Cabral v. United States , 317 F. App'x 979 ( 2008 )


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  •                       NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2008-5044
    DUARTE MANUEL CABRAL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Duarte Manuel Cabral, of Poway, California, argued for plaintiffs-appellants.
    David F. D’Alessandris, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
    Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-
    appellee. With him on the brief were Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney
    General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Mark A. Melnick, Assistant Director.
    Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims
    Judge Christine O.C. Miller
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2008-5044
    DUARTE MANUEL CABRAL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in 07-872C,
    Judge Christine C. Miller.
    _______________________
    DECIDED: October 8, 2008
    _______________________
    Before GAJARSA, DYK and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM
    Duarte Manuel Cabral seeks review of the United States Court of Federal Claims’
    January 15, 2008 order that sua sponte 1 dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
    1
    Mr. Cabral argues that it was improper for the Court of Federal Claims to
    dismiss his action for lack of jurisdiction sua sponte before the United States
    investigated the claim’s merits and responded. This argument is meritless because the
    law is well-settled that a trial court has the responsibility to determine its own jurisdiction
    sua sponte whenever it appears it may be lacking. Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States,
    
    845 F.2d 999
    , 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
    For the reasons set forth below, the court’s order is affirmed.
    Mr. Cabral filed a complaint against the United States in the Court of Federal
    Claims seeking reimbursement of past and future wage garnishments in accordance
    with a California court order mandating child support. In his complaint, Mr. Cabral relies
    on the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 2 to
    provide jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims. Cabral v. United States, Case No.
    07-872C (Ct. Cl. 2008). The Court of Federal Claims concluded that it lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction over Mr. Cabral’s claims because nothing in the First Amendment or
    the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment explicitly or implicitly obligates the
    Federal Government to pay money damages.
    Mr. Cabral also alleges that 
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
     allocates authority to the Court of
    Federal Claims to render declaratory relief when no other avenue for remedy is
    available. The Court of Federal Claims concluded that 
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
     does not
    provide any basis for jurisdiction and that it lacks jurisdiction to grant declaratory
    judgments.
    This court reviews de novo the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of Mr. Cabral’s
    complaint for lack of jurisdiction. See Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 
    419 F.3d 1355
    , 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In conducting its review, this court assumes that the facts
    pled by Mr. Cabral are true. See 
    id. at 1364
    .
    2
    Mr. Cabral’s original complaint relies on the Fourteenth Amendment.
    Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the Federal Government, the
    Court of Federal Claims reinterpreted Mr. Cabral’s claim as relying upon the Fifth
    Amendment.
    2008-5044                                    2
    The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction. See Tucker Act, 
    28 U.S.C. §1491
     (waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States). However, any
    claim for money damages against the United States must be premised upon an express
    or implied contract, or under a money-mandating constitutional provision, statute, or
    regulation. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
     (a)(1); Fisher v. United States, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    , 1172 (Fed.
    Cir. 2005) (en banc). Therefore, whether the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
    over Mr. Cabral’s case depends on whether any of the constitutional or statutory
    provisions on which he relies are money-mandating.
    The law is well-settled that the constitutional provisions—the First Amendment
    and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment—are not money-mandating in these
    circumstances. See LeBlanc v. United States, 
    50 F.3d 1025
    , 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
    Mullenberg v. United States, 
    857 F.2d 770
    , 773 (Fed Cir. 1988); United States v.
    Connolly, 
    716 F.2d 882
    , 886-87 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
    The statutes on which Mr. Cabral relies are similarly unavailing. Section 2201 of
    Title 28, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, does not provide any basis for
    jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. See Rolls-Royce v. United States, 
    364 F.2d 415
    , 420 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (“The [Declaratory Judgment] statute is a procedural one and
    does not supply an independent ground of jurisdiction where none otherwise exists.”)
    On appeal, Mr. Cabral also avers that he is entitled to compensation under the
    California Family Code § 3653. However, the Court of Federal Claims does not have
    jurisdiction over claims founded on state law. Souders v. South Carolina Public Service
    Authority, 
    497 F.3d 1303
    , 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the Court of Federal
    Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Cabral’s claims.
    2008-5044                                   3
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Federal Claims.
    No costs.
    2008-5044                                  4