Inguran, LLC v. Abs Global, Inc. ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-1385   Document: 44     Page: 1   Filed: 07/05/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    INGURAN, LLC, DBA STGENETICS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    ABS GLOBAL, INC., GENUS PLC,
    Defendants-Appellees
    ______________________
    2022-1385
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Wisconsin in No. 3:20-cv-00085-wmc,
    Judge William M. Conley.
    ______________________
    Decided: July 5, 2023
    ______________________
    Z.W. JULIUS CHEN, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
    LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also
    represented by KRISTEN LOVELAND, PRATIK A. SHAH;
    DANIEL LYNN MOFFETT, San Antonio, TX.
    STEVEN J. HOROWITZ, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL,
    argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by
    STEPHANIE P. KOH, THOMAS D. REIN.
    ______________________
    Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
    Case: 22-1385     Document: 44     Page: 2     Filed: 07/05/2023
    2                            INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.
    REYNA, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant Inguran, LLC appeals the dismissal by the
    Western District of Wisconsin of the induced infringement
    suit it brought against Appellee ABS Global, Inc. The dis-
    trict court found that Inguran’s claim was precluded by res
    judicata based on an earlier judgment the court entered
    against Appellee. On appeal, Inguran challenges the dis-
    trict court’s res judicata finding and the court’s interpreta-
    tion of the scope of its earlier judgment. We reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    The patent at issue, 
    U.S. Patent No. 8,206,987
     (the
    “’987 patent”), titled “Photo-Damage Method for Sorting
    Particles,” is directed to a method for sorting bull sperm
    cells according to a specific DNA characteristic in order to
    preselect the gender of a domestic animal’s offspring. ’987
    patent, col. 19 ll. 40–44. Claim 1 of the ’987 patent recites:
    1. A method of sorting a mixture of stained sperm
    cells having either characteristic A or characteris-
    tic B into at least one population, the method com-
    prising the steps of:
    a. flowing a fluid stream containing stained
    sperm cells through a flow path at a fluid
    delivery rate;
    b. exciting fluorescence emissions from the
    stained sperm cells having characteristic A
    and the stained sperm cells having charac-
    teristic B flowing in the flow path;
    c. detecting the fluorescence emissions
    from the excited sperm cells;
    d. classifying the stained sperm cells as ei-
    ther having characteristic A or having
    characteristic B based upon the fluores-
    cence emissions;
    Case: 22-1385      Document: 44       Page: 3   Filed: 07/05/2023
    INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.                           3
    e. selecting stained sperm cells in the flow
    path based on their classification; and
    f. photo-damaging the selected sperm cells
    to produce an enriched population of sperm
    with respect to either characteristic A or
    characteristic B.
    
    Id.
     at col. 212 l. 57–col. 213 l. 8. Appellant Inguran, LLC
    is the patent holder of the ’987 patent. Inguran, doing busi-
    ness as STGenetics (“ST”), provides bull semen-processing
    services, including to, at one time, Appellee ABS Global,
    Inc. and Appellee’s parent company Genus PLC (“ABS”).
    J.A. 6776–78.
    ABS is a “bull stud.” A bull stud is a specialized busi-
    ness that sells semen drawn from its own bulls that is pack-
    aged in small tubes, or “straws,” for use in artificial
    insemination. J.A. 6777; Appellee’s Br. 4. Artificial insem-
    ination is needed by, for example, dairy farmers and beef
    producers to increase fertility rates of female calves, which
    is profitable for milk production. Appellee’s Br. 4. “Con-
    ventional” bovine straws tend to produce an offspring of
    each sex approximately 50% of the time, since it has ap-
    proximately 50% of each X-chromosome and Y-chromo-
    some-bearing sperm cells. 
    Id.
     ST provides bull studs like
    ABS with “sexed semen straws,” which consist either of
    predominantly male or female sperm cells. J.A. 6777. This
    appeal focuses on “sexed semen straws.”
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The parties have a lengthy litigation history that stems
    from a contractual relationship. J.A. 6777. In 2006, ABS
    and ST entered into a contract for sorting semen. 
    Id.
     The
    parties entered into another related agreement in 2012. 
    Id.
    ABS I
    In 2014, ABS filed an antitrust lawsuit in the Western
    District of Wisconsin, ABS Global Inc. v. Inguran, LLC, No.
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    4                            INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.
