Case: 22-1158 Document: 27 Page: 1 Filed: 04/05/2022
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JOHN D. HORTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2022-1158
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:20-cv-01520-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
______________________
Decided: April 5, 2022
______________________
JOHN D. HORTON, Lawton, OK, pro se.
MARGARET JANTZEN, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
BRIAN M. BOYNTON, DEBORAH ANN BYNUM, PATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY.
______________________
Before CHEN, SCHALL, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-1158 Document: 27 Page: 2 Filed: 04/05/2022
2 HORTON v. US
PER CURIAM.
John Horton appeals from the United States Court of
Federal Claims’ summary judgment denying Mr. Horton’s
claim to relief from the debt collected from him by the
United States. For the below reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Horton was employed by the United States Depart-
ment of Defense until 2003. During his final pay period,
the Department of Defense improperly paid Mr. Horton for
several hours that should have been considered leave with-
out pay or for hours that extended beyond his separation
date. Twelve years later, in 2015, the Defense Finance Ac-
counting Service (DFAS) sent Mr. Horton a letter inform-
ing him of the overpayment and stating that he owed the
government $566.68. Mr. Horton did not respond to this
letter. In 2016, DFAS turned the debt over to the United
States Department of Treasury (Treasury) for collection.
In 2019, Coast Professional, Inc., a service provider for
the Treasury, sent Mr. Horton a letter informing him of its
intent to collect the debt. Later that year, Coast Profes-
sional sent another letter stating the Treasury intended to
begin wage garnishment proceedings. That letter informed
Mr. Horton that he could request a hearing on the validity
of the debt. Mr. Horton did not respond to these letters or
request a hearing. In December 2019, the Treasury issued
a wage garnishment order to Mr. Horton’s employer.
Mr. Horton’s wages were then garnished to satisfy the
debt.
Mr. Horton brought suit in the Court of Federal
Claims, alleging that “the US federal government, acting
through the US Dept. of Education . . . or some other un-
known federal government entity” improperly garnished
Case: 22-1158 Document: 27 Page: 3 Filed: 04/05/2022
HORTON v. US 3
his wages. SAppx. 4–6. 1 Mr. Horton alleged that he did
not owe a federal debt and that the government’s collection
actions “were unlawful and all money wrongfully taken
from [Mr. Horton] should be refunded.” SAppx. 5. The
Court of Federal Claims interpreted Mr. Horton’s com-
plaint as alleging an illegal exaction claim. SAppx. 1–3;
Horton v. United States, No. 20-1520,
2021 WL 4988036
(Fed. Cl. Oct. 27, 2021).
The government moved for summary judgment. 2 Be-
cause Mr. Horton did not identify any contrary facts, the
court found there were no material facts in dispute. The
court further noted that Mr. Horton had not identified any
statute, regulation, or other authority that the government
allegedly violated in collecting the debt. Continuing, the
trial court found that “[w]age garnishments are authorized
1 Citations to “SAppx.” refer to the Appendix at-
tached to the appellee’s brief.
2 Mr. Horton did not file a timely response to the gov-
ernment’s motion for summary judgment. After the court’s
judgment on that motion was entered, Mr. Horton belat-
edly filed a response. See SAppx. 13–14; Order, Horton
v. United States, No. 1:20-cv-01520-DAT (Fed. Cl. Nov. 4,
2021), ECF No. 29. In consideration of “the leniency af-
forded to pro se plaintiffs,” the trial court considered
Mr. Horton’s response, but determined that nothing in
Mr. Horton’s response compelled it to grant Mr. Horton re-
lief or reconsider its summary judgment determination.
SAppx. 14. Similarly considering the leniency given to par-
ties proceeding pro se, we understand Mr. Horton to be
challenging both the court’s original summary judgment
determination and its order declining to reconsider that de-
termination. See Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab.,
812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[L]eniency with re-
spect to mere formalities should be extended to a pro se
party.”).
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4 HORTON v. US
means of collecting debts”; “DFAS properly notified
Mr. Horton of the overpayment and demand for repay-
ment”; and the “Treasury followed the procedures outlined”
in the applicable debt collection statutes. SAppx. 2–3. Fur-
ther, while acknowledging that Mr. Horton was “under-
standably surprised by the United States’ delay in
collecting a debt that dates back nearly two decades,” the
court explained that there is no statute of limitations ap-
plicable to administrative wage garnishments. SAppx. 3.
The trial court thus granted the government’s motion, de-
termining that Mr. Horton’s illegal exaction claim failed as
a matter of law because his debt “was valid, legally estab-
lished, and collected in accordance with applicable law.”
SAppx. 3.
Mr. Horton appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the grant of summary judgment by
the Court of Federal Claims. Cal. Fed. Bank, FSB
v. United States,
245 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We
reapply the same summary judgment standard as the trial
court. Palahnuk v. United States,
475 F.3d 1380, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2007). Under the standard applied by the Court
of Federal Claims, summary judgment is appropriate if the
movant, here the government, “shows that there is no gen-
uine dispute as to any material fact” and that it “is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” R. Ct. Fed. Cl. 56(a). For
the reasons below, we affirm the trial court’s summary
judgment.
On appeal, Mr. Horton argues that: (1) the Treasury
did not meet the statutory notice requirements for wage
garnishments because it sent notice to Mr. Horton’s former
address; (2) the garnishment notice was defective because
it “referred to a ‘US Department of Education’ debt and not
to a ‘US Department of Defense’ debt”; (3) Mr. Horton’s ear-
lier bankruptcy proceedings preclude collection of the debt
Case: 22-1158 Document: 27 Page: 5 Filed: 04/05/2022
HORTON v. US 5
at issue; (4) the garnishment is barred by the statute of
limitations; and (5) the government committed an illegal
exaction. We take each argument in turn.
