Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc. ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 19-2418     Document: 67    Page: 1   Filed: 03/01/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC,
    Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant
    v.
    BAXALTA INC., BAXALTA US INC.,
    Defendants-Appellants
    NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2019-2418, 2020-1017
    ______________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware in No. 1:16-cv-01122-RGA, Judge
    Richard G. Andrews.
    ______________________
    Decided: March 1, 2021
    ______________________
    BRADFORD J. BADKE, Sidley Austin LLP, New York,
    NY, argued for plaintiff-cross-appellant. Also represented
    by SONA DE, CHING-LEE FUKUDA; JOSHUA JOHN FOUGERE,
    RYAN C. MORRIS, PAUL ZEGGER, Washington, DC.
    EDGAR HAUG, Haug Partners LLP, New York, NY, ar-
    gued for defendants-appellants and defendant-appellee.
    Also represented by KAITLIN ABRAMS, NICHOLAS F. GIOVE,
    JONATHAN HERSTOFF, ERIKA SELLI.
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 2    Filed: 03/01/2021
    2                      BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.
    ______________________
    Before NEWMAN, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    STOLL, Circuit Judge.
    This patent infringement case presents various issues
    of claim scope, infringement, validity, and damages. Bayer
    HealthCare LLC sued Baxalta Inc. and Baxalta US Inc.
    (collectively, “Baxalta”) and Nektar Therapeutics, alleging
    that Baxalta’s biologic product Adynovate® infringes cer-
    tain claims of Bayer’s 
    U.S. Patent No. 9,364,520
    . The jury
    found that the asserted claims were enabled and infringed,
    and that Bayer was entitled to reasonable-royalty dam-
    ages. The district court did not, however, send the question
    of willful infringement to the jury, instead holding as a
    matter of law that Baxalta’s conduct did not meet the re-
    quirements for willfulness. Baxalta now appeals the dis-
    trict court’s denial of its motions for judgment as a matter
    of law or a new trial on the issues of infringement, enable-
    ment, and damages, along with the court’s award of pre-
    verdict supplemental damages. Bayer cross-appeals, chal-
    lenging the district court’s denial of its motion for a new
    trial on willfulness. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    I
    The ’520 patent is directed to recombinant forms of hu-
    man factor VIII (or FVIII). FVIII is a protein that is pro-
    duced, and released into the bloodstream, by the liver.
    FVIII comprises 2,332 amino acids and has six different
    structural domains: A1-A2-B-A3-C1-C2. Most relevant to
    this case is the domain of FVIII known as the “B-domain.”
    As “a critical component of the intrinsic pathway of
    blood coagulation,” FVIII is useful in the treatment of he-
    mophilia A. ’520 patent col. 1 ll. 29–30. Hemophilia A is
    the “most common hereditary coagulation disorder” and is
    “caused by deficiency or structural defects in” naturally
    Case: 19-2418     Document: 67     Page: 3    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                      3
    occurring FVIII. 
    Id.
     at col. 1 ll. 27–29. Because FVIII has
    a “short half-life” of “only about 11 hours,” as a therapeutic
    it “must be administered frequently.” 
    Id.
     at col. 1 ll. 52–55.
    The ’520 patent recognizes that “[t]he need for frequent in-
    travenous injection creates tremendous barriers to patient
    compliance” and, thus, “[i]t would be more convenient for
    the patients if a FVIII product could be developed that had
    a longer half-life and therefore required less frequent ad-
    ministration.” 
    Id.
     at col. 1 ll. 56–60; see 
    id.
     at col. 2
    ll. 47–49. Moreover, “the cost of treatment could be re-
    duced if the half-life were increased because fewer dosages
    may then be required.” 
    Id.
     at col. 1 ll. 60–62.
    The patent explains that a process called “PEGylation”
    has “been demonstrated to increase the in vivo half-life of
    a protein.” 
    Id.
     at col. 3 ll. 34–35. PEGylation is the conju-
    gation (or attachment) of a polymer called polyethylene gly-
    col (PEG) to a protein such as FVIII. See 
    id.
     at col. 3
    ll. 35–37; see also 
    id.
     at col. 9 ll. 12–14. PEG is a type of
    polyalkylene oxide. See 
    id.
     at col. 8 ll. 41–43.
    The patent further teaches that “random” modification
    of FVIII by PEGylation was known and that certain ran-
    domly PEGylated proteins had been approved as therapeu-
    tics. The inventors sought, however, “a more specific
    method for PEGylating FVIII” because the prior-art “ran-
    dom” approach had several drawbacks:
    Random modification of FVIII by targeting pri-
    mary amines (N-terminus and lysines) with large
    polymers such as PEG and dextran has been at-
    tempted with varying degree[s] of success . . . .
    This random approach . . . is much more problem-
    atic for the heterodimeric FVIII. FVIII has hun-
    dreds of potential PEGylation sites, including the
    158 lysines, the two N-termini, and multiple histi-
    dines, serines, threonines, and tyrosines, all of
    which could potentially be PEGylated with rea-
    gents primarily targeting primary amines.
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    4                         BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC        v. BAXALTA INC.
    
    Id.
     at col. 3 l. 50–col. 4 l. 1, col. 4 ll. 19–20.
    The patent identifies as an “additional drawback to not
    controlling the site of PEGylation on FVIII” the “potential
    activity reduction if the PEG were to be attached at or near
    critical active sites, especially if more than one PEG or a
    single large PEG is conjugated to FVIII.” 
    Id.
     at col. 4
    ll. 7–11. Furthermore, “[b]ecause random PEGylation will
    invariably produce large amounts of multiply PEGylated
    products, purification to obtain only mono-PEGylated
    products will drastically lower overall yield.” 
    Id.
     at col. 4
    ll. 11–14. Finally, the patent explains that “the enormous
    heterogeneity in product profile will make consistent syn-
    thesis and characterization of each lot nearly impossible”
    and constitutes “a barrier to commercialization,” since
    “good manufacturing requires a consistent, well-character-
    ized product.” 
    Id.
     at col. 4 ll. 14–19; see 
    id.
     at col. 4 ll. 4–7
    (“[H]eterogeneous processing of full length FVIII can lead
    to a mixture of starting material that leads to further com-
    plexity in the PEGylated products.”).
    Thus, the inventors recognized “a need for an improved
    FVIII variant that possesses greater duration of action in
    vivo . . . while retaining functional activity,” and that is de-
    sirably “produced as a homogeneous product in a consistent
    manner.” 
    Id.
     at col. 4 l. 65–col. 5 l. 3. The patent purports
    to overcome the drawbacks of “random” PEGylation by us-
    ing “site-directed” PEGylation at the B-domain of FVIII:
    The present invention is based on the discovery
    that polypeptides having FVIII activity can be co-
    valently attached at a predefined site to a biocom-
    patible polymer that is not at an N-terminal amine,
    and that such polypeptides substantially retain
    their coagulant activity. Furthermore, these poly-
    peptide conjugates have improved circulation time
    and reduced antigenicity. The conjugates of the in-
    vention are advantageous over the prior art conju-
    gates that had random polymer attachments to
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    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.                       5
    FVIII or attachments at an N-terminal. Site-di-
    rected attachment allows one to design modifica-
    tions that avoid the regions required for biological
    activity and thereby to maintain substantial FVIII
    activity. . . . Site-directed attachment also allows
    for a uniform product rather than the heterogene-
    ous conjugates produced in the art by random pol-
    ymer coupling.
    
    Id.
     at col. 8 ll. 15–30; see 
    id.
     at col. 15 ll. 9–13 (explaining
    that the “retained activity” of the claimed conjugates was
    “surprising” given “the problems with past polymeric con-
    jugates causing nonspecific addition and reduced activity”).
    Claim 1 is the only asserted independent claim and re-
    cites:
    1. An isolated polypeptide conjugate comprising a
    functional factor VIII polypeptide and one or more
    biocompatible polymers, wherein the functional
    factor VIII polypeptide comprises the amino acid
    sequence of SEQ ID NO: 4 or an allelic variant
    thereof and has a B-domain, and further wherein
    the biocompatible polymer comprises polyalkylene
    oxide and is covalently attached to the functional
    factor VIII polypeptide at the B-domain.
    