    14-cv-503 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (“ABS I”), against ST alleging
    that ST was maintaining a monopoly power for sexed se-
    men processing by its contractual terms and acquisition of
    patents on the technology. J.A. 6777. ST brought counter-
    claims and third-party claims for trade secret misappropri-
    ation, breach of contract, and, relevant here, patent
    infringement. J.A. 6778. ST alleged, in a counterclaim,
    that ABS’s competing GSS System or technology directly
    infringed at least one claim of the ’987 patent. J.A. 6798.
    ABS stipulated to direct infringement of claims 1, 2, and 7
    of the ’987 patent. See J.A. 3, 271, 3439, 6798; Appellant’s
    Br. 3.
    The parties presented to a jury expert testimony as to
    damages. ST’s damages expert based his proposed royalty
    rate by considering many factors, including by conducting
    a hypothetical negotiation based on the framework in Geor-
    gia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 
    318 F. Supp. 1116
     (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“Georgia-Pacific factors”). 1
    J.A. 7227–28. ST’s expert highlighted agreements between
    ABS and prospective licensees to show what royalty rates
    ST would expect to receive in exchange for giving another
    company the right to use its technology to process and sell
    sexed straws. Appellant’s Br. 32; Appellee’s Br. 11; J.A.
    7300. ST’s expert calculated that ABS would charge a
    1    The fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors set out an ana-
    lytical framework for assessing a reasonable royalty and
    for determining the value of the patented technology to
    parties in the marketplace. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
    318 F. Supp. at 1120
    ; see also LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta
    Comput., Inc., 
    694 F.3d 51
    , 60, 60 n.2, 76 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
    Relevant here is factor 6: “[t]he effect of selling the pa-
    tented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the
    licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor
    as a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the
    extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.” Georgia-Pa-
    cific, 
    318 F. Supp. at 1120
    .
    Case: 22-1385      Document: 44       Page: 5   Filed: 07/05/2023
    INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.                           5
    royalty rate of $2.05 per straw. Appellant’s Br. 9–10; Ap-
    pellee’s Br. 11. ST’s expert testified that ABS’s licensing
    plan would open additional lines of revenue for ABS. Ap-
    pellee’s Br. 10. ST’s expert further opined that the parties
    would have agreed in a hypothetical negotiation to a per-
    straw royalty rate of $1.50. Appellant’s Br. 10.
    The jury found that claim 2 of the ’987 patent was in-
    valid and that the remaining claims were infringed. J.A.
    3, 6798. The jury awarded ST a “lump sum for ABS’s past
    infringement in the amount of $750,000, and a per straw
    royalty on future sales of sexed semen straws sold by ABS
    of $1.25.” J.A. 3802.
    The district court provided that:
    Judgment is entered for ABS or Genus’s future in-
    fringement of the ’987 patent, granting ST an on-
    going royalty of One Dollar and Twenty-Five Cents
    ($1.25) per straw of sexed semen sold by ABS that
    was processed with the infringing GSS technology,
    or any technology not more than colorably differ-
    ent, where such sale or processing took place in the
    United States through the remaining life of the
    ’987 patent.
    J.A. 7503. Both parties disputed the scope of the ongoing
    royalty, and the district court issued an order attempting
    to resolve the dispute, stating: “th[e] ongoing royalty covers
    straws sold by ABS that were processed with GSS technol-
    ogy and imported into the United States for sale.” J.A. 5.
    The judgment was appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
    ABS Glob., Inc. v. Inguran, LLC, 
    914 F.3d 1054
     (7th Cir.
    2019). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s va-
    lidity findings for the claims and issued a remand order
    that did not concern judgment of the ongoing royalty of
    ABS I. Appellant’s Br. 12–13.
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    6                            INGURAN, LLC     v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.
    ABS II
    On June 7, 2017, ST filed another patent infringement
    suit against ABS in the Western District of Wisconsin, In-
    guran, LLC v. ABS Global, Inc., No. 17-cv-446 (W.D. Wis.)
    (“ABS II”).
    ABS II was consolidated with the remand proceedings
    in ABS I for trial. Appellee’s Br. 14. During trial, ST
    learned that, in addition to using the GSS System to sort
    semen and produce straws for both itself and others, ABS
    had begun selling and licensing the GSS System to third
    parties and teaching them how to use the technology so
    that those parties could process and produce their own
    sexed straws. Appellant’s Br. 13; J.A. 273–74.
    Addressing remaining issues after trial and the re-
    mand order from the Seventh Circuit in ABS I, the district
    court entered judgment that included an ongoing royalty
    “subject of course to a renewed finding of the [’987] patent’s
    validity,” J.A. 7552, along with supplemental damages for
    sexed semen straws processed by foreign ABS licensees
    and imported for sale in the United States, J.A. 7551–67;
    Appellee’s Br. 14–15.