We begin with Mr. Horton’s assertion that the Treas-
ury failed to meet statutory notice requirements for debt
collection because its first letter to Mr. Horton was sent to
“a residential address which [he] had not lived at since
2011.” Appellant’s Br. 4. The relevant statute, however,
only requires that written notice be “sent by mail to the
individual’s last known address.” 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(2);
see also
31 C.F.R. § 285.11(e)(1) (notices of wage garnish-
ment shall be sent “to the debtor’s last known address”).
Mr. Horton has not alleged or provided evidence that he
provided an updated address to his former employer or that
the Treasury was otherwise aware of a different mailing
address. Because Mr. Horton has presented no evidence to
this effect, he thus has not shown that there is a material
issue of fact to preclude summary judgment.
We turn next to Mr. Horton’s argument that the gar-
nishment notice was defective, and thus unenforceable, be-
cause it “referred to a ‘US Department of Education’ debt
and not to a ‘US Department of Defense’ debt.” Appellant’s
Br. 4–5, 11 (citing § 3720D(b)(2)). As explained in the stat-
utory section Mr. Horton cites, “the head of the executive,
judicial, or legislative agency” must mail a proper wage
garnishment notice to the debtor informing him, among
other things, of “the nature and amount of the debt to be
collected.” § 3720(D)(b)(2). Mr. Horton argues that be-
cause the notices mailed to him stated “that a student loan
debt was owed to the Department of Education,” they did
not come “from the head of the” appropriate agency nor ad-
equately inform him of “the nature . . . of the debt” and are
thus invalid. Appellant’s Br. 4–5, 11, 16.
Each of the communications sent to Mr. Horton, how-
ever, correctly states that the debt is owed to the Depart-
ment of Defense or DFAS. SAppx. 15–18 (initial demand
Case: 22-1158 Document: 27 Page: 6 Filed: 04/05/2022
6 HORTON v. US
letter from DFAS describing the debt as originating from
“corrections to time and attendance”); SAppx. 20 (notice
from Coast Professional referring to Mr. Horton’s “out-
standing delinquent federal obligation on behalf of [the]
Department of Defense”); SAppx. 22 (same). There is no
mention of the Department of Education or a student loan
in any of the letters or notices sent to Mr. Horton regarding
this debt. Because Mr. Horton has not presented evidence
that the wage garnishment notices were facially defective,
he has not shown that there is a material issue of fact to
preclude summary judgment.
Next, we consider Mr. Horton’s argument that his ear-
lier bankruptcy proceedings prevent the collection of the
debt at issue. Appellant’s Br. 16–17. Mr. Horton alleges
that he discharged certain student loans in a 1996 bank-
ruptcy proceeding and thus the government cannot now
seek to collect on those loans. Id. The debt at issue, how-
ever, is not a student loan. As mentioned above, each of
the communications sent to Mr. Horton correctly identify
the debt as owed to the Department of Defense. See
SAppx. 15–18, 20, 22. Mr. Horton has not presented any
evidence that the government is attempting to collect a dis-
charged student loan. Accordingly, Mr. Horton has not
shown there is a material issue of fact precluding summary
judgment.
We now turn to Mr. Horton’s argument that the gov-
ernment’s wage garnishment is barred by a statute of lim-
itations. Appellant’s Br. 17, 21–28. As the trial court
correctly explained, “Congress did not establish a statute
of limitations applicable to administrative wage garnish-
ments.” SAppx. 3 (first citing
31 U.S.C. § 3720; and then
citing
31 CFR § 285.11(d)) (“Whenever an agency deter-
mines that a delinquent debt is owed by an individual, the
agency may initiate proceedings administratively to gar-
nish the wages of the delinquent debtor.”). Here, too,
Mr. Horton has not shown there is a material issue of fact.
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HORTON v. US 7
Finally, we turn to Mr. Horton’s argument that the
government committed an illegal exaction by garnishing
his wages. Appellant’s Br. 17–18. An illegal exaction claim
arises where money is improperly “exacted[] or taken from
the claimant in contravention of the Constitution, a stat-
ute, or a regulation.” Norman v. United States,
429 F.3d
1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2005). To properly plead an illegal
exaction claim, a plaintiff must seek to recover money the
government required him to pay “contrary to law.” Aero-
lineas Argentinas v. United States,
77 F.3d 1564, 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1996). Here, Mr. Horton has not shown that the
government collected the debt at issue in contravention of
any statute, regulation, or other authority. As the trial
court explained, “DFAS properly notified Mr. Horton of the
overpayment and demand for repayment.” SAppx. 2. The
Treasury subsequently “followed the procedures outlined
[by statute] by explaining the nature and amount of the
debt and giving” Mr. Horton an opportunity “to pay the
debt[] or contest its validity.” SAppx. 2–3. When Mr. Hor-
ton did not respond to these notices, the Treasury “issued
a Wage Garnishment Order that adhered to the limits es-
tablished” by statute. SAppx. 3. Put simply, as the trial
court determined, Mr. Horton has not shown that the gov-
ernment has violated any authority in collecting this debt.
SAppx. 3. Mr. Horton’s illegal exaction claim accordingly
fails as a matter of law and summary judgment denying
this claim was properly granted.
We have considered Mr. Horton’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Federal Claims.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
