Ramirez v. United States , 239 F. App'x 581 ( 2007 )

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2007-5029
MARIA GRACIELA RAMIREZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Maria Graciela Ramirez, of Laredo,Texas, pro se.
Brian T. Edmunds, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. With
him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen,
Director, and Kathryn A. Bleecker, Assistant Director.
Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims
Judge Francis M. Allegra
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2007-5029
MARIA GRACIELA RAMIREZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________
DECIDED: April 4, 2007
___________________________
Before BRYSON, Circuit Judge, CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and LINN, Circuit
Judge.
PER CURIAM.
DECISION
Maria Graciela Ramirez appeals from a decision of the Court of Federal Claims,
No. 06–CV–704, dismissing her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
On October 11, 2006, Ms. Ramirez filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims as a
pro se litigant, seeking unspecified damages from an unspecified defendant. Giving a
generous reading to her complaint, as is required when the litigant is pro se, we
interpret the complaint to allege that the state and federal courts have conspired to
deprive her and all other women of rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
She argues that, although she has been litigating various civil and criminal matters in
various courts for the past 26 years, she has yet to receive a fair hearing because she
has always proceeded pro se. She claims that the courts have wrongly deprived her of
her property; stigmatized her by calling her a mentally incompetent criminal; wrongly
convicted, imprisoned, and tortured her by confining her in a county jail; wrongfully
denied her motions and dismissed her claims; and altered court transcripts sent to the
appellate courts when she has appealed her cases.
She also alleges that various government officials, including the FBI and local
police agencies, have covered up government-sponsored mail tampering and repeated
government-sponsored attempts to intimidate and kill her for speaking out about the
ongoing denial of fundamental rights to women in America. She further alleges ongoing
vandalism of her property, trespass, and violations of sections 1983 and 1985 of Title 42
of the United States Code. Ms. Ramirez also appears to allege that she was entitled to
a hearing in this case, presumably both as to jurisdiction and on the merits.
Acting on its own motion and without holding a hearing, the trial court dismissed
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Ramirez appealed to this court.
DISCUSSION
The Court of Federal Claims properly held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Ms.
Ramirez’s claims. The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction, and, like
all federal courts, is obligated to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to hear a case.
2007-5029 2
Nickerson v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 581, 588 (1996), aff'd, 113 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (citing Hambsch v. United States, 857 F.2d 763, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); R. Ct.
Fed. Cl. 12(h)(3). The Tucker Act defines the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims. It states:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon
the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is
limited to cases in which "the constitutional provision, statute, or regulation in question
expressly creates a substantive right enforceable against the federal government for
money damages." LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)). Moreover, except in specific
circumstances not relevant here, the court cannot grant equitable relief such as an
injunction or specific performance. Kanemoto v. Reno, 41 F.3d 641, 644 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 (1988)).
To the extent that Ms. Ramirez alleges due process and equal protection
violations, the Court of Federal Claims correctly determined that it lacks jurisdiction to
consider those claims because those provisions do not mandate the payment of money
damages by the government. LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1028. Similarly, the Court of Federal
Claims does not have jurisdiction over Ms. Ramirez’s claims of civil rights violations
under sections 1983 and 1985 of Title 42; the general civil rights claims alleged are not
based on any money-mandating provisions, and those statutes do not give rise to
liability for the United States. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424-25
2007-5029 3
(1973); Davis v. United States, 204 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2000); Sanders v. United
States, 34 Fed. Cl. 75, 80 (1995), aff'd, 104 F.3d 376 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Nor does the
trial court have jurisdiction over tort claims alleging mail tampering, attempted murder,
vandalism, or trespass. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S.
200, 214 (1993).
Ms. Ramirez was also not entitled to a hearing before the trial court. Because
the court assumed all the complaint’s allegations were true, there were no disputed
material facts pertaining to the court’s jurisdiction that would have required a hearing to
resolve. Deprenyl Animal Health, Inc. v. Univ. of Toronto Innovations Found., 297 F.3d
1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002). And because the trial court does not have jurisdiction over
any of the claims presented, Ms. Ramirez is not entitled to a hearing on the merits.
Although the trial court’s decision on jurisdiction resolves the case, the court
noted that Ms. Ramirez “has raised several of the issues in her complaint before other
courts, where they have been rejected by final decisions.” For that reason, the court
explained that even if it had jurisdiction over those claims, they would be barred by res
judicata, which prohibits parties to a lawsuit from relitigating previously decided claims.
Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (“A final judgment on the
merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were
or could have been raised in that action.”). Those decisions must be challenged
through the appropriate appeal process and cannot be collaterally attacked by a new
action brought in the Court of Federal Claims.
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