    Id.
     at col. 61 ll. 9–16 (emphases added to the disputed claim
    terms).
    II
    Bayer sued Baxalta and Nektar, Baxalta’s collaborator
    on its Adynovate® product, for patent infringement. Ady-
    novate® is a recombinant PEGylated FVIII product used to
    treat hemophilia A. Adynovate® is made by PEGylating to
    amino acids in FVIII that have amine groups, including the
    amino acid lysine. We hereafter refer to this process as
    “amine/lysine” PEGylation.
    Case: 19-2418     Document: 67      Page: 6    Filed: 03/01/2021
    6                       BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    The district court construed the claim term “an isolated
    polypeptide conjugate” in claim 1 to mean “a polypeptide
    conjugate where conjugation was not random.” Bayer
    Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., No. 16-cv-1122, 
    2018 WL 3212425
    , at *2 (D. Del. June 29, 2018) (Claim Construction
    Op.). The district court determined that, during prosecu-
    tion of the ’520 patent, Bayer had “clearly and unmistaka-
    bly disclaimed any ‘polypeptide conjugate where
    conjugation was random.’” 
    Id. at *4
    .
    In addition, the district court construed the claim term
    “at the B-domain” in claim 1 to mean “attachment at the
    B-domain such that the resulting conjugate retains func-
    tional factor VIII activity.” 
    Id. at *8
    . The district court re-
    jected Baxalta’s proposed construction of the term to mean
    “at a site that is not any amine or carboxy site in factor VIII
    and is in the B-domain,” finding that Bayer did not dis-
    claim PEGylation at amine or carboxy sites. 
    Id.
     at *8–9.
    Baxalta moved for summary judgment of noninfringe-
    ment and invalidity for lack of enablement. The district
    court denied Baxalta’s motions due to genuine factual dis-
    putes.    See Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
    No. 16-cv-1122, 
    2018 WL 6727054
    , at *3–7 (D. Del. Dec. 21,
    2018) (Summ. J. Op.). Baxalta also moved in limine re-
    questing that the district court clarify the meaning of “ran-
    dom” in its construction of “an isolated polypeptide
    conjugate.” The district court denied Baxalta’s motion,
    “again reject[ing] [Baxalta’s] argument that [Bayer] de-
    fined ‘random’ conjugation as ‘any conjugation at amines or
    carboxy sites.’” Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
    No. 16-cv-1122, 
    2019 WL 10890386
    , at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 3,
    2019) (Mot. in Lim. Order).
    Prior to trial, Baxalta moved to exclude the testimony
    of Bayer’s damages expert, Dr. Addanki, regarding his pro-
    posed reasonable-royalty rate. In his expert report, Dr. Ad-
    danki opined that Bayer was entitled to a royalty rate of
    23.75%—the midpoint of the bargaining range of 5.1% to
    Case: 19-2418     Document: 67     Page: 7    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                      7
    42.4%—based on the Nash Bargaining Solution. The dis-
    trict court concluded that the expert failed to tie his 50/50
    split to the facts of the case, and thus excluded his “opinion
    that a reasonable royalty rate is ‘the mid-point of the bar-
    gaining range’ . . . , including any subsequent opinions that
    rely on that mid-point rate.” Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Bax-
    alta Inc., No. 16-cv-1122, 
    2019 WL 330149
    , at *8 (D. Del.
    Jan. 25, 2019) (Daubert Order). The district court denied,
    however, Baxalta’s request to prohibit Dr. Addanki from
    testifying as to his proposed bargaining range of 5.1% to
    42.4%.
    The case then proceeded to a jury trial. The district
    court granted Baxalta’s pre-verdict motion for JMOL of no
    willful infringement. Thereafter, the jury found that Bax-
    alta infringed asserted claims 1–3 and 8 of the ’520 patent,
    and that none of those claims were invalid for lack of ena-
    blement. J.A. 1889–90, 1892. The jury also found that
    Bayer was entitled to $155,190,264 in reasonable-royalty
    damages for the time period from June 14, 2016 through
    November 30, 2018 based on a 17.78% royalty rate applied
    to a $872,836,128 royalty base. J.A. 1893.
    Following the verdict, Baxalta moved for JMOL or a
    new trial on the issues of infringement, enablement, and
    damages. The district court denied Baxalta’s motions. See
    generally Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
    
    407 F. Supp. 3d 462
     (D. Del. 2019) (JMOL Op.). For its
    part, Bayer moved under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure for an award of pre-verdict supplemental
    damages for the time period from December 1, 2018
    through February 8, 2019, the date of the district court’s
    judgment. The district court granted Bayer’s motion and
    awarded Bayer supplemental damages in the amount of
    $18,324,562 based on the actual sales data for that period
    and the jury’s 17.78% royalty rate. Bayer Healthcare LLC
    v. Baxalta Inc., No. 16-cv-1122, 
    2019 WL 4016235
    , at *6
    (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2019) (Rule 59 Op.); Final Judgment at 2,
    Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., No. 16-cv-1122
    Case: 19-2418     Document: 67     Page: 8    Filed: 03/01/2021
    8                      BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    (D. Del. Sept. 10, 2019), ECF No. 507. Bayer also moved
    for a new trial under Rule 59(a) on the issue of willfulness,
    but the district court denied its motion. Rule 59 Op.,
    
