Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corporation ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 22-1765   Document: 47     Page: 1   Filed: 08/24/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC,
    Appellant
    v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION,
    Appellee
    KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
    COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
    AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
    PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
    Intervenor
    ______________________
    2022-1765
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2020-
    01512.
    ______________________
    Decided: August 24, 2023
    ______________________
    JOHN C. ALEMANNI, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton
    LLP, Raleigh, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented
    by N. DEAN POWELL, Winston-Salem, NC; ANDREW N.
    SAUL, Atlanta, GA.
    WILLIAM R. PETERSON, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
    Case: 22-1765     Document: 47     Page: 2    Filed: 08/24/2023
    2                        VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    Houston, TX, for appellee. Also represented by JULIE S.
    GOLDEMBERG, Philadelphia, PA; JASON C. WHITE, Chicago,
    IL.
    KEVIN RICHARDS, Office of the Solicitor, United States
    Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for
    intervenor. Also represented by PETER J. AYERS, THOMAS
    W. KRAUSE, FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED, PETER JOHN
    SAWERT.
    ______________________
    Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE and CUNNINGHAM,
    Circuit Judges.
    LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
    Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC (“Volvo Penta”) ap-
    peals from a final written decision of the United States Pa-
    tent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) Patent Trial and
    Appeal Board (“the Board”) holding all claims, claims 1–18,
    of U.S. Patent 9,630,692 unpatentable as obvious. Bruns-
    wick Corp. v. Volvo Penta of the Ams., LLC, IPR2020-
    01512, 
    2022 WL 1153453
     (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2022) (“Deci-
    sion”), J.A. 1–119 (public version), 1285–1309 (confidential
    excerpts). For the reasons articulated below, we vacate
    and remand.
    BACKGROUND
    The ’692 patent, assigned to Volvo Penta, is directed to
    a tractor-type stern drive for a boat. Claim 1 of the ’692
    patent, reproduced below, is representative.
    1. A steerable tractor-type drive for a boat,
    comprising:
    a drive support mountable to a stern of the
    boat;
    a drive housing pivotally attached to the sup-
    port about a steering axis, the drive housing
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    VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.                          3
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    having a vertical drive shaft connected to
    drive a propeller shaft, the propeller shaft ex-
    tending from a forward end of the drive hous-
    ing;
    at least one pulling propeller mounted to the
    propeller shaft,
    wherein the steering axis is offset forward of
    the vertical drive shaft.
    ’692 patent, col. 5 ll. 48–67.
    A stern drive is a type of engine mounted in the hull of
    a boat and connected to a drive unit mounted outside of the
    hull, typically on the stern. 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 19–21. It may also
    be referred to as an “inboard/outboard drive.” 
    Id.
     Alterna-
    tive drive arrangements include inboard drives, where the
    engine and transmission are mounted in the hull with a
    propeller shaft extending through the bottom of the hull,
    and outboard drives, where the engine and propeller drive
    are generally configured as a unit attached to and located
    outside the hull. 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 13–19.
    A tractor-type drive generally relies on one or more for-
    ward, bow-facing propellers that produce a propulsive force
    to pull the boat through the water. 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 26–28. It
    may also be referred to as a “pulling-type” or “forward-fac-
    ing drive.” 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 28–29. A drive may alternatively
    be a pushing-type drive, where the propellers face rear-
    ward relative to the boat and generate a propulsive force
    that pushes the boat through the water. 
    Id.
     col. 1 ll. 22–26.
    In 2015, Volvo Penta launched its commercial embodi-
    ment of the ’692 patent, the Forward Drive. 1 Patent Owner
    1   Like the Board, we refer to the Forward Drive as
    owned by Volvo Penta and the Bravo Four S as owned by
    Brunswick even though each may technically be an offering
    from a related corporate entity. See Decision at *26 n.18.
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    4                        VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    Resp. at 52. This product became extremely successful
    once available, particularly for wakesurfing and other wa-
    ter sports. See, e.g., Decision at *31. The forward-facing
    propellers increased the distance between the propeller
    and swimmers or surfers compared with prior, pulling-type
    stern drive boats. See J.A. 3712. In August 2020, Bruns-
    wick Corp. (“Brunswick”) launched its own drive that also
    embodies the ’692 patent, the Bravo Four S. Patent Owner
    Resp. at 52–53. Brunswick does not dispute that the For-
    ward Drive and Bravo Four S both embody the ’692 patent.
    See, e.g., J.A. 1211 (Oral Hearing Tr.) at 117:20–25.