    ABS III
    On January 29, 2020, ST filed a third suit against ABS
    before the Western District of Wisconsin, Inguran LLC v.
    ABS Global, Inc., No. 20-cv-85 (“ABS III”). J.A. 266–83.
    ST asserted additional patent infringement claims on the
    same ’987 patent and filed two motions to supplement its
    complaint to assert two recently issued patents, U.S. Pa-
    tent Nos. 10,583,439 (the “’439 patent) and 10,689,210 (the
    “’210 patent”). J.A. 2–3. ST asserted, among other claims,
    induced infringement under 
    35 U.S.C. § 271
    (b) based on
    ABS’s selling or licensing GSS machines to third parties.
    J.A. 3.
    ABS filed a motion to dismiss the induced infringement
    claims of the ’987 patent on the grounds that the claims
    Case: 22-1385      Document: 44       Page: 7   Filed: 07/05/2023
    INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.                           7
    were precluded by the judgment in ABS I. J.A. 4. The dis-
    trict court agreed with ABS, finding that ABS I “resolve[d]
    the claims asserted in the original complaint in the ’085
    [ABS III] case,” and dismissed the action. J.A. 2–3. The
    district court also ruled to stay the pending case regarding
    the ’439 patent pending conclusion of the Patent Trial and
    Appeal Board’s inter partes review of that patent. J.A. 3.
    The district court denied ST’s motions to supplement as
    moot and noted that, if ST wanted to add additional in-
    fringement claims concerning the ’210 patent, they must
    seek leave to amend in its patent infringement claims and
    explain “why those claims should proceed at this time in
    light of the stay of the infringement claims under the ’439
    patent.” 
    Id.
    In June 2020, the district court clarified the scope of its
    previous order in a second amended judgment. J.A. 7564–
    67; Reply Br. 9–11; J.A. 7572–78. In December 2021, the
    district court did so again. J.A. 2–10. To that effect, the
    district court stated that “the judgment is reasonably in-
    terpreted to cover straws produced by third parties using
    GSS technology as licensed by ABS” and that “the court
    agrees that Count I of [ABS III] is precluded by the judg-
    ment in ABS I.” J.A. 7. ST appeals both the district court’s
    interpretation of the scope of the ongoing royalty and the
    finding of claim preclusion. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Whether a claim is barred by claim preclusion is a
    question of law that we review de novo. Acumed LLC v.
    Stryker Corp., 
    525 F.3d 1319
    , 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). When
    assessing the general principles of claim preclusion, this
    court applies the law of the regional circuit in which the
    district court sits, here, the Seventh Circuit. SimpleAir,
    Inc. v. Google LLC, 
    884 F.3d 1160
    , 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
    Under Seventh Circuit law, there are three elements to
    claim preclusion: “(1) an identity of the parties or their
    Case: 22-1385     Document: 44      Page: 8     Filed: 07/05/2023
    8                            INGURAN, LLC    v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.
    privies in the first and second lawsuits; (2) an identity of
    the cause of action; and (3) a final judgment on the merits
    in the first suit.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 
    742 F.3d 720
    , 736 (7th Cir. 2014). We apply our own authority and
    precedent when addressing questions of U.S. patentability.
    Superior Indus., LLC v. Thor Glob. Enters. Ltd., 
    700 F.3d 1287
    , 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2012). For example, in the context of
    claim preclusion in a patent case, this court looks to its own
    precedent to resolve “the operative facts involved in a claim
    for patent infringement.” 
    Id.
     Here, we have interpreted
    “same cause of action” to mean “the second claim is based
    on the same set of transactional facts as the first.” Jet, Inc.
    v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 
    223 F.3d 1360
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir.
    2000).
    We review a district court’s interpretation of the scope
    of equitable authority and its orders for abuse of discretion.
    Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 
    517 F.3d 1353
    , 1358–60 (Fed.
    Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit has cautioned against giv-
    ing “[t]oo much deference” to a court’s later interpretation
    where doing so would “create[] the risk that interpretation
    of an order becomes a means to rewrite it.” Grede v.
    FCStone, LLC, 
    746 F.3d 244
    , 257 (7th Cir. 2014).
    DISCUSSION
    On appeal, ST challenges both the district court’s find-
    ing that the ABS I judgment precluded ST’s induced in-
    fringement claims in ABS III, and the district court’s
    interpretation of the scope of its order regarding the ongo-
    ing royalty. We first address the issue of res judicata or
    claim preclusion.