    2019 WL 4016235
    , at *8–9.
    Bayer and Baxalta appeal. We have jurisdiction pur-
    suant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    This case presents various issues on appeal and cross-
    appeal. We start by addressing Baxalta’s challenges to the
    district court’s construction of the claim term “at the B-do-
    main” and its interpretation of the word “random” in its
    construction of the claim term “an isolated polypeptide con-
    jugate.” We then turn to Baxalta’s challenges to the dis-
    trict court’s judgments of infringement and enablement,
    along with the court’s awards of damages and pre-verdict
    supplemental damages. Finally, we address Bayer’s chal-
    lenge to the district court’s judgment of no willful infringe-
    ment.
    I
    We first address Baxalta’s challenge to the district
    court’s construction of the disputed term “at the B-domain”
    in claim 1. Baxalta contends that the district court erred
    in failing to construe the term to exclude amine/lysine con-
    jugation. Neither the parties nor the district court consid-
    ered extrinsic evidence in construing this claim term.
    “Claim construction based on the intrinsic evidence is a
    question of law that this court reviews de novo.” Hologic,
    Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc., 
    957 F.3d 1256
    , 1269
    (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec
    Corp., 
    811 F.3d 1359
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). “The con-
    struction of claim terms based on the claim language, the
    specification, and the prosecution history are legal deter-
    minations.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Trs. of Columbia Univ., 811 F.3d
    at 1362). Based on our review of the claim language, spec-
    ification, and prosecution history, we conclude that the
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    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.                       9
    district court did not err in construing the disputed claim
    term.
    A
    The plain claim language recites “[a]n isolated polypep-
    tide conjugate” in which PEG “is covalently attached to the
    functional factor VIII polypeptide at the B-domain.” The
    plain language of claim 1 does not require PEGylation at
    any particular amino acid sites in the B-domain, let alone
    exclude from its scope any specific amino acids as attach-
    ment sites in the B-domain. Rather, claim 1 more broadly
    requires PEGylation at the B-domain as a region.
    B
    Statements in the specification support this view of the
    claims and indicate that site-directed PEGylation target-
    ing the B-domain, rather than particular amino acid sites
    within it, achieved the desired benefit of retaining coagu-
    lation activity. See, e.g., ’520 patent col. 4 ll. 7–9 (“An ad-
    ditional drawback to not controlling the site of PEGylation
    on FVIII is a potential activity reduction if the PEG were
    to be attached at or near critical active sites . . . .”); id.
    at col. 8 ll. 23–26 (“Site-directed attachment allows one to
    design modifications that avoid the regions required for bi-
    ological activity and thereby to maintain substantial FVIII
    activity.”). We acknowledge that the specification discloses
    embodiments of site-directed PEGylation at cysteine amino
    acids within the B-domain. See, e.g., id. at col. 5 ll. 46–57,
    col. 20 l. 56–col. 21 l. 5. But the specification does not state
    that this is the only embodiment or otherwise indicate that
    the invention is limited to site-directed PEGylation at cys-
    teine amino acids within the B-domain and, as noted above,
    the claim language is not so limited.
    On appeal, Baxalta contends that the specification dis-
    parages amine/lysine conjugation. In particular, it points
    to the “Background of the Invention,” which discloses that
    “[r]andom modification of FVIII by targeting primary
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    10                    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    amines (N-terminus and lysines) with large polymers such
    as PEG” has “been attempted with varying degrees of suc-
    cess,” and that “[t]his random approach, however, is much
    more problematic” because FVIII has “hundreds of poten-
    tial PEGylation sites.” Appellants’ Br. 24 (quoting ’520 pa-
    tent col. 3 l. 50–col. 4 l. 1). To support its disparagement
    argument, Baxalta cites Indivior Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labor-
    atories, S.A., 
    930 F.3d 1325
     (Fed. Cir. 2019), and SciMed
    Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems,
    Inc., 
    242 F.3d 1337
     (Fed. Cir. 2001). Although Baxalta pre-
    sents a close question as to disparagement, the facts here
    differ from those of cases finding disclaimer based on the
    specification.
    In Indivior, the asserted patent claimed pharmaceuti-
    cal films with uniform distribution of the active ingredient.
    930 F.3d at 1331. The claims identified “drying” as a pa-
    rameter that contributes to film uniformity. Id. at 1332.
    The specification taught that using conventional drying
    methods, which applied hot air to the top of the film, pro-
    duced nonuniform films. Id. The specification also dis-
    closed controlled drying methods that differed from
    conventional techniques. Id. The district court construed
    the drying limitation to mean “dried without solely employ-
    ing conventional convection air drying from the top” based
    on its conclusion that the patentee disclaimed drying films
    using solely conventional top air drying. Id. at 1336. We
    agreed with the district court’s construction, concluding
    that “the specification repeatedly disparages conventional
    top air drying because such drying does not produce uni-
    form films, the central object of the claimed invention.” Id.
    at 1337. The “specification also provide[d] examples that
    demonstrate[d] the failure of conventional drying methods
    to achieve uniformity.” Id.
    Similarly, we concluded in SciMed that the shared
    specification of the patents-in-suit disclaimed an embodi-
    ment from the scope of the asserted claims. The patents
    were drawn to balloon dilatation catheters containing two
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    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.                     11
    passageways, or lumens. 
    242 F.3d at
    1338–39. Two ar-
    rangements of the lumens were practiced in the art: the
    dual lumen configuration and the coaxial lumen configura-
    tion. 
    Id. at 1339
    . The district court construed the asserted
    claims to be limited to catheters with coaxial lumens, and
    not to read on catheters with dual lumens. 
    Id.
     We agreed
    with the district court’s construction because the specifica-
    tion unequivocally limited “all embodiments” of the
    claimed invention to a coaxial lumen configuration. 
    Id. at 1340
    , 1343–44. In particular, the specification repeat-
    edly defined “the invention” as catheters having a coaxial
    lumen structure and discussed the disadvantages of prior-
    art catheters having a dual lumen configuration. 
    Id.
    at 1342–44.
    We likewise determined that the patent owner in Gaus
    v. Conair Corp., 
    363 F.3d 1284
     (Fed. Cir. 2004), unequivo-
    cally disclaimed a particular embodiment from its claims’
    scope and therefore could not rely on the doctrine of equiv-
    alents to cover that embodiment. The patent at issue
    claimed a device, such as a hairdryer, comprising “an elec-
    trical operating unit and a pair of spaced-apart electrically
    exposed conductive probe networks.” 
    Id. at 1287
    . The
    specification “made clear that it is essential to [the] inven-
    tion that the pair of probe networks be separate from the
    voltage-carrying components of the appliance, i.e., the ‘elec-
    trical operating system.’” 
    Id. at 1291
    . By contrast, the
    specification “criticized prior art in which the protective de-
    vice relied on the fluid coming in contact with the voltage-
    carrying portions of the system.” 
    Id.
     Thus, we concluded
    that the patent owner “disavowed coverage of devices in
    which the two components are not separate and in which
    the protective cut-off mechanism is not triggered until the
    water reaches the electrical operating system.” 
    Id.
    Each of these cases presented a strong case of dis-
    claimer of a particular feature from the scope of a claim
    because the specification made clear that the invention did
    not include that feature. See Indivior, 930 F.3d at 1337;
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    12                     BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    SciMed, 
    242 F.3d at
    1342–44; Gaus, 
    363 F.3d at 1291
    . The
    specification of the ’520 patent disparages random PEGyla-
    tion of FVIII, including random PEGylation targeting
    amines like lysines, but nowhere disparages non-random,
    site-directed amine/lysine PEGylation at the B-domain.
    Thus, we agree with the district court that Bayer did not
    unequivocally disclaim non-random amine/lysine PEGyla-
    tion in the specification.
    C
    We turn next to the prosecution history, which can be
    helpful in understanding the proper claim construction.
    We are not persuaded that the prosecution history includes
    a clear and unmistakable surrender of claims directed to
    non-random amine/lysine PEGylation. Nor are we per-
    suaded that Bayer’s statements during prosecution other-
    wise require a claim construction that would exclude such
    conjugates.
    During prosecution of the ’520 patent, the Examiner
    rejected the pending claims as inherently anticipated by a
    patent application filed by Nektar: Bossard. 1 On appeal to
    the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Bayer argued that
    Bossard did not teach the claimed conjugates because
    Bossard’s “alleged showing of B-domain attachment is ran-
    dom PEGylation and does not ensure that attachment oc-
    curs at the B-domain.” J.A. 3507. Bayer also argued that
    its then-rejected claim 58, which ultimately issued as
    claim 1, “excludes compositions of randomly PEGylated
    factor VIII in which some conjugates have PEGylation at
    the B-domain but a large number do not.” 
    Id.
     Bayer con-
    tinued by stating that:
    The Patent Office . . . relies on passages in Bossard
    that show random PEGylation at any one of nu-
    merous amino acid residues in the 2,332-amino
    1   U.S. Patent. Pub. No. 2004/0235734.
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    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.                     13
    acid protein that have the disclosed functionality.
    Specifically, the Patent Office asserts that Bossard
    et al. “teach many polymer attachment sites such
    as ‘lysine, cysteine and/or arginine’, ‘amine groups’
    and/or ‘carboxyl groups’ for the site of attachment
    to factor VIII, wherein said many polymer attach-
    ment sites are presented in the B-domain . . . .”
    These types of sites are present in the B-domain,
    but they are also present in many other domains of
    factor VIII. This description does not ensure that
    attachment occurs at the B-domain, and does not
    disclose isolated conjugates with attachment at the
    B-domain.
    J.A. 3507–08 (second ellipsis in original) (citations omitted)
    (emphases added). In response to the Examiner’s Answer
    and specifically the Examiner’s arguments based on
    Bossard, Bayer argued in its reply brief to the Board that:
    Much of the Patent Office’s prior arguments relied
    upon possible conjugation at amines or carboxy
    sites, which are present not only in the B-domain
    but in other domains. Any conjugation with these
    reactive groups is random and does not ensure that
    attachment occurs at the B-domain.
    J.A. 4599 (emphases added).
    Baxalta’s disclaimer arguments based on Bayer’s state-
    ments to the Board have some merit. Ultimately, however,
    we agree with the district court’s view as to how a person
    of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the pros-
    ecution history as a whole. Specifically, we agree with the
    district court that when the “entire passage” from Bayer’s
    reply brief is “read together, it is clear that ‘[a]ny conjuga-
    tion’ refers to the conjugations allegedly disclosed by
    Bossard.” Summ. J. Op., 
    2018 WL 6727054
    , at *4. Specif-
    ically, though Bossard “may have taught conjugations at
    various sites on factor VIII, such as amines or carboxy
    sites,” Bayer “argued that the conjugations were not
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 14    Filed: 03/01/2021
    14                    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.
    targeted to particular sites” and, thus, “described ‘[a]ny
    conjugation’ in Bossard as random.” 
    Id.
     As the district
    court reasoned, it “does not follow” that Bayer “defined all
    conjugations with amines or carboxy sites as random.” Id.;
    see also Claim Construction Op., 
    2018 WL 3212425
    , at *9
    (“[Bayer] stated that conjugation at amines and carboxy
    sites cannot ensure PEGylation at the B-domain—not that
    conjugation cannot occur at amines and carboxy sites.”).
    We agree with the district court that Bayer distinguished
    the prior art on the ground that it did not teach non-ran-
    dom PEGylation at the B-domain, and that Bayer did not
    clearly and unmistakably disclaim all PEGylation at
    amines and carboxy sites.
    Additional sections of the prosecution history support
    our conclusion. First, the prosecution history reveals that
    Bossard randomly PEGylated at both lysines and cysteines
    on FVIII, which undermines Baxalta’s position that Bayer
    disclaimed the former but not the latter as sites for
    PEGylation. Second, the Board reversed the Examiner’s
    anticipation rejection based on a separate prior-art refer-
    ence, Rostin. 2 The Examiner argued that Rostin’s PEG at-
    tached to the lysine in Rostin’s shortened B-domain, and
    thus inherently anticipated Bayer’s claims. The Board dis-
    agreed, holding that Rostin’s PEG did not “necessarily at-
    tach[] to the single lysine located in the [shortened]
    B-domain” because there were many other lysines through-
    out FVIII. J.A. 3589–90. These passages suggest that the
    Examiner and the Board understood that lysine PEGyla-
    tion at the B-domain was within the scope of Bayer’s
    claims.
    Finally, Baxalta’s reliance on the applicants’ state-
    ments during prosecution of the ’520 patent’s European
    2  Rostin, J., et al., B-Domain Deleted Recombinant
    Coagulation Factor VIII Modified with Monomethoxy Poly-
    ethylene Glycol, Bioconjugate Chem., 11:387–96 (2000).
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 15    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                    15
    counterpart 3 is misplaced. To overcome an anticipation re-
    jection, the applicants argued that the asserted prior-art
    reference “teaches random PEGylation at any lysine on the
    FVIII molecule and therefore does not anticipate the pres-
    ently claimed isolated conjugates in which essentially all
    the molecules have a polymer attached at the B-domain.”
    J.A. 7702 (emphasis added). A skilled artisan would not
    read this statement as a clear and unmistakable exclusion
    of non-random lysine PEGylation at the B-domain from the
    asserted ’520 patent claims’ scope. Rather, when read in
    context of the entire response, this statement appears to
    distinguish the process claimed in the European applica-
    tion from the process of random PEGylation using lysine in
    the prior art. Indeed, the applicants argued that “none of
    the references cited by the Examiner anticipate the present
    claims, as they disclose only random modification and not
    specific conjugation at the B-domain.” J.A. 7701–02. More-
    over, the district court correctly noted this court’s admoni-
    tion that “varying legal and procedural requirements for
    obtaining patent protection in foreign countries might ren-
    der consideration of certain types of representations inap-
    propriate for consideration in a claim construction analysis
    of a United States counterpart.” 4 Claim Construction Op.,
    3   Eur. Pat. Appl. No. 11153287.4.
    4   We also consider unpersuasive Baxalta’s reliance
    on Bayer’s statements during prosecution of U.S. Patent
    Application No. 13/748,983, a continuation of the applica-
    tion that issued as the ’520 patent. Similar to the ’520 pa-
    tent specification, Bayer told the Examiner that “[r]andom
    modification of Factor VIII such as by targeting primary
    amines with large polymers such as PEG had been at-
    tempted,” but that this “random approach, however, re-
    sults in a heterogenous product with polymer attachment
    possible at many potential sites.” J.A. 9093. The claims of
    the continuation application recited polymer attachment to
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67       Page: 16   Filed: 03/01/2021
    16                    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    
    2018 WL 3212425
    , at *5 (quoting AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Ma-
    gotteaux Int’l S/A, 
    657 F.3d 1264
    , 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
    Although Baxalta’s challenge presents close questions,
    we conclude that the claim language, specification, and
    prosecution history are more aligned with the district
    court’s construction.
    II
    We next consider Baxalta’s challenge to the district
    court’s refusal to define the term “random” in its construc-
    tion of “an isolated polypeptide conjugate” in claim 1. Bax-
    alta contends that the district court’s decision not to
    construe “random” improperly delegated to the jury the
    task of determining claim scope and warrants a new trial
    on infringement. We disagree.
    “When the parties present a fundamental dispute re-
    garding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to
    resolve it.” O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech.
    Co., 
    521 F.3d 1351
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “This duty re-
    sides with the court because, of course, ‘the ultimate ques-
    tion of construction [is] a legal question.’” Eon Corp. IP
    Holdings v. Silver Spring Networks, Inc., 
    815 F.3d 1314
    ,
    1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Teva
    Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 
    135 S. Ct. 831
    , 842
    FVIII “at only the heavy chain,” not “at the B-domain.”
    J.A. 9091, 9094. Thus, the cited statement is not relevant
    to the construction of the ’520 patent’s different claim term.
    See Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 
    357 F.3d 1340
    ,
    1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he prosecution history of one pa-
    tent is relevant to an understanding of the scope of a com-
    mon term in a second patent stemming from the same
    parent application.” (emphasis added)). Even if this state-
    ment were relevant, it still demonstrates, at most, a dis-
    claimer of random PEGylation.
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 17    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                    17
    (2015)). We have observed, however, that “a sound claim
    construction need not always purge every shred of ambigu-
    ity.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 
    483 F.3d 800
    , 806 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
    We conclude that the district court did not violate its
    duty to interpret the claims in declining to provide a de-
    tailed interpretation of the term “random” in its claim con-
    struction instructions to the jury. The district court
    construed the claim term “an isolated polypeptide conju-
    gate” to mean “a polypeptide conjugate where conjugation
    was not random.” The district court resolved the parties’
    controversies as to the meaning of “random.” Specifically,
    the district court addressed and rejected Baxalta’s two ar-
    guments: (1) that “random” conjugation means any conju-
    gation at amines or carboxy sites; and (2) that “random”
    conjugation means all heterogenous conjugation.
    In construing the claim term “an isolated polypeptide
    conjugate,” the district court rejected Baxalta’s argument
    that the specification disclaimed “heterogeneous conju-
    gates” by disparaging such conjugates. Claim Construction
    Op., 
    2018 WL 3212425
    , at *3. The district court observed
    that the patent “never distinguishes B-domain pegylated
    conjugate products” having “any degree” or “even the
    slightest degree” of heterogeneity. 
    Id.
     The district court
    explained that, instead, the specification “disparage[s]
    products with a high degree of heterogeneity.” Id.; see 
    id. at *4
     (concluding that the specification disparages random
    conjugation in stating that such conjugation is “problem-
    atic” for FVIII because it yields “enormous heterogeneity in
    its product profile” (quoting ’520 patent col. 8 ll. 28–30)).
    The district court reiterated its conclusion when it de-
    nied Baxalta’s motion for summary judgment of nonin-
    fringement. Specifically, the district court stated that it
    had “determined during claim construction that non-ran-
    dom conjugation does not require total homogeneity,” and
    that it had disagreed with Baxalta that Bayer “disclaimed
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67      Page: 18    Filed: 03/01/2021
    18                    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    all heterogeneous conjugation.” Summ. J. Op., 
    2018 WL 6727054
    , at *4. The district court made clear that it was
    referring to heterogeneity among FVIII conjugates in a
    product and heterogeneity within each individual FVIII
    conjugate. 
    Id.
     In other words, according to the district
    court, non-random conjugation neither required that each
    FVIII protein in a product such as Adynovate® be
    PEGylated in the same places (homogeneity among conju-
    gates in the product) nor required that every PEG on each
    FVIII protein be in the B-domain (homogeneity within each
    conjugate). Thus, it rejected Baxalta’s noninfringement po-
    sition that “the fact that some pegylation occurs outside the
    B-domain is sufficient to show that Adynovate is made by
    random conjugation.” 
    Id.
    The district court further reiterated this conclusion in
    its orders denying Baxalta’s pre-trial motions. First, the
    district court denied Baxalta’s motion in limine seeking
    further construction of “random” to mean “any conjugation
    at amines or carboxy sites” or, alternatively, that PEG
    “may attach at any available site of reaction throughout
    the protein.” J.A. 29244. The district court found it unnec-
    essary “to further construe [its] construction by explicitly
    defining ‘random,’” given its earlier holdings at claim con-
    struction and summary judgment. Mot. in Lim. Order,
    
