Case: 21-1746 Document: 28 Page: 1 Filed: 04/11/2022
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
WILLIAM KOOPMANN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
WILLIAM ROYALL, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2021-1746
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:09-cv-00333-TMD, Judge Thompson M. Dietz.
______________________
Decided: April 11, 2022
______________________
WILLIAM ROYALL, JR., Petaluma, CA, pro se.
JANET A. BRADLEY, Tax Division, United States Depart-
ment of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee.
Also represented by ARTHUR THOMAS CATTERALL, DAVID A.
HUBBERT.
______________________
Case: 21-1746 Document: 28 Page: 2 Filed: 04/11/2022
2 KOOPMANN v. US
Before LOURIE, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant William Royall, Jr. appeals from the decision
of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“the Claims
Court”) dismissing his claims for failure to prosecute under
Rule 41(b) of the Rules of the United States Court of Fed-
eral Claims (“RCFC”). Koopmann v. United States,
151
Fed. Cl. 336 (2020) (“Rule 41(b) Decision”); see also
Koopmann v. United States,
151 Fed. Cl. 805, 807 (2021)
(“Rule 54(b) Decision”); S. Appx. 1 (Judgment). For the rea-
sons explained below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 26, 2009, William Koopmann, a retired United
Airlines pilot, filed a lawsuit in the Claims Court against
the United States seeking a refund of Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (“FICA”) taxes paid relating to retire-
ment benefits. Koopmann’s complaint began by listing doz-
ens of plaintiffs, all of whom were described as “retired
career employees of United Airlines that belong to an
online fraternal group, Retired United Pilots (RETUP), an
online Message Board organization.” See Koopmann v.
United States, No. 09-333 (Fed. Cl. May 26, 2009), Com-
plaint (ECF No. 1). Although the complaint listed other
plaintiffs, however, Koopmann was the only plaintiff who
signed it. It is undisputed that Koopmann is not licensed
to practice law and was not authorized to represent or act
on behalf of any of the other plaintiffs in the action.
On July 27, 2009, the government moved for a more
definite statement and requested that the court strike all
purported plaintiffs other than Koopmann. In response to
that motion, Koopmann obtained and submitted what he
styled “Plaintiff Information” sheets from many of the
plaintiffs. See S. Appx. 5; see also, e.g., S. Appx. 117. Each
Plaintiff Information sheet contained basic contact infor-
mation for the plaintiff, including address, email address,
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KOOPMANN v. US 3
and phone number. See, e.g., S. Appx. 117. Each Plaintiff
Information sheet also included certain limited infor-
mation relevant to the specific plaintiff’s refund claim, in-
cluding the tax year for which the FICA tax claim was filed,
the date and place the refund claim was filed, the amount
claimed, and the IRS claim number.
Id. The Plaintiff In-
formation sheet concluded with the plaintiff’s signature,
immediately below the statement: “I have read the Com-
plaint, Motions and Answers and those are my allega-
tions.”
Id.
Royall was one of the listed plaintiffs in Koopmann’s
complaint. Royall and his wife signed a Plaintiff Infor-
mation sheet on August 14, 2009, and that document was
submitted to the court on September 11, 2009.
Id.
More than a decade later, on April 28, 2020, the Claims
Court ordered the plaintiffs to file a notice verifying their
contact information. Royall did not respond. After the
court held a telephonic status conference with the parties
on May 7, 2020, which Royall did not attend, the court or-
dered the government to file any updated motions for a
more definite statement and ordered the following:
Plaintiffs may collectively submit a Response to
Defendant’s Motion in a single filing provided that
each individual Plaintiff who joins such a Response
must sign at the end of the document with “s/[first
and last name]” or via handwritten signature or a
copy thereof. Any Plaintiff may alternatively sub-
mit an individual Response to Defendant’s Motion.
However, if a Plaintiff fails to submit a Response –
either by joining a collective Response via signa-
ture or by filing an individual Response – they will
waive any right to respond to or oppose Defendant’s
Motion.
S. Appx. 142.
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4 KOOPMANN v. US
There is no indication that Royall responded to the gov-
ernment’s motion, or to any of the court’s orders. By all
accounts, the last time the Claims Court heard from Royall
regarding this case was when his Plaintiff Information
sheet was submitted on September 11, 2009.
On July 16, 2020, the government moved pursuant
RCFC 41(b) to dismiss the claims of forty-six individual
plaintiffs, including Royall, for failure to prosecute their
claims. On December 1, 2020, the Claims Court granted
the government’s motion with respect to eighteen of the
plaintiffs. Rule 41(b) Decision, 151 Fed. Cl. at 336. The
court noted that “[t]his court has tried to reach the eighteen
plaintiffs repeatedly; despite their pro se status, the Non-
Responding Plaintiffs’ failure to respond to this Court’s Or-
ders and comply with Rule 83.1 is sufficient reason to dis-
miss their claims for failure to prosecute.” Id. at 340. The
court concluded that “[t]he Non-Responsive Plaintiffs have
simply failed to prosecute their case in any respect.” Id.