    The same day that Brunswick launched the Bravo
    Four S, it petitioned for inter partes review of all claims of
    the ’692 patent. Brunswick asserted that the challenged
    claims would have been anticipated or obvious based on
    several references, two of which, Kiekhaefer 2 and Brandt, 3
    are relevant to this appeal. Kiekhaefer is a 1952 patent
    assigned to Brunswick and directed to an outboard motor
    that could have either rear-facing or forward-facing propel-
    lers. See, e.g., Kiekhaefer, Figs. 1 and 2. Brandt is a 1989
    patent assigned to Volvo Penta and directed to a stern
    drive with rear-facing propellers. 4 See, e.g., Brandt, Fig. 1,
    col. 2 ll. 59–60.
    Volvo Penta did not assert that the references in com-
    bination failed to disclose all the claim elements. Rather,
    Volvo Penta argued that a person of ordinary skill in the
    art would not have been motivated to combine the
    2   U.S. Patent 2,616,387 issued November 4, 1952 to
    Kiekhaefer (“Kiekhaefer”).
    3   U.S. Patent 4,840,136 issued June 10, 1989 to
    Brandt (“Brandt”).
    4   Similarly, we refer to Brandt as assigned to Volvo
    Penta and Kiekhaefer as assigned to Brunswick even
    though each may technically be assigned to a related cor-
    porate entity.
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    VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.                         5
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    references with a reasonable expectation of success and
    that the objective indicia of nonobviousness overcame any
    prima facie case of obviousness. Volvo Penta offered evi-
    dence of six objective indicia: copying, industry praise, com-
    mercial success, skepticism, failure of others, and long-felt
    but unsolved need. It also argued that it was entitled to a
    presumption of nexus between the objective indicia and the
    claimed invention, and, even if there was no presumption,
    that there was still nexus.
    The Board first found that Kiekhaefer did not antici-
    pate any challenged claim of the ’692 patent because it
    “only discloses improvements involving outboard propul-
    sion systems” yet the “the independent claims [of the ’692
    patent] are limited to improvements involving stern drives,
    and do not encompass, for example, improvements involv-
    ing outboard propulsion systems.” Decision at *10. How-
    ever, the Board held that it would have been obvious to
    redesign the stern drive of Brandt in light of the outboard
    motor of Kiekhaefer to arrive at the challenged claims. In
    finding a motivation to combine, the Board relied largely
    on (1) a sentence in Kiekhaefer, and (2) testimony of a
    Volvo Penta employee, Mr. Andrew Sweet. Namely, the
    Board relied on an express teaching in Kiekhaefer that
    changing to a forward-facing propeller arrangement is one
    way to provide a system that is “more efficient and capable
    of higher speeds.” Id. at *17 (quoting Kiekhaefer, col. 1 ll.
    10–13). It also relied on Mr. Sweet’s testimony that he
    knew that “the teachings of Kiekhaefer as to outboard mo-
    tors—including the benefits of increased speed and effi-
    ciency—would have been understood to apply even to stern
    drives, as in Brandt,” in addition to testimony from Bruns-
    wick’s expert witness. Id. at *19.
    After finding a motivation to combine, the Board next
    considered Volvo Penta’s arguments on secondary consid-
    erations. The Board first found that Volvo Penta was not
    entitled to a presumption of nexus because, even though
    the Forward Drive and Bravo Four S indisputably
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    6                       VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    embodied the claimed invention, Volvo Penta did not make
    sufficient arguments on coextensiveness. Decision at *26–
    27. It further held that record evidence showed that the
    Forward Drive is not coextensive with the claims, citing
    statements made by Volvo Penta in marketing materials
    “that the Forward Drive ‘includes several patented fea-
    tures that make the drive stand out,’ such as exhaust-re-
    lated features, which are not claimed in the ’692 patent.”
    Id. at *26 (quoting J.A. 1735). The Board then found that,
    regardless of the presumption, Volvo Penta did not other-
    wise show nexus because it failed to identify the “unique
    characteristics” or “merits” of the claimed invention. Id. at
    *28.
    Despite finding a lack of nexus, the Board went on to
    alternatively consider Volvo Penta’s evidence of objective
    indicia. It assigned copying, industry praise, and commer-
    cial success “some weight,” id. at *30–32, and assigned
    skepticism, failure of others, and long-felt but unsolved
    need “very little weight,” id. at *33–34. It found that “Pa-
    tent Owner’s objective evidence weighs somewhat in favor
    of nonobviousness.” Id. at *34.