    2019 WL 10890386
    , at *1. Furthermore, in denying Bax-
    alta’s motion to exclude Bayer’s damages expert, the dis-
    trict court reiterated once again that “infringement does
    not require complete homogeneity—that is, some PEGs
    may attach outside the B-domain.”             Daubert Order,
    
    2019 WL 330149
    , at *9. Having resolved this issue, the
    district court then left it to the parties to present evidence
    to the jury as to whether or not Adynovate® is the result of
    random or non-random conjugation.
    That the district court resolved this issue is further
    supported by the fact that Baxalta did not ask the district
    court to give additional jury instructions on the meaning of
    “random.” J.A. 1595–96 (Tr. 1374:18–1375:25). In fact,
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67       Page: 19   Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                    19
    Baxalta “object[ed] to anything going to the jury about
    claim construction other than [the district court’s] claim
    construction order.” J.A. 1595 (Tr. 1374:19–21).
    Moreover, Baxalta’s argument as to the district court’s
    use of “random” is another attempt to arrive at the same
    construction Baxalta sought for the claim term “at the
    B-domain” because it attempts to equate “random” with
    amine/lysine PEGylation. For the reasons discussed above
    regarding the district court’s construction of “at the B-do-
    main,” we again reject Baxalta’s argument that amine/ly-
    sine PEGylation is outside the scope of the asserted claims.
    III
    We next turn to Baxalta’s challenge to the jury’s in-
    fringement finding, which is a question of fact that we re-
    view for substantial evidence. Eon Corp., 815 F.3d at 1318.
    We hold that substantial evidence supports the jury’s in-
    fringement verdict and, therefore, the district court did not
    err in denying Baxalta’s motion for JMOL of noninfringe-
    ment.
    This court reviews the denial of a motion for JMOL un-
    der regional circuit law, here, Third Circuit law. Idenix
    Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 
    941 F.3d 1149
    , 1153
    (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Tr. of Boston Univ. v. Everlight El-
    ecs. Co., 
    896 F.3d 1357
    , 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Applying
    Third Circuit law, we “exercise plenary review over a dis-
    trict court’s rulings on motions for JMOL, applying the
    same standard as the district court.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Agrizap,
    Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 
    520 F.3d 1337
    , 1341–42
    (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc.,
    
