persua[sive]” explanation by St. Jude for why a relevant
    artisan would keep the “integral” cuff portion while replac-
    ing the leaflet portion to which it is attached.
    Id. The relevant portion
    of St. Jude’s petition offers no
    meaningful explanation for this proposal. Pet. for Inter
    Partes Review at 55–56, J.A. 2933–34. The relevant por-
    tion of the petition cites five paragraphs from the declara-
    tion of St. Jude’s expert, Dr. Lakshmi Prasad Dasi
    , id. (citing Dasi Declaration
    ¶¶ 66–70, J.A. 3677–79), but those
    paragraphs merely characterize Bessler, without address-
    ing the specific question of separating the leaflets from the
    cuff for purposes of a combination with Johnson. St. Jude
    Case: 19-2108    Document: 63        Page: 19   Filed: 10/15/2020
    ST. JUDE MEDICAL, LLC   v. SNYDERS HEART VALVE LLC          19
    now points to two additional paragraphs of the Dasi decla-
    ration, J.A. 3696–98 (¶¶ 109, 111)—which themselves de-
    scribe how the contemplated combination would function,
    rather than specifically address the question of motivation
    to make the specific combination—but those paragraphs
    are not cited in the relevant portion of the petition or in any
    other submission to the Board on this point that St. Jude
    identifies. St. Jude has not demonstrated the unreasona-
    bleness of the Board’s determination that St. Jude did not
    adequately or persuasively establish the motivation to
    make the particular combination it proposed in arguing ob-
    viousness. We therefore affirm the Board’s obviousness de-
    termination in IPR-106. 7
    III
    The Board’s decision in IPR-105 is affirmed. The
    Board’s decision in IPR-106 is reversed as to claims 1, 2, 6,
    and 8 but otherwise affirmed.
    Costs awarded to Snyders.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART
    7   As an alternative ground for affirming the Board’s
    obviousness finding, Snyders challenges the Board’s deter-
    mination that a relevant artisan would be motivated to
    combine Bessler, Johnson, and Imachi. Snyders Response
    Br. at 45. We need not reach that argument.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-2108

Filed Date: 10/15/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/15/2020