    The Board ultimately found that, even if there was a
    nexus, Brunswick’s “strong evidence of obviousness out-
    weighs [Volvo Penta’s] objective evidence of nonobvious-
    ness.” Id. at *34. It therefore concluded that Brunswick
    had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
    claims 1–18 would have been obvious over Brandt and
    Kiekhaefer.
    Volvo Penta appealed to this court. Following the com-
    pletion of briefing on appeal, the petitioner, Brunswick,
    settled its dispute with patent owner Volvo Penta, in-
    formed us that it no longer opposed the appeal, and waived
    its oral argument time. ECF 33. The USPTO intervened.
    ECF 35. It participated in oral argument, defending the
    decision of the Board by largely adopting the arguments
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    VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.                         7
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    raised by the original appellee, Brunswick, rather than
    submitting new briefs. Id.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(4)(A).
    DISCUSSION
    Volvo Penta raises three main arguments on appeal:
    (1) that the Board’s finding of motivation to combine was
    not supported by substantial evidence, (2) that the Board
    erred in its determination that there was no nexus, and (3)
    that the Board erred in its consideration of Volvo Penta’s
    objective evidence of secondary considerations of nonobvi-
    ousness. We address each of these in turn.
    I. Motivation to Combine
    The ultimate conclusion of obviousness is a legal deter-
    mination based on underlying factual findings, including
    whether or not a relevant artisan would have had a moti-
    vation to combine references in the way required to achieve
    the claimed invention. Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster
    LLC, 
    938 F.3d 1324
    , 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Wyers v.
    Master Lock Co., 
    616 F.3d 1231
    , 1238–39 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
    We review the Board’s obviousness determination de novo,
    but its factual findings for substantial evidence. E.g.,
    Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 
    942 F.3d 1343
    ,
    1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Substantial evidence exists when,
    reviewing the record as a whole, “a reasonable fact finder
    could have arrived at” the finding on review. In re Gart-
    side, 
    203 F.3d 1305
    , 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
    Volvo Penta first argues that the Board ignored a num-
    ber of assertions in its favor: (1) that Brunswick, despite
    having knowledge of Kiekhaefer for decades, never at-
    tempted the proposed modification itself; (2) that Bruns-
    wick’s proposed modification would have entailed a nearly
    total and exceedingly complex redesign of the drive system;
    (3) the complexity of and difficulty in shifting the vertical
    drive shaft of Kiekhaefer; and (4) that Brunswick itself
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    8                       VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    attempted to make its proposed modification yet failed to
    create a functional drive.
    We disagree on all points. The Board considered and
    evaluated each of these assertions in view of the record ev-
    idence. For example, the Board acknowledged the testi-
    mony of Volvo Penta’s expert that a “complete redesign of
    Brandt” would be necessary, including “over two dozen
    modifications,” Decision at *21, but ultimately found that
    not all of the identified changes would have been required
    to arrive at the claimed invention and/or they would have
    been “minor,” id. at *22. The Board likewise considered the
    prototype drive created by Brunswick and acknowledged
    evidence both in favor of and contrary to its alleged success.
    Id. at *24. That the Board ultimately did not rely on this
    “proof of concept” drive as support for its motivation to com-
    bine finding, id., does not mean that they did not consider
    it.
    Volvo Penta also argues that the Board’s reliance on
    Kiekhaefer for motivation to combine is misplaced.
    Kiekhaefer states that a “tractor-type propeller” is “more
    efficient and capable of higher speeds.” Kiekhaefer, col. 1
    ll. 10–13. The Board found that this statement would have
    motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify
    Brandt’s pushing-type stern drive to be a pulling-type stern
    drive. Decision at *17. Volvo Penta argues that (1) there
    are other ways to provide higher speeds and greater effi-
    ciency, (2) speed is not the metric by which most recrea-
    tional boats are measured and wakesurfing boats, for
    instance, travel at low speeds, (3) greater speed and effi-
    ciency is too generic to be a motivation, (4) Kiekhaefer’s
    statement only related to outboard propulsion systems for
    racing boats, and (5) the Board erred in relying on the tes-
    timony of Mr. Sweet to determine the applicability of
    Kiekhaefer’s teachings.
