Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 1 Filed: 03/05/2021
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ROBERT J. MAY,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2019-2451
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 17-4809, Senior Judge Mary J.
Schoelen.
______________________
Decided: March 5, 2021
______________________
ROBERT J. MAY, Portland, OR, pro se.
ROBERT C. BIGLER, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
JEFFREY B. CLARK, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT EDWARD
KIRSCHMAN, JR.; MEGHAN ALPHONSO, Y. KEN LEE, Office of
General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans
Affairs, Washington, DC.
Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 2 Filed: 03/05/2021
2 MAY v. MCDONOUGH
______________________
Before WALLACH, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Robert J. May, appeals a decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”),
affirming a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
(“Board”) denying Mr. May’s request for: (1) entitlement to
compensation benefits for right and left shoulder disabili-
ties pursuant to
38 U.S.C. § 1151; (2) an earlier effective
date for the grant of service connection for depression, sec-
ondary to herpes simplex virus 2 (“HSV-2”); (3) to revise an
October 2004 rating decision regarding his disability rating
assigned for sciatic nerve paralysis, bilateral knee disabil-
ity, and a total disability rating based on individual unem-
ployability (“TDIU”) premised on clear and unmistakable
error (“CUE”); and (4) to revise an April 2007 rating deci-
sion assigning a non-compensable rating for tinea versi-
color. 1 May v. Wilkie, No. 17-4809,
2019 WL 3366794, at *1
(Vet. App. July 26, 2019); see R.A. 19 (Judgment); see also
R.A. 20–61 (Board Decision). 2 The Veterans Court also de-
termined that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to address
[Mr. May]’s argument that the [S]ecretary lacks authority
to issue a non[-]compensable rating.” May,
2019 WL
3366794, at *9. To the extent Mr. May appeals the denial
of his entitlement benefits for right and left shoulder
1 Tinea versicolor is “a skin condition characterized
by patches of skin that vary in color, shape, and size.” Rus-
sell v. McDonald, 586 F. App’x 589, 589 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
2 “R.A.” refers to the appendix attached to Appellee,
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs’ (“the Secretary”), re-
sponse brief; “A.A.” refers to the appendix attached to
Mr. May’s opening brief. The appendix attached to
Mr. May’s opening brief was unnumbered, accordingly, we
cite to it in its numerical sequence. See generally A.A.
Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 3 Filed: 03/05/2021
MAY v. MCDONOUGH 3
disabilities under
38 U.S.C. § 1151, we have jurisdiction
pursuant to
38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), and affirm. To the extent
Mr. May argues that the Veterans Court should have
reached the merits of his other underlying claims, we dis-
miss for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND 3
Mr. May served on active duty in the U.S. Marine
Corps from 1974 to 1986. R.A. 22. In July 2003, Mr. May
filed a claim for disability compensation for HSV-2
disabilities, tinea versicolor disability, bilateral knees
rating increase, and TDIU. A.A. 23–26; see A.A. 18–26
(2004 Notice of Disagreement). In October 2004, the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) denied Mr. May’s
claim for entitlement to compensation (“October 2004
Rating Decision”). A.A. 18. 4 Following the denial, Mr. May
filed a notice of disagreement, stating that he felt “complete
embarrassment” over his HSV-2 diagnosis. A.A. 21. In
April 2007, the VA issued a statement of the case, and
again, denied Mr. May’s claim of HSV-2. R.A. 82. The VA
also issued an April 2007 rating decision, granting
Mr. May’s July 2003 claim for tinea versicolor with a non-
compensable disability rating. R.A. 52.
In September 2007, more than sixty days after the
issuance of the April 2007 statement of the case, Mr. May
appealed the Board’s denial of his HSV-2 claim. A.A. 36.
In November 2012, Mr. May filed a motion to revise the
October 2004 Rating Decision, alleging that his HSV-2
caused depression. May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *3. In a
3 For ease of reference, unless otherwise noted, we
cite to the uncontested facts as set forth in May,
2019 WL
3366794, at *1–7; see generally Appellant’s Br.; Appellee’s
Br.
4 The October 2004 Rating Decision is not in the rec-
ord. See generally A.A.; R.A.
Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 4 Filed: 03/05/2021
4 MAY v. MCDONOUGH
June 2016 rating decision, the VA interpreted Mr. May’s
claim of depression as a claim for secondary service
connection to his HSV-2 diagnosis and assigned a 30
percent disability rating, effective from November 5, 2012.
R.A. 37. In July 2016, Mr. May appealed the November 5,
2012 effective date, arguing that his statement of
“complete embarrassment” constituted an informal claim
for entitlement to service connection for depression as
secondary to HSV-2, however, the VA denied the appeal.