    311 F.3d 565
    , 568 (3d Cir. 2002). “A grant of JMOL is ap-
    propriate ‘where a party has been fully heard on an issue
    during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable
    jury would not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary ba-
    sis to find for the party on that issue.’” Idenix, 941 F.3d
    at 1153–54 (quoting Agrizap, 
    520 F.3d at 1342
    ); see also
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). The court should grant JMOL
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 20    Filed: 03/01/2021
    20                    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    “sparingly” and “only if, viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the ad-
    vantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is in-
    sufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find
    liability.” Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 
    497 F.3d 286
    , 300
    (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
    Bayer presented documentary evidence and expert wit-
    ness testimony demonstrating that Adynovate® meets the
    limitations of claim 1 of the ’520 patent as construed by the
    district court. Bayer’s biochemistry and protein chemistry
    expert, Dr. Ploegh, testified about Baxalta’s letter to the
    U.S. Food and Drug Administration seeking support for
    Orphan Drug designation for its recombinant FVIII prod-
    uct BAX 855, which it later named Adynovate®.
    J.A. 654–55 (Tr. 433:9–434:25). In its submission, Baxalta
    represented to the FDA that “BAX 855 is a modified recom-
    binant FVIII protein created by the pre-translational inclu-
    sion of the B-domain, and controlled, targeted chemical
    addition of 20 [kilodalton] PEG conjugates to this FVIII
    B-domain.” J.A. 36942 (emphases added). Baxalta’s sub-
    mission also stated that “evidence suggests that the B-do-
    main is more surface-exposed than the other domains, and
    becomes accessible to the PEG-reagent under the specific
    reaction conditions utilized for the controlled chemical
    PEGylation of the FVIII molecule.” J.A. 36944 (emphasis
    added). Dr. Ploegh explained that Baxalta’s statements
    show that it “exert[s] control [over] how [it] chemically
    modif[ies] this protein and the net result is the attachment
    of 20 kilodalton preferable to the B-domain of Factor VIII,”
    J.A. 655 (Tr. 434:7–11), and that Baxalta made specific re-
    action condition choices to “allow[] [it] to target the
    PEGylation reaction to the B-domain” of FVIII, 
    id.
    (Tr. 434:20–25). Dr. Ploegh also walked the jury through
    the reaction condition choices Baxalta made to achieve con-
    trolled PEGylation at the B-domain.               J.A. 656–61
    (Tr. 435:1–440:25); J.A. 670 (Tr. 449:13–22).
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67      Page: 21    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                     21
    Bayer’s expert, Dr. Ravetch, a professor of molecular
    genetics and immunology and expert on protein structure,
    function, and modification, also testified about Baxalta’s
    letter to the FDA. In his view, Baxalta’s representations
    showed that “the reaction was controlled in such a way to
    result in the targeted addition of th[e] PEG to the B-do-
    main and that is a nonrandom process.”           J.A. 756
    (Tr. 535:2–4). Dr. Ravetch opined that random PEGyla-
    tions are neither “controlled” nor “targeted,” and that
    based on its representations to the FDA, “Baxalta use[d]
    conjugation that was not random.” 
    Id.
     (Tr. 535:6–12).
    Dr. Ravetch testified that based on the FDA documents,
    testimony from Baxalta and Nektar scientists, and
    Dr. Ploegh’s testimony, in his opinion Adynovate® met the
    “isolated polypeptide conjugation element” because Bax-
    alta “uses a non-random conjugation method to generate
    Adynovate.” J.A. 760 (Tr. 539:7–11).
    Dr. Ravetch further opined that Adynovate® contains
    PEG attached at the B-domain based on test results re-
    ported in Baxalta’s Biologics License Application for Ady-
    novate®, which indicated to him that “there’s a consistent
    PEGylation in a particular region predominantly on B-do-
    main” and “B-domain PEGylation was observed as a pre-
    dominant aspect of the product.” J.A. 774–75 (Tr. 553:4–
    554:3); see also J.A. 38063 (“[T]he consistency of the region-
    specific PEGylation predominantly on the B-domain was
    confirmed.”). Dr. Ravetch also discussed additional FDA
    submissions in which Baxalta provided the FDA with data
    showing that 40 out of 55 (or 73%) of the PEG attachment
    sites are in the B-domain, which supported his opinion that
    Adynovate® is formed by a non-random process in which
    PEGylation is region specific and predominant at the B-do-
    main.      J.A. 775–76 (Tr. 554:12–555:13 (discussing
    J.A. 37097)). In one such submission, a technical report
    identifying the PEGylation sites of BAX 855, Baxalta
    stated: “PEGylation sites are distributed over the whole
    rFVIII molecule but clustered on the B-domain. . . . The
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67      Page: 22   Filed: 03/01/2021
    22                    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    basis for preferential PEGylation of the B-domain is the
    higher density of lysine residues in the B-domain and in
    addition the higher flexibility and surface exposure. By
    preferential PEGylation the B-domain carries now a new
    function in BAX 855 – the prolongation of action of rFVIII.”
    J.A. 37077 (emphases added).
    We conclude that this is substantial evidence to sup-
    port the jury’s finding that Adynovate® meets the claim
    limitations. Baxalta’s expert, Dr. Zalipsky, provided con-
    trary testimony to Drs. Ploegh and Ravetch, but the jury
    was in the best position to determine whether it found
    Dr. Zalipsky or Bayer’s experts more persuasive. See Mo-
    bileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 
    780 F.3d 1159
    , 1168
    (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen there is conflicting testimony at
    trial, and the evidence overall does not make only one find-
    ing on the point reasonable, the jury is permitted to make
    credibility determinations and believe the witness it con-
    siders more trustworthy.”). We discern no error in the dis-
    trict court’s conclusion that substantial evidence supported
    the jury’s infringement verdict.
    IV
    We turn next to Baxalta’s argument that no reasonable
    jury could find that the ’520 patent enables the full scope
    of the claims because it does not enable non-random lysine
    PEGylation. “Whether a claim satisfies the enablement re-
    quirement is a question of law that we review de
    novo. However, ‘in the context of a jury trial, we review the
    factual underpinnings of enablement for substantial evi-
    dence.’” Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Everlight,
    896 F.3d at 1361)). On the record before us, we conclude
    that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that
    Baxalta failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that the asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement.
    “Enablement requires that ‘the specification teach
    those in the art to make and use the invention without un-
    due experimentation.’” Id. (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d
    Case: 19-2418     Document: 67       Page: 23     Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC     v. BAXALTA INC.                       23
    731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). “A claim is not enabled when,
    ‘at the effective filing date of the patent, one of ordinary
    skill in the art could not practice their full scope without
    undue experimentation.’” Id. (quoting Wyeth & Cordis
    Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 
    720 F.3d 1380
    , 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
    Factors for assessing whether a disclosure would require
    undue experimentation include: “(1) the quantity of exper-
    imentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guid-
    ance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working
    examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of
    the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
    predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the
    breadth of the claims.” Wands, 858 F.2d at 737.
    The specification of the ’520 patent includes detailed
    instructions as to the reaction conditions required to prac-
    tice the claimed invention using cysteine PEGylation, and
    includes a working example for non-random cysteine
    PEGylation at the B-domain. See ’520 patent col. 20
    l. 56–col. 21 l. 5. Additionally, Bayer presented evidence to
    the jury bridging the gap between the patent’s disclosures
    about cysteine PEGylation on the one hand and non-ran-
    dom PEGylation, including non-random lysine PEGyla-
    tion, on the other. For example, ’520 patent inventor
    Dr. Murphy testified that at the time of the invention, he
    did not believe that cysteine conjugation would be the only
    way to achieve the claimed B-domain PEGylation of FVIII.
    J.A. 574 (Tr. 353:5–8).
    In addition, multiple witnesses testified that random
    lysine PEGylation was known at the time of the invention.
    E.g., J.A. 1248 (Tr. 1027:8–16) (’520 patent inventor
    Dr. Pan testifying that nonspecific “lysine PEGylation has
    been around for 20, 30 years” and was a “very old technol-
    ogy”); J.A. 1563 (Tr. 1342:20–22) (Dr. Ravetch testifying
    that lysine PEGylation had been known in the art “20,
    30 years prior to these patents[,] [s]o a long time”);
    J.A. 1456 (Tr. 1235:21–25) (Dr. Zalipsky testifying that
    random lysine PEGylation had been performed by 2005).
    Case: 19-2418   Document: 67     Page: 24    Filed: 03/01/2021
    24                   BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.
    Moreover, Dr. Russell, Bayer’s expert in protein modifica-
    tion, including PEGylation, testified that lysine PEGyla-
    tion can be either random or non-random, and that skilled
    artisans would have known that various factors, including
    reaction conditions and process steps, can be manipulated
    to achieve either random or non-random PEGylation. 5 See
    J.A. 1527–28 (Tr. 1306:23–1307:10). Consistent with this,
    the jury was also entitled to rely on Dr. Ravetch’s testi-
    mony that, at the time of the invention, “protein chemistry
    [wa]s a well-defined field” going back 150 years and that
    the “sophistication and knowledge” in this field regarding
    proteins and amino acids had “accumulated over time.”
    J.A. 1564 (Tr. 1343:4–18). Similarly, in response to
    Dr. Zalipsky’s testimony that ordinarily skilled artisans
    would not have known from reading the specification how
    to non-randomly PEGylate FVIII with any amino acid
    other than cysteine, Dr. Ravetch opined that skilled arti-
    sans would have understood that “some amino acids are
    more amenable than other amino acids for modification”
    based on the amino acids’ known reactivities under differ-
    ent conditions. J.A. 1564–65 (Tr. 1343:4–1344:1). In short,
    Dr. Ravetch explained to the jury that the advanced
    knowledge concerning amino acids—along with the fact
    that only a certain subset could be used for PEGylation—
    would have aided skilled artisans in applying the teachings
    in the patent to prepare a non-random lysine PEGylated
    conjugate without undue experimentation. Baxalta, in
    5  Though Dr. Russell referenced Baxalta’s Ady-
    novate® product in his discussion of random and non-ran-
    dom lysine PEGylation, his testimony, when read in
    context, more generally concerned what was known in the
    art at the time of the invention based on his experience in
    protein modification. See J.A. 1528 (Tr. 1307:3–10) (re-
    sponding to the question: “what determines whether you
    have random PEGylation as opposed to non-random
    PEGylation?”).
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67      Page: 25    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                     25
    turn, chose not to cross-examine Dr. Ravetch. J.A. 1565
    (Tr. 1344:21).
    Based on the record before us, we conclude that sub-
    stantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and the jury
    was not obliged to credit Baxalta’s expert Dr. Zalipsky over
    Bayer’s contrary evidence. Bayer presented substantial ev-
    idence from which a reasonable juror could find that the
    specification’s disclosure of instructions as to the reaction
    conditions required to practice the claimed invention using
    cysteine PEGylation were sufficient to enable not only non-
    random cysteine PEGylation at the B-domain, but also
    non-random lysine PEGylation at the B-domain.
    Baxalta contends that the district court legally erred in
    resorting to the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill as
    a “substitute for the specification’s lack of a basic enabling
    disclosure.” Appellants’ Br. 59. Baxalta focuses on the ab-
    sence of working examples of lysine PEGylation in the
    specification. As the district court correctly recognized,
    however, that the “novel aspect” of the asserted claims is
    non-random PEGylation at the B-domain “does not mean
    the specification must disclose an embodiment for non-ran-
    dom pegylation at each amino acid in the B-domain.”
    JMOL Op., 407 F. Supp. 3d at 472. As this court has re-
    peatedly made clear, the specification need not include a
    working example of every possible embodiment to enable
    the full scope of the claims. See Alcon Rsch. Ltd. v. Barr
    Labs., Inc., 
    745 F.3d 1180
    , 1189–90 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
    Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 
    314 F.3d 1313
    ,
    1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We are thus not persuaded that
    the district court erred in considering the knowledge of an
    ordinarily skilled artisan to determine whether undue ex-
    perimentation would have been required to practice the in-
    vention with lysine. Indeed, whether a patent is enabled—
    or requires undue experimentation—are questions that
    must be viewed “from the perspective of one of ordinary
    skill in the art.” Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 
    448 F.3d 1357
    , 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (concluding that the Board of
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67      Page: 26     Filed: 03/01/2021
    26                     BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    Patent Appeals and Interferences did not err in concluding
    that claims directed to a poxvirus-based vaccine were ena-
    bled by the specification’s detailed teachings of a herpesvi-
    rus-based vaccine and the knowledge of a skilled artisan
    regarding the two viruses); see also McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
    Namco Games Am. Inc., 
    959 F.3d 1091
    , 1102 (Fed. Cir.
    2020) (“An ‘artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine
    experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between
    embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the
    disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability
    of the art,’ and a ‘patent need not teach, and preferably
    omits, what is well known in the art.’” (first quoting AK
    Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 
    344 F.3d 1234
    , 1244
    (Fed. Cir. 2003); and then quoting Spectra-Physics, Inc.
    v. Coherent, Inc., 
    827 F.2d 1524
    , 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).
    Baxalta also contends that it was legal error for the dis-
    trict court to rely on testimony by Bayer’s experts concern-
    ing post-priority lysine PEGylation used in Baxalta’s
    Adynovate®’s manufacture. See Appellants’ Br. 62–63. We
    agree that post-priority knowledge about the “reaction con-
    ditions” for the accused product cannot support the jury
    verdict of enablement. But any error was harmless be-
    cause the district court also cited other testimony, includ-
    ing Dr. Ravetch’s testimony regarding the depth of
    knowledge in the art about protein chemistry and PEGyla-
    tion at the time of the invention, J.A. 1563–65
    (Tr. 1342:3–1344:1), and Dr. Russell’s testimony concern-
    ing the knowledge regarding reaction conditions and pro-
    cess steps, among other factors, that determine whether
    PEGylation is random or non-random, J.A. 1527–28
    (Tr. 1306:23–1307:10). Furthermore, contrary to Baxalta’s
    assertion, the specification’s purported “teaching away”
    from random PEGylation at amines such as lysines does
    not render the asserted claims non-enabled as to non-ran-
    dom lysine PEGylation.
    For all these reasons, we conclude that the district
    court did not err in its legal analysis. In addition, we
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 27   Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                   27
    cannot say that a reasonable jury could not find the claims
    enabled. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied
    Baxalta’s motion for JMOL of invalidity for lack of enable-
    ment.
    V
    We next turn to the issue of damages. Baxalta con-
    tends that the district court correctly held that Bayer’s
    damages expert’s (Dr. Addanki’s) 50-50 split royalty rate
    was not properly tied to the facts of the case. According to
    Baxalta, however, the district court thereafter committed
    several errors. We address each argument in turn.
    First, Baxalta argues that the district court errone-
    ously permitted Bayer to rely on a flawed and speculative
    methodology—namely, asking the jury to pick a rate be-
    tween the range of feasible rates presented by Dr. Addanki
    as the reasonable rate. We review a district court’s deci-
    sion to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion.
    Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 
    944 F.3d 1327
    , 1341 (Fed. Cir.
    2019) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
    522 U.S. 136
    , 146
    (1997)); see also SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena
    Labs. Corp., 
    926 F.2d 1161
    , 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting
    that “subsidiary decisions underlying a damage[s] theory,”
    such as “the methodology for arriving at a reasonable roy-
    alty,” are reviewed for abuse of discretion (citations omit-
    ted)).
    The district court properly exercised its discretion in
    allowing Bayer to ask the jury to select a rate between the
    range presented. While an expert must use reliable meth-
    odology for determining the range of possible hypothetical
    negotiation royalty rates, we are aware of no precedent
    that requires an expert to provide a single proposed royalty
    rate. As an initial matter, a jury is “entitled to choose a
    damages award within the amounts advocated by the op-
    posing parties” and is “not bound to accept a rate proffered
    by one party’s expert but rather may choose an intermedi-
    ate royalty rate.” Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
    Case: 19-2418     Document: 67      Page: 28    Filed: 03/01/2021
    28                     BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC     v. BAXALTA INC.
    