Accordingly, the court dismissed with prejudice the claims
of eighteen plaintiffs, including Royall. Id.
The government then moved under RCFC 54(b) for fi-
nal judgment with respect to the dismissed plaintiffs. On
January 12, 2021, the Claims Court determined that there
was “no just reason to delay final judgment as to the dis-
missed plaintiffs . . . because the claims of the dismissed
parties are readily separable from those of the remaining
plaintiffs.” Rule 54(b) Decision, 151 Fed. Cl. at 807. Thus,
for good cause shown and in the interest of justice, the
court granted the government’s motion and directed the
Clerk of Court to enter separate judgment with respect to
each of the dismissed plaintiffs. Id. at 808. On January
14, 2021, the Claims Court entered judgment that Royall’s
claims are dismissed. S. Appx. 1.
On March 4, 2021, Royall filed a Notice of Appeal from
the Claims Court’s judgment under RCFC 54(b).
S. Appx. 243. Royall enclosed with his Notice of Appeal a
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KOOPMANN v. US 5
copy of a letter that he appears to have sent to Judge Rou-
mel on February 28, 2021 in which he requested that he be
reinstated as a plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit. Royall’s
appeal was docketed in this court on March 17, 2021. We
have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
Under RCFC 41(b), the Claims Court may dismiss a
case “for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of court.” When reviewing a
Claims Court dismissal “pursuant to Rule 41(b), our in-
quiry is whether the court abused its discretion.” Kadin
Corp. v. United States,
782 F.2d 175, 176 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied,
476 U.S. 1171 (1986). We will not disturb the
Claims Court’s exercise of discretion “unless upon a weigh-
ing of relevant factors we are left with ‘a “definite and firm
conviction” that the court below committed a clear error of
judgment.’” Adkins v. United States,
816 F.2d 1580, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire
Stores, Inc.,
750 F.2d 903, 917 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
Construing Royall’s arguments liberally, as we are re-
quired to do for a pro se litigant, see Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), we can discern two general argu-
ments that Royall makes in this appeal. First, Royall ar-
gues that the Claims Court erred in finding that his actions
constituted a failure to prosecute his case because his lapse
in responding to court orders was “inadvertent and unin-
tentional.” See Appellant Informal Br. (Answer 2). And
second, Royall argues that the Claims Court erred by dis-
missing with prejudice and failing to consider the appropri-
ateness of a lesser sanction. See
id. (Answer 4). We are
unpersuaded by either of Royall’s arguments.
The Claims Court provided Royall with multiple oppor-
tunities to retain his status as a plaintiff by demonstrating
his intention to prosecute this case. Royall does not dispute
the fact that he repeatedly failed to respond, and he does
not argue that he was not receiving case-related documents
Case: 21-1746 Document: 28 Page: 6 Filed: 04/11/2022
6 KOOPMANN v. US
during his decade-long silence. Although Royall now ar-
gues that his failures to respond were not deliberate, that
contention was unknown to the Claims Court at the rele-
vant time when it dismissed his claims, and it is irrelevant
to the question whether the Claims Court abused its dis-
cretion. Said differently, we can discern no legal frame-
work under which the Claims Court should be precluded
from dismissing a plaintiff who is inactive for more than a
decade simply because that plaintiff may later claim that
the inactivity was inadvertent.
As for Royall’s argument that dismissal with prejudice
was a disproportionately harsh sanction, the law does not
support that contention. Royall concedes that the Claims
Court has the authority to impose sanctions, including the
authority to dismiss a case. See Appellant Informal Reply
Br. (Page 2). Under the circumstances as they existed in
this case, the Claims Court’s dismissal under RCFC 41(b)
is the prescribed sanction under the Claims Court’s rules
for a plaintiff who repeatedly failed to respond to motions
and court orders, including, ironically, the motions and or-
ders concerning the very question whether his case should
be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thus, the Claims
Court’s decision to dismiss pursuant to RCFC 41(b) was not
an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Claude E. Atkins Enters.,
Inc. v. United States,
899 F.2d 1180, 1183–84 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (affirming dismissal under RCFC 41(b) of a plaintiff
who was warned that its complaint was in danger of dis-
missal but failed to comply with court orders); Kadin, 782
F.2d at 178 (affirming dismissal under RCFC 41(b) of a
plaintiff who “repeatedly and without valid justification ig-
nored both court-imposed deadlines and court rules”).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Royall’s remaining arguments but
we find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the de-
cision of the Claims Court.
AFFIRMED