A.A. 37–38; see May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *3.
In January 2009, Mr. May filed another claim with the
VA, asserting “that his service-connected right shoulder
injury worsened as a result of a December 2003 incident at
[a VA Medical Center].” May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *1; see
A.A. 32; see also A.A. 27–33 (2014 Notice of Disagreement).
In January 2010, the VA denied Mr. May’s claim for
entitlement to compensation under
38 U.S.C. § 1151 for his
aggravated right shoulder injury. May,
2019 WL 3366794,
at *1. In November 2010, Mr. May filed a notice of
disagreement, asserting that his right shoulder injury was
aggravated as a result of a fight with VA police at the VA
Medical Center, A.A. 32; see May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *1,
thereafter, in June 2013, Mr. May filed a separate claim for
his left shoulder, related to the December 2003 incident,
which the VA denied in September 2013, A.A. 69; see May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *1.
In November 2017, the Board affirmed the following
decisions by the VA. R.A. 25–26. First, the Board denied
Mr. May’s claim for shoulder injuries under
38 U.S.C.
§ 1151, concluding that “the evidence [did] not support a
finding that the December . . . 2003 incident in question
happened during the course of VA hospital care, VA
medical or surgical treatment, or an examination furnished
by [the] VA.” R.A. 42. Second, concerning the earlier
effective date for Mr. May’s depression as secondary to his
service-connected HSV-2, the Board determined that “no
submission from [Mr. May] to [the] VA . . . [was] received
Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 5 Filed: 03/05/2021
MAY v. MCDONOUGH 5
prior to November 5, 2012, that communicated an intent to
file a claim for service connection for depression[.]”
R.A. 38. Third, the Board found no CUE in the
October 2004 Rating Decision on sciatic nerve paralysis,
right and left knee chondromalacia, and TDIU. R.A. 43–
51. 5 Fourth, the Board found no CUE in an April 2007
Rating Decision on Mr. May’s tinea versicolor claim.
R.A. 54.
In December 2017, Mr. May appealed the 2017 Board
Decision to the Veterans Court. R.A. 17. In July 2019, the
Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision. May,
2019
WL 3366794, at *1. Specifically, the Veterans Court
determined that the Board had not clearly erred by
5 “A final decision of [the] VA . . . is subject to collat-
eral attack by a claim of CUE.” Disabled Am. Veterans v.
Gober,
234 F.3d 682, 686 (Fed. Cir. 2000), overruled on
other grounds by Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v.
Sec’y of Veterans Affs.,
981 F.3d 1360, 1368–69 (Fed.
Cir. 2020); see
38 C.F.R. § 3.105 (“Final decisions will be
accepted by [the] VA as correct with respect to the eviden-
tiary record and the law that existed at the time of the de-
cision, in the absence of [CUE].”). The following must be
demonstrated to establish CUE:
(1) Either the correct facts, as they were known at
the time, were not before the adjudicator or the
statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the
time were incorrectly applied; (2) [t]he error must
be undebatable and the sort which, had it not been
made, would have manifestly changed the outcome
at the time it was made; and (3) [a] determination
that there was CUE must be based on the record
and the law that existed at the time of the prior
adjudication in question.
Cousin v. Wilkie,
905 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 6 Filed: 03/05/2021
6 MAY v. MCDONOUGH
determining that Mr. May was not entitled to disability
compensation under
38 U.S.C. § 1151, as his “injuries were
divorced” from his VA treatment. May,
2019 WL 3366794,
at *3. Further, the Veterans Court found no clear error in
the Board’s conclusion that Mr. May’s depression claim
was separate from his HSV-2 claim.
Id. at *4. The
Veterans Court also determined that the Board did not err
by not finding CUE in the October 2004 and April 2007
Rating Decisions.
Id. at *6–9. Finally, the Veterans Court
held that it lacked jurisdiction to address Mr. May’s
argument that the Secretary lacked authority to issue a
non-compensable disability rating.
Id. at *9.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard
“The jurisdiction of this court to review decisions of the
Veterans Court is limited by statute.” Gazelle v.
Shulkin,
868 F.3d 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We may re-
view a Veterans Court decision “with respect to the validity
of a decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of law or of
any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation
thereof . . . that was relied on by the [Veterans] Court in
making the decision.”
38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). “Except to the
extent an appeal . . . presents a constitutional issue,” we
“may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination,
or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the
facts of a particular case.”
Id. § 7292(d)(2). “We review
statutory and regulatory interpretations of the Veterans
Court de novo.” Gazelle, 868 F.3d at 1009 (italics, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted).
