Metzenbaum v. Department of Homeland Security ( 2005 )


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  •                      NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
    is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    04-3369
    TERRY S. METZENBAUM,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
    Respondent.
    ___________________________
    DECIDED: January 12, 2005
    ___________________________
    Before BRYSON, GAJARSA, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Terry S. Metzenbaum (“Metzenbaum”) appeals from the final decision of the
    Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”), which dismissed his appeal of non-selection
    for a position in the Federal Protective Service as a police officer for lack of jurisdiction.
    Metzenbaum v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, CH-3443-03-0168-I-1 (M.S.P.B. May 20,
    2004 final decision). We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    In 1996, Metzenbaum applied to the General Services Administration (“Agency”),
    now the Department of Homeland Security, seeking appointment as a police officer in
    the Federal Protective Service.      After a background investigation, the Agency
    determined that Metzenbaum was unsuitable for the position due to his poor credit
    history. This action arises from Metzenbaum’s third appeal to the Board based on his
    non-selection.
    On December 19, 2002, Metzenbaum filed an appeal with the Board alleging that
    the Agency violated the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 
    58 Stat. 387
     (“VPA”), by
    hiring a non-veteran over himself without first obtaining permission from the Office of
    Personnel Management (“OPM”).          Metzenbaum also claimed that the Agency
    discriminated against him on the basis of disability discrimination due to his type-II
    diabetes and his political affiliation since he is related to former U.S. Senator Howard
    Metzenbaum.
    The administrative judge (“AJ”) issued an acknowledgment order requiring
    Metzenbaum to submit evidence and argument to prove that the Board has jurisdiction
    over his appeal. The acknowledgment order incorporated an order to show cause,
    which advised Metzenbaum that the Board will not hear claims already adjudicated and
    barred by the doctrine of res judicata.    The order also provided the jurisdictional
    requirements to appeal under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
    Rights Act of 1994 and the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998.
    Metzenbaum did not respond to the order. Instead, Metzenbaum filed a motion
    in which he alleged that the AJ was biased and requested that the AJ withdraw from the
    04-3369                                    2
    appeal. Metzenbaum stated that the AJ used “all the same jurisdictional arguments that
    [the AJ in his prior appeal] used to dismiss the appeal with prejudice, so [he does] not
    have to hear it.” Metzenbaum also argued that his claim is not barred because he had
    withdrawn his prior appeal to the Federal Circuit pursuant to a settlement agreement
    wherein he and the Department of Justice agreed that he could file a Board appeal
    alleging a violation of the VPA.
    On January 22, 2003, the AJ issued an initial decision dismissing Metzenbaum’s
    appeal on grounds of res judicata. Metzenbaum filed a petition for review seeking
    reconsideration of the initial decision. The Board denied Metzenbaum’s petition for
    review, but reopened the appeal on its own motion holding that the doctrine of res
    judicata did not technically apply to the claims raised in Metzenbaum’s prior appeals.
    Nevertheless, the Board held that Metzenbaum failed to allege a valid basis for
    jurisdiction.   Accordingly, the Board vacated the initial decision and dismissed the
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Metzenbaum timely appealed to this court and we have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    DISCUSSION
    We must affirm the Board unless we determine that its decision is (1) arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained
    without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3)
    unsupported by substantial evidence. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c) (2000). As the petitioner,
    Metzenbaum bears the burden of showing that the Board had jurisdiction in this matter.
    Minor v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    819 F.2d 280
    , 282 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
    04-3369                                      3
    The Veterans Employment Opportunity Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-339, 
    112 Stat. 3182
     (1998) (“VEOA”) grants the Board jurisdiction to hear appeals by individuals
    who are preference eligible and who assert that an agency has violated their rights
    under any statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference. 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(d)(1)
    (2000). In Lapuh v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    284 F.3d 1277
    , 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002), we held
    that jurisdiction under the VEOA does not extend to events that occurred before
    October 31, 1998, the effective date of the VEOA. Metzenbaum has identified no law,
    rule, or regulation establishing Board jurisdiction to consider his claim that the Agency
    violated his rights under the VPA in 1996, prior to the VEOA’s effective date of 1998.
    Metzenbaum argues, based on his discrimination claims, that the Board should
    have applied 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b)(6), which prohibits agency hiring officials from granting
    any preference or advantage not authorized by law, rule, or regulation to
    any employee or applicant for employment (including defining the scope or
    manner of competition or the requirements for any position) for the purpose
    of improving or injuring the prospects of any particular person for
    employment.
    As the Board correctly held, 
    5 U.S.C. § 2302
    (b) does not provide an independent
    source of Board jurisdiction. Schmidt v. Dep’t of Interior, 
    153 F.3d 1348
    , 1356 (Fed. Cir.
    1998); Saunders v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 
    757 F.2d 1288
    , 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    Metzenbaum further argues, as in Lackhouse v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    773 F.2d 313
     (Fed. Cir. 1985), that the Board possesses jurisdiction to entertain his case as an
    “employment practice” appeal pursuant to 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.104
    (a).1           To satisfy his
    jurisdictional burden under that provision, Metzenbaum must show that the actions in
    1
    
    5 C.F.R. § 300.104
    (a) provides that “[a] candidate who believes that an
    employment practice which was applied to him or her by the Office of Personnel
    Management violates a basic requirement in § 300.103 is entitled to appeal to the Merit
    Systems Protection Board under the provisions of its regulations.”
    04-3369                                     4
    question constitute employment practices, and that the OPM was involved in the
    administration of those practices. Prewitt v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    133 F.3d 885
    , 887
    (Fed. Cir. 1998). Metzenbaum has not alleged an employment practice, based on the
    three grounds set forth in 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.103
    , that involved administration by the OPM.
    See Meeker v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    319 F.3d 1368
    , 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Therefore,
    the Board lacks jurisdiction pursuant to Lackhouse and 
    5 C.F.R. § 300.104
    (a).
    Furthermore, jurisdiction cannot be conferred based on a settlement agreement
    with the Department of Justice because parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the Board
    by agreement where jurisdiction would not otherwise exist. See Waldrop v. United
    States Postal Serv., 
    72 M.S.P.R. 12
    , 15 (1996). “As a limited-jurisdiction tribunal, the
    Board must satisfy itself that it has authority to adjudicate the matter before it, and may
    raise the matter of its own jurisdiction sua sponte at any time.” 
    Id.
    Metzenbaum also argues that the AJ was biased against him alleging that the AJ
    used “all the same jurisdictional arguments that [the AJ in his prior appeal] used to
    dismiss the appeal with prejudice, so [he does] not have to hear it.” Even accepting
    Metzenbaum’s allegations as true, the Board’s adverse rulings are not evidence of “a
    deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible” and
    thus, fail to prove bias. Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994); Bieber v.
    Dep’t of the Army, 
    287 F.3d 1358
    , 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Furthermore, Metzenbaum
    has offered no evidence to show that the AJ issued the initial decision to retaliate
    against him for asking the AJ to withdraw from the case.
    We have considered all of Metzenbaum’s arguments and hold that the Board
    properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over his appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.
    04-3369                                       5