    It is not decisive here whether or not there are other
    ways to improve speed and efficiency. Regardless whether
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    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    or not that is true, that does not mean improved speed and
    efficiency cannot provide a motivation for the method of us-
    ing a tractor-type drive. It is likewise not conclusive that
    speed may not be the primary or only metric by which rec-
    reational boats are measured. Substantial evidence sup-
    ports a finding that speed is at least a consideration. Nor
    was the Board’s found motivation too generic. As we have
    found, a broadly applicable motivation may be sufficient as
    long as it is supported by more than conclusory expert tes-
    timony. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 
    21 F.4th 784
    ,
    797 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, the prospect of increased speed
    and efficiency has the support of an express statement in
    one of the asserted prior art references. Further, the Board
    did not rely on improved speed or improved efficiency alone
    as a motivation to combine, but rather improved speed and
    improved efficiency together. See Decision at *18. The rec-
    ord supports that increased speed and greater efficiency
    may have provided a motivation to modify a boat drive sys-
    tem. Finally, Volvo Penta forfeited the argument that
    Kiekhaefer’s statement only related to racing boats, and
    not recreational sport boats, by not making it before the
    Board. See Appellee Br. at 25–26.
    In determining that Kiekhaefer’s teachings would have
    been relevant to more than outboard propulsion systems as
    part of its obviousness analysis, the Board relied in part on
    the testimony of Andrew Sweet, a Volvo Penta employee.
    See 
    id.
     at *18–19. Mr. Sweet testified that Volvo Penta
    knew from the products that they had on the market “that
    putting the propell[e]rs on the front of the stern drive cre-
    ated quite a bit of efficiency” because there would be “noth-
    ing to block the flow of water to the propell[e]rs.” J.A. 1813
    (Sweet Depo. Tr.), 43:3–9. But, as the Board found, Mr.
    Sweet was “not a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Deci-
    sion at *19. Rather, his testimony indicated the nonpublic,
    corporate knowledge of Volvo Penta. Id. at *19 (viewing
    “his statements—as to what ‘we’ knew with regard to cre-
    ating efficiency in stern drives—as indicating more than
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    10                      VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    merely his personal knowledge on the issue”). It was there-
    fore an error for the Board to rely on Mr. Sweet’s testimony
    for the knowledge of a skilled artisan. See Graham v. John
    Deere Co., 
    383 U.S. 1
    , 3 (1966) (stating that the obviousness
    inquiry is with respect to the knowledge of a person having
    ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention).
    Nonetheless, the Board’s reliance on Mr. Sweet’s testi-
    mony does not deprive the Board’s finding of motivation to
    combine as being supported by substantial evidence. Sub-
    stantial evidence exists when a reasonable fact finder could
    have reached the same conclusion when considering the
    record as a whole. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
    
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938) (“Substantial evidence is more
    than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as
    a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.”). The Board also relied on other evidence to
    demonstrate that a skilled artisan would have understood
    Kiekhaefer’s teachings to have broader applications, such
    as the testimony of Brunswick’s expert witness, Decision at
    *17–18, and Volvo Penta’s lack of dispute that Kiekhaefer
    was “reasonably pertinent” to the claimed invention, 
    id.
     at
    *17 (citing Pet. at 47; Pet. Reply at 7). The Board’s finding
    of a motivation to combine is therefore supported by sub-
    stantial evidence.
    II. Nexus
    For objective evidence of secondary considerations to be
    relevant, there must be a nexus between the merits of the
    claimed invention and the objective evidence. See In re
    GPAC, 
    57 F.3d 1573
    , 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A showing of
    nexus can be made in two ways: (1) via a presumption of
    nexus, or (2) via a showing that the evidence is a direct re-
    sult of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.
    A patent owner is entitled to a presumption of nexus
    when it shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied
    to a specific product that “embodies the claimed features,
    and is coextensive with them.” Brown & Williamson
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    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
    229 F.3d 1120
    , 1130
    (Fed. Cir. 2000). When a nexus is presumed, “the burden
    shifts to the party asserting obviousness to present evi-
    dence to rebut the presumed nexus.” Id.; see also Yita LLC
    v. MacNeil IP LLC, 
    69 F.4th 1356
    , 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
    The inclusion of noncritical features does not defeat a find-
    ing of a presumption of nexus. See, e.g., PPC Broadband,
    Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 
    815 F.3d 734
    ,
    747 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that a nexus may exist “even
    when the product has additional, unclaimed features”).
    However, even absent a presumption of nexus, “the pa-
    tent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus
    by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations
    is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the
    claimed invention.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 
    944 F.3d 1366
    , 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Huang,
    
    100 F.3d 135
    , 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
    Volvo Penta challenges both the Board’s finding that it
    was not entitled to a presumption of nexus and that it did
    not otherwise independently show nexus. We address each
    below.