    I
    As noted above, under Seventh Circuit law, there are
    three elements to claim preclusion: “(1) an identity of the
    parties or their privies in the first and second lawsuits; (2)
    an identity of the cause of action; and (3) a final judgment
    on the merits in the first suit.” Adams, 
    742 F.3d at 736
    .
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    INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.                           9
    The parties only dispute one element of the test, element
    two: the “same cause of action.” Appellant’s Br. 19; Appel-
    lee’s Br. 20. There is no dispute that the parties and the
    asserted ’987 patent are the same between ABS I and ABS
    III, or that there was a final judgment on the merits. Ap-
    pellee’s Br. 15; Appellant’s Br. 19–20.
    Under claim preclusion, “a judgment on the merits in a
    prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or
    their privies based on the same cause of action.” Acumed,
    
    525 F.3d at 1323
    . Thus, whether the induced patent in-
    fringement claim asserted in ABS III is precluded by the
    ABS I judgment hinges on whether the same “cause of ac-
    tion” or set of “transactional facts” are at issue. We have
    held that “a cause of action” is based on the transactional
    facts from which it arises. SimpleAir, 
    884 F.3d at 1165
     (“In
    a patent suit, essential transactional facts include both the
    asserted patents and the accused activity.”) (cleaned up).
    ST asserts that the patent infringement claims raised
    in ABS I and III are separate and distinct causes of action
    involving different infringing acts. Appellant’s Br. 19–20.
    According to ST, ABS I focuses on direct infringement
    while ABS III focuses on induced infringement. 
    Id.
     ST ar-
    gues that an action involving direct infringement cannot
    preclude a subsequent action based on induced infringe-
    ment. 
    Id.
     at 21–24. As support, ST highlights the different
    elements needed to prove direct infringement under 
    35 U.S.C. § 271
    (a) from those needed to prove induced in-
    fringement under § 271(b). Id. at 20–21; see also Power In-
    tegrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 
    843 F.3d 1315
    , 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2016). ST argues that it would
    have been premature to bring an induced infringement ac-
    tion against ABS during ABS I because, at that time, ABS
    had not yet begun selling or licensing its GSS technology to
    third parties. Appellant’s Br. 23. ST argues that, even if
    it was “on notice” that ABS planned to license its GSS Sys-
    tem during ABS I, notice of a potentially infringing activity
    cannot form the basis of a justiciable claim. 
    Id.
     at 24–25.
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    10                          INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.
    ABS contends that ST accused the same conduct—its
    licensing program—in both ABS I and ABS III and that the
    transactional facts “are all but identical.” Appellee’s Br.
    17, 21–22. ABS disagrees with ST’s argument that it was
    premature to raise an induced infringement claim in ABS
    I because the entire accused activity in ABS I had not yet
    occurred; ABS had “neither sold a single sexed semen
    straw nor entered into a single fee-for-service contract” by
    the time of trial in ABS I such that the relief sought was
    already prospective in nature. Id. at 22. ABS cites the tes-
    timony from ABS I of its business development director
    who explained the company’s three “business models” for
    selling the GSS technology such that ST and the jury knew
    and understood the “anticipated commercial uses” at that
    time. 2 Id. at 22–23.
    In patent cases, this court applies the general rule that
    res judicata does not bar the assertion of “new rights ac-
    quired during the action which might have been, but which
    were not, litigated.” Gillig v. Nike, Inc., 
    602 F.3d 1354
    ,
    1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v.
    Altai, Inc., 
    126 F.3d 365
    , 370 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also Man-
    ning v. City of Auburn, 
    953 F.2d 1355
    , 1360 (11th Cir.
    1992) (“[F]or res judicata purposes, claims that ‘could have
    been brought’ are claims in existence at the time the origi-
    nal complaint is filed or claims actually asserted by supple-
    mental pleadings or otherwise in the earlier
    action.”). Indeed, claim preclusion requires that the claim
    2  At oral argument, ABS described two main busi-
    ness models: “fee-for-service” and “licensee.” Oral Arg. at
    20:57–22:34. In both models, ABS makes the GSS machine
    and delivers it to the customers configured to the “nature
    of the animal genetics at play.” 
    Id.
     at 21:43–21:46. ABS
    employees operate the machine in the first model while, in
    the second model, the machine is operated by the cus-
    tomer’s employees according to ABS’s operations. 