While “[w]e review statutory and regulatory interpre-
tations of the Veterans Court de novo,” Gazelle, 868 F.3d
at 1009 (citation omitted), “[w]e may set aside the Veterans
Court’s interpretation of a regulation only if it is unconsti-
tutional, violative of statute, procedurally defective, or oth-
erwise arbitrary,” Blubaugh v. McDonald,
773 F.3d 1310,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing
38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1)); see 38
Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 7 Filed: 03/05/2021
MAY v. MCDONOUGH
7
U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1) (providing that we “shall . . . set aside”
any regulatory interpretation “relied upon in the decision
of the [Veterans Court]” that is “(A) arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, author-
ity, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or (D)
without observance of procedure required by law”); Sursely
v. Peake,
551 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining
that the “jurisdictional grant” of
38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) “dis-
tinguishes between statutory interpretation and regula-
tory interpretation,” and that we review the Veterans
Court’s regulatory interpretations “only under [the] more
deferential standard set out in [§ 7292(d)(1)]”).
II. The Veterans Court Properly Affirmed the Board’s
Decision to Deny Entitlement to Disability Benefits under
38 U.S.C. § 1151
The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s denial of
Mr. May’s request for disability benefits under
38 U.S.C.
§ 1151, as it found the Board’s determination that Mr.
May’s “[shoulder] injuries were divorced from his treat-
ment ha[d] a plausible basis in the record and comports
with applicable law.” May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *3. The
Veterans Court determined that “[t]he Board properly re-
cited the relevant law and applied it to the above facts.”
Id.