    A
    A presumption of nexus requires both that the product
    embodies the invention and is coextensive with it. Brown
    & Williamson, 
    229 F.3d at 1130
    . Neither party disputes
    that both the Forward Drive and the Bravo Four S embody
    the claimed invention. See, e.g., J.A. 1211, 117:10–25. But
    coextensiveness is a separate requirement. Fox Factory,
    944 F.3d at 1374.
    Volvo Penta, as Brunswick and the Board note, did not
    provide sufficient argument on coextensiveness in its Pa-
    tent Owner Response. See Decision at *19. Its argument
    for the Forward Drive amounts to a single sentence with a
    citation to its expert’s declaration: “Volvo Penta’s Forward
    Drive is a commercial embodiment of the ’692 Patent and
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    12                     VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    coextensive with the claims. Ex. 2027, ¶ 51.” Patent
    Owner Resp. at 52. The declaration paragraph cited does
    little more than confirm that the Forward Drive embodies
    the challenged claims. J.A. 4040. The Board correctly
    found the single, conclusory sentence and one-paragraph
    citation to be insufficient to show a presumption of nexus,
    and “[t]he patentee bears the burden of showing that a
    nexus exists.” Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373 (quoting WMS
    Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 
    184 F.3d 1339
    , 1359 (Fed.
    Cir. 1999)).
    Volvo Penta’s arguments regarding the alleged coex-
    tensiveness of the Bravo Four S were equally insufficient.
    As with the Forward Drive, Volvo Penta only included one
    sentence of argument in its Patent Owner Response: “The
    Bravo Four S also embodies the claimed features of the ’692
    Patent and is coextensive with them. Ex. 2027, ¶ 119–120.”
    Patent Owner Resp. 52–53. The two cited paragraphs of
    its expert declaration likewise only demonstrate that the
    Bravo Four S embodies the challenged claims and do not
    address coextensiveness. J.A. 5086–87. As the Board
    found, that is insufficient to show a presumption of nexus
    for the Bravo Four S. Decision at *27.
    B
    Our inquiry does not end there, however. We may also
    consider whether the patent owner proved a nexus inde-
    pendently of a presumption. Volvo Penta’s arguments that
    its evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness
    is the direct result of the unique characteristics of the
    claimed invention is likewise brief, but carries more sub-
    stance. In its Patent Owner Response, Volvo Penta argued
    that “Brunswick recognized that the success of Volvo
    Penta’s Forward Drive was tied directly to the claimed fea-
    tures, namely a steerable tractor-type drive as recited in
    each of the challenged claims,” citing internal Brunswick
    documents in support. Patent Owner Resp. at 53 (citing
    J.A. 4521–23). As the Board found, these documents
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    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    “clearly reference[] the Forward Drive that Patent Owner
    argues—and Petitioner does not dispute—practices the
    claims of the ’692 patent” and “discuss[] the objective of de-
    livering a ‘comparable forward facing stern drive’ with ‘ca-
    pabilities that match the Volvo Penta Forward Drive.’”
    Decision at *28; Conf. J.A. 1292. However, the Board crit-
    icized Volvo Penta for “not actually identify[ing] the
    ‘unique characteristics’ of the claimed combination” or the
    “‘merits of the claimed invention’” that were tied to the ob-
    jective evidence. Decision at *28 (quoting In re Huang, 
    100 F.3d at 140
    ). For this reason, it found that Volvo Penta had
    not shown a nexus between its objective evidence of second-
    ary considerations and the claimed invention. 
    Id.
    That finding was not supported by substantial evi-
    dence. It ignores the crux of Volvo Penta’s argument and
    its evidence cited in support. Volvo Penta expressly argued
    that the “steerable tractor-type drive as recited in each of
    the challenged claims” was shown to drive the success of
    the Forward Drive. Patent Owner Resp. at 53. The docu-
    ments cited in its Response further demonstrate the con-
    nection between these claim elements and the objective
    evidence of nonobviousness. For example, the cited Bruns-
    wick documents state the need for a “comparable forward
    facing sterndrive” with “capabilities that match the Volvo
    Penta Forward Drive,” going on to recite unique character-
    istics that made “a forward-facing drive [] valuable in
    wake-surfing.” Conf. J.A. 4521–22; ECF 46. To the extent
    that there was any confusion over the characteristics and
    capabilities Volvo Penta was pointing to, it clarified in its
    Sur-Reply, arguing that “[t]he inventive combination of
    propeller arrangement and steering axis location provided
    certain benefits praised in the industry and not achieved
    by drives in the prior art.” Patent Owner Sur-Reply at 23.