    Id.
     at
    32:43–33:39.
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    INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.                          11
    either was asserted, or could have been asserted, in the
    prior action. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc.,
    
    672 F.3d 1335
    , 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012). If, for example, the
    claim did not exist at the time of the earlier action, it could
    not have been asserted in that action and is not barred by
    res judicata. 
    Id.
    In view of the foregoing, we first address whether ST
    asserted an induced infringement claim against ABS in
    ABS I. It did not. ST’s reference to § 271(b) in its answer
    was its induced infringement claim against the parent
    company Genus for the actions taken by ABS. We find no
    support in the record that ST asserted or cited induced in-
    fringement against ABS for actions taken by third parties
    as a result of ABS’s activities. J.A. 3270–71; contra Appel-
    lee’s Br. 9–10.
    Next, we address whether ST could have brought an
    induced infringement claim against ABS at the time the
    complaint was filed before the district court. Here, we look
    to whether an induced infringement claim could have been
    raised out of the transactional facts in ABS I. Superior In-
    dus., 
    700 F.3d at 1291
    ; see also Acumed, 
    525 F.3d at
    1323–
    24 (“Under the Restatement approach to claim preclusion,
    a claim is defined by the transactional facts from which it
    arises.”). To be sure, courts have wrestled with how to as-
    sess the portion of the test stating that any claims that
    “could have been raised in a prior action.” See, e.g., Hells
    Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
    403 F.3d 683
    ,
    686 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). For example, some courts will find
    that a claim is precluded by a prior action if it involves the
    same legal theory or cause of action. 
    Id.
     Here, we resolve
    whether a claim “could have been raised” on the basis of
    the same transactional facts. We hold that the induced in-
    fringement claim brought in ABS III is not precluded by
    the direct infringement claim brought in ABS I because the
    claims are not based on the same transactional facts.
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    12                          INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.
    The accused activity and the transactional facts differ
    between the direct infringement claims asserted in ABS I
    and the induced infringement claims raised in ABS III.
    ABS I centered around ABS’s activity for direct infringe-
    ment, while the induced infringement claim of ABS III cen-
    ters around third parties whose direct infringement
    activities are induced by ABS. Appellant’s Br. 21–22.
    Framed differently, the evidence that ST needs to support
    a claim for direct infringement by ABS is different from the
    evidence required to sustain a claim of induced infringe-
    ment by third parties. ST would need additional facts to
    plausibly allege an induced infringement claim—facts that
    largely came to light during discovery in ABS II.
    We agree with ST that an induced infringement claim
    rests on evidence and elements beyond those required by
    direct infringement. Niazi Licensing Corp. v. St. Jude
    Medical S.C., Inc., 
    30 F.4th 1339
    , 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
    (“For induced infringement under 
    35 U.S.C. § 271
    (b), the
    two steps become three. In addition to showing direct in-
    fringement . . . , the patentee must also show that the al-
    leged infringer ‘knowingly induced infringement and
    possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringe-
    ment.’” (quoting Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Sem-
    iconductor Co., 
    909 F.3d 398
     407 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).; see also
    Gammino v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 12-666, 
    2013 WL 6154569
    , at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 22, 2013) (finding that res ju-
    dicata did not bar a direct infringement claim because in-
    duced and indirect infringement claims arise under
    different statutes and comprise different causes of action).
    We recognize that minimal evidence exists in the ABS I
    record that arguably supports an allegation that ABS in-
    duced third parties to infringe ST’s patent. At the time of
    the ABS I trial, ABS had not yet commercially launched its
    GSS System. Appellee’s Br. 7, 9–10; Appellant’s Br. 4–5.
    The evidence established that ABS directly infringed ST’s
    ’987 patent by the sale of sexed straws sold by ABS. Ap-
    pellant’s Br. 5, 31. The only evidence that ABS’s proposed
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    INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.                          13
    business model involved third parties, which is what ST
    refers to as “sublicensing,” was a single “brainstorming” in-
    ternal-facing document. Oral Arg. at 2:32–3:30; Conf. J.A.
    3347; J.A. 4250–51. 3 Even so, we have held that a suit may
    not be barred by claim preclusion, even where the same
    transactional facts are present in both suits, if infringe-
    ment allegations are “temporally limited to acts occurring
    after final judgment was entered in the first suit.” Brain
    Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 
    746 F.3d 1045
    , 1054 (Fed. Cir.
    2014).