    663 F.3d 1221
    , 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Spectralytics,
    Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 
    649 F.3d 1336
    , 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
    In addition, we have previously held that a jury’s damages
    award that fell within the range suggested by the pa-
    tentee’s damages expert was supported by substantial evi-
    dence. See Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v. Samsung
    Elecs. Co., 
    853 F.3d 1370
    , 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In grant-
    ing-in-part Baxalta’s Daubert motion, the district court de-
    termined that Dr. Addanki’s expert report included
    “substantial analyses to determine ‘end points of the bar-
    gaining range for the hypothetical negotiation,’” including
    “deriv[ing] a maximum royalty rate from the incremental
    profits Baxalta would expect to earn from Adynovate, and
    a minimum royalty rate from the profits Bayer would ex-
    pect to lose by granting a license to Baxalta.” Daubert Or-
    der, 
    2019 WL 330149
    , at *7. Dr. Addanki’s testimony
    further demonstrates that he considered and discussed the
    appropriate Georgia-Pacific factors at length in determin-
    ing the range of reasonable royalties, see J.A. 962–1020,
    and Bayer in its closing statement explained to the jury
    that its damages award should fall within that range,
    J.A. 1728 (Tr. 1507:16–25). Moreover, the district court
    permitted Baxalta to cross-examine Dr. Addanki on his end
    points and range and to present the testimony of its own
    damages expert. Under these circumstances, we conclude
    that the district court did not err in allowing the jury to
    hear Dr. Addanki’s testimony regarding a range of possible
    hypothetical reasonable royalty rates instead of a single
    proposed royalty rate.
    Second, Baxalta argues that the district court should
    have excluded Dr. Addanki’s testimony that the entire
    range of rates was reasonable because such a conclusion
    was not in his expert report. The district court rejected
    Baxalta’s argument that Dr. Addanki presented new opin-
    ions at trial in violation of Rules 26(a)(2)(B) and 37(c) of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such evidentiary rulings
    are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Siemens
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 29    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                    29
    Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics,
    Inc., 
    637 F.3d 1269
    , 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We agree
    with the district court that Dr. Addanki’s opinions in his
    expert reports are consistent with his trial testimony about
    a range of royalty rates and were not limited to the single
    rate that the district court had excluded. For instance,
    Dr. Addanki had opined in his reply expert report that “as
    a matter of economics, any of these royalty rates [between
    5.1% and 42.4%] would be a feasible outcome to the negoti-
    ation” and the “reasonable royalty is the likely outcome
    within that range.” J.A. 21887 (emphasis added). The dis-
    trict court exercised its sound discretion in permitting
    Dr. Addanki’s testimony. J.A. 233 (Tr. 12:6–10).
    Third, Baxalta appears to challenge the jury’s determi-
    nation of the amount of damages, which is an issue of fact
    that we review for substantial evidence. Amgen, 944 F.3d
    at 1341 (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
    