Mr. May contends, however, that the Veterans Court erred
by incorrectly adopting “the Secretary’s narrow interpreta-
tion of § 1151.” Appellant’s Br. 8. That is, Mr. May argues,
that the Veterans Court’s determination “suggests that the
Secretary incurs absolutely no § 1151 liability for tort inju-
ries caused by VA medical facilities staff,” and thus, the
Veteran Court erred in its application of § 1151. Id. at 8–
9. We disagree with Mr. May.
The Veterans Court properly affirmed the Board’s de-
cision to deny Mr. May entitlement to disability benefits
under
38 U.S.C. § 1151. For a claimant to recover under
Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 8 Filed: 03/05/2021
8 MAY v. MCDONOUGH
§ 1151, the claimant must satisfy three prerequisites for
obtaining disability compensation: (1) the “claimant must
incur a ‘qualifying additional disability’ that was not the
result of his own ‘willful misconduct,’” (2) the “disability
must have been ‘caused by hospital care, medical or surgi-
cal treatment, or examination furnished the veteran’ by the
VA or in a VA facility,” and (3) the “‘proximate cause’ of the
veteran’s disability must be ‘carelessness, negligence, lack
of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instance of
fault on the part of the [VA],’ or ‘an event not reasonably
foreseeable.’” Viegas v. Shinseki,
705 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (quoting
38 U.S.C. § 1151(a)). Here, Mr. May’s
shoulder injury was “aggravated as a result of a fight with
VA police at the VA medical center.” May,
2019 WL
3366794, at *1; see R.A. 41–42. Our precedent holds that
§ 1151 neither “covers every injury sustained by a veteran
in a VA medical facility” nor “extend[s] to the remote con-
sequences of the hospital care or medical treatment pro-
vided by the VA.” Viegas, 705 F.3d at 1383. As such, the
Board correctly determined that at the time of the incident
Mr. May “was not undergoing hospital care, medical or sur-
gical treatment, or examination furnished by [the] VA,” but
rather en route to his medical appointment, not in the
course of medical treatment. R.A. 24, 41; see Viegas, 705
F.3d at 1383 (“If, for example, a veteran reported to a VA
medical center for an examination, and hours later was in-
jured while engaged in recreational activities at the facil-
ity, his injury might well be deemed only a remote
consequence of his earlier examination.”) Therefore, the
Veterans Court did not rely on an incorrect understanding
of § 1151. Accordingly, Mr. May is not entitled to disability
benefits for his shoulder injuries, as of result of the Decem-
ber 2003 incident, under
38 U.S.C. § 1151.
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MAY v. MCDONOUGH 9
III. We Lack Jurisdiction to Review Mr. May’s Remaining
Challenges Against the Veterans Court’s Decision
A. We Lack Jurisdiction to Review Whether Mr. May
is Entitled to An Earlier Effective Date for
Secondary Service-Connected Depression
The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s denial of
Mr. May’s request to revise the June 2016 Rating Decision
on the basis that it “detect[ed] no clear error in the Board’s
analysis” that Mr. May’s “depression claim is separate from
[his] HSV-2 claim.” May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *4. The
Veterans Court concluded that the Board correctly deter-
mined that Mr. May’s “service-connected depression [was]
not inextricably intertwined with his service-connected
HSV-2,” id.; that the Board properly determined “that
there [was] no communication from [Mr. May] received
prior to November 5, 2012, that may reasonably be con-
strued as a formal or informal claim for entitlement to ser-
vice connection for depression,
id. at *5 (quotations marks
and citation omitted); and that it need not “opine on the
constitutionality of [38 C.F.R.] § 20.302,” id. Mr. May con-
tends, however, that the Veterans Court erred by affirming
the Board’s determination that his 2012 submission was a
new claim, Appellant’s Br. 11; concluding that his state-
ment of “complete embarrassment” did not constitute a
claim for entitlement to service connection for depression,
id. at 12. That is, Mr. May argues that he “met the mini-
mum requirements to establish [an] HSV-2 [d]epression[]
service connection effective date as of July 14, 2003.” Id.
at 24. However, we lack jurisdiction to review this claim.
We lack jurisdiction to review the Veterans Court de-
termination that Mr. May is not entitled to an earlier effec-
tive date for secondary service-connected depression.
Mr. May neither challenges any particular aspect of the
Veterans Court’s decision based on a rule of law or the va-
lidity of any statute or regulation, nor raises any legitimate
Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 10 Filed: 03/05/2021
10 MAY v. MCDONOUGH
constitutional challenge. See generally Appellant’s Br. 6 In-
stead, Mr. May challenges the Veterans Court affirmance
of the Board’s factual finding “that no filings contempora-
neous with the HSV-2 claim could be construed as contain-
ing a claim for depression or any other psychological issue,”
i.e., that it was not until November 2012 that Mr. May filed
a claim that could “reasonably be construed as a formal or
informal claim for entitlement to service connection for
6 The Veterans Court concluded that it was “not nec-
essary–nor would it be proper–for th[e Veterans] Court to
opine on the constitutionality of § 20.302 because the Board
weighed the evidence of record and held that the appellant
was not entitled to an earlier effective date,” and therefore,
“any error is harmless” because “there is no decision with
which [Mr. May] could have filed a[] [notice of disagree-
ment].” May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *5. However, Mr. May
argues that any error was not harmless. See Appellant’s
Br. 18. Mr. May’s argument is misplaced. To the extent
Mr. May continues to challenge the constitutionality, the
regulation is irrelevant to the outcome in this case and
therefore we do not reach it. Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party,
552 U.S. 442, 450
(2008) (explaining that courts should exercise judicial re-
straint “from unnecessary pronouncement on constitu-
tional issues” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Moreover, to the extent Mr. May challenges a
finding of harmless error on the facts of the case, we lack
jurisdiction. See Newhouse v. Nicholson,
497 F.3d 1298,
1302 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (concluding that an appellant’s chal-
lenge as to whether an error is prejudicial involves factual
matters outside our jurisdiction); Conway v. Principi,
353
F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[W]e would surpass our
jurisdiction if we were to apply the harmless error rule as
codified in [
38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2)] to the facts of [a]
case[.]”). Therefore, we need not review the Veterans
Court’s determination.
Case: 19-2451 Document: 33 Page: 11 Filed: 03/05/2021
MAY v. MCDONOUGH 11
depression.” May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *5. Because the
Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s denial of Mr. May’s
request to revise the June 2016 Rating Decision based on
an application of law to fact, i.e., that he did not make a
claim related to depression until November 2012, and
Mr. May does not appear to raise a non-frivolous legal chal-
lenge to the Veterans Court’s legal determinations, we lack
jurisdiction. See Bozeman v. McDonald,
814 F.3d 1354,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Veterans Court’s
“application of law to fact” is “a question over which we lack
jurisdiction” (citation omitted)).