    An induced patent infringement claim brought at the
    time of trial in ABS I would have been based on specula-
    tion, in part because the parties stipulated to direct in-
    fringement and the question of inducement was not before
    the jury. Oral Arg. at 25:12–26:48. We agree with ST that
    it could not have asserted an inducement claim during
    ABS I. Accordingly, the district court erred in applying res
    judicata or claim preclusion to ST’s induced infringement
    claim. With that context in mind, we turn to whether the
    district court, in its later interpretation of its ABS I order,
    improperly expanded the scope of the order.
    II
    Subsequent to entering judgment in ABS I, the district
    court clarified that the language in its order covered straws
    sold by ABS that were processed with the GSS technology
    and imported into the United States for sale. J.A. 5. Years
    later, the district court again “conclude[d]” that the judg-
    ment of ABS I “reasonably . . . cover[ed] straws produced
    by third parties using GSS technology as licensed by ABS.”
    3   ST stated at oral argument that it believes ABS be-
    gan sublicensing its GSS technology to third parties at
    some point after the judgment in ABS I was entered. Oral
    Arg. at 11:53–12:17. ABS clarified that the record contains
    evidence of foreign licensing with payments made but no
    known domestic licensing. 
    Id.
     at 13:09–14:11.
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    14                            INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.
    J.A. 7. Thus, the district court found that the ongoing roy-
    alty rate of ABS I reached induced infringement by ABS.
    See Appellant’s Br. 26. The district court’s finding relied
    on its interpretation of its order as well as the testimony of
    ST’s damages expert. J.A. 4–7. On appeal, ST challenges
    the district court’s interpretation and its order in ABS I.
    ST asserts that its expert’s testimony confirms that the
    ongoing royalty in ABS I is limited to ABS’s direct infringe-
    ment of the ’987 patent. Appellant’s Br. 31–33; Oral Arg.
    at 9:37–58, 29:29–31:56. ST argues that the district court’s
    interpretation of its order was given five years after the or-
    der was issued and is “plainly” broader in scope and “incon-
    sistent with the language of the order.” Reply Br. 28 (citing
    Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc., 
    641 F.3d 1368
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS
    Corp., 
    383 F.3d 1312
    , 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). On the other
    hand, ABS cites various portions of ST’s damages expert
    testimony that ABS claims reflect the understanding that
    ABS intended to license the GSS technology, which ABS
    argues was factored into the proposed reasonable royalty
    rate and award in ABS I. Appellee’s Br. 23–24.
    We have admonished district courts for issuing sweep-
    ing injunctions that cover potential infringing activities.
    Aspex, 
    672 F.3d at
    1344 (citing Forest Lab’ys., Inc. v. Ivax
    Pharms., Inc., 
    501 F.3d 1263
    , 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The
    Seventh Circuit has also cautioned that too much deference
    to an issuing court’s much-later interpretation of an order
    “would undermine the ability of parties and non-parties to
    rely on a court order” and “creates the risk” where inter-
    pretation can become a means to “rewrite it after unin-
    tended consequences have given rise to regrets.” Grede,
    
    746 F.3d at 257
    . We conclude that the district court’s sub-
    sequent interpretation or clarification of its initial order es-
    sentially rewrites that order.
    Here, the plain language of the royalty is limited to
    straws. Oral Arg. at 1:02–37. The plain language of the
    Case: 22-1385     Document: 44        Page: 15   Filed: 07/05/2023
    INGURAN, LLC   v. ABS GLOBAL, INC.                          15
    clarifying order first issued by the court is also limited to
    straws. J.A. 5. While “GSS technology” is mentioned
    throughout ABS I, see, e.g., Conf. J.A. 5785; Conf. J.A.
    7673, the scope of ABS’s direct infringement allegations
    cannot reasonably be expanded to cover actions of third-
    party licensees using GSS technology to make their own
    straws.
    In light of the reasons we state above that claim pre-
    clusion does not apply in this case, we hold that the district
    court improperly broadened the scope of the ABS I judg-
    ment to address induced infringement activity. See
    Amado, 
    517 F.3d at 1359
    ; see also Grede, 
    746 F.3d at 257
    .
    We therefore reverse the district court’s interpretation of
    its prior order.
    CONCLUSION
    We hold that ST was not precluded from bringing an
    induced patent infringement claim in ABS III based on the
    judgment in ABS I. We also hold that the district court
    abused its discretion by interpreting its initial order in
    ABS I in a way that expanded that scope of the order.
    Thus, we reverse the district court’s dismissal order with
    respect to claim preclusion.
    REVERSED
    COSTS
    No costs.