    Indeed, the undisputed evidence, as the Board found,
    shows that boat manufacturers strongly desired Volvo
    Penta’s Forward Drive and were urging Brunswick to bring
    a forward drive to market. Conf. J.A. 1300; ECF 46. The
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    Board went on to find that Brunswick’s development of the
    Bravo Four S was “akin to ‘copying,’” and that its “own in-
    ternal documents indicate that the Forward Drive product
    guided [Brunswick] to design the Bravo Four S in the first
    place.” Conf. J.A. 1297. There is therefore a nexus between
    the unique features of the claimed invention, a tractor-type
    stern drive, and the evidence of secondary considerations.
    At oral argument, counsel for the USPTO argued that
    to the extent Volvo Penta identified these claim elements
    as unique characteristics of the claimed invention, they al-
    ready existed in the prior art. Oral Arg. at 18:55–20:43
    (available at https://cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argu-
    ment/listen-to-oral-arguments/). But the Board did not
    rely on this argument in reaching its decision. See gener-
    ally Decision at *26–28. We therefore cannot adopt it as a
    basis to affirm. “The Board’s judgment must be reviewed
    on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied,” and
    “[a]lternative grounds supporting the Board’s decision gen-
    erally are not considered.” In re Applied Materials, Inc.,
    
    692 F.3d 1289
    , 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Further, as the Board
    found and we have previously articulated, a nexus analysis
    need not be limited to a discussion of only novel features.
    Decision at *27–28 (citing WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 
    829 F.3d 1317
    , 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that “proof of
    nexus is not limited to only when objective evidence is tied
    to the supposedly ‘new’ feature(s)”)). It is instead im-
    portant to consider “the invention as a whole,” rather than
    on a “limitation-by-limitation” basis. Chemours Co. FC,
    LLC v. Daikin Indus., Ltd., 
    4 F.4th 1370
    , 1377 (Fed. Cir.
    2021); see also Yita, 69 F.4th at 1364 (discussing WBIP).
    The Board’s finding of a lack of nexus is therefore not
    supported by substantial evidence. We hold that Volvo
    Penta demonstrated a nexus between the claims and its ev-
    idence of secondary considerations.
    Case: 22-1765    Document: 47      Page: 15    Filed: 08/24/2023
    VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.                        15
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    III. Objective Indicia
    Objective evidence of nonobviousness includes: (1) com-
    mercial success, (2) copying, (3) industry praise, (4) skepti-
    cism, (5) long-felt but unsolved need, and (6) failure of
    others. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling,
    Inc. v. Maersk Drilling U.S., Inc., 
    699 F.3d 1340
    , 1349–56
    (Fed. Cir. 2012). The weight to be given to evidence of sec-
    ondary considerations involves factual determinations,
    which we review only for substantial evidence. In re Cou-
    varas, 
    70 F.4th 1374
    , 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
    Volvo Penta argues that the Board failed to conduct a
    reasoned, collective weighing of its evidence of secondary
    considerations, assigning only vague weights (i.e., “some
    weight” and “very little weight”) to the various factors and
    failing to explain its overall summation. It argues that the
    Board, in its analysis, improperly shifted the burden to
    Volvo Penta, forcing it to show that the claims would not
    have been obvious, rather than considering the evidence of
    secondary considerations as part of the totality of the rec-
    ord. Even were the Board’s assignment of weight to vari-
    ous factors and its overall summation not overly vague,
    Volvo Penta further argues that they are not supported by
    substantial evidence.
    We agree with Volvo Penta that the Board’s analysis of
    objective indicia of nonobviousness, including its assign-
    ments of weight to different considerations, was overly
    vague and ambiguous. A closer look at the individual fac-
    tors highlights the problem.
    For example, when considering the evidence of copying,
    the Board concluded that “the record here shows some evi-
    dence supporting a finding of copying” and that Bruns-
    wick’s investigation into the Forward Drive for developing
    its own product “was more akin to ‘copying’ than to a mere
    assessment of a competitor’s product.” Decision at *29–30.
    It further found that Brunswick’s “own internal documents
    indicate that the Forward Drive Product guided Petitioner
    Case: 22-1765    Document: 47      Page: 16    Filed: 08/24/2023
    16                      VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    to design the Bravo Four S in the first place.” Conf. J.A.
    1297. Although the Board found the Brunswick internal
    documents more persuasive than the similarities between
    the two products, it still found similarities “as supporting”
    and did not identify any evidence that detracted from its
    finding of copying. See Decision at *29–31. It is unclear
    why, despite finding copying, the Board only afforded this
    factor “some weight.” Id. at *30.