    580 F.3d 1301
    , 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). “A jury’s damages
    award ‘must be upheld unless the amount is grossly exces-
    sive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence,
    or based only on speculation or guesswork.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Lucent, 
    580 F.3d at 1310
    ). We agree with the district court
    that substantial evidence supports the jury’s 17.78% roy-
    alty rate, which was “within the range encompassed by the
    record as a whole.” JMOL Op., 407 F. Supp. 3d at 480
    (quoting Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 
    69 F.3d 512
    ,
    519 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Dr. Addanki provided ample guid-
    ance to the jury to help it determine the royalty rate. E.g.,
    J.A. 962–67 (explaining the Georgia-Pacific factors, the
    concept of the hypothetical negotiation, and determining
    maximum and minimum points in a range), J.A. 967–68,
    970–1005, 1008–13 (explaining how he applied the hypo-
    thetical negotiation analysis and determined the specific
    end points of 5.1% and 42.4% in this case), J.A. 1014–20
    (discussing each of the Georgia-Pacific factors and explain-
    ing whether and how each one applied in his analysis).
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67       Page: 30    Filed: 03/01/2021
    30                     BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    Finally, we note that Baxalta’s criticisms about the
    jury’s royalty rate are more appropriate for cross-examina-
    tion of the expert. Indeed, Baxalta cross-examined Dr. Ad-
    danki about his methodology and presented testimony of
    its own damages expert, Dr. Rausser, who opined that a
    reasonable-royalty rate would be 1%.              J.A. 1485–93
    (Tr. 1264:22–1272:14). While Baxalta complains that it
    could not cross-examine Dr. Addanki on his prior selection
    of a single, mid-point rate, Baxalta still could have—and in
    fact did—cross-examine Dr. Addanki on why the upper end
    of his proposed range would not result in an absurd rate in
    an effort to undermine Dr. Addanki’s credibility. A party
    need not present expert testimony on damages or, as a cor-
    ollary, on every aspect of damages, such as a single royalty
    rate. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Mee Indus., Inc., 
    341 F.3d 1370
    ,
    1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 284 is clear that expert
    testimony is not necessary to the award of damages, but
    rather ‘may [be] receive[d] . . . as an aid.’” (annotations in
    original) (quoting 
    35 U.S.C. § 284
    )). A party runs the risk,
    however, of loss to its expert’s credibility on cross-examina-
    tion if the expert does not identify a single royalty rate. But
    “[w]here the methodology is sound and the evidence relied
    upon is sufficiently related to the case, disputes over the
    expert’s credibility or over the accuracy of the underlying
    facts are for the jury.” Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs.
    Co., 
    802 F.3d 1283
    , 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing i4i Ltd.
    P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 
    598 F.3d 831
    , 852 (Fed. Cir.
    2010)). Here, Baxalta cross-examined Dr. Addanki and, ul-
    timately, the jury evaluated his opinions and adopted a
    rate within his proposed range. The district court did not
    err in denying Baxalta’s motion for JMOL or a new trial on
    damages.
    VI
    We turn to the final issue raised in Baxalta’s appeal—
    whether the district court violated Baxalta’s Seventh
    Amendment right to a jury trial by amending its judgment
    under Rule 59 to award Bayer pre-verdict supplemental
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 31    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                    31
    damages. We disagree with Baxalta that the Seventh
    Amendment right to a jury trial attaches to the award of
    pre-verdict supplemental damages in this case. We also
    conclude that the district court acted within its discretion
    in awarding supplemental damages.
    This court reviews “the constitutional question of
    whether a party is entitled to a jury trial” de novo. TCL
    Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM
    Ericsson, 
    943 F.3d 1360
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Te-
    gal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 
    257 F.3d 1331
    , 1339
    (Fed. Cir. 2001)). The Seventh Amendment provides that,
    “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
    shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
    be preserved . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Under the
    Patent Act, “[u]pon finding for the claimant the court shall
    award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for
    the infringement,” and “[w]hen the damages are not found
    by a jury, the court shall assess them.” 
    35 U.S.C. § 284
    .
    “The methodology of assessing and computing damages un-
    der 
    35 U.S.C. § 284
     is within the sound discretion of the
    district court.” TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 
    789 F.2d 895
    ,
    898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
    The jury was asked to calculate the royalty rate, roy-
    alty base, and total damages for the time period between
    June 14, 2016 through November 30, 2018. The jury ren-
    dered its verdict on February 4, 2019, and the district court
    entered judgment on February 8, 2019. Bayer thereafter
    sought pre-verdict supplemental damages for the period
    from December 1, 2018 through February 8, 2019. The dis-
    trict court granted Bayer’s motion and determined that
    supplemental damages should be based on the actual sales
    data for that period—which Baxalta had produced after
    trial—and the jury’s 17.78% royalty rate. Rule 59 Op.,
    
    2019 WL 4016235
    , at *6. The district court rejected Bax-
    alta’s contentions that Bayer should have used the pro-
    jected sales data Baxalta had produced before trial and
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67      Page: 32     Filed: 03/01/2021
    32                     BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    that awarding supplemental damages would violate Bax-
    alta’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
    We have on occasion reviewed decisions by district
    courts awarding pre-verdict supplemental damages with-
    out directly addressing the constitutionality of such
    awards. See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp.,
    
    626 F.3d 1197
     (Fed. Cir. 2010) (addressing a challenge to
    the district court’s refusal to award additional supple-
    mental damages for post-verdict sales up until the date of
    its injunction while noting that pre-verdict supplemental
    damages had been awarded); Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1
    v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 
    967 F.3d 1380
    , 1382
    (Fed. Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s grant of pa-
    tent owner’s request for “supplemental damages and an ac-
    counting of infringing sales of all adjudicated products
    through the date of the verdict”). Here, Baxalta contends
    that the district court’s award of pre-verdict supplemental
    damages “constitutes an impermissible additur.” Appel-
    lants’ Br. 82. Baxalta cites Dimick v. Schiedt, 
    293 U.S. 474
    (1935), for the proposition that “a court has no power to
    consider new facts to award additional damages that are
    not part of the verdict, as it would invade the constitutional
    right to a trial by jury.” Appellants’ Br. 81–82. In Dimick,
    the plaintiff moved the district court for a new trial, argu-
    ing that the jury’s damages award was inadequate.
    