B. We Lack Jurisdiction to Review the Veterans
Court’s Decision Denying Mr. May’s Various
Challenges of CUE
The Veterans Court determined that Mr. May’s CUE
arguments addressing the Board’s determination regard-
ing the October 2004 and April 2007 Rating Decisions
“amount[ed] to . . . fundamental disagreement[s] with how
the Board weighed the evidence.” May,
2019 WL 3366794,
at *7; see, e.g.,
id. (concluding that Mr. May’s assertions of
CUE were “based on inadequate reasons or bases,” pertain-
ing to sciatic nerve paralysis, and “are misplaced”);
id. (con-
cluding that Mr. May’s assertion of CUE pertaining to his
right and left knee chondromalacia “amount[ed] to an as-
sertion that VA failed in its duty to assist,” which “cannot
form the basis for finding CUE”);
id. at *8 (concluding that
Mr. May’s assertion of CUE pertaining to his TDIU
amounted to a disagreement over whether the Veterans
Court “should [have] look[ed] over his medical history for
potential extraschedular referral,” which cannot serve as
the basis for CUE);
id. at *9 (concluding that Mr. May’s
“disagreements with his tinea versicolor rating amount to
a disagreement with the merits determination and cannot
serve as the basis for CUE”). Consequently, the Veterans
Court concluded that Mr. May failed to show that the
Board committed CUE pertaining to his claims for sciatic
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12 MAY v. MCDONOUGH
nerve paralysis, right and left knee chondromalacia, TDIU,
and tinea versicolor.
Id. at 7–9. Mr. May contends that the
Veterans Court erred by concluding that the Board did not
commit CUE. Appellant’s Br. 24–29. However, we lack ju-
risdiction to review this claim.
We lack jurisdiction to review the Veterans Court’s de-
cision to deny Mr. May’s various challenges of CUE. While
we may review challenges to the validity or interpretation
of a statute or regulation relied on by the Veterans Court,
we lack jurisdiction to review a challenge to a “factual de-
termination” or “law or regulation as applied to the facts.”
38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2); see also Githens v. Shinseki,
676
F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[We] may not review the
Veterans Court for an ‘application of a legal standard to the
facts of a particular case to determine whether there has
been an error that is essentially factual in nature.’” (quot-
ing Szemraj v. Principi,
357 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2004))). Here, it appears that Mr. May’s arguments
amount to a disagreement with the Veterans Court’s
weighing of evidence and application of law to the facts of
this case. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 25 (Mr. May asserting
that “between 2004 and 2007, the Secretary misapplied
38 U.S.C. §§ 7252 and 7266 to, inter alia, promulgate any
decisions against the sciatica optimum-benefit claim”);
id.
(Mr. May asserting that “[t]he 2004 bilateral knees CUE
claims involved the misapplication of 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d),
38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1 and 19.9, inter alia”);
id. at 26 (Mr. May
asserting “[c]ontrary to the Veterans Court’s findings, that
the [Social Security Administration (‘SSA’)] determination
‘postdates the adjudication in question,’” and that the
“[Agency of Original Jurisdiction] issued [the April 2007
Decision Rating] after being informed of the SSA’s deci-
sion”);
id. at 27 (Mr. May asserting that we “may vacate
[the] Veterans Court’s tinea versicolor decision based upon
the failure to remand the claim to [the] Board upon
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MAY v. MCDONOUGH 13
misapplication of
38 C.F.R. § 19.9”). 7 Therefore, we lack
jurisdiction to review the Veterans Court’s decision deny-
ing Mr. May’s CUE challenges pertaining to the Board’s
October 2004 and April 2007 Rating Decisions. See Guil-
lory v. Shinseki,
669 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (con-
cluding that because the appellant’s “arguments [were]
disagreements with how the facts were weighed or how the
law was applied to the facts in this particular case,” we
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to
38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)).
7 Mr. May argued that “pursuant to
38 U.S.C.
§ 1155, it is unlawful for the Secretary to grant a 0 [per-
cent] disability rating,” May,
2019 WL 3366794, at *8, how-
ever, the Veterans Court concluded that pursuant to
Wingard v. McDonald, it lacked jurisdiction to address
Mr. May’s argument,
id. at *9 (citing
779 F.3d 1354, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2015)). On appeal, Mr. May contends that our
holding in Wingard does not apply to him because the ap-
pellant in Wingard “did not have standing [to] present her
38 U.S.C. § 2303 claim based upon a challenge to the 0 per-
cent rating because she was not the veteran burdened with
the 0 [percent] rating,” and thus, the Veterans Court erred.
Appellant’s Br. 28. Mr. May is mistaken. In Wingard, we
held that:
Congress precluded the Veterans Court from re-
viewing the schedule of ratings for disabilities
adopted under [§] 1155 or any action of the Secre-
tary in adopting or revising that schedule. That
provision squarely precludes the Veterans Court
from determining whether the schedule, by includ-
ing a 0 [percent] rating, substantively violates stat-
utory constraints.
779 F.3d at 1356 (internal alterations, quotation marks,
and citation omitted). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to
consider the challenge to the rating schedule.
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14 MAY v. MCDONOUGH
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. May’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the above reasons, we
affirm the Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Vet-
erans Claims and dismiss those parts of Mr. May’s appeal
over which we lack jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND DISMISSED-IN-
PART
COSTS
No costs.