    Further, although copying is not alone dispositive of
    nonobviousness, we have usually considered a determina-
    tion of copying to be “strong evidence of nonobviousness.”
    Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 
    774 F.2d 1082
    , 1099
    (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other
    grounds, 
    475 U.S. 809
     (1986) (“That Dennison, a large cor-
    poration with many engineers on its staff, did not copy any
    prior art device, but found it necessary to copy the cable tie
    of the claims in suit, is equally strong evidence of nonobvi-
    ousness.”). Indeed, we have found that “[o]bjective consid-
    erations such as failure by others to solve the problem and
    copying may often be the most probative and cogent evi-
    dence of nonobviousness.” Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent
    State Univ., 
    212 F.3d 1272
    , 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (cleaned
    up); see also Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 
    782 F.2d 995
    , 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
    477 U.S. 905
     (1986)
    (reasoning that “copying the claimed invention, rather
    than one in the public domain, is indicative of non-obvious-
    ness”). In light of the Board’s own findings that copying
    occurred, its assignment of only “some weight” was not sup-
    ported by substantial evidence.
    Similarly to copying, the Board found no evidence de-
    tracting from its finding of commercial success. Bruns-
    wick’s only arguments against commercial success of the
    Forward Drive were related to nexus. Decision at *31. As
    the Board found, Brunswick either admitted or did not con-
    test that “the Forward Drive essentially created a new
    market for stern drives,” “sales of the ‘Forward Drive have
    increased significantly since its launch in 2015,’” and “more
    Case: 22-1765    Document: 47      Page: 17    Filed: 08/24/2023
    VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.                        17
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    and more boat builders are offering the Volvo Penta For-
    ward Drive as original equipment, including boats specifi-
    cally designed to incorporate the Forward Drive.” 
    Id.
     The
    Board further found that the record supported, and Bruns-
    wick did not contest, that boat manufacturers strongly de-
    sired Volvo Penta’s Forward Drive and were urging
    Brunswick to bring a forward drive to market. Conf. J.A.
    1300; ECF 46. Despite these findings and Brunswick’s lack
    of arguments to the contrary (at least for the Forward
    Drive), the Board only afforded this factor “some weight.”
    Decision at *31. This finding was not supported by sub-
    stantial evidence.
    Meanwhile, regarding industry praise, the Board found
    that although the exhibits “provide praise for the Forward
    Drive more generally, including mentioning its forward-
    facing propellers, as claimed in the ’692 patent,” it also
    found that “many of the statements of alleged praise spe-
    cifically discuss unclaimed features, such as adjustable
    trim and exhaust-related features.” Id. at *32. Yet the
    Board assigned industry praise, commercial success, and
    copying all “some weight.” Id. at *30–32. The Board did
    not explain why it gave these three factors the same
    weight, or even whether or not that constituted precisely
    the same weight. Although “some weight” may not always
    be ambiguous, it is in this context. The Board therefore
    failed to sufficiently explain and support its conclusions.
    See, e.g., Pers. Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 
    848 F.3d 987
    ,
    993 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (remanding in view of the Board’s fail-
    ure to “sufficiently explain and support [its] conclusions”);
    In re Nuvasive, Inc., 
    842 F.3d 1376
    , 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
    (same).
    We also determine that the Board failed to properly
    evaluate long-felt but unresolved need. In evaluating the
    evidence presented by Volvo Penta, the Board dismissed it
    as merely describing the benefits of the product without in-
    dicating a long-felt problem that others had failed to solve.
    Decision at *33. This understanding of the cited evidence
    Case: 22-1765    Document: 47      Page: 18     Filed: 08/24/2023
    18                       VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    was not supported by substantial evidence. Volvo Penta
    cites an article in a 2015 issue of Boating World magazine,
    J.A. 3711–13, which describes Volvo Penta’s Forward Drive
    as “radical,” “game-changing,” and as starting a “revolu-
    tion.” The Board, without explanation, gave those com-
    ments very little weight. But more concerningly, it ignores
    other portions of the article. In addition to those laudatory
    comments, the article also explains that “[e]ver since the
    first surfer discovered he could hang 10 behind a boat’s
    wake, back in the 1950s, people have been trying to figure
    out a way to do it better…and safer.” J.A. 3712. It further
    explains that although “inboard V-drive manufacturers—
    their props tucked safely under the hull—enjoyed serving
    [the wakesurfing] market[,] sterndrive manufacturers
    couldn’t.” 
    Id.