    293 U.S. at 475
    . The district court entered a “conditional
    order” for a new trial whereby it would grant the plaintiff’s
    request “unless [the defendant] would consent to an in-
    crease of the damages to the sum of $1,500.” 
    Id.
     at 475–76.
    The Supreme Court held that this practice of additur vio-
    lates the Seventh Amendment. 
    Id.
     at 486–87.
    Calculating pre-verdict supplemental damages in this
    case merely required applying the jury’s royalty rate to the
    undisputed actual infringing sales base. That royalty rate
    was based on a hypothetical negotiation as of the date of
    first infringement (June 14, 2016), and was applied by the
    jury to the actual infringing sales base from the date of first
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 33    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                    33
    infringement through November 30, 2018. Under these
    circumstances, we are not persuaded that the district
    court’s award constitutes an impermissible additur or an
    otherwise “bald addition of something which in no sense
    can be said to be included in the verdict.” 
    Id. at 486
    . Nor
    are we convinced that our conclusion conflicts with
    WEGCO, Inc. v. Griffin Services, Inc., 19 F. App’x 68, 73–74
    (4th Cir. 2001), where the district court’s erroneous supple-
    mental damages award was based on its “own findings re-
    garding what monies were owed” to the plaintiff and was
    “not based on any findings made by the jury.” Similarly
    inapposite is Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co.
    v. Sealy, Inc., 
    669 F.2d 490
     (7th Cir. 1982), which con-
    cerned a plaintiff’s ability to obtain future damages in an
    antitrust context, and which was silent as to the Seventh
    Amendment.
    Moreover, the district court acted within its discretion
    in awarding supplemental damages. In the district court’s
    view, “it was reasonable for Bayer to limit its damages at
    trial to the period for which it had actual sales data.”
    Rule 59 Op., 
    2019 WL 4016235
    , at *6. The district court
    also observed that the “projected sales were substantially
    higher than the actual sales” and, thus, Baxalta would
    have faced higher damages if Bayer had used projected
    sales. 
    Id.
     Baxalta cites TransPerfect Global, Inc. v. Mo-
    tionPoint Corp., No. 10-cv-2590, 
    2014 WL 6068384
    (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2014), to support its argument that
    “fail[ing] to present the jury with extrapolated damages de-
    spite having the opportunity to do so” warrants denying
    pre-verdict supplemental damages. Appellants’ Br. 83. In
    TransPerfect, the district court denied the patentee’s mo-
    tion to amend the judgment to award pre-verdict supple-
    mental damages, noting that the patentee “could have
    sought to ask the jury to extrapolate post-2012 damages
    from the pre-2012 financial records and analysis.”
    
    2014 WL 6068384
    , at *4. Unlike this case, it was “not even
    clear” to the district court “that the jury did not award
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67      Page: 34   Filed: 03/01/2021
    34                    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    damages for the full [pre-verdict] period,” and unlike
    Bayer, the patentee had not sought updated financial in-
    formation during discovery. 
    Id.
     Based on the facts of this
    case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in awarding pre-verdict supplemental damages.
    VII
    Lastly, we address Bayer’s challenge in its cross-appeal
    of the district court’s judgment as a matter of law that Bax-
    alta did not willfully infringe the asserted claims. In
    Bayer’s view, it presented sufficient evidence of willfulness
    at trial to send the question to the jury. We disagree.
    Willful infringement is a question of fact. Polara Eng’g
    Inc. v. Campbell Co., 
    894 F.3d 1339
    , 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
    To establish willfulness, the patentee must show the ac-
    cused infringer had a specific intent to infringe at the time
    of the challenged conduct. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse
    Elecs., Inc., 
    136 S. Ct. 1923
    , 1933 (2016). As the Supreme
    Court stated in Halo, “[t]he sort of conduct warranting en-
    hanced damages has been variously described in our cases
    as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, con-
    sciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a
    pirate.” 
    Id. at 1932
    . A patentee needs to show by a pre-
    ponderance of the evidence the facts that support a finding
    of willfulness. 
    Id. at 1934
    .
    In granting Baxalta’s motion for JMOL of no willful in-
    fringement, the district court concluded that Bayer failed
    to present sufficient evidence of the “state of mind” neces-
    sary for a finding of willfulness.              J.A. 1355–56
    (Tr. 1134:24–1135:3). According to the district court, there
    was no dispute that Baxalta was “aware of the ’520 patent,”
    and that Bayer merely “assume[d] that [Baxalta] knew
    Adynovate infringed because it involved pegylation at the
    B-domain of factor VIII.” Rule 59 Op., 
    2019 WL 4016235
    ,
    at *9. The district court concluded that this was not
    “enough for a reasonable jury to find that infringement was
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 35    Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                    35
    ‘either known or so obvious it should have been known.’”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1930).
    On appeal, Bayer identifies evidence that purportedly
    satisfies the state of mind requirement for willfulness.
    Specifically, Bayer presented testimony of Baxalta and
    Nektar witnesses concerning their awareness of the patent
    application that issued as the ’520 patent. J.A. 634–38.
    Additionally, Bayer presented evidence of Baxalta’s repre-
    sentations to the FDA that Adynovate®’s activity was due
    to controlled, targeted PEGylation at the B-domain.
    J.A. 654–55 (Tr. 433:9–434:25); J.A. 718–20 (Tr. 497:7–
    499:5); J.A. 755–60 (Tr. 534:1–539:11); J.A. 774–77
    (Tr. 553:12–556:18); J.A. 897–98 (Tr. 676:14–677:17).
    Bayer further contends that the jury heard evidence show-
    ing that Baxalta’s internal documents described Ady-
    novate®’s PEGylation process as controlled and consistent.
    J.A. 1238–43 (Tr. 1017:9–1022:21); J.A. 38368–90. Bayer
    also presented testimony by Baxalta and Nektar witnesses
    that the companies’ initial approach with FVIII conjugates
    was random PEGylation, and that they switched to tar-
    geted, B-domain PEGylation. J.A. 713–16 (Tr. 492:8–
    495:19); J.A. 722–23 (Tr. 501:1–502:13); J.A. 1121–23
    (Tr. 900:12–902:19). In Bayer’s view, this evidence shows
    that “Baxalta knew from prior dealings that random
    pegylation had failed, found out about Bayer’s B-domain
    pegylation work that underpins the ’520 patent, and con-
    sciously redirected its own research to B-domain pegyla-
    tion after learning about Bayer’s invention.” 6 Cross-
    Appellant’s Reply 4.
    6   As additional support for its willfulness case, Bayer
    identifies a poster regarding FVIII PEGylation that Bayer
    had purportedly presented to a conference attended by
    Baxalta scientists in 2007 and that Baxalta subsequently
    circulated internally. The district court initially excluded
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67      Page: 36     Filed: 03/01/2021
    36                     BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC    v. BAXALTA INC.
    Even when accepting Bayer’s evidence as true and
    weighing all inferences in Bayer’s favor, we conclude that
    the record is insufficient to establish that Baxalta’s “con-
    duct rose to the level of wanton, malicious, and bad-faith
    behavior required for willful infringement.” SRI Int’l, Inc.
    v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 
    930 F.3d 1295
    , 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
    The evidence adduced at trial merely demonstrates Bax-
    alta’s knowledge of the ’520 patent and Baxalta’s direct in-
    fringement of the asserted claims. Knowledge of the
    asserted patent and evidence of infringement is necessary,
    but not sufficient, for a finding of willfulness. Rather, will-
    fulness requires deliberate or intentional infringement.
    Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc.,
    
    946 F.3d 1367
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
    Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not
    err in granting Baxalta’s motion for JMOL of no willfulness
    or denying Bayer’s motion for a new trial.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered the parties’ other arguments, but
    we do not find them persuasive. For the foregoing reasons,
    we affirm the district court’s judgments of infringement,
    enablement, damages, pre-verdict supplemental damages,
    and no willfulness.
    AFFIRMED
    this poster on relevance grounds. The district court then
    stated that it was “going to keep th[e poster] out for now,”
    and that Bayer could “bring it up again in a day or two if
    things have changed.” J.A. 536 (Tr. 315:21–23). Bayer did
    not, however, raise the issue of the poster’s admissibility
    again. On appeal, Bayer does not argue that the district
    court abused its discretion in excluding the poster. We do
    not consider the poster here.
    Case: 19-2418    Document: 67     Page: 37   Filed: 03/01/2021
    BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC   v. BAXALTA INC.                  37
    COSTS
    No costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-2418

Filed Date: 3/1/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/1/2021

Authorities (21)

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Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories ... , 926 F.2d 1161 ( 1991 )

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Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. , 580 F.3d 1301 ( 2009 )

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