     That indisputably identifies a long-felt need:
    safe wakesurfing on stern-drive boats. Although the article
    notes that another manufacturer attempted to make
    wakesurfing possible on sterndrive boats by creating a
    platform extension, it explains that it was Volvo Penta’s
    Forward Drive that revolutionized the industry with its
    “game-changing propulsion system.” 
    Id.
     That article
    therefore identifies more than mere benefits of the Forward
    Drive.
    Volvo Penta additionally cited an article in a 2015 issue
    of Volvo Group Magazine, J.A. 1734–36. Although that ar-
    ticle is marketing material originating from Volvo Penta
    itself, it is still informative. That article, like the Boating
    Magazine article, does not simply tout benefits of the For-
    ward Drive; it also describes the decade-long need for a safe
    sterndrive boat as the popularity of watersports grew. It
    explains that Volvo Penta had not previously developed a
    forward-facing sterndrive ten years prior “due to the lack
    of a strong market case to build it.” 
    Id.
     However, the arti-
    cle goes on to explain that “[f]or the past decade, growth in
    the US leisure motorboat market has been dominated by
    pricey inboard tow-boats and ski boats speciali[z]ed for wa-
    tersports,” but that the new “forward-facing sterndrive
    Case: 22-1765    Document: 47      Page: 19    Filed: 08/24/2023
    VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.                        19
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    allows Volvo Penta to compete in the water sports market.”
    
    Id.
     That there was an earlier time when there was not a
    market demand for a forward-facing stern drive does not
    completely negate the decade when there was a demand for
    a forward-facing stern drive.
    The Board also inexplicably dismisses the relevance of
    the time since the issuance of the asserted prior art refer-
    ences, Brandt and Kiekhaefer. Although we agree with the
    Board that “the mere passage of time from dates of the
    prior art to the challenged patents” does not indicate non-
    obviousness, Decision at *34, their age can be relevant to
    long-felt unresolved need. See Leo Pharm. Prods., 
    726 F.3d 1346
    , 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The length of the intervening
    time between the publication dates of the prior art and the
    claimed invention can also qualify as an objective indicator
    of nonobviousness.”); cf. Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 
    812 F.3d 1326
    , 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled on other grounds by
    Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 
    872 F.3d 1290
     (Fed. Cir. 2017).
    As the Board noted, other factors, such as “lack of market
    demand” can explain why a product was not developed for
    years, even decades after the prior art. Decision at *34.
    But when, as here, evidence demonstrates that there was
    a market demand for at least the prior decade, the fact that
    Brunswick itself owned one of the asserted references for
    almost fifty years yet did not develop the claimed invention
    should not be overlooked. Even if the market demand only
    existed for ten of those fifty years, it is certainly relevant
    that the asserted patents were long in existence and not
    obscure, but rather owned by the parties in this case.
    Finally, we address the Board’s ultimate conclusion
    that “Patent Owner’s objective evidence weighs somewhat
    in favor of nonobviousness” but that Brunswick’s “strong
    evidence of obviousness outweighs Patent Owner’s objec-
    tive evidence of nonobviousness.” Decision at *34. The
    Board fails to provide any explanation for that conclusion.
    Even if its assignment of weight to each individual factor
    was supported by substantial evidence (“some weight” for
    Case: 22-1765    Document: 47      Page: 20     Filed: 08/24/2023
    20                       VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION
    copying, industry praise, and commercial success; and
    “very little weight” for skepticism, failure of others, and
    long-felt but unsolved need), it stands to reason that these
    individual weights would sum to a greater weight. The
    Board does not discuss the summation of the factors at all
    other than to say, without explanation, that they collec-
    tively “weigh[] somewhat in favor of nonobviousness.” 
    Id.
    That is not sufficient to sustain its determination. See, e.g.,
    Pers. Web, 
    848 F.3d at 993
    ; In re Nuvasive, Inc., 
    842 F.3d at 1385
    .
    For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the
    Board failed to properly consider the evidence of objective
    indicia of nonobviousness. We therefore vacate and re-
    mand for further consideration consistent with this opin-
    ion. The Board should make additional findings as needed,
    considering the totality of the evidence of obviousness, in-
    cluding the teachings of the combined references in rela-
    tion to secondary considerations. Brown & Williamson,
    
    229 F.3d at 1124
     (“The ultimate determination of whether
    an invention would have been obvious is a legal conclusion
    based on the totality of the evidence.”).
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered both parties’ remaining arguments
    but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the
    decision of the Board is vacated and remanded.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    COSTS
